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'IRAQ, 1900 TO 1950

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'IRAQ, 1900 TO 1950

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A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

BY

STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG

Ay me! ay me! with what another heart
In days far-off, and with what other eyes
I used to watch—if I be he that watch'd—
The lucid outline forming round thee . . . .

TENNYSON: *Tithonus*

Issued under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
1953

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OOO *Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4*

GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI CAPE TOWN IBADAN

Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD

BY CHARLES BATEY, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

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PREFACE

MORE than a quarter of a century has passed since, a young official of the 'Iraq Government, I published an account of the four centuries of that country's history ending in 1900. That tentative and imperfect work has not, to my knowledge, been superseded; and as it seems now to call for a continuation into more recent times I have tried in the volume now offered to carry out this task. My own connexion with the territory, which has been continuous since 1915, has included some sixteen years of residence there followed by annual or more than annual visits, and has been favoured by the friendship of many scores of 'Iraqis at all levels, including perhaps two-thirds of those mentioned in these pages.

The interest which 'Iraq offered formerly to the world—that of history, archaeology, strategy, economics, and social structure—has grown not less but greater during the last generation. Apart from the personal and affectionate interest felt by many friends of the 'Iraqis, the circumstances of the foundation of their nation, its era of tutelage and emancipation, its varying fortunes as an independent State, its social and cultural development as illustrating the familiar but uneasy impact of West on East, its revelation of national character, its share in Arab politics and in world groupings, its material development, its possible future: all these should contribute to a story well worth the telling, if it can be rightly told. At the same time I, and probably some readers, must regret the absence from these pages of many or most of the figures—tribal or village chiefs, town 'notables' and professional men, the humble as well as the eminent in officialdom and the general public—so long and so well known to residents in 'Iraq in this or that part of a wide, varied, and deeply interesting country. It is indeed regrettable that so little of this element of social life, enriched by many picturesque, responsive, and often eminent personalities of the country, will appear in this history; indeed much of the best that 'Iraq has to offer in courtesy, humour, and kindliness must be here unrecorded.

The need for a general account of the last half-century in 'Iraq has not hitherto been met. There are diplomatic papers, military histories and dispatches, travellers' tales, 'Iraqi political writings and a voluminous press, biographies of the eminent, and a few scholars' and specialists' monographs: but there seems to be no single work attempting to be both as comprehensive and as reliable as the variety and the too close proximity of the events will permit. I have hoped to be of use in helping both the contemporary reader

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000 and the future historian in the formation of just judgements and the avoidance of factual errors, by giving them access to an objective version of what 'Iraq has done and suffered, received and contributed, during these fifty years.

The decision which I made in 1925, to close my narrative of *Four Centuries* at 1900, was wise in its avoidance of the need to refer to actors on the 'Iraqi stage who were still living and in many cases my friends. I am not this time able to avoid the dangers of such references, and I anticipate the pained surprise of those whom, as they may feel, I have misrepresented or misjudged. Others, including some of my own countrymen, will regret that their names, in spite of admirable services rendered—of which I am not ignorant—find no place in these pages. This, whatever one's efforts to be just, cannot in practice be otherwise, as long as a fallible historian is forced, as he is, to assess and to omit. It is certain that much valuable service to 'Iraq is here unrecorded, and that another writer might well judge differently of the acts and motives of many individuals, movements, or factors which play their parts in these pages. To no reader, I am certain, will the shortcomings of this work be as apparent as they are to me; the necessity to compress and to over-simplify—often with imperfect knowledge—has led to results which, in page after page, I must condemn as inadequate to the interest of the subject-matter.

The 'Iraq of 1951 is a country which, with an increasing though still imperfect sense of unity and nationhood, neither has any reasonable claims or grievances against any other, nor is itself the subject of others' demands. Its boundaries are fixed, its climate healthy, its people increasing and progressive. It possesses abundance of fertile land and controllable water, and the certainty that these together can produce, as they did in earlier ages, great material wealth; and it has a well-exploited mineral resource of exceptional richness to provide funds, meanwhile, for works of development and for social services. Few territories can be more blessed by nature with materials for 'the good life' of its citizens, who are themselves unusually intelligent and by no means incapable of progress, and for whose manifold increase room and to spare will be available. The highest hopes for the future of 'Iraq can not unreasonably be formed by its people and by its foreign friends, who are many and sincere. With what pleasure would these latter, who include myself, watch the progress and happiness of this nation! To achieve these, stability and continuity are indispensable conditions; all must depend, it seems, on the ability of its leaders, and behind them of the public, to turn their backs on selfish faction and wearisome rhetoric: to keep the goodwill of strong friends among the Powers: and, choosing as their main or sole

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objective 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' of their own people, to conduct their affairs with good sense and moderation. 000

No historian of current or very recent events can feel confident that he has seen *all* the published sources of information about them. I have no such confidence, and can only hope that the bibliography given, which aims at brevity rather than at the portentousness of the thesis-writer, omits no really valuable work. I have used to a varied and selective extent the contemporary newspaper and periodical press of 'Iraq, Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, as well as histories and monographs published in these countries; have had the advantage of close personal acquaintance with the 'Iraqi scene during most of the period covered; and have been exceptionally fortunate in the generous help I have received from 'Iraqi and British friends with expert and recent knowledge. Among these I should wish to thank in particular Sayid Tawfiq al-Naqib, of the Port Directorate at Baṣra: Sayid Salman Juwayda, of the Date Association: Mr. R. C. Kelt, the Port Director: H. E. Sayid Khalil Kunna, Minister of Education: Mr. A. H. Ditchburn, Chief Administrative Inspector: Mr. F. Stoakes, of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company: Mr. C. C. Aston, formerly of the 'Iraq Government and latterly chief of the (war-time) Political Adviserate: Mr. F. H. Gamble, of the Commercial Section of the British Embassy in Baghdad: Mr. J. J. Page and the late Mr. A. J. B. Chapman, both of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company: Mr. F. S. Hardy and Mr. J. D. Atkinson, each in turn Director of Irrigation: Sir Harry Sinderson, veteran of the 'Iraq Health Services in many capacities: Dr. M. Critchley, of the same service: Mr. J. Battey, of 'Mespers' and E. and T. S. N. Co.: and Professor M. E. L. Mallowan, Field Director of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq.

The typescript of the book has been read through, and most valuable comments and corrections made, by Sir Reader Bullard, Mr. C. J. Edmonds, and Mr. R. S. M. Sturges, all of whom spent years in positions of responsibility in 'Iraq. It was read also, not without critical comment, by both my sons. I have had kind help from the heads of missionary or religious bodies in 'Iraq, notably Father J. P. Merrick, S.J., and Father S. G. Tunmer of the Dominicans at Mosul, from the Secretary-General of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris, and from spokesmen or correspondents of the American Protestant Missions represented in 'Iraq. Information, verbal or written, has been kindly given by many other friends, who include Mr. W. Allard, formerly Director of Irrigation: Mr. L. M. Swan, formerly Adviser to the Ministry of Finance: Mr. D. W. Gumbley, formerly Inspector-General of Posts and Telegraphs: Mr. E. C. Caparne, formerly Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Communications and Works: Dr.

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Ahmad Susa, the irrigation engineer and author: Sir John Prichard, President until 1951 of the Court of Appeal: Sayid Darwish Haydar, Director-General of Agriculture: Sayid Tariq al-'Askari, now pioneering in 'Iraq scientific agriculture: H. E. Sayid Tawfiq Wahbi, ex-Minister and deeply learned in Kurdish affairs: Judge 'Abd al-Ḥafidh Taha, now of the Basra Petroleum Company: Mr. F. F. Haigh, lately head of the Irrigation Commission of 1946–9: my son, Mr. J. S. Longrigg, of the British Embassy in Baghdad, and Mr. P. Mallet of the same: Mr. W. S. Bailey, formerly of the 'Iraqi Department of Telegraphs.

Confronted with the usual problems of transliteration from Arabic, I have knowingly fallen into some perhaps objectionable compromises and inconsistencies. With most words, I hope, accurately transliterated, I have yielded to the greater comfort of the general reader—or to the mere habit of a lifetime—in retaining Mosul for al-Mawṣil, Mecca for Makka, Kupri for Köprü, 'Abdullah for 'Abd-Allah, Haifa for Ḥayfa, Alamein for 'Alamayn, and similarly for a number of other names. In some place-names there are alternative spellings, where Arabic and Kurdish versions of the word are not identical: in others a final spelling seems to be not yet established. I have omitted *hamza*, except where medial.

May 1952. S. H. L.

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I

THE 'IRAQ OF 1900

1. THE THREE WILAYAS

'To the lover, Baghdad is not far off', 'A (false) account will come back even from Baghdad'; by these and suchlike proverbs the Turk of Istanbul, half a century ago, confessed the remoteness of the sunbaked lands of Tigris and Euphrates. The three wilayas (vilayets) one day to become the 'Iraq Kingdom lay indeed upon the very borderland of Turkish possessions. At no time inhabited by Turks, they belonged rather to the northern extension of the Arabian peninsula, and formed the eastern half of its Fertile Crescent. The country had in older days formed the 'Abbasid province of 'Iraq 'Arabi and part of Jazira. In the first three centuries of Turkish rule it had been united as the single eyalet of Baghdad, one of the great provinces of the Empire ruled by a three-tailed Pasha. Thanks to its ancient fame, its strategic position and present scale, Baghdad had always held easy primacy over the two other renowned cities of 'Iraq, Mosul and Baṣra; and even in 1900, after Mosul had emerged finally as a wilaya in 1879 and Baṣra in 1884, the Wali of Baghdad was by every standard the senior of the three governors.

The tripartite territory was bounded on the north, amid wild mountains, by the Ḥakkari sanjaq of Van wilaya: on the north-west, by a short face of the Jazira-ibn-'Umar qadhā of Diyarbakr wilaya: on the west, by the newly created 'independent' sanjaq of Dayr al-Zur. Farther south the boundary lay at the mid-desert frontier of the wilaya of Damascus and, south again, crossed the deserts of north Arabia, beyond which lay the Arab oasis principalities. To the south also lay the waters of the Persian Gulf and, along its western shores, a stretch of maritime Arabia which was claimed as Turkish and grouped officially under the Baṣra wilaya. To the east, bordering all three provinces, lay Persia.

These boundaries were those of modern 'Iraq save in three particulars. The Persian frontier was still undemarcated; the line observed or flouted in 1900 was in places to be amended by the Commission of 1914. The boundary with the Turkish provinces of Van and Diyarbakr was to be fixed in 1926, that with later Syria in 1920 and 1933, that with the Arabian rulers in 1922. The territories of al-Aḥsā, Qaṭar, and Kuwayt ceased to be Turkish before or during the First World War, and do not concern the historian of 'Iraq.

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1775 'Iraq's place in the Empire was determined by various factors. Its remoteness, its non-Turkish inhabitants, its fierce climate were all considerations which made service in it the dread of most Turkish officials; and little was in practice contributed to correct this ill repute by the prestige and past glories of Baghdad, its history of struggles with Persian armies, its almost successful attempts to secede. The progress which Turkish culture had made in some 'Iraqi circles detracted little from the Arab character which it shared equally with the backward provinces of the Hijaz, the Yaman, and North Africa, and with those, more sophisticated, of the Levant. The whole block of Arab territory exceeded in area the rest of Turkey, possessed great cultural solidarity, and differed from the Turkish dominions in race and history, in language, social atmosphere, and manners. And as the Arab provinces in general, so 'Iraq in particular brought the Sultan's Government into touch with foreign issues of particular delicacy. The Caliph could not disinterest himself in the loyalty of a race which controlled the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, the Shi'i shrines of the Euphrates, the tomb of the Sunni saint 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani (Jilani): who spoke the unique language of Islam and, inhabiting its lands of origin, must control much of its living sentiment in Islamic countries. To this realization, as well as to mere vainglory, were due the ceaseless efforts of the Turks to complete what in the end they never achieved, the conquest of Arabia: a conquest which on the Red Sea coasts, in al-Aḥsā and 'Uman and later in Najd, finally eluded them after weary and weakening aggressive efforts, of which 'Iraqis had been and were to be the spectators. The sight did nothing to diminish the abiding mutual antipathy which in general marked the attitudes of Turk and Arab.

The 'Iraq wilayas, viewed with however scanty favour, were yet held as vital to the Caliph's position. Beyond their fame in Islamic history and religion, they had another claim. From these most neglected and remote of provinces came stories of vast potential riches and the expectation of important future development. In the later years of the century not only foreign travellers and diplomats but Turks at the Sublime Porte itself, and incoming Walis hot for progress, spoke of railways, canal schemes, minerals, extended river navigation, bridges, and town-planning. Such designs had not advanced in 1900 beyond the stage of idle speculation or vaguest project; the impediments of sheer poverty, governmental ignorance, and pervading insecurity had prevented realization of any part of the schemes. But they existed still, in diwan and coffee-shop, and gained for 'Iraq a measure of interest and respect.

To Europeans the country had for a century past become

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familiar, to some extent, through these same dreams or projects of development, projects whose proportions were better appreciated perhaps in London or Petersburg than in Istanbul, and not without a flavour of international competition. The territory had held for many years its place in world trade, with its interest for steamship lines and market-seekers reorientated by the opening of the Suez Canal. It had long fascinated students of ancient, biblical, and Islamic history. It had astonished the world by the revelation of its excavated sites, Assyrian, Babylonian, Sumerian; it had provided for three centuries an outlet for missionary enterprise by Catholic and Protestant: and it was valued by strategists then as now as the only land approach to the Gulf and, more generally, as the traditional land-bridge of East and West.

To Britain the territory, or its southern half, formed part of the Persian Gulf 'sphere of interest' in which British diplomacy had for two centuries built up a unique position. The suppression of the arms- and slave-traffic and piracy, chart-making and the buoying and lighting of channels, were achievements of high value; and British statesmen felt that a fair reward would be freedom from rivalry in the Gulf waters and coasts and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab hinterland. Trade interests, ocean navigation, a strategic route to India, were all involved. A high proportion of the traffic of Baṣra was in British hands, with nine-tenths of the steamer-tonnage which used that port. Inland, the oldest-established river steamers on the Tigris were British; British and British-Indian firms plied their business at Baghdad and Baṣra. Indian pilgrims arrived in hundreds to visit the 'Iraqi shrines; and money bequeathed long since by a pious King of Oudh was handed twice yearly by the British Resident at Baghdad for charitable distribution by the Mujtahids of Najf and Karbalā—a task which their sanctity, their refusal of supervision, and (as some alleged) their avarice rendered sadly embarrassing. Englishmen had been pioneers of 'Iraqi archaeology, as the names of Layard, Rawlinson, Loftus, and Taylor attested for the earliest period, those of Budge and King for the later. A mission of the Church Missionary Society had been established with its church and hospital at Baghdad in 1882, and extended its work later to Mosul. Watchful over all these enterprises, the British Resident and Consul-General at Baghdad presided over a far more considerable establishment than other foreign representatives. With their own residency surgeon and dispensary, their river steamer the *Comet* of the Royal Indian Marine, their guard of sepoys and their extraterritorial Indian Post Offices, successive Residents had been forced by the jealous disfavour of Walis to fight hard for their privileges. The Resident belonged normally to the Indian Political Service, the Consul at Baṣra, after 1898, to

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the Levant Consular Service. A Consular Agent of Indian nationality had since 1893 watched the interests of Indian pilgrims at Karbalā and the Oudh Bequest distributions. A similar post at Mosul was revived in 1893, to be held by a local Christian.

The attitude of officialdom in the 'Iraq of the 'nineties to British or any foreign enterprise—though by no means to all individuals, for socially many were accepted—was suspicious or hostile. The days of 'the Great Elchi', when Britain had no rival at Istanbul, were long forgotten. The occupation of Cyprus and Egypt, the British attitude to the Armenian massacres, and the bitter words of Gladstone had cost the friendship of the Porte and led to an attitude founded upon jealousy, with a colouring of Muslim feeling, against the alien interloper. The frequent appeals of 'Iraqi tribesmen for British support, though always correctly repulsed by the Resident or Consul, were specially irritating to the Pashas who, with some part of the public, appeared to believe in British covetousness of 'Iraq territory itself; and constructed a ridiculous mud fort at Fao against the invader.

The interest of Russia in the 'Iraqi wilayas followed at a considerable distance that of Great Britain. Well informed, through its Armenian agents, the Russian Consulate refounded at Baghdad in 1889 was at least aware of his nation's persistent penetration of north-western Persia, of the fringes of the Van wilaya, and even of the mountain qadhās of Mosul itself; for the Consul and his Vice-Consul at Basra, with their total of three-score Persians claimed as nominal Russian subjects, had few other duties. Russian 'protection' of Orthodox Christians was scarcely in question, since these were few in 'Iraq. In projects, however, and hopes of extending the Tsar's influence towards further goals the Russians were only less active in 'Iraq than in Persia. It was the application of Count Kapnist for a Mediterranean–Persian Gulf railway concession that hastened, as will later appear, the Anglo-Kuwayt Agreement of 1899.

The French had anticipated all others in their consular appointments in 'Iraq, naming a Consul to Basra in the seventeenth and to Baghdad in the eighteenth centuries. In 1900 there survived only a Vice-Consul at Baghdad. Their commercial interests were in fact slight, and political objectives scarcely existed. It was to them a territory of two activities. The first was archaeological research in which French scholars, Place, Fresnel, and Oppert had played an early, and de Sarzec an outstanding part. The second was the field of Catholicism. They played resolutely the part of Protector to all local Catholics and Uniates, and through their missions and bishops and the Papal Delegate resident at Mosul had powerful influence over the most numerous and wealthy of the Christian

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communities: an influence in which observers found an element of Gallic nationalism accompanied by rancour against non-Catholics and the Powers who might support these. The French missions were ancient and active. Their long-established Carmelites maintained two boys' schools at Baghdad, a press, an orphanage, and a dispensary. At Mosul the Dominican fathers, formerly Italian but French since 1859, maintained their urban and village schools, their dispensaries, their priests' training college, their church, and their prolific and polyglot printing-press; while, from the same Order, the Sisters of the Presentation had maintained their elementary and needle-work schools for girls at Mosul since the eighteen-seventies, and extended their work to Baghdad in 1881. These efforts had gone far to popularize the French language, enrich the culture of the Uniates, and contribute an element of real education to the local world. 'Iraq, in fact, and particularly the Mosul wilaya, formed part of the French sphere of cultural predominance. The missionary work of French Jewry will be mentioned later.

A Consul of the United States had been replaced in 1894 by a Vice-Consul, who resided intermittently in Baghdad; for American interest in 'Iraq was slight. An ambitious archaeological survey was carried out in the 'eighties, followed by a season of excavation; and a branch of the Arabian mission of the Dutch Reformed Church of America was started in the 'nineties with a school, dispensary, and hospital at Basra, with later work also at 'Amara and Nasiriya. The effort met with strong Turkish opposition, which it survived. A number of converts to Protestantism were made from local Christians.

Other nations of Europe pretended at this period to little or no concern in the 'Iraq wilayas. Greek subjects had had recourse until 1897 to the British Resident, Austrian until 1900 to the French Consul. The German Empire had entrusted its slight interests in 'Iraq to Great Britain until 1894, when a German resident in Baghdad was appointed Consul. Late in the century their archaeologists had appeared—Sachau in 1879 and the great Koldewey first in 1889, then from 1898 onwards; but they showed no other concern with the territory until the eastward march of German policy was to raise, at the end of the century, the burning question of the Baghdad Railway. Meanwhile the penetration of Turkey by a mission of German military officers, their railway enterprises in Anatolia, the Kaiser's State visits, the abstention of his Government alone among the Powers from condemnation of the Armenian atrocities, were confirming Germany in the empty place of Great Britain as the leading Western nation in the Ottoman Empire.

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2. COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

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The zones of land surface into which the territory divides itself, though they belong less to history than to geography, may be briefly mentioned since they deeply affect the life of the inhabitants and reflect their ethnology.

First comes the mountain belt in the north and north-east. A part of the main Armenian and Zagros system, it formed in 1900 the sanjaq of Sulaymaniya and a large part of those of Mosul and Shahrizur. This terrain is wholly un-Arabian, the population solidly Kurdish. Its mountains, mainly barren but carrying also areas of forest, are divided by deep valleys sometimes widening into plains. The hardy inhabitants of its hundreds of villages produce crops of grain, rice, vegetables, fruit, and tobacco, grown on the water of springs and rivulets and the relatively abundant rain. The climate is equable in summer, harsh in winter, the landscape commonly of striking beauty.

In the flattish submontane area of Mosul and Shahrizur sanjaqs lie treeless uplands and the lower courses of the Greater and Lesser Zabs. Here, in ancient Assyria, village-dwelling cultivators grow spring grain crops on rain and, in places, by water-lift from the rivers. The country is intermediate in environment and race between the mountain zone and the hot flatlands of central 'Iraq. The latter, the most extensive and most characteristic region of the country, covered the sanjaqs of Baghdad and Karbalā and most of Ḥilla. Everywhere dead flat and stoneless, it is unblessed, save in rare seasons, by rainfall sufficient for crop-growing, and must needs be cultivated by lift or flow from controlled canals or flood-channels. The crops are winter and summer grain and vegetables, locally some rice, and vast gardens of dates. The population, entirely Arab, lives in mud-built villages or in clusters of hair tents or reed huts.

The equally flat silt-country of the lower Tigris–Euphrates delta, astride and below the prehistoric coast-line, covered the southern part of the Ḥilla sanjaq and almost the whole of the three sanjaqs of 'Amara, Muntafiq, and Baṣra. It was characterized by a higher proportion of reed dwellings, fewer mud villages: by lesser crops of wheat and barley, but extensive rice-growing in the flooded areas: by miles of date gardens, and by a special way of life developed by the buffalo breeders, mat weavers, and fishermen in the great marshes.

Ignoring the Arabian dependencies of Baṣra, two other zones remain to be mentioned. One is that of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab in the Baṣra sanjaq, with its miles of ordered date gardens in a lean strip between river and desert: the other is that of the arid steppe

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country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. It lies equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis": a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i, while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur. Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qadhā and nahiya; and the Kurds, in turn, supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept. 563

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire. 563 181 795

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Tuz Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism. 563 621 181

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with 563 162 184

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar, from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to 'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boat-builders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants had been largely driven from the field. Western education was widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch. Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nestorians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians, whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq. The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping, artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually schools, served for long years past by the missions of European churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls' schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by families whose property or politics constrained them to live there, by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 162 [177] perhaps a fifth part of the military forces and a tenth of the gendarmerie. But this minority was disproportionately powerful by dint of the authority of Government, and by the contact of its leaders with the ante-rooms of Istanbul and with Turkish culture. It followed that some 'Iraqis, but not many, were thus attracted to the prestige of Turkish circles and all they signified, and, before the day of an Arab nationalism—or even after it—identified themselves with that element. Turkish was everywhere the language of Government, the courts, and the State schools.

3. PERSIAN AND ARABIAN NEIGHBOURS

648 With their Persian neighbour, Turkey and 'Iraq had a long tradition of discord. If, by the nineteenth century, the days of major aggressive war were over, there remained material for ill will between two unsympathetic peoples who differed in language, culture, and character. This was not diminished by the Persian Consular representatives—some of dubious status—at a dozen of the 'Iraq cities. The two Empires, devoted respectively to the Sunni and Shi'i faiths, were passing also through different stages of their evolution: Turkey struggling with modernism and western aspirations, Persia still medieval and uneasy with half-independent vassals in her midst. Reaction in its crudest forms was in the ascendant at Teheran since the accession in 1896 of the amiable spendthrift Mudhaffar al-Din Shah.

The frontier itself had proved a major irritant. Its line had been settled by nothing more stable than the fortunes of many wars and the fickle adherences of tribes. It cut through the featureless flatlands east of the lower Tigris and across the tumbled mountains of Kurdistan; it divided homogeneous peoples, often migratory and always incapable of loyalty to a distant throne. The 1847 Treaty of Erzerum had been followed by thirty years of conventions, commissions, and map-making, and by as many, in the last quarter of the century, of minor forays, counter-interventions, and angry protests. The close of the century found the Turks still claiming Persian-occupied towns and valleys—Urmiya, Wazna, Bana, Sardasht, Zuhab—and the Persians demanding the Gul'ambar Plain, the Hawraman Mountain, and lands near Khaniqin. These squabbles, which forbade all border tranquillity, were echoed in the extreme south by the pretensions of both to possess the shoals and islands of the Shaṭṭ. Turkish claims to Muhammara had indeed by now been abandoned; but jealousies and reprisals on the Shaṭṭ offered a fertile field for piracy, which led in turn to British intervention, the threat of a British Consul at Fao, and the stationing of a gunboat on the river in 1898.

The great pilgrimages by Persians to Najf, Karbalā, Kadhimiya

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Samarrā, productive as these were of mutual ill-feeling, were as rich in occasions for governmental stiffness and private extortion, with demands for visa and quarantine fees. The carrying of Persian corpses for burial at holy Najf was charged at £1 per body, and produced frontier fraud and evasion in a dozen forms. Everywhere on the roads and at the cities the pilgrims were at the mercy of Khan-keepers, carriers, and the privileged parasites of the shrines.

The transit trade between the countries consisted of Persian goods conveyed through 'Iraq to Baṣra and the far more important carrying of foreign goods into Persia through Baṣra, Baghdad, and Khaniqin. Interruption of this major element in 'Iraq trade was habitual through insecurity on the Tigris and on the Kirmanshah highway. It formed a recurring subject of recrimination, as did the delays and venality of Turkish Customs officers.

Of the Persian provinces which marched with the frontier, each had its own character and none was effectively administered. On the flank of Baṣra, across the Shaṭṭ, lay 'Arabistan. Its southern half, Arab in population, had been left by the Persians for sixty years to the care of a hereditary Shaykh of the Muḥaysin (Arab) tribe; and under this administration, unpretentious but enormously superior to the monstrous corruptions of Teheran, Muḥammara at the Karun mouth had developed into a port and market of importance, all the greater since in 1888 steamship navigation had been inaugurated on the Karun by British enterprise. Irrigation and even railway projects were contemplated, archaeological work was pursued under a French monopoly, foreign Consuls and Agencies appeared. The ruler, Shaykh Khaz'al, showed a flexible astuteness in his position as the independent Arab ruler over Persian territory; he accepted an imperial Delegate at his capital, dispatched tribute to Teheran, accepted Persian titles, and maintained an uneasy peace with the Wali of Baṣra. Khaz'al and his adviser, Ḥajj Muḥammad 'Ali, familiar to many European friends as Ḥajji Ra'is, were modernistic in matters of education and development, but traditional in tribal administration. Muḥammara was a city of refuge for the Shi'i Shaykhs of the lower Tigris when in trouble with their own governors.

North of 'Arabistan and almost equally independent of the Qajar dynasty lay Luristan, the province of the Lurs, who are racially and dialectically distinct from Persians. It fell into two areas, the Greater and the Lesser. The Pusht-i-Kuh, western zone of the latter and home of the Fayliya Lurs, formed its boundary with Baṣra and Baghdad wilayas. It had remained for three centuries under a single line of Walis. The obligations of the governorship were confined to a small tribute to the central Government,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

its powers unlimited within Pusht-i-Kuh, its influence considerable in eastern 'Iraq. Ghulam Ridhā Khan, fourteenth of his line, was respected for his pomp and his religious observances, but hated for his morbid avarice.

Northward from his domain, along the frontier, lay more of the ungoverned no-man's-land of the Kurdish tribesmen. Of the province of Kirmanshah, the western half was wholly Kurdish and, in effect, ungoverned. North of it lay Ardalan (or officially 'Kurdistan') with its capital at Sinna; and north again lay the borders of Adharbayjan, which rich and famous province—the normal appanage of the Persian heir-apparent—included the areas south and west of Urmiya of the Turkish frontier.

Throughout this deep belt of Persian Kurdistan it was hard rigidly to distinguish the tribesmen or the terrain attributable to the one or to the other Power. The Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya, as of Van beyond it, resembled Ardalan and Kirmanshah in the complete dominance of the Kurdish race, language, and way of life, and between them all there was constant intercourse, traffic, intermarriage, feuds or alliances in which nominal nationality was unconsidered. Caravan routes ran everywhere across the frontier zone. Many of the tribes were either physically divided between the two national territories, such as the Hawraman tribesmen, the Bilbas, or Bajlan, or by seasonal habit migrated across the frontier for grazing as did the Sinjabi, Jaf, and Harki: or considered themselves free, when hunted like the Hamawand, to take convenient refuge in either country.

In the Kurdish districts of Kirmanshah province, through which passed the brigand-haunted trunk road, dwelt the powerful Kalhur group, the Sinjabi and the Guran. The Bajlan were divided by the frontier; their Pasha lived at Khaniqin, most of the tribe around disputed Zuhab. Northward, across the upper Diyalā, here called the Sirwan, were the settled sections of the nomadic Jaf. This greatest of migratory Kurdish tribes was faithful to its habit of trans-frontier movement. Astride the Hawraman lay the tribe of that name, divided in allegiance; beyond these the Persian Marivan and a tract of settled Ardalan country depending on Bana, Sardasht, and Saqiz. Farther north, on the confines of Adharbayjan, lay the ancient and famous Mukri tribe-group. Finally, in the lowlands opposite Urmiya, beyond the border villages of the Shirwan and Baradost tribesmen, lay settled Kurds and Turkoman villages.

The tract of Kurdish mountain country north of Mosul wilaya differed in nothing from the Persian-Kurdish zone, unless in the greater wildness of the Hakkari Mountains. It belonged to Van wilaya, faced eastward towards Salmas and the Shikak tribesmen in Persian Adharbayjan, and ran westward from Shamdinan—the

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home, at Neri village, of Sayid Muḥammad Sadīq, son of the notorious Christian-murderer, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah—to the Tigris at Jazira-ibn-'Umar. This zone, governed from Julamark the capital of Ḥakkari, was inhabited or was traversed in their migrations by tribes of great renown—the Goyan, Sharnakhi, and Artushi, whose chiefs twenty years earlier had welcomed the prestige and profit of raising Ḥamidiya cavalry regiments for their Caliph.

In place of the free Kurdish dynasties at Bitlis, Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and Julamark of half a century earlier, there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a régime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish Government. Scattered amid the Kurdish villages in both wilayas were communities of Armenians, Chaldaeans, Jews, and Assyrians.

The last-mentioned community was a generation later to play, transplanted and half-destroyed, a dismal part in 'Iraq history. These East Syrian or Nestorian or Assyrian shepherds and cultivators were an ancient Christian Millet, Syriac in speech, uncertain of origin and of blood, and hardly distinguishable in their manner of life, dress, and custom from the Kurds, in whose truculent or tolerant midst they had existed for many centuries. They were protected by their resolute character and jealous loyalty to their own faith and leadership. The Mar Sham'un of the time, their spiritual head and community ruler, resident at Kuchanis, had been for half a generation supported by a mission of the Church of England. This divided its efforts between the Ḥakkari Assyrian clans, with their fighting maliks and rough illiterate bishops, and the more peaceful, less harassed branch of the people who had settled at Urmiya. The former group, Turkish subjects, were in part *'ashiret*—tribute-paying tribes—and in part *ra'ayā*, peasantry. The nation contained perhaps one hundred thousand souls in Turkish territory. Faithful to an ancient Church, isolated in savage mountains, poor and threatened by every whim of powerful neighbours, though capable of a virile resistance and even of harsh aggression, its plight was watched by anxious eyes in Europe.

To the west of 'Iraq lay the steppe-desert where roamed the bedouin tribe-group of the 'Aniza. Southward of these, beyond the Dhafir and Muṭayr nomads, lay the communities of true Arabia: the small harbour State of Kuwayt, established a century earlier under the house of Ṣubaḥ; the coastlands of al-Aḥsā with its oases and its vigorous life of nomadic tribes; and, finally, central Arabia where for years past two dynasties had disputed for supremacy.

Of these districts, Kuwayt and the Wahhabi Amirate of ibn Sa'ud were static Arab sultanates; al-Aḥsā (part of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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empire until 1871) was a tract unified only by dominance from without; the Amirate of ibn Rashid was a purely tribal organism of the southern Shammar. Common to them all was their primitive governmental and social level; save partially in al-Aḥsā, it was the aboriginal Arabia, undisturbed and unaltered in its statecraft, its economics, its ignorance. The revolution of the next half-century, already well begun in 'Iraq, had as yet cast no shadow in eastern Arabia.

Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt had gained the throne by fratricide in 1896 and, like his two predecessors, acknowledged Turkish authority. His first years of power were a struggle for survival, which he achieved by rough justice at home and discreet bribes placed in Istanbul and Baṣra; by the end of the century he had gained the Sultan's recognition. But his fame and the later special interest were due to other causes. In 1897 and again in 1898 he begged the 'protection' of the British Government. His advances were rejected; but later in 1898 the position changed suddenly. There were rumours of Turkish military occupation, of a Russian railway from the Mediterranean, and of the German Bagdadbahn itself (p. 33) threatening to reach the shores of the Gulf. The British Resident was sent from Bushire to Kuwayt and in January 1899 signed an agreement with Mubarak, whereunder the Shaykh would alienate no territory without British concurrence. Renewed Turkish pressure reproved his independent airs; but Mubarak stood by his British agreement, and yet remained titular Qa'immaqam of Kuwayt.

Since 1897 his court had sheltered distinguished exiles in the persons of the head of the Wahhabi ruling family, 'Abd al-Raḥman ibn Sa'ud and his young son. These had fled from their home when in 1891 the dynasty of Jabal Shammar, under its famous Amir Muḥammad whom Doughty visited, had overwhelmed their forces and installed viceroys in their oases. The last decade of the century showed Sa'udi power almost extinguished, that of ibn Rashid triumphant and professing a profitable loyalty to the Turks. But the death of Muḥammad and the dynastic struggles which followed suggested possibilities of a reversal.

In al-Aḥsā, the 'Sanjaq of Najd' of Turkish officialdom, the thirty-year Turkish occupation had not attempted normal government, nor greatly affected the life of the people. But, in contrast to Kuwayt, it was in part effective. Turkish officials came and went, troops were stationed in the towns, taxes were collected, government schools opened though little attended. The Saniya Administration (p. 38) owned valuable properties in the Sanjaq, which from time to time 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs—a Muntafiq tribesman, a Baṣra notable—had governed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier. Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Basra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Basra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

technique included blackmail. Rickety boat-bridges served a dozen of the riverain towns. Street lighting consisted, at the best, of a few battered oil-lamps. Water was supplied by donkey-borne waterskins from the river, or from polluted wells in private court-yards; only in Baghdad was a single quarter of the town furnished by pipes with silt-laden untreated water. Municipal street-sweepers maintained some appearance of decency in the main lanes and bazaars, while filth and stenches abounded in the rest. Every town and larger village had cemeteries in its midst or on its fringes. Khans for caravans or wayfarers were found everywhere; hotels approaching the lowest European standard existed only in Baghdad.

Municipal administration was entrusted, save in unorganized villages, to a Mayor and his council. These functionaries, elected by procedures which could amount to Government nomination, enjoyed some local prestige; but their powers in practice were limited so rigidly that the local Governor in fact controlled all projects and all expenditure. Baghdad in the 'nineties was divided into three *baladiyas*, two for the left bank and one for the right. The Mayor was a member or nominee of one of its leading families or, rarely, a Government official. Municipal law was not inadequate, the code of taxation and procedure meticulous, its sphere of nominal activity reasonable. But in practice these administrations were corrupt and futile, and effective chiefly in providing a salary for a city notable and free servants for the local Governor. Nevertheless, pride of city was not lacking and schemes of town improvement were popular topics throughout decades of inactivity.

The picture of urban society of the period must embrace varying scenes. Baṣra with its miles of date gardens and network of tidal creeks, the activity of its riverain suburb—the sole seaport of 'Iraq—its daily contacts with Najd and Muḥammara, its rich garden-owning notables, its cosmopolitan merchants and agents, had a character unique in 'Iraq. Of the other towns of Baṣra sanjaq, Qurna was tribe-dominated, the growing village of Abu al-Khaṣib non-tribal, and Zubayr a desert-fringe town ruled by a hereditary Shaykh. Among Baṣra's leading families were those of the Naqib, and the houses of Basha'yan, Mandil, and Ṣani'.

Baghdad city with a mainly Sunni right bank and an all-Shi'i and largely Persian left, and its important suburbs of Kadhimiya, Mu'adhdham, and Qarara formed by far the greatest commercial centre in the wilayas. It was industrially important, administratively and militarily dominant. The city was mean, without modern improvements, without protection against river floods; it was adorned only by two or three monuments and mosques of interest and by the great shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani. With

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its greater society of high officials, its circle of famous Sunni Muslim families, its half-Europeanized wealthy Jews—the houses of Daniel and Sasun (Sassoon)—its doctors and lawyers, its men of affairs and their busy agents, Baghdad could claim at least equality with Baṣra in the vanguard of 'Iraqi progress. In both cities a small European society, led by the Consulates and predominantly British, maintained its comfortable homes, its clubs and sports, and found life pleasant.

Mosul fell far behind; lesser in status and remoter from Westernizing influences save those of French Catholicism, the city acted as entrepôt for the Jazira and the Kurdish highlands, and maintained a restless yet unprogressive atmosphere among its mixed population. Despite the dignity of the leading families—Pashas of the province in bygone days, the houses of the Jalilis and 'Umaris—and some Christian families of repute, it was ill famed for its criminal brawling, its fanaticism, and its dirt. Its dusty and treeless glare, subdued only by the smoke of lime-kilns, attracted few visitors.

In the lesser cities of 'Iraq, Arab or Kurdish, the atmosphere and condition of society varied widely with the environment. Many towns had no interest but that of staging-post for caravans, produce market for an agricultural area, fuelling point for river steamers, or cantonment for troops. Others had more individual character. Such were Hit with its industry of bitumen: Kirkuk and Arbil as main entrepôts for Kurdistan and nurseries of Turkish-speaking effendis: Khaniqin as the frontier post for Persia. Mandali and Badra looked east to Pusht-i-Kuh in much of their sentiment and interests. Sulaymaniya was the capital of the southern Kurds, and dominated by its oppressive 'holy' family of the Barzinji Sayids. Ḥalabja was the urban centre of the great Jaf tribe, as was 'Amara of the Tigris marshmen and Naṣiriya of the Muntafiq. Kaḍhimiya and Samarrā were eminent as Shi'i shrines and pilgrim-places, Ba'quba, Shahroban, and Daltawa as centres for the estates of the landed gentry. The mid-Euphrates Shi'i towns were suffering at the time from a tragic disturbance of Euphrates irrigation. On the upper Euphrates, settlements of the Dulaym were turning into villages or miniature townships. In the qaḍhā headquarter towns of Mosul province—'Aqra, Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, Raniya, Rawanduz, Keui Sanjaq—urban life was developing and a class of town notables, sometimes religious, was holding its own against the tribal Aghās.

Yet more particular was the function of the Euphrates Holy Cities, Karbalā and Najf. These were at once the twin hearts of 'Iraqi Shi'ism (the greatest non-Turkish influence in the territory) and centres of the pilgrim and corpse-burial industries. The power

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wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

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stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

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and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great confederacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

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from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

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of Nasir Pasha and later of his son Falih to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Sa'dun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Mansur Pasha and later of his son, Sa'dun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Huchaym (Hukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khaza'il, Bani Hasan, and the tribes of 'Afak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shi'ism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muhammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqata'as*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

[1] The *muqata'a* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqata'a* was an object of the keenest rivalry.

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feature of 'Amara life, involving *Zaptié* escorts on the paddle-boats, protests to the Wali, telegrams to London by the Lynch managers, and punitive expeditions, often unsuccessful. Shaykh Bunaya was by wealth and guile paramount in the Bani Lam for twenty years, till his death in 1903. Power among the Albu Muhammad lay, subject to endless rivalries, in the ruling house of Khalifa.

The central Tigris groups of the Rabi'a and Zubayd had outlived their days of united insurgence. They were fully settled since the mid-century, and the Zubayd had suffered the secession of large elements to the Hilla district. The growth of the steamer-fuelling townships—'Aziziya, Ṣuwayra, Bughayla, and Kut itself—had brought a measure of Government control and economic opportunity.

Across the Jabal Ḥamrin in the submontane region of Mosul wilaya, Government had at all times been relatively strong and the tribes—Bayat, Da'udiya, Diza'i—in general unaggressive if pettily lawless. In the higher foothills and the true mountain country of the southern and central Kurds, which included wide patches of non-tribal territory, dwelt under their hereditary Aghās such strong communities as the Zangana, Jabbari, Ṭalabani, Shaykh Bizayni, Girdi, Surchi, Khushnau, Piran, Pishdar, Baradost, and a score of lesser names. These, generally homogeneous in speech and habit, were well armed and mounted, proud of their traditions, not unprosperous, suspicious or scornful of Turkish pretension; and the authority of their Aghās far exceeded that of the unhappy Mudir or Qa'immaqam sent to govern them. Their lawless self-centred life was still that of a millennium of ungoverned valley lordship; Turkish claims were in great part unenforceable, and strife endemic; yet the penetration of more modern ways had been for fifty years insistent, and with many a local setback and humiliation continued to gain ground.

Turkish control, at its best in the accessible flatter lands, was at its feeblest, to vanishing point, in the mountains. The Hamawand of Bazyan district, most famous of robber tribes, had raided as far afield as Russian territory, terrorized the Kirkuk countryside, returned intact from distant banishment, and lived on varying terms with the venerated Barzinji Sayids. The Jaf, with settled sections in Persia and the Gul'anbar Plain, were still nomadic between the two countries. Under united leadership—that of Mahmud Pasha over the nomads and his brother 'Uthman Pasha in Ḥalabja, which he and his emancipated Persian wife 'Adila Khanim had largely built and wholly controlled—they could defy Government, refuse taxation, uproot telegraph lines, and recall the ways of the ancient Dere Beys. Attitudes no more amenable prevailed in the frontier territory of the Pishdar, who since 1893, when

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a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver "Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

made by Persians in the Holy Cities. Rifles with Russian-made barrels were made in an old-established factory at Sulaymaniya and thence distributed over all Kurdistan. Tanning and leather-work were practised in the suburbs of Baghdad; but the products—shoes, belts, and saddles—were of low quality. The local river-craft, of primeval design, were fashioned crudely from imported wood and Euphrates bitumen, and use was made in lower 'Iraq of the lashed poles of the skin-supported *kelleks* which were drifted downstream from Mosul and Diyarbakr. Beds and baskets were made from the date frond, mats from the marsh reeds. These, with some soap-making and the Jewish industries of 'araq distillation and the fabrication of forged antiquities, complete the meagre list.

The 'Iraqi-Persian transit trade, a main economic factor, has been elsewhere mentioned (p. 13). To it as an 'invisible export' should be added the proceeds of the great Shi'i pilgrimages—life-blood of the Holy Cities—and those of Sunnis to the shrine of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani; and, with these, the money spent in 'Iraq by travellers and archaeologists, missions, and foreign consuls.

Apart from export and transit operations, the trade of the territory consisted of the import of those needed commodities which the country could not itself supply. The imports, except for some part brought overland from Syria, Najd, or Anatolia, all passed through Basra and were distributed from Baghdad, the unquestioned commercial capital. Cotton cloth, handled by Jewish and British firms, formed three-quarters of the whole. Most of this came from Manchester, a little from India, some silken and woollen goods from France and Austria. Coal reached 'Iraq from Wales, coffee from Brazil and the Yaman, gunny-bags and indigo from India, kerosene from the United States, sugar from Egypt, France, and Austria, wood and tea, yarns and spices from India, date-box wood from Austria, tobacco from Persia. Such, with lesser quantities of paper, hardware, zinc sheets, colours, candles, and fezes, were the imports which were distributed to the limits of the rural and urban population by way of merchant's warehouse, vaulted or mat-covered bazaar, village shop and wandering pedlar.

The currency of the three wilayas was that of the copper qirsh (piastre), the silver majidiya, and the gold lira of the time, a stable coinage adequate to all needs. The intrusion of the Indian rupee in Basra and of Persian coins in the middle Tigris towns and Kurdistan was of little inconvenience in an age of steady exchange rates, no restrictions, and no paper-money. A multitude of local weights and measures varied capriciously from district to district. Banking was represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and by the shrewd operations of many local *sarrafs*.

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Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one-fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

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241 [312] advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

511 In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

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[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north. [311]

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the resources to initiate new methods or improve the old.

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and discouraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

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312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Ḥilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Ṣaqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Ḥilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Ḥilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya. 491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

capital rendered abortive; and a successor enterprise in 1890 was no more fortunate. At the close of the century talk of the 'Baghdad Railway' was more than ever persistent since, from the year 1888, the Germans had begun their career of Eastern ambition. The completion by the 'Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways' of its line to Ankara in 1893 was followed by its prolongation to Konia in 1896; and in the same year permission was obtained for an extension to Diyarbakr, and ultimately through 'Iraq. But immediate Russian objection was raised, the proposed alignment by Diyarbakr was abandoned, and a pause of two years followed. Thereafter the Kaiser paid the second of his visits to the Ottoman dominions, swore devotion to the Caliph and to Islam, and secured in 1899 the arrangement of a draft concession for a line from Konia to Mosul, Baghdad, and the Persian Gulf. A German envoy visited 'Iraq to report on routes, a German cruiser appeared in the Gulf, and a technical Commission in 1900 toured the probable alignment through 'Iraq to Kuwayt, where British suspicions were abruptly aroused. Meanwhile the diplomats of Turkey and Germany met to prepare a definitive convention, watched with interest from Whitehall and Delhi. The public of 'Iraq, far from these conclaves, had as yet seen no enterprise on steel rails more imposing than the Baghdad–Kadhimiya horse tramway, relic of Midhat Pasha.

The natural highways of 'Iraq had been, since the dawn of history, its great rivers, and on these the dozen types of sailing-boat and skiff, raft and coracle still plied. But since the eighteen-forties steam navigation on the rivers had played its part in 'Iraq economics. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, formed in 1861 by the Lynch family and managed in Baghdad and Basra by companies bearing their name, had maintained a Tigris service for two generations, interrupted only by the obstructions of an officialdom dully resentful of foreign enterprise, by the low-water difficulties of navigation, and by the rifle-fire of riverain tribesmen. The Firman of authority, dating from 1834, seemed to limit the Company to simultaneous use of two steamers,[1] and the Lynch efforts were ceaseless for authority to increase this number and to employ barges. Their interests were, from 1879 onwards, closely associated with the British India Steam Navigation Company. Various Turkish or 'Iraqi single-ship enterprises had been amalgamated, a generation earlier, into a single 'Oman-Ottoman Administration', under the Turkish Ministry of Marine. Its fleet of small, barely river-worthy steamers took about half of the total

[1] The *City of London* launched in 1862 was lost in 1881, the *Dijla* launched in 1865 was lost in 1876. The *Blosse Lynch* (1878), *Khalifa* (1880), and *Mejidieh* (1882) were in service in 1900.

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505 traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these —a Baṣra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Baṣra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A ship-building yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

504 The port of Baṣra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shaṭṭ al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Baṣra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

206 Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey, through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia. The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal 205 services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the 'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry the Indian and European mails to Baṣra, where the service connected with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in 1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886 after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul, by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

631 The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

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impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardihood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

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Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive.

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

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647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Baṣra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Baṣra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

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If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

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668 but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this [186] time was an alternative conceivable. At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

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II

THE LAST OF TURKISH 'IRAQ

1. TURKISH POLITICS AND ARAB NATIONALISM

LITTLE in the fortunes of Turkey from 1900 to 1914 could encourage the world, or its own 'Iraqi subjects, to hope for better administration or better lives. Already in the eighteen-nineties there had been signs—disturbances in Crete, followed by a Greco-Turkish War—that the long respite since 1878 in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would not last for ever. In the new century conditions in Macedonia led to Western Powers' intervention and restrictions on Turkish authority; and the advent of a new régime in Turkish government precipitated further losses. In 1908 Bulgaria declared its independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1911 Italy invaded the two Libyan wilayas; in 1912 a league of Balkan States declared war, and defeated Turkish armies with ignominy; but quarrels over the spoils led to a renewal of hostilities, the Second Balkan War. The period was thus, with but momentary successes, one of humiliating defeats, dismemberment, and distraction from the domestic reforms for which the need was paramount.

Internally, the picture contains newer features. The Ḥamidiyan régime, indeed, earned the further execration of all Europe (except Germany) for the Armenian massacres of the 'nineties, divorced the personal rule of the monarch more than ever from that of his ministers, and intensified the spy system; but the reforming forces which, a generation earlier, 'Abd al-Ḥamid had first flattered and then ruthlessly suppressed, had never entirely perished. Strengthened from year to year by the foreign education of the military officers, they found recruits among modernized Levantines and Salonika Jews, as well as genuine Turkish patriots. A second wave of political activity was inevitable, though delayed by the attractiveness of the old régime to powerful interests and by the astuteness of the ruler. From a committee of exiles in Geneva in the 'nineties, the Reform movement spread back into Turkey and installed itself in the Macedonia of 1906 to 1908. The emergence of the Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) in August 1908 availed to compel the Sultan to re-establish the Constitution, order the holding of immediate elections—the first for thirty years—decree the abolition of espionage, and dismiss the more notorious of his officials. The reactionary counter-revolution of April 1909 ended with his deposition in favour of a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

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excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P. committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, followed four months later by another for the accession of Muhammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qahtaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Basra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Hamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Government, were active in these politics before 1914.

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to independent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'ẓham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intrusion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Tahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unimportant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Hilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained, and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg, General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra. The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast. Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja under its Jaf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1960) MH Iraq MH1

Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhīl Pasha against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1960) MEI Iraq MEI

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Falih Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Falih. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas of aggressive independence. The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72). 619 721

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Halabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Mahmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their
721 traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salim, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muhammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Taha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Hakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Başra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Başra line was under all-British construction.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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The Turkish revolution had immediate effects. The Germans became unpopular, their railway was bitterly opposed, not least by Isma'il Haqqi Bey, a Kurdish deputy from Baghdad; and the British enjoyed a brief return of popularity. But by 1911 the old positions were resumed, with Germany again as the acceptable Power and the railway tolerated. Great Britain still refused participation and declined equally to agree to a requested raising of Turkish Customs rates. Suggestions in 1910 for a British-dominated southern section of the railway came to nothing, and early in 1911 a Turkish plan for a Turkish-French-British Company to construct the Basra–Baghdad section was again rejected. But a Convention was drafted soon afterwards, in March 1911, on the basis of German renunciation of its Company's exclusive rights in southern 'Iraq, in return for assurance of participation in whatever other non-Turkish company might undertake these works.

Meanwhile by the Potsdam Agreement of 1910 Germany had accepted Russia's position in north Persia, and agreed not to oppose a Russian railway from Teheran to Khaniqin. France, disturbed by this Agreement, was pacified; and her favour to the Baghdad Railway was secured by a Franco-German arrangement which admitted a French privileged position in Syria, and removed other causes of friction or suspicion.

Before the conclusion of this Agreement, further Anglo-Turkish talks in 1911 and 1912 had dealt with the construction of the railway through southern 'Iraq, and in May 1913 terms were at last agreed though in fact never ratified. They covered, besides the railway, the quasi-independent status of Kuwayt within the Ottoman Empire, and the special British position in the Gulf. The Baghdad Railway terminus was to be at Basra itself, unless and until Great Britain should agree to its prolongation to the coast. The Company's Board was to be increased by two British Directors; the British position in river navigation was secured; and, in exchange, an increase of the Turkish Customs duties to 15 per cent. was to be allowed.

To consolidate all these results an Anglo-German Convention was initialed on 15 June 1914, by Sir Edward Grey and Lichnowsky, and but for the War would have been signed in August. It confirmed the cessation of British opposition to the railway with its terminal at Basra, established an open-door policy in 'Iraq with acknowledgement of British interests in the sphere of irrigation, and confirmed the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. Southern Persia was accepted by the Germans as a British area for oil development, and to aid this a Kut–Mandali railway would not be opposed. These provisions, against which many voices were raised among Turkish patriots, offered neverthe-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

less a prospect of the completion of the railway, object of so many hopes and fears for twenty years.

Meissner Pasha, brilliant and dynamic, polished Orientalist and courtier, appeared in Baghdad in July 1911 and opened his offices in the house of Kadhim Pasha, destined but ten years later to accommodate the British High Commission and later Embassy. The site of the future railway station was selected on the right bank, and the first sod for the projected first section of the line, from Baghdad to Samarrā, was cut in the Wali's presence in July 1912. Difficulties of labour and of river transport, of docks and barges were somehow overcome. The hair of Meissner Pasha turned, as Lorimer reported, from black to white in three years of struggle; but forty-one miles of line to Sumayka were finished in May 1914, and eighty to Samarrā a few weeks after the declaration of war.

The history of river steam-navigation in this period is closely tied to that of the Railway. A clause in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903 alarmed both the Lynchs' Euphrates and Tigris Company and the Oman-Ottoman Administration by its threat of privileged competition; but it was never applied. In 1904 the Saniya Administration, for a derisory payment, took over from the Oman-Ottoman their whole fleet and equipment which included four passenger steamers—*Baghdadi*, *Furat*, *Rasafa*, *Mosul*—and a number of smaller craft. The Ḥamidiya Navigation Administration, now so named, proceeded next to bring into service two new and relatively palatial Scottish-built paddle-steamers, the *Hamidiya* and *Burhaniya*, which Oman-Ottoman had ordered three years before, and four new barges. It operated during its five years of life with a greater efficiency than its predecessor; an English visitor, indeed, pronounced it in 1908 'wonderfully well run', and prophesied its final displacement of the Lynch boats, unless the Railway should first displace both. The Lynch Company meanwhile strove continually for greater freedom of development, which was tenaciously withheld, though a third steamer was permitted to sail regularly after 1907. The difficulties of low-water Tigris navigation and the tribal insecurity above and below 'Amara at times stopped all traffic and distracted the Lynch managers, Mr. Parry and Mr. Tod. The *Julnar*, the most pretentious of their fleet, was acquired in 1908; the other Lynch steamers already time-honoured (*Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*) continued in service under their tough veteran officers and Tall Kayfi crews. Free lances on the river—two Shi'i merchants and a head of the rich Khudhayri (Khedery) family—continued to take a share of the traffic, and schemes for further competition, such as that of an Anglo-Greek combine in 1905, were not infrequent. The Turkish revolution led to a retransfer of the Ḥamidiya Administration steamers from the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

505 Privy Purse to an organization of the central Government, the Ottoman River (Nahriya) Administration; but the service deteriorated in spite of new and important units acquired in 1912, the *Basra* and the *Baghdad*. Negotiations for a merger between Lynch and the Nahriya were persistent after 1909, but were long delayed by strong hostile outcry, both locally and in Istanbul, against such an example of foreign dominance, and were incomplete on the outbreak of war.

505 648* The subject, indeed, was among those covered by the never-ratified Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May 1913. This provided that, in the interests of the steamers, no 'navigable streams' were to be diverted from their courses; navigation rights were to be awarded for sixty years to a new Ottoman River Navigation Company, to be formed upon a basis of equal participation by Turkish and British interests. A fourth steamer (but under the Turkish flag) was to be allowed to the Euphrates Company. But while this arrangement was acceptable to the Baghdad Railway Company, which guaranteed the new Company a high minimum of tonnage, the damage to Lynch interests was clear. This in turn was met by a further agreement of March 1914 which was to bring the Lynch interest itself into the Ottoman Navigation Company. The Railway's rights of port-construction at Basra were to be passed to an Ottoman Port Company with participation for each of Lynch, Lord Inchcape, and the British India interests, and the Baghdad Railway. World events, however, were to prevent any of these arrangements from coming into force; before the end of 1914 German and Turkish interest in Tigris steam navigation was for ever extinguished.

Meanwhile, the immediate task of moving the Baghdad Railway materials from Basra led to the formation in 1912 of an *ad hoc* company, the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient, with equal participation of the Lynch Company and the Deutsche Bank; it acquired suitable small craft for its purposes, and was controlled locally by the Euphrates and Tigris management.

312 In the all-important sphere of irrigation, the new century was to see great and promising developments. The year 1900 and succeeding years found, indeed, the same evils as ever flourishing unchecked: disastrous annual flooding, deficiency of irrigation water in the season of greatest need, lack of control, lack of drainage. The same helplessness of the unled and unrecognized cultivators, the same archaic methods, the same vague and abortive projects formed in high circles, continued to provide no practical cure. Conditions in the mid-Euphrates area turned from bad to worse, with lands abandoned, canals drying, and tribes fighting for existence. The Hindiya Barrage again partially collapsed in 1903

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous.

But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to Istanbul through the British Ambassador. Late in 1908 he was appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra, Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra.

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stop-gap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

312 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete con-
185 struction were called for in September 1910, and the contract
653 awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Baṣra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Habbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Ṣaqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Ḥawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The infant oil industry in neighbouring Persia will be mentioned later (p. 71). In 'Iraq, in spite of some enlargement of the primitive extraction and refining plants at Qaiyara and elsewhere, no modern oilfield enterprise appeared. Nevertheless, the presence of important oil deposits in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas was universally believed, and was affirmed by German visitors in 1907. The first move was the allotment of a twenty-metre strip of territory, athwart the railway alignment, to the Anatolian Railway in its 1902 and 1903 Conventions; the Sultan reaffirmed in December 1903 his previous Iradas declaring the Privy Purse to be sole owner of 'Iraq oil; and in July 1904 an option for exploration was given by that administration to the Baghdad Railway who passed it to the Deutsche Bank. It was not pursued, and after two renewals the option was treated by the Turks (though never by the Bank) as having lapsed.

Meanwhile W. K. D'Arcy, after gaining his Persian Concession (p. 71), had sent a representative to Istanbul in 1901 and after three years of negotiation and a ministerial promise that a concession would later be forthcoming, firm application was made by his new-formed Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. Success was almost achieved in 1908; but the revolution interfered, Royal Iradas retransferred Turkish oil rights to the Treasury, and all negotiators perforce started again. The latter by now included another British group associated with Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, an able and progressive Armenian, and representatives of Admiral Chester, an American ex-officer with long-standing Turkish connexions and now a candidate for railway and mineral privileges.

The aspirants for 'Iraq oil development—for this was chiefly though not exclusively in question—regrouped and returned to the attack in 1910. In January 1911 Mr. Gulbenkian's group formed African and Eastern Concessions Ltd., with substantial holdings by the newly founded (British) National Bank of Turkey, the Shell interests, the Deutsche Bank, and Mr. Gulbenkian himself. The Company was late in 1912 renamed the Turkish Petroleum Company, with doubled capital, and the Deutsche Bank agreed to transfer to it the options which it claimed for railway-strip exploration. The D'Arcy interests, merged in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company since 1909, continued to press its candidature, which in 1913 again narrowly failed of success. Meanwhile, late in 1909, a Turkish Parliamentary Committee had voted for the grant of mineral rights on a 900 mile railway strip to Admiral Chester; and strong German opposition was needed to thwart his efforts to achieve ratification.

By 1913 the desirability of reconciling the rival applicants and enabling field work to commence was clear to all. Anglo-German

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

315 471 648* agreement on the diplomatic level was added to that of the Companies. The Turkish Petroleum Company was again reorganized. A quarter of its capital was allotted to the Deutsche Bank, a quarter to the Shell group, and a half to Anglo-Persian, with an interest of 5 per cent. to Gulbenkian. Confident application could now be made to the Grand Vizier, with the backing of both British and German Ambassadors. The result was a letter to these from Sa'id Ḥalim Pasha on 28 June 1914. It stated that the Minister of Finance agreed to lease to the T.P.C. all oil deposits discovered or to be discovered in the Mosul and Baghdad wilayas, and 'reserved the right later on to fix its own share, as well as the general terms of the Agreement'. Upon this letter, precisely, was based the application of the T.P.C. to the 'Iraq Government in 1923 for an oil concession to cover northern and central 'Iraq.

5. NEIGHBOURS AND FOREIGNERS

648* The increase in foreign interest and interests in 'Iraq during this period was rapid beyond precedent. It is explained by 'Iraq's more active participation in the nationalist movement, in Istanbul politics, and in educational foundations such as the Tribal College and the American University of Beirut; and it was aided by the railway and irrigation works projected and under execution, and the considerations of strategy and development suggested by them.

The Germans had, from 1900, included 'Iraq in their area of eastern expansion. They had taken the lead in archaeological work by nearly two decades of excavation by Koldewey at Babylon, and initiated excavation elsewhere in 'Iraq, for which their Consuls alleged the personal interest of the Kaiser. They founded a German school in Baghdad, and invited the French Carmelite fathers to teach German. They appointed a regular Consul in Baghdad in 1905 with his Vice-Consul at Baṣra, and planned a German-dominated quarter of the town with the Consulate, railway station, wharves, and Customs house. Since the earliest arrivals of German steamers at Baṣra in 1899, the subsidized traffic of these had steadily increased. The Hamburg–Amerika Line started regular sailings in 1906, to be followed by an influx of German commercial travellers and resident agents—notably the firm of Wonckhaus at Baṣra—and by the appearance of their goods in the Baghdad shops. 'Iraq, in fact, seemed destined to afford a stage for full German penetration.

Russian enterprise still kept to limited and uncommercial lines. Having failed at Kuwayt, they felt their way towards acquiring rights in a Persian port, and projected a trans-Persian railway; but the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 1907 helped to remove from these projects the element of menace to British interests in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Gulf. The occasional visits of their steamers, plying from Odessa to Baṣra, attempted no serious inroads into the market except in petroleum and wood; and Russian naval officers on their rare visits to the Shaṭṭ amused the foreign community by their high-handed treatment of the port regulations. It was rather to northern 'Iraq that their Consul-General and his deputy at Mosul directed their attention, even though most of the gradual Russian penetration of Kurdistan was arranged from Van and from the Russian dominated city of Urmiya. Increasingly from 1910 the frontier Aghās looked to Russia for support. The Sayids of Neri, Shaykh 'Abd al-Salim of Barzan, the Jaf leaders, and the Assyrian maliks and bishops were not alone in maintaining touch with them. This creeping Russian expansion seemed, however, to envisage no specific, certainly no immediate, objectives.

French interest in 'Iraq was, as ever, cultural. Their Consul in Baghdad followed with passion the controversy of Catholic against Nestorian in northern 'Iraq: supported the Alliance, the Dominicans, and the Carmelites, all of whom notably extended their institutions and charities between 1900 and 1914: and received in the 'French Garden' or Club in Baghdad his compatriot archaeologists, who were excavating from 1903 onwards. Commercial France was represented by the French-controlled Ottoman Bank, but by little else. Nothing came of their offer to contract for the carrying of mails from Baghdad to Syria, or to extend French railways from the Levant to the Euphrates.

The concern of the United States did not by 1914 yet extend to more than Protestant missionary enterprise and its developing schools, and the export of dates and liquorice to America. That of Great Britain had increased and consolidated. British interest in irrigation, in oil, in commerce, and river steamers has been already described. The strategic interest of southern 'Iraq and the Gulf approaches was jealously reassessed when the Russian threat gave way to the German, and the implications of this were discussed at high levels in London and Delhi. Lord Curzon's visit to Gulf ports in 1903, the parliamentary pronouncements of Lord Lansdowne in the same year, the determined preservation of all his privileges by the British Resident in Baghdad, all showed the value placed on the 'Iraq connexion. British sloops still sailed the Gulf and enlivened the British community at Baṣra (which trebled during the period) by occasional visits to 'Ashar. A new British Consulate finished in Baṣra in 1903, a new Residency in Baghdad in 1905, were impressive by local standards. A commercial assistant was added to the Resident's staff in 1906, an English Vice-Consul appointed to Mosul in 1908 after a twenty-year interval. British visitors to 'Iraq included a dozen officers of the Indian Army

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

648 interested in Arab affairs—G. E. Leachman, Hubert Young, Trenchard Fowle, A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, and others—and writers of distinction who included the gifted and scholarly traveller Gertrude Bell. Among private British residents were interesting or outstanding personalities: Dr. W. A. Wigram of the Archbishop's mission, Arthur Tod of Lynch's, Captain C. H. Cowley [186] of the river steamers. But even while personal relations with the Pashas remained cordial, a policy of pinpricks which reflected a jealous and suspicious xenophobia was at times directed against British interests. Expropriations without compensation, capricious refusal of the right to use commercial codes, baseless demands for registration fees, permission to practise withheld from British doctors, mean treatment of British employees recruited for technical functions: these were episodes of an intermittent campaign of petty malice. The refusal of British Consuls to listen to shaykhs or notables who begged for British 'protection', and their manifest sympathy with distracted Governors, availed little to overcome the suspicion that the British had, somehow, sinister designs on the 'Iraq wilayas. Nevertheless, life in 'Iraq was found pleasant enough by resident Englishmen, and many warm friendships were formed between them and 'Iraqis.

British Residents and their Consuls during the period maintained a high level of loyal and disinterested service. At Basra A. C. Wratislaw was Consul from 1898 to 1903, E. F. Crow from 1903 to 1914; both were loyal friends of successive Walis. At Baghdad Colonel L. S. Newmarch was Resident and Consul-General from 1902 to 1906, Colonel J. Ramsey and J. G. Lorimer from 1906 to 1909 and 1909 to 1913. These, and not these alone, were outstanding public servants and good friends of the 'Iraq peoples. The tragic death in 1914 of Lorimer, author of the encyclopædic *Persian Gulf Gazetteer*, was a grievous loss.

British-Indian interests did not diminish. The extraterritorial Post Offices continued to be resented by Turkish officialdom, the Indian pilgrim-agents at Samarrā and Kadhimiya served their visiting fellow countrymen in spite of official interference, trading firms developed their businesses. Visits to the Holy Cities by the rich and great of Indian Islam were events notable to the Indian communities which existed in most of the larger towns of central and southern 'Iraq; but these, with partial assimilation into the local population, had little community organization and few eminent members.

000 To turn now to 'Iraq's Arabian and Persian neighbours, Shaykh Mubarak at Kuwayt maintained his delicate triple position of nominal Qa'immaqam, treaty-bound British protégé, and effectively independent ruler. He survived the embarrassing visit of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the German Railway Commission, to which he refused all facilities, and was visited by French and by Russian warships; the British sloops called frequently. Mubarak's first attempts to serve and repatriate his now impatient Najdi guest, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa'ud, were discouraged by the British Government and forbidden by the Wali of Basra, who detached Sa'dun Pasha of the Muntafiq from his forces. He persisted, was defeated with loss in March 1901, and again barely survived Turkish wrath, thanks to the reasserted agreement of Istanbul and London to maintain the Kuwayt *status quo*. In October 1901 Kuwayt was threatened by the forces of ibn Rashid, but the attack was not pressed. In December further Turkish pressure was used, in vain, to lead him to abandon his claims to special status; Turkish forces occupied points on the confines of Kuwayt territory, the Shaykh's flocks were raided, his house in Basra looted, his Shatt al-'Arab date gardens sequestrated. Finally in September 1902 a surprise attack on the town, organized by his enemies with Turkish support, was thwarted only by the intervention of H.M.S. *Lapwing*. Thereafter no direct attempts were made to evict Mubarak or to upset his British engagements. In 1904 the Turks released his Basra and Fao properties with a clear title; a British Agent was installed at Kuwayt in the same year. Towards Istanbul and the Wali of Basra he continued until 1914 to express the most correct of attitudes; but his effective independence was admitted in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913.

The defeat of Sa'udi forces in March 1901 did not deter the exiled Amir of that dynasty from continuing to plan for a restoration. The famous sortie of his son, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, from Kuwayt to Riyadh in January 1902, his entry into the city by night and subsequent expulsion of Rashidi garrisons from all Kharaj and Hariq, do not belong to the history of 'Iraq; but they firmly re-established the rule of the house of Sa'ud in Najd, a rule extended by further operations against the Ha'il Amirate in 1902 to 1904; and in these increasingly the young 'Abd al-'Aziz represented his father as the active head of the State. The appeals of ibn Rashid to the Turks for support against such aggression were not, however, always to be ignored. The command of the 6th Army was instructed early in 1904 to launch from 'Iraq an invasion of Arabia. A force marched or crawled south-westward from Samawa in May and was in time to save Ha'il from Wahhabi attack. The forces of ibn Sa'ud were defeated by those of his rival; but the latter refused to permit the entry of the Turks into Ha'il. The defeated Sa'udi ruler, having made acceptable apologies to Istanbul and met the Wali of Basra, was appointed Qa'immaqam of Najd independently of ibn Rashid.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Later in the year 1904 a second Najd expedition from 'Iraq was mustered under the command of the aged and notorious Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha. Although ill-prepared and weakened by desertion, it reached Burayda unopposed. A military parade was organized, the official prayers offered in the name of the Sultan-Caliph, and a final comedy of Turkish administration was reached by the inscription of the central Arabian oases as qadhās and nahiyas of the Empire.

Turkish forces from 'Iraq, wholly ineffective and wasted by constant desertions to Kuwayt and Baṣra, remained in central Arabia until the last weeks of 1906, when evacuation was carried out. Thereafter it seemed that a tolerable *modus vivendi* in central and eastern Arabia had been found. But, to complete the ruin of age-long Turkish hopes of a conquered Arabia, one more blow awaited them. In May 1913 forces under 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud occupied the sanjaq of al-Aḥsā and, welcomed by tribe and oasis alike, compelled the withdrawal to Baṣra of Turkish civil officials and military garrisons. The Amir announced that he held the province from and for the Sultan as a loyal subject, but that direct Turkish occupation could not again be accepted. Baṣra wilaya lost a sanjaq, and the blow to Turkish prestige was severe. al-Aḥsā ceased in effect to be Turkish; Qaṭar, overlooked or uninteresting, retained a wretched Turkish garrison until the War removed it. In June 1914 ibn Sa'ud accepted from the Turks the title of Wali of Najd and al-Aḥsā.

In 'Iraqi-Persian relations, there has been reference elsewhere to the transit trade of the Kirmanshah road, to the Persian pilgrims to the Shi'i shrines and the burials of the Faithful, and to the resented influence of the Persian Mujtahids. Persian diplomatic representatives remained widespread in 'Iraq, headed by their Consul-General at Baghdad. For the rest, apart from normal trans-frontier traffic, there was active but rarely cordial contact at four points on the long frontier—the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, the Pusht-i-Kuh, the Kirmanshah road, and the province of Kurdistan.

At all these points was reflected the tragic depth of Persian corruption and impotence, and the beginnings of efforts, after 1905, to improve them. In 1907 the promise of a representative Chamber was extracted from Shah Muẓhaffar al-Din, but his despotic successor, Muḥammad 'Ali, continued until his abdication in 1909 to ignore both popular feeling and his own sworn undertakings. There followed twenty months of disturbance and Russian intervention, succeeded by the futile efforts of Muḥammad 'Ali to regain the throne from his child successor, Aḥmad Shah. To every evil of central misgovernment and provincial tyranny was added the misfortune of a decadent and avaricious royal house and an aggressive

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

northern neighbour. It was small wonder that the rulers and public of 'Iraq thought poorly of their eastern neighbours, sunk in miseries to which 'Iraq was paradise.

On the Shaṭṭ, the Turkish Government increasingly insisted upon that control of the whole river which the Erzerum Treaty, it was claimed, had awarded them. Episodes of smuggling, evasion of quarantine, and neighbourly obstruction multiplied. Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara continued far to outshine the Persian Government's Resident at his court, and dominated all southern 'Arabistan. His capital increased after 1900 in size and amenities, aided by the oil development, the thriving trade, and the good local security which attracted British, Persian, and German firms. The Shaykh befriended exiled rice-shaykhs of the 'Amara marshes, and was leagued with Sayid Ṭalib at Baṣra and Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt. He survived bitter quarrels with successive Walis of Baṣra, who resented his independence and prosperity. A Turkish encroachment on his territory in Ḥawiza district was frustrated by British intervention after Turkish guns had bombarded his palace. His relations with Teheran were coloured by jealous suspicion, and his friendship with the oil pioneers disliked. The Shaykh's children and those of Ḥajj Ra'is were educated at mission schools at Baṣra.

The plan for a trans-Persian railway with a terminus on the Gulf died hard. When it ceased to be all-Russian, it was adopted by an Anglo-Franco-Russian 'Société d'Études' which planned a Russian-controlled section from the Caucasus to Teheran with further British-dominated sections to the Gulf coast. These projects were debated in the House of Commons in 1912. Meanwhile an all-British group, including the Lynch interests, had other plans for south Persian railways, with Muḥammara or Khur Musā as terminal; and detailed surveys (under a young Indian Army officer, Lieutenant A. T. Wilson) were carried out through wild tribal territory.

Such threats to the supremacy of Baṣra as chief Gulf port were matched by other developments in 'Arabistan. In May 1901 W. K. D'Arcy, an Englishman enriched by a fortune made in Australia, obtained from the Shah an oil concession covering all central and southern Persia. After eighteen months of geological survey, drilling began at Chiah Surkh, a site just inside Persia according to the then recognized frontier, near Qaṣr-i-Shirin on the Khaniqin–Kirmanshah road. In spite of transport and supply difficulties and tribal and official interference, oil in commercially uninteresting quantities was struck early in 1904. Since these could never justify the projected pipeline to Muḥammara, Chiah Surkh was temporarily abandoned. D'Arcy, undeterred, transferred his

1a Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

operations far south to the Bakhtiari country, whose approaches lay through Muḥammara. A well at Mamatain was unsuccessful; then, on the very eve of abandoning the enterprise, oil was struck at Masjid-i-Sulayman on 26 May 1908. The success was followed up, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company formed in 1909, and a site for a refinery chosen on the barren desolate Jazirat al-Khidhr, or Abadan Island, on the Shaṭṭ some miles south of Muḥammara. The period from 1909 to 1914 in 'Arabistan was one of immense activity, of which a considerable effect was felt at Baṣra. The first installations were completed by 1912, and the export of oil at a rate which had reached 250,000 tons a year was in operation at the outbreak of war: a development which substantially increased the strategic interest of the Gulf-head area, the Shaṭṭ approaches, and southern 'Iraq. In the spring of 1914 the British Government, on the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The relations between the Shaykh of Muḥammara and the Company were consistently cordial.

In the Pusht-i-Kuh zone of the frontier[1] relations were normal in their squabbles over tribal and grazing matters, the shared Mandali water-courses, and the Badra Customs house. The pious and avaricious Wali, Ghulam Ridhā Khan, grew ever richer, acquired a house in Baghdad, and supported the persistent claims to the throne by the half-insane Salar al-Dawla, brother of the Muḥammad 'Ali Shah deposed in 1909. The bloody and futile antics of this prince form indeed a main part of the history of the frontier area astride the Kirmanshah road in the last five years of our present period. His annual appearance in the field, his seduction of some of the frontier tribes, his threats to Kirmanshah and Hamadan, his relapses into mere looting, blackmail, and voluptuous living on the harassed countryside, became the normal régime in a fertile and delightful territory. If he could make no headway against the official forces of Prince Firman Firmā, representing the central Government and royal family, neither could the latter pacify the country or expel him. D'Arcy's drillers were among the sufferers from the general disorder. The road was frequently closed, goods accumulated at Baghdad, pilgrims and corpse-caravans could not move. The pretensions of Salar al-Dawla were added as an irritant to the habitual factions and warfare of the Persian-Kurdish tribes, and to these the raids by—and exiled residence sought for—the 'Iraqi-Kurdish tribes of Hamawand, Zangana, Jaf, and Ṭalabani. The leaders of these joined in the mêlée with forces fitfully assembled and dispersed for and against the wretched pretender; who, with difficulty persuaded to leave Kurdistan in 1914, was nevertheless destined to appear yet again on the 'Iraq frontier.

1 [Iraq-Persian frontier.—analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Farther north, the history of Shaykh 'Ubaydullah's great raid of 1880 was repeating itself. The last frontier crisis around Wazna in 1889 had never been settled, and in 1906 Persian forces continued to hold territory claimed by the Turks under the vague terms of the 1847 treaty. The internal distractions of Persia, aided by bribery, now opened the door to a long-prepared Turkish invasion of the disputed area. Ḥamidiya battalions accompanied the Turkish regulars, and tribal bands joined in. Sardasht and Bana were occupied, Urmiya threatened, its plain devastated. Persian countermeasures under Firman Firmā prevented further advance; but in 1907 strong Turkish forces, refusing to parley with protesting Persian Governors, converged on Ṣawj Bulaq. The town was barely saved as a result of pressing Anglo-Russian representations, and the Turks withdrew a short distance from it and from Urmiya. But in 1909 the deposition of Muḥammad 'Ali Shah and the helplessness of Persia again invited Turkish ambition. Their troops reoccupied the disputed area and planted garrisons in the districts of Qutur, Khoi, Salmas, Margawar, Targawar, and Baradost. Ṣawj Bulaq was occupied as part of a wide and deep strip of borderland which, whatever ancient claims might allege, had not been Turkish for some generations. The Turks failed, however, to seduce the Persian Kurds of Marivan and Hawraman areas, Sunni though they were, and made little headway in the Shi'i tribes of Kirmanshah province. Vivid pictures of the assembly of the Turkish forces from Anatolia at frontier posts, and the asperities and absurdities of the Frontier Commissioners dispatched to the spot, ignorant of all history and topography but fervid in patriotism, are given by European travellers of the time.

Such episodes could possibly be obviated by diplomacy, never by border warfare. The frontier had now become a direct British interest by reason of the oil at Chiah Surkh and on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab; and since 1907 joint Anglo-Russian action had become easier. These Powers succeeded in 1912 in reassembling the 65-year-old Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission in Istanbul. In 1913 it was reconstituted with British and Russian membership and power to arbitrate, and a copy of the old 'Carte identique' was with difficulty unearthed. Each Power named its representatives. The British with wise forethought secured an undertaking that, should any Persian territory be transferred to Turkey, the D'Arcy oil rights therein should be honoured. The four Commissioners met at Muḥammara in December 1913, Great Britain being represented by Wratislaw and A. T. Wilson. Their delimitation work proceeded with remarkable amity. The line fixed involved Turkish withdrawal from most of the newly occupied region, but assigned to them two strips of territory in the Khaniqin–Mandali zone and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648* north of the Sirwan—the future 'Transferred Territories'. The Commission reached Mount Ararat late in September 1914. Their work proved to be an important contribution to Turko-Persian relations, and established, by concrete pillars and accurate maps, an 'Iraq-Persian frontier which Persian repudiation twenty years later (p. 267) could not discredit, and which in 1950 was still accepted.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

Too few countries in the world were greater changes brought by the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH Iraq MH

642 619 distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pretensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Government. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914 642 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of 185 Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

000 Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

The action of Germany in precipitating a world war in August 1914, and of Turkey in entering it, swept all these considerations and speculations aside for ever.

2. THE CAMPAIGN IN LOWER 'IRAQ

The intervention of British armed forces in the 'Iraq of 1914 was a stroke universally unexpected. The Indian Army had been weakened by curtailment ever since the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The dispatch of a column to the mouth of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab on a minimum scale had, indeed, been considered in staff conferences at Simla as a conceivable operation, but never seriously planned. All Indian forces which could be spared from an India itself insecure were dispatched to France on the outbreak of war; and hostilities with Turkey had always been feared as likely to produce dismay among Indian Muslims. The physical acquisition of territory on the Tigris or Euphrates had at no time been considered in responsible British circles. The immediate military value of a diversion at Fao or Baṣra could not be considerable. There were, in fact, abundant reasons against any such expedition.

But there were counter-arguments. Even before their declaration of war, the attitude of the Turks in 'Iraq was pointedly hostile. British property was requisitioned without ceremony. Turkish and German agents left for Persia to stimulate anti-foreign emotion, and sought even to seduce the Shaykh of Muḥammara. The Army was mobilized and supplied, martial law was proclaimed. Troop movements, if mainly northward to Anatolia, were reported also southward to Baṣra. There was reason to fear that Turkish authority at the head of the Gulf, if asserted with truculence and left unchallenged, would weaken the British position there, bring ruin to the Anglophil Shaykhs of Muḥammara and Kuwayt and in some degree ibn Sa'ud also, encourage malevolent elements in Persia, and be used indeed by the Germans as a disquieting threat to India itself. Finally, it would place in danger, or immediate ruin, the British oil enterprise in 'Arabistan.

Throughout August, September, and October 1914 intensive consultations took place between London and Delhi. Military and political views, British and British-Indian, were explored. Weight was given to the sage and balanced opinion of Sir Percy Cox, now Foreign Secretary in India after twelve years' service in the Gulf. Feeling in favour of an expedition to 'Iraq grew slowly in strength, without unanimity or enthusiasm, as the probability grew to certainty that Turkey would enter the War. On 2 October a positive decision was reached. The mission of the Expeditionary Force would be to protect the Abadan oil installations, cover the potential landing of reinforcements, and reassure the Arab

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

potentates. A Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division sailed with sealed orders under Brigadier W. S. Delamain on 16 October, and arrived a week later at Bahrayn. After a fortnight its transports moved northward. War became certain on 29 October, and was declared on 5 November. Cox, as Chief Political Officer to the force, proclaimed that the British Government, while it 'had no quarrel with the Arab inhabitants of the river banks, as long as they showed themselves friendly', had been forced by Turkish hostility to take this step to protect its friends and interests. At dawn on 6 November the Fao fort was silenced by naval guns. Troops were landed at Abadan and soon reinforced, to be brought progressively up to divisional strength under the command of Major-General Sir A. A. Barrett. Turkish resistance led to two sharp actions, at Sayḥan and at Saḥil on 15 and 17 November; attempts to block the Shaṭṭ by sunken ships (including the *Kilid al-Baḥr*) failed of their object. Baṣra lay open and was entered on the 22nd. Pillage and arson by the town riff-raff were immediately suppressed, order established, the British flag hoisted, and gestures of welcome made by the notables and people. Cox announced again by proclamation that no ill will was felt against the civil population, justice and liberty would be respected, troops would behave 'with complete consideration and friendliness'. The British occupation of 'Iraq had begun.

The objectives of Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' had been achieved in full. Abadan was secure, the Turks discomfited, the friendly shaykhs complacent. Was this the end? No decision would have been more natural than one to remain in strong possession of Baṣra and its suburbs, and to advance no farther. But, impressed by the feebleness of Turkish resistance and the hope of enhancing British prestige, the C.P.O. telegraphed on 22 November to the Viceroy that he 'found it difficult to see how we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'; and, indeed, the lure of Baghdad was to continue, till its capture in March 1917, to lead the Army into advances and adventures never indicated by its essential rôle—though this too, thanks to the divided councils of the War Office, Foreign Office, India Office, Viceroy, and local commanders, was never clearly formulated. The military command was needlessly ill informed of 'Iraq conditions; its Intelligence and Political officers were almost all unacquainted with the territory, as was Cox himself. The Turkish Army was underrated, the deficiencies of the Indian military machine only gradually revealed; but these considerations hardly explain a persistent lack of precision in the objectives of I.E.F. 'D'. To the defeat of the Turco-German armies the Expedition made from first to last, and in spite of all its successes, a contribution quite unequal to its own cost and grievous losses.

ls Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca, 1918-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Meanwhile, the first suggestion to advance on Baghdad was rejected by London and Delhi. Qurna was occupied late in December, the Wali of Baṣra, Subḥi Bey and his staff captured, the ancient gunboat *Marmaris* sunk. A few miles of territory west and north-west of Baṣra, including Shu'ayba, were occupied, though a more ambitious proposal to advance on Naṣiriya and thus to control the Muntafiq was refused. The beginning of 1915 found the British forces firmly rooted on both banks of the Shaṭṭ. For the civil government of Baṣra city and suburbs a Military Governor was appointed, with an officer of the Levant Consular Service, R. W. Bullard, who had been acting as Consul at Baṣra, to assist him as Civil Adviser. Rupee currency was introduced and a party of Indian and Somali police brought in. Contact was made with the leading Baṣrawis and rural notables, who took the initiative of telegraphing complacent greetings to King George V. The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, visited Baṣra in February 1915. Sayid Ṭalib had approached the Chief Political Officer through Shaykh Khaz'al in October, to offer his services in return for recognition as Amir of the territory; but his suggestion was rejected and he was seen in 'Iraq no more until 1920. Many leading citizens and nearly all responsible officials had accompanied the retreating Turks; but with the date-village folk, the Shaykh of Zubayr, and the riverain tribesmen friendly terms were established. 'Ujaymi, lurking on the desert fringe, offered his services, refused to appear, bargained, and finally withdrew, thenceforward a profitless ally of the Turks.

Early in 1915 signs appeared that the Turks would not lightly accept invasion. By suitable counter-measures they could strike southward by the Tigris at Qurna, by the Euphrates at the Shu'ayba outposts, or in 'Arabistan by way of attack on the oilfields and pipelines. The last-mentioned plan was the first to be adopted. The loyalty of a part of the tribes of 'Arabistan, subjects of Muḥammara, was perverted, and the pipeline cut. A small British force was promptly detached and placed at Ahwaz; but weeks of keen anxiety were to pass and more forces to be dispatched before the oil territory was secure. On the Shu'ayba front, where the spring flooding created the acutest difficulties of supply, attack by major Turkish forces and Arab auxiliaries was reported in March as probable, and as imminent in early April, at the moment when a newly formed Indian division, the 12th, was disembarking at Baṣra. The four-day battle of Shu'ayba, 12–15 April, was critical and desperately fought. It ended with the withdrawal of the Turks, harassed murderously by their Arab allies, and the suicide of Sulayman Bey al-'Askari, their commander.

I.E.F. 'D' had been reorganized as from 8 April as a Corps (the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1948) MH Iraq MH

600 2nd Indian Army Corps) under Lieutenant-General Sir John Nixon. The instructions conveyed to him were to 'control the Baṣra wilaya . . . and those portions of neighbouring territory which may affect its security; to ensure the safety of the oilfields, pipeline and refineries; and . . . to submit plans for effective occupation . . . and for a further advance to Baghdad.' These orders, in the eyes of a highly confident Commander, seemed not to exclude limited offensives which would take his arms deeper into 'Iraq and achieve Cox's political objectives, including the control of major tribes and routes. He dispatched in April a strong column under Brigadier-General G. F. Gorringe, who in three months restored the position in 'Arabistan, punished insurgent tribesmen, and secured the oil supply. Next, late in May, he directed Major-General C. V. Townshend and the 6th Indian Division with improvised transport of local river-craft—'Townshend's regatta'—to advance with naval support northward from flood-surrounded Qurna. His objective was 'Amara. The operation, thanks to Turkish withdrawal in panic, was completely successful. 'Amara was occupied on 2 June. Nixon then, with the reluctant permission of Simla, ordered a force under Gorringe to occupy Naṣiriya. The task was completed on 25 July after heroic struggles against heat and swamp conditions at their deadliest. This achieved the occupation of the triangle Fao–'Amara–Naṣiriya, and left the 2nd Corps distributed, apart from its lines-of-communication posts, in five main groups: at Baṣra, Qurna, Ahwaz, 'Amara, and Naṣiriya. At this stage and this degree of dispersal, it was able, but barely able, to maintain and supply itself.

But much more was to be attempted; considerations of prestige and the lure of Baghdad beckoned the Army onward in spite of all orthodox military considerations, partly as a counterblast to recent failure at Gallipoli, partly to forestall a not impossible Russian occupation. The Secretary of State for India, still responsible for the campaign, was induced to agree to the 150-mile increase of communications necessary to reach Kut and the Gharraf–Tigris junction. Townshend on 1 September began to concentrate his division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade at 'Ali al-Gharbi above 'Amara. He reached and forced the Ṣana'iyat position, scored a decisive victory on 27–28 September over the forces of Nur al-Din Bey, and enforced it by a vigorous pursuit through and beyond Kut. On 5 October his cavalry had reached 'Aziziya. Within the next few days, after exchanges of telegrams with India and London, the surprising decision was reached to attempt the capture of Baghdad without more ado: that is, with wholly inadequate transport and no reserves. The forward concentration at 'Aziziya was complete by 14 November—just as, unknown to Townshend, two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

fresh divisions under Khalil Pasha, the 45th and 51st, released from Gallipoli by the withdrawal of the British forces, had arrived to strengthen the Turkish 6th Army. The advance of the 6th Indian Division, its initial successes and later Pyrrhic victory at Ctesiphon, followed by enforced retreat by way of Lajj and 'Aziziya to Kut, belong to British military history and have been amply recorded by other writers. Kut was reached on 3 November. Instead of falling farther back, Townshend and his tired and weakened troops were ordered to halt the retreat and to hold Kut. The siege began; it was to last for 140 days, until 29 April 1916, and to end in the unconditional surrender of the garrison.

3. BRITISH AND TURKISH 'IRAQ, 1915–16

The impact of the Mesopotamian scene and people upon the invaders was generally unfavourable. The troops of every rank were impressed equally by the repellent desolation of the desert, and by the poverty and filth of the villages. Low standards of life and, as they judged it, low types of humanity confronted them. Idlers, beggars, pimps, sneak-thieves, haunted the fringes of the camps. These impressions were not improved by the physically inferior workers of the Arab Labour Corps, which were quickly established, nor by greedy bazaar shopkeepers, shameless and often murderous pilfering, and the ghoulish stripping of corpses on the battlefield itself by riverain tribesmen. Only Political Officers had opportunity of meeting the better elements, the respectable citizens and headmen of tribe or village, who, with their qualities of self-respect, humour, and intelligence remained regrettably unknown to the vast majority of the forces. If the Indian soldier and follower, especially if a Muslim, was not too incomprehensible to the southern 'Iraqi, the British officer and soldier were wholly strange in the difference of their manners, their prejudices, their tempo, and standards from those of the Turkish soldiery. When common tasks or interests—in river craft, fatigue parties, or coffee-shop meetings—brought fair types of the two races together, friendly relations were easily established; but such cases were too rare, and mutual non-comprehension and inhibition between 'the Army' and the population were to prove sadly permanent. Even though troops behaved well, abundant money was paid for all goods and services, and requisitioning was never harsh, yet billeting in the towns, blockade measures to keep supplies from the enemy, irksome sanitary and veterinary restrictions, control of movement and travel, road-making across canal beds, and military damage to crops and gardens were all ever-recurrent grievances. Moreover, the early contacts of the infant

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Civil Administration[1] under Cox and his loyal indefatigable assistant, A. T. Wilson, were shadowed by the absence of all assurance that the occupation would be permanent. Imposed by caution and by French susceptibilities, the silence of the British on this matter must effectively preclude whole-hearted 'Iraqi co-operation. The Turks might yet return! But many or most of the town and tribal notables seemed willing to make the best of an occupation well conducted—and immensely profitable.

The honesty and inexperienced zeal of the incoming Political Officers—in almost every way the strangest of contrasts to their Turkish predecessors—did not preclude minor trouble with tribal communities unused to the new tranquillity or eager for loot or seduced by Turkish propaganda. Many punitive columns, sometimes unsuccessful, sought to chastise offenders. Meanwhile, the cramped and ill furnished Political Offices, staffed with Indian clerks and thronged with petitioners, witnessed from morning to night the rough-and-ready disposal of land and revenue and tribal cases, criminal trials, municipal and police business, and attempts to meet ever-increasing military demands for information, billets, labour, and supplies.

The occupation of 'Amara brought the Albu Muḥammad and Bani Lam within the field of the new administration, that of Naṣiriya the Muntafiq. Relations were established gradually: many tribal leaders were shy of a novel and a Christian government, some shunned contact and refused submission. In the Muntafiq, the increase of control was slow and difficult. A *modus vivendi* was arranged between the patrician Sa'duns and their nominal tenants, the machinery of a simple administration appeared, revenue collection began, countryside government by tribal Mudirs could be introduced, blood feuds were composed, a force of mounted police—forerunner of the 'Iraq Levies—was recruited. In Baṣra and Qurna tranquillity was unbroken. In the desert the Dhafir were made responsible for the frontier marches;

[1] Among the British officials, with Cox and Wilson, to serve the 'Civil Administration of Mesopotamia' in 1915–16 were: in 1915, S. G. Knox (Judicial), Drs. D. F. Borrie and N. E. H. Scott (Medical); C. R. Watkins (Customs); E. G. Gregson (Police): and as 'Politicals', C. C. J. Barrett, H. R. P. Dickson, C. J. Edmonds, T. C. W. Fowle, R. E. Holland, G. E. Leachman, C. F. Mackenzie, C. F. Macpherson, R. Marrs, E. W. C. Noel, H. St. J. B. Philby. In 1916 the Administration was joined by H. F. Forbes (Judicial), Drs. T. H. Bishop, G. Finch, T. H. Wood (Medical), F. W. Gerrard and F. C. Bright (Police), C. F. Weakford (Government Press), T. C. Wilson (Hostile Trading Concerns), H. R. C. Dobbs and C. C. Garbett (Revenue), and as 'Politicals' and in miscellaneous duties, H. M. Bloomfield, R. W. Bullard, H. A. Goldsmith, F. S. Greenhouse, M. Hiles, E. B. Howell, J. B. Mackie, S. G. C. Murray, E. B. Soane, A. L. Gordon-Walker, W. F. C. A. Wilson, and Miss G. L. Bell. These officers belonged to the Indian or Sudan Civil or Levant Consular or Indian Political services, or to the commercial houses established in 'Iraq before the War. See the last words of the footnote on p. 101.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

but ibn Rashid, invited by Cox to make his peace, preferred to remain well subsidized in the Turkish orbit. In 'Amara Division, the *muqata'a* system was retained, for lack of any feasible alternative, and taxation was handled with discretion. After the occupation of Kut, the pro-Turkish shaykhs were attracted in, one after another, after a number of abrupt changes of attitude. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh maintained a watchful neutrality. The Zubayd and Rab'iya, upstream, waited on events.

Relations with Shaykh Khaz'al remained close and cordial. His tribal control in 'Arabistan, badly shaken in early 1915, was soon wholly recovered. Mubarak of Kuwayt, loyal to the last, died in November 1915. His son Jabir, surviving him by a single year, left the principality to his brother, Salim, whose pro-Turkish attitude called for the presence of a British force at Kuwayt. To 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud an envoy of goodwill, Captain W. H. I. Shakespeare, of the Indian Political Department, was sent at the outbreak of war, only to be killed by a tragic accident in the course of a Sa'udi–Rashidi battle in January 1915. Ibn Sa'ud was thereafter preoccupied by a rising among his own tribes. In December 1915 a formal treaty of mutual recognition and friendship between him and the British Government was arranged by Cox, and in November 1916, after a stately durbar at Basra, he was granted a supply of arms and a subvention of £60,000 a year. Postponing his own settlement with ibn Rashid, he viewed with suspicion from afar the uprising and pretensions of the astute and ambitious Amir of Mecca, the Sharif Husayn bin 'Ali, but himself, for reasons arising from Arabian politics, took no part in the War.

The retreating Turks had removed from southern 'Iraq all senior officials while looters (and defaulting taxpayers) destroyed the records; the new Administration must start from nothing. Substituting Arabic for Turkish, it retained many forms of Turkish procedure, including those of revenue assessment, for lack of better available. Customs duties, at a standard 10 per cent., were collected on incoming civilian goods. Criminal justice remained in the hands of the Military Governor, Political Officers, and their Assistants. Of Capitulations, abolished by Turkish decree throughout their Empire on the outbreak of war, there was for the time no need or question. For cases among tribesmen a special code—the Tribal Disputes Regulations—was evolved, and was destined to hold force for many years. Normal civil cases were tried by Courts newly established at successive headquarters, working in Arabic. Bodies of police, local constables under British officers, were established in 'Amara and Nasiriya. Less formal gendarmerie forces, the Shabana, kept order under the Political Officers and performed a host of miscellaneous services in the smaller riverain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

towns and country districts. The Shabana of 'Amara Division were provided by the chief shaykhs themselves; in Qurna and the marshes they were non-tribal. At Naṣiriya and Suq al Shuyukh the police were supplemented by bodies of tribal horse under direct military command.

Such attention as was possible was paid, thus early, to civil health requirements in the form of dispensaries and hospitals serving the local population, insistence on sanitation, control of urban water supplies, anti-malarial and anti-epidemic measures. A modest news service was inaugurated at Baṣra, where a newspaper was published in Arabic and English. The Eastern and the Imperial Ottoman Banks opened branches in Baṣra, soon followed by the Imperial Bank of Persia. A few primary schools were started in 1915 and 1916, and grants were made to the American Mission School at Baṣra and those of the Christian and Jewish communities.

But the British occupation covered, at this stage, only a small fraction of 'Iraq. The rest remained under a Turkish Government increasingly militarized, harsh, and disillusioned. Some of the foreign residents in Baghdad had left for Baṣra and Muḥammara before the declaration of war; of the British community, almost intact when war broke out, the men were then marched to Syria when the intervention of Jamal Pasha, formerly Wali of Baghdad (p. 50) and personally acquainted with most, secured their release without parole, and some, including E. B. Soane and Arthur Tod, returned by way of Egypt to Baṣra: the women stayed in Baghdad until March 1917 when they were sent to Istanbul, there to remain for the rest of the war. Foreign interests and all but the most privileged of 'Iraqis suffered heavily from restrictions, rarely-paid requisitions, and sheer confiscation. Turkish ill will towards the population had increased with the growth of Arab nationalism, and was now exasperated by Arab indifference, or worse, towards their rulers' war effort. The Liberal Committee in Baghdad was dissolved in 1916, the work of the foreign missions —Carmelite, Jewish, and Protestant in Baghdad, Dominican in Mosul—was suppressed and forbidden. Conscription was rigorously enforced on formerly exempted classes, and general mobilization created many hardships. The early proclamation of Holy War against the infidel had been reinforced by every Mosque preacher, Sunni or Shi'i, whom the Turks could influence. It created little popular or religious feeling, unless for a short phase at Baṣra in 1915; but it proved possible under this guise to mobilize some thousands of loot-hungry tribesmen from central 'Iraq, and some hundreds from southern Kurdistan, to join the Turkish forces opposite Shu'ayba and in 'Arabistan. Their military value was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

negligible, and the outcome an added bitterness between Turk and Arab and the final failure of the Jihad. The tribesmen returned home confident, with reason, that their escapade would not prejudice them with eventual British occupiers. Many shaykhs changed their loyalties—if their naïve and futile professions of adherence deserve the name—more times than once. The Turks continued to subsidize 'Ujaymi and ibn Rashid and, on the middle Euphrates, to preach resistance to the invading infidel: efforts which, neutralized in part by sheer indifference and in part by British propaganda and tribal contacts already made up-stream, produced no military results.

Meanwhile a situation dangerous to the Turks had developed in the Holy Cities. Turkish rancour did not spare the priestly circles of Karbalā and Najf. Deserters from their forces took refuge in the latter city and the attempt to recover these, added to harsh requisitions, led to riots, reprisals, and damage to the sacred buildings. The enraged mob overcame the troops, pillaged Government offices, and installed a 'Government' of leading citizens. The movement of violent revolt spread, with wide tribal backing, to Karbalā and elsewhere. Turkish garrisons and officials were expelled, their houses burnt, their property destroyed. But no unity developed in the movement; it died feebly down and the Turks, after a course of appeasing conciliation, could return to restore a nominal authority. A correspondence developed in September 1915 between spokesmen of the Holy Cities and Sir Percy Cox in which the former offered, on highly imaginative terms, to renounce Turkish allegiance, and the latter sent gifts of money. Six months later further disorders broke out at Karbalā; an attempted arrest led to violence whereby the Turks were again evicted. The same followed at Najf and Ḥilla. The latter place was the scene of further long-remembered tragedy: Turkish troops appearing outside it in November 1916 arrested a deputation of townsmen, hanged a number of them, then wrecked and looted parts of the town. To such depths of folly and crime did the Caliph's Government descend in its last months of life in the Shi'i areas of 'Iraq.

In the north, economic life and the Persian transit-route suffered catastrophe by the closing of the Baṣra supply-line. Surpluses of exportable grain and dates accumulated, with increasing shortages of textiles, hardware, and imported necessities, and a general paralysis of trade. The introduction of valueless paper-money was accompanied by brutal seizures of gold and valuables. Civil life became ever less normal and less tolerable. It was complicated by increasing pressure on the minority communities, and by the appearance of Armenian refugees in hundreds from the abominable

1i Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 massacres of 1915–16 in Anatolia. Some lurked in the towns, some were scattered among the tribes. Outlying tribal disobedience must perforce be ignored by the weakened and harassed governors; but occasional blows could still be struck. Shaykh Salim of Barzan was caught and hanged, to be succeeded by the half-idiot Shaykh Aḥmad. Sayid Ṭaha of Neri contrived to escape. The Rawanduz area, invaded in 1915–16 by Russian troops detached from their western Persian operations, was devastated by their barbarous exactions and indiscipline.

4. KUT–BAGHDAD–MOSUL

Townshend's retirement to Kut early in December was followed by its complete investment by the end of that month. Cox left, under orders, before the siege closed in. Some 6,000 'Iraqis were inside, the suggestion to evict them having been rejected. The siege began with an impetuous Turkish attack on 24 December; it was unsuccessful and never repeated. The forces of Khalil Pasha consisted, from this time onward, of strong elements of the Turkish 13th Corps (35th and 36th Divisions) and 18th Corps (45th and 51st Divisions), with the 52nd and 2nd Divisions arriving soon afterwards. His army was, throughout, more numerous and far more easily supplied than the relieving forces. The latter, the Tigris Corps, consisted of the 7th and shortly afterwards the 3rd Indian Divisions, the 6th Cavalry Brigade, and miscellaneous Corps troops, and was commanded as from 12 December by Lieutenant-General F. Aylmer. They concentrated at 'Ali al-Gharbi from the first days of 1916, moved up-river and successfully occupied Shaykh Sa'ad, but failed to carry the Umm Ḥanna position on 21 January. Conditions of flooding, mud, sickness, and deficient transport and supplies hampered their operations to the verge of immobility.

A week earlier General Nixon, whose health had collapsed, had been relieved by Sir Percy Lake in the highest command. His earliest care was to plan improvement of the port facilities of Baṣra, where congestion and confusion were indescribable, and simultaneously to augment the pitifully inadequate river fleet and to build roads and railways. This gave promise of future improvement, but all too late for the Kut operations. The dispatch of the (British) 13th Division from Europe, and the tardy transfer of control of the British and British-Indian Army—I.E.F. 'D' now renamed the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force—from India Office to direct War Office control, were other favourable elements. The Russian capture of Erzerum on 17 February, and the advance of their forces southward to Kirmanshah on the road to Baghdad, could also seem encouraging.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

But the stars in their courses, with the powerful alliance of sheer military inferiority and heart-breaking conditions, fought against the Tigris Corps. A promising offensive on the right bank, at the Dujayla Redoubt, was turned into fiasco by misunderstanding among the generals. The appeals of Townshend for relief indicated ever-varying dates as his limit of endurance. Gorringe succeeded Aylmer in command of the Corps, and was able with the fresh troops of the 13th Division under Major-General Stanley Maude to carry the Ḥanna and Fallahiya positions on 5 April; but the Ṣana'iyat line proved impregnable. That of Bayt 'Isā on the right bank was captured, but another attack on Ṣana'iyat on 22 April was unsuccessful and grievously costly. Tigris Corps casualties had amounted in four months to over 23,000 men; further frontal attacks were out of the question, and floods covered the flanks. Supplies dropped by aircraft could not long avert the end. A hopeless and unworthy attempt to buy the safety of the garrison for cash from the Turkish Commander was made and rejected; T. E. Lawrence and Aubrey Herbert had been sent to 'Iraq to make the effort, of which Cox disapproved. A last heroic venture to run the blockade by river with the Lynch paddle-steamer *Julnar* under Captain Cowley failed. On 29 April Townshend and his garrison of 2,750 British and 6,500 Indian troops surrendered.

The abominable treatment in 'Iraq and Turkey of the Kut prisoners in Turkish hands, and the proceedings and Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, which allotted blame for the débâcle to all concerned with a generous but discriminating hand, belong rather to the history of the British Army than to that of 'Iraq. The local effects of the Kut defeat, however, were appreciable. Many tribal waverers again changed sides or withdrew from sight; little could be done to develop the civil administration or to extend it beyond the river banks; and the reluctance of townsfolk to identify themselves with the British was increased, though less than could have been expected.

The Turks re-entering Kut in triumph behaved with gross indiscipline, and hanged or tortured 'Iraqi civilians who had committed 'treason' by enduring the siege: a lesson not lost upon the 'Iraqi public elsewhere. Thereafter Khalil Pasha consolidated his position athwart the Tigris, held Ṣana'iyat with his 18th Corps (45th, 51st, and 52nd Divisions) and could send his 13th Corps into Persia to oppose the Russians, whom it decisively drove back after General Baratoff had already occupied Karind and threatened Khaniqin. The British Commander-in-Chief received on 30 April instructions to adopt a defensive rôle but to maintain his forward positions with the hope of Russian co-operation and to minimize

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 loss of prestige. His forces entered a period of regrouping and rebuilding. One more division, the 14th, joined the forward troops opposite Kut. The summer of 1916 set in.

The period from April to December 1916, unmarked by military operations, witnessed nevertheless the gradual transition of the British forces from a position of inadequacy in supplies, transport, services, and reinforcements to one of abundance and sound organization. This, in spite of the utmost efforts of General Lake, was achieved only painfully and gradually; even in August it was necessary for supply reasons to withdraw the 13th Division to the rear. Arms, ammunition, equipment, railway material, land and river transport arrived week by week. The port of Baṣra was created on extensive modern lines by Sir George Buchanan, with the construction of wharves, provision of equipment, and operations of dredging and buoying. Roads and light railways were built to serve it, protected by 'bunds' from the ever-threatening floods. The river fleet, augmented fiftyfold by miscellaneous craft from all quarters, was organized into a Directorate of Inland Water Transport which, controlling a fleet without parallel on the world's rivers for number of craft and tonnage handled, played thereafter a part of immense importance. Straightening of channels, conservancy and lighting operations were carried out on the Tigris and Shaṭṭ al-'Arab to facilitate navigation, and a deep channel was dredged at vast cost through the Ḥammar Lake—only to be abandoned unused and unwanted. On the roads, mechanical transport was introduced on a major scale during 1916, with the network of depots and repair shops indispensable to it. It changed, in a day and for ever, 'Iraqi conceptions of movement by land. Aircraft, which did not exist at the outset of the campaign and mustered only three machines in the autumn of 1915, were multiplied, with improved types, to a level of superiority over the enemy for the first time. The medical services, hitherto inadequate to the point of grave scandal, were overhauled and greatly increased. The labour organization, which provided well-paid and well-found employment for many thousands of Arabs and Kurds, was unified into a competent Directorate; that of Local Resources vastly extended its operations in all controlled areas, and worked through innumerable local contractors and suppliers. These various and interlocking services, which multiplied the ration strength of the Expedition and filled Base and lines-of-communications areas with an infinity of camps, buildings, depots, workshops, and roads, were co-ordinated by an incoming Inspector-General of Communications, Major-General G. McMunn.

Railway construction, apart from light lines at the Port, was begun in April 1916. A metre-gauge line from Baṣra to Naṣiriya

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was completed in December, a narrow-gauge line from Qurna to 'Amara was begun in July and opened in November. In August a light line in the forward area connected Shaykh Sa'ad and al-Sinn, and was later prolonged to Imam Manṣur. The Qurna–'Amara line was converted in 1917 to metre-gauge, and a similar line was constructed in the summer of that year from Kut to Baghdad. The gap between Baṣra and Qurna was later filled, that of 'Amara–Kut never. All these lines, save that of Baṣra–Naṣiriya, were dismantled after the war; they had served their war-time purpose and had no economic rôle in civilian life.

In the autumn of 1916 it was possible to consider further operations. Sir Percy Lake, a sick and ageing Commander, had given place to the vigorous and competent Maude late in August. The Tigris Corps was now divided into a 1st and 3rd Corps. Major-General A. S. Cobbe replaced Gorringe as Commander of the 1st Corps (3rd and 7th Divisions). Lieutenant-General W. R. Marshall commanded the 3rd Corps (13th and 14th Divisions), while the 15th Division under Major-General H. T. Brooking occupied the lower Euphrates. Two cavalry brigades and a multiplicity of Army troops were available for offensive operations without robbing communications defences, now fully secure. The case for action was the stronger since the Russian retreat and the Turkish penetration in Persia, which if unchecked might again threaten the oilfields. The British Cabinet's War Committee began to favour at least a semi-offensive policy; 'British influence in the Baghdad wilaya' was at last to be established. To this end Maude was instructed to strengthen his forward positions, and he felt free to consider the possibility of an advance to synchronize with greater Russian efforts in Persia and Kurdistan. Of the forces confronting each other in the Kut positions, the British was by now the stronger. Maude, deciding on a plan calculated to operate by successive limited phases, intended the defeat of the enemy forces without regard to Baghdad or to any political considerations. His operations began on 10 December. The details of these belong to military history; it must here suffice to record that the stages by which Maude's advance was organized, each patiently and logically following the last, led in spite of strong resistance and moderate losses to the clearing of Turkish forces from the Tigris right bank as far as the Gharraf (Ḥai) by 4 February, the capture of the Dahra Bend by mid-February and of the Sana'iyat position by the 24th. The passage of the Tigris from right bank to left was achieved on that day: and thereafter the dislodged and defeated Turkish forces were pursued along the Tigris left bank towards Baghdad. After a pause for supply and reorganization, and a momentary check at the Diyalā crossing, no serious resistance was offered by the Turks

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 to prevent what the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London now by telegram authorized—the full exploitation of Maude's success and the occupation of Baghdad. The city was entered on 11 March.

Politically the objective of the campaign—if such it was—had now been gained; but Baghdad was strategically untenable without the occupation of considerable further ground to the north and west. The routes converging on it must be held, the danger of malicious flooding prevented. Columns vigorously pushed forward secured by the end of March, after a series of successful actions on the Tigris and on both sides of the Diyalā, a line Shahroban–Sumayka–Faluja, though the 'Aqar Quf depression and tracks west of Baghdad were flooded by Turkish dyke-cutting on the Euphrates. Not until late April when actions had been fought to gain Samarrā and the Jabal Ḥamrin approaches was the position accounted fully secure, and a pause permitted.

Russian troops, though the revolution had broken out on 11 March with unpredictable results, had again advanced through north-west Persia to Kirmanshah against strong resistance by the Turkish 13th Corps. The latter finally disengaged and retired towards Kifri; the Russians occupied Qaṣr-i-Shirin, Khaniqin, and finally Qizil Ruba† where they could join hands with the British. But hopes of Russian assistance farther north against Mosul, or in holding Baghdad, were to prove abortive; the Tsar's forces henceforward slowly disintegrated, and their presence on the 'Iraq borders to the east and north-east became no asset but a grave embarrassment.

The autumn and winter of 1917 and spring of 1918 passed without major military operations. The expectation of a serious Turkish counter-move in 'Iraq—the boasted Yilderim Army, to sweep the British back to the Gulf—was disappointed, since the Turks preferred to make such effort as they could in Syria–Palestine. The British, while maintaining forces now important by any standard and in admirable order, could plan for no resounding success for lack of powerful enemy forces to defeat or strategic object to pursue.

In September General Maude made, by one of his few errors of military judgement, a premature and unsuccessful attempt to take Ramadi. Two months later, in better weather, he attacked again and was able to advance his positions not only to Ramadi but to the Jabal Ḥamrin gorge on the Diyalā, and to Takrit on the Tigris. It was his last operation. He died of cholera, universally admired and regretted, on 19 November. He was succeeded by Marshall, from 3rd Corps, with Major-General W. Gillman as his Chief of Staff.

The new Commander-in-Chief lost no time in carrying out the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

policy communicated to him on his assumption of command. It was to be that of a steadily maintained pressure with local offensives, and while consolidating the British positions throughout the Baghdad wilaya would develop the country's resources, and as much as possible of its man-power, for the war effort. An operation by the 13th and 14th Divisions late in November ended with the seizure of the Ṣaqalṭuṭan Pass on the Jabal Ḥamrin and the Turkoman town of Qara Tepe in the Kifri plain. In March troops advancing up the Euphrates occupied Hit, Alus, Ḥaditha, and 'Ana, and after a light reconnaissance 75 miles beyond, finally stabilized their advanced posts at Ḥaditha. A month later a forward move on the right flank occupied Kifri on 28 April, Ṭuz Khurmatu a day later and then, under War Office instructions, Kirkuk on 7 May. A raid on Altun Kupri was made simultaneously by cavalry across the Ḥawija from the Tigris. Kirkuk was not held, by reason of military supply difficulties: tragic as it was from the viewpoint of local relations, British forces evacuated the town a fortnight after the promising and applauded occupation, accompanied by some hundreds of despairing local Christians and Jews. Ṭuz Khurmatu became the most forward position. So passed the summer of 1918.

Late in October an armistice with Turkey was known to be imminent; and, with the diminished and disheartened forces of 'Ali Iḥsan Pasha concentrated at Fatḥa Gorge and the Kirkuk area, the British made simultaneous advances towards Kirkuk and Altun Kupri on the eastern flank, and up the Tigris on the western. The former was but lightly opposed, and Kirkuk was reoccupied; the latter, after gaining ground, met stiff opposition at the Jabal Makḥul astride the Tigris, where severe fighting took place. Mobile but fiercely disputed operations followed, to end with the destruction or surrender on 30 October of almost all the surviving elements of the Turkish 6th Army, save the few hundred men and guns in Mosul city. Qaiyara was reached on 31 October, and on the following day British cavalry under Major-General Cassels were met by a flag of truce and news of the Armistice. It had been signed at Mudros on 30 October, to be effective at noon 31 October. Article 16 of the Armistice terms, which reached Baghdad on 2 November, provided that all the 'Turkish garrisons in Mesopotamia . . . should forthwith surrender to the nearest Allied Commander'; and Article 7, that the Allies had the right 'to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies'. 'Ali Iḥsan nevertheless, in communication with Cassels, requested the withdrawal of British troops to Qaiyara, the farthest point occupied at the moment of the Armistice. The British Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand,

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 interpreted the Armistice terms very differently and directed the immediate occupation of Mosul and full compliance with Article 16. An exchange of messages, with Colonel Leachman as go-between, failed to dislodge the Pasha and his forces from the city; he claimed that Mosul was not in 'Mesopotamia' and his troops not a 'garrison' but a field army. At a conference at Mosul on 7 November, attended by General Marshall and the Acting Civil Commissioner, 'Ali Iḥsan signed under protest the terms dictated to him, whereunder he must evacuate all parts of Mosul wilaya within ten days. This condition, and others attached in the interests of the Mosul public, was carried out.

To the resolute and successful attitude of Marshall in these exchanges was due, it would appear, the effective establishment of the Mosul wilaya as a *de facto* part of 'Iraq; if an Armistice line had been accepted such as to include in Turkish-held territory that city and its fringe of Kurdish qaḍhās, these would form part today, in all probability, of Turkey and not of 'Iraq.

5. BRITISH WAR-TIME ADMINISTRATION, 1917–18

The last twenty months of the War, while British forces occupied central 'Iraq and established relations with and an Administration[1] for the public in every area, were a profoundly formative period in Anglo-'Iraqi relations. Conditions of life and Government were obviously abnormal; the Turkish Administration had disappeared; many leading 'Iraqis of the urban Sunni upper class and most senior officials were absent; local politics were inactive, military needs had unquestioned priority, and communications were largely closed to civilians. Nevertheless, the close terms upon which in many relationships 'Iraqis and British officers and troops found themselves, and the resulting mutual appraisal and the shared necessity to restart the functions of Government and society, led inevitably to the making of many decisions which, directly or by reaction, were to contribute to shaping the public life of the territory for a generation: decisions regarding the law, the adoption or modification of Turkish procedures, tribal policy, the structure and units of the Administration, and the currency.

In southern 'Iraq the all-pervading British military forces dominated the scene within all riverain areas. The fostering of local resources for Army use, employment of 'Iraqi labour, railway construction, efforts to improve Tigris navigation, were examples of military activity which had civilian consequences; and from them all arose thousands of claims, grievances, petitions from the humble and the great among the public to the ever-accessible

[1] For officers of the Administration 1915–16 see p. 82, n. 1: for period 1917–20, p. 100, n. 1.

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Political Officers. The patient disposal of these cases established the tone of the infant Administration and marked its remoteness from Turkish standards. The Baṣra townspeople, vastly enriched and led by progressive men, seemed for the moment heedful rather of the material future of their city than of the nascent nationalism of pre-1914. From 'Amara, scene of immense military activity and correspondingly prosperous, were administered the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad; it was sad that on a dozen of its citizens, convicted of correspondence with the Turks, fell the sentence of exile to India. The Political Officers, helped by the comparative stability of southern 'Iraq and its remoteness from the firing line, were able to extend their contacts, levy taxation, administer the Shabana, compose feuds and punish crimes with a fund of enthusiasm, goodwill, and daily acquired experience. They learnt soon to distinguish the reliable from the shifty among the shaykhs, and on occasion saw need to remove the worst of these from their places. Security was generally good on main routes, and inter-tribal fighting almost suspended. Only on the fringes of the Pusht-i-Kuh and in the further areas of the Muntafiq and Bani Ḥuchaym was control still unestablished. Political Officers or their Assistants were in residence during 1917–18 at nearly all other qadhā headquarters in Baṣra wilaya.

The proclamation of General Maude upon his occupation of Baghdad, drafted in London in the flamboyant prose of Sir Mark Sykes, assured the public of British benevolence, suggested an Arab future of 'greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth', and invited the public 'through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs'. It made no great impression; more immediately pressing matters called for the urgent attention of the Chief Political Officer. The innumerable visitors to his office included all the notables of the city and inlying areas, with the aged Naqib Sayid 'Abd al-Raḥman at their head, and scores or hundreds of tribal shaykhs from every part of the country. A telegram to King George V from the leading 'Ulamā of Karbalā and Najf was courteously acknowledged. Euphrates shaykhs from areas where no British soldier had trodden, nor would tread for some months, were received by Cox with honour and returned home with instructions to keep order and to till their fields.

In Baghdad city the climax of two years of scarcely tolerable misery had been reached by the requisitions and destructions of the last few weeks of Turkish occupation. Public buildings had been wantonly damaged, the barely completed German wireless station was left in ruins. Conditions were deplorable in the jails and hospitals and in the streets, where a new main thoroughfare had

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 been abandoned half-finished and rubble-strewn. Food in some quarters was deficient to the point of starvation, economic life was dead, the public services had ceased to exist, and a cowed population looked forward to the rumoured blessings of British rule. These now appeared in the form of unprecedented activity and traffic, abundant money and a sound currency, the opening or reopening of the British banks within a few weeks of the occupation, full employment, a high standard of security, and public services quickly developing to the limit of war-time practicability. Insistence on sanitation, the requisitioning of houses, searches for arms, movement restrictions, and a host of miscellaneous regulations were less popular features. In general, the Baghdad of 1917–18 was bewildered, optimistic, and highly receptive of new ideas and methods; and nowhere was it more difficult for the Administration to content itself, as it was bidden to do, with 'the minimum administrative efficiency necessary to preserve order'.

In the Kut, 'Aziziya, and Ba'quba areas a number of the shaykhs, expecting a Turkish return and victory, had accompanied the army of 'Ali Ihsan; but restoration of normal conditions was rapid on the Tigris, where the immediate rebuilding of Kut was hailed as symbolic and the Shammar Tawqa, Rabi'a, and Zubayd returned early to their ploughs. On the Diyalā, progress was rapid as soon as the retirement of the Turks from the Jabal Ḥamrin permitted access to the vital canal-heads. The Euphrates tribes above Hindiya—Zawba' and Dulaym—offered a hesitating allegiance when Ramadi and other of the Dulaym centres were occupied.

The urgent need to increase food production in a war-harried territory and thereby to save military shipping led in 1917 to the establishment of an Agricultural Development Scheme under C. C. Garbett, head of the Revenue Board. It aimed at the production of some 300,000 tons of grain, and as its means employed seed advances, supply of plough-cattle, and assistance with canal clearance. The co-operation of the shaykhs was gained by the promise of revenue privileges and by the enthusiastic propaganda of Political Officers. In spite of such varied difficulties as untimely tribal disturbance, the disappointing performance of some canals, thefts of seed, and misleading surveys, the Scheme secured a large part of its objectives; and it presented a wild tribal public with the unprecedented spectacle of a Government planning and spending to increase production from which its subjects must directly gain.

In the Euphrates districts, main scene of the Agricultural Development Scheme and habitually unquiet, no troops were available for some months to establish the prestige of the new Power, nor had the British any detailed knowledge of the personalities of the region. Every tribal leader was resolute to aggran-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

dize his own position, to secure privileges, to pay off old scores. Every town, headed by Najf and Karbalā, had its town roughs as well as its holy men and their factions. The first stage was to send a Political Officer to Ḥilla in May 1917. He was able without force to assert some authority in that area and in Hindiya, but none in Diwaniya, where a Turkish force maintained itself under a truculent Circassian lieutenant until August, and none farther south. The Shamiya, Samawa, and Rumaytha folk were perforce left to their own devices. At Karbalā the Kammuna family, in touch with Cox since 1916, were confirmed by him in authority till further notice. Resented by rival families, Muḥammad 'Ali and Fakhr al-Din Kammuna maintained order of a sort for some months; but as wholesale blockade running to the Turks was tolerated or even organized by a régime already flagrantly abusing its power, it could not long continue. First one brother, then the other, was removed and to the general relief a British officer was sent to administer the town and district. In Najf power was conferred on (or taken by) one 'Aṭiya abu Qulal, a powerful half-crazed ex-outlaw who was head of the Zuqurt gang and had formed the 'interim Government' of Najf in 1915–16. But such a régime could never last. In July 1917 an authorized Government Agent, Ḥamid Khan (a cousin of the Aghā Khan), was sent there from Baghdad, still without forces, to do his best. Rioting in Najf in October, caused by resentment against 'Aniza visitors, led to an ugly situation and was followed by the resignation of Ḥamid Khan, and the arrival of a Political Officer for the Shamiya District. 'Aṭiya was still able to create chaos in Najf, with riots and arson in Kufa and Abu Ṣukhayr, though order was restored by Mujtahid intervention; but these conditions were too clearly inconsistent with the essential functions of Government, and in December 1917 small military garrisons were posted to the mid-Euphrates towns, accompanied by Political Officers and the beginnings of a normal administration. 'Aṭiya stayed in Najf, and opened relations with 'Ujaymi and the Turks. Conditions in Samawa area and among the powerful Bani Ḥuchaym remained anarchic.

An incident early in 1918 provided a test of the authority of Government in those middle-Euphrates areas, which had for months sustained the penetration of well-financed propaganda from German and Turkish sources. Although ungarrisoned, Najf had by then been administered for some weeks from Kufa, with a new police force, a restored municipality, town services, and timely distributions of Oudh Bequest money. In January shots maliciously fired at Indian troops from the walls of Najf led to the imposition of a fine on the town; and on 19 March Captain W. M. Marshall, the Assistant Political Officer, who lived in a khan

I: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

outside the walls, was cold-bloodedly murdered as the opening move of a German-organized programme for a series of such crimes. The sanctity of Najf must, it seemed to Cox and the Army Commander, protect it from vigorous punishment; but evident weakness could have yet graver effects. With no shot fired, the city was closely besieged. The chief Mujtahid himself condemned the crime and kept contact with the besiegers. By 10 April the known murderers and their accomplices began to be handed over, soon to the number of 102 wanted persons. A dozen proved offenders were sentenced to death, eight to transportation for life, and others for lesser periods. A few days later elaborate receptions were being organized for the Commander-in-Chief who visited the town. But the atmosphere within, and radiating from, the Shi'i shrines remained sinister, obscurantist, and anti-Government, as successive authorities in the Dawla were to find. The sensitiveness of the Persian 'Ulamā to events affecting Islam or Persia was shown by their visible uneasiness at the mission of British troops into Persia in 1918—the beginning of the 'Dunsterforce' fiasco.

In desert areas west and north-west of 'Iraq relations were opened with the nomads by Colonel Leachman and his colleagues soon after the occupation. Among the 'Aniza the aged ibn Hadhdhal readily made his terms and secured a food supply for his tribe. The Shammar, divided as ever, entered British territory for a time, then withdrew to the north where in Turkish territory lay their chief grazing-grounds.

With the Kurds the Political Officers of the advancing army had had no contact before the fall of Baghdad, and the first relations after March 1917 were unfortunate. Letters exchanged with Kurds of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya could not be followed up; Khaniqin, the only Kurdish area open to British penetration, was suffering the horrors of Russian occupation. The behaviour of the latter, for all their ingratiating Kurdish contacts before the War, resulted inevitably in driving all Kurds of the neighbourhood back to the milder Turks, with tragic loss of goodwill. The Russian withdrawal in June of forces now disintegrated and half-mutinous permitted the Turks to return and to complete the ruin of the frontier regions; but the operations of the autumn of 1917 allowed, finally, the installation of a British Political Officer at Khaniqin, after nine months of heart-rending petitions from Muṣṭafā Pasha Bajlan and every class in the ruined countryside. Kifri was occupied in April 1918, and in both areas the restoration of tolerable conditions was immediately attempted. The tribes of both, except for the trans-frontier Sinjabi, behaved well in their adversity.

The advance to Kirkuk in the spring of 1918 promised at last open access to southern Kurdistan. It was greeted by a warm

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

welcome in Kirkuk and by the Hamawand. A meeting of Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniya was convened, at which they decided to offer the rule of their country to the British. The abandonment of Kirkuk (p. 91) led to the miseries of Turkish re-occupation of that district and of Sulaymaniya; but it was possible for the Political Officers of Kifri and Ṭuz to retain touch with the Kurdish Aghās, and notably with Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, their acknowledged spokesman. He was the son of the Shaykh Sa'id, murdered in Mosul in 1908.

The penetration of a British mission, followed by the light British forces which formed Dunsterforce, into north-west Persia early in 1918, besides weakening the Army in 'Iraq by excessive extension, found touch in Urmiya district with a Christian community, of which earlier mention (p. 15) has been made: the Assyrians. The ruin of this small nation was already imminent, and was shortly to be consummated. On the outbreak of war the Turkish attitude to it had been one of reassurance; and while in Persia the Urmiya Assyrians were decimated by the departure of the protecting Russians and by subsequent Persian brutality, their cousins the Ḥakkari mountaineers survived unmolested during the Armenian massacres of 1915 and the proclamation of Jihad. Russian forces, however, invaded Turkish Armenia, reached Van and Bashqal'a, and invited the Assyrians to rise against their hated rulers. By a rash and fatal decision they accepted and declared their apostacy from Turkish allegiance—only to find themselves abandoned by a sudden Russian retirement. Thereafter every Kurdish tribe of the region—Barwari, Artushi, Chal, Oramar—had the best of pretexts to combine under Turkish instigation to assail them. Kuchanis and other villages were pillaged, the Mar Sham'un's brother put to death in Mosul. The first assaults indeed did not avail to dislodge the Assyrian villagers; but in a second series, in the midsummer of 1915, their territory was ravaged and themselves driven to their highest inaccessible pastures. Winter rendered this refuge uninhabitable. The Russians could not respond to a supreme appeal; and the whole community managed, with astonishing fortitude, to climb and fight its way to Urmiya. Based here, where they were highly unwelcome, they raided the westward hill villages of their Kurdish enemies.

But this tolerable period of 1916 and 1917 was ended by the Russian collapse. Allied efforts to unite all anti-Turkish elements in Adharbayjan led to a short-lived alliance of Armenian and Assyrian elements with Kurdish tribesmen; but the feeble and fickle attitude of the Persian Government left the field open to intrigue and violence by all, and inspired the brutal murder of the Mar Sham'un himself by Simko, Kurdish chief of the Shiqaq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

600 Pressure from every side, Turkish and Kurdish, grew against the beleaguered community. In these conditions the landing of a British aircraft, revealing the presence of British troops at Sayn Qal'a, appeared as the harbinger of deliverance. The decision to break out from Urmiya led to an operation of withdrawal which, mistimed and over-hopeful, ended inevitably in a routed, headlong, and massacre-haunted straggle by the entire community through the mountains to Sayn Qal'a and, thereafter partly escorted by British troops, onward to Hamadan. The remnant of the nation, perhaps one-third of its original strength, was collected, fed and re-equipped by the British, moved into 'Iraq and settled finally, with some 20,000 Armenians, in a vast refugee camp at Ba'quba on the Diyalā in September 1918. From here they expected—and soon began to demand as a right—an early restoration to their homes. To the British in 'Iraq, who had no responsibility whatever for their plight but had spared neither effort nor expense to save them from destruction, they were long to remain a liability and an embarrassment.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

IV

MANDATE AND MONARCHY

1. AFTER THE ARMISTICE

THE months following the Armistice in 'Iraq were to witness a period of general public relief and confidence, followed too soon by the accumulation, at first invisibly then openly, of elements of discontent and disorder. These, widespread in various sections of the public, were to be temporarily united and moved to action by an ardent and aggressive nationalist movement among the political element, and were in 1920 to create tribal lawlessness and insurgence over a wide area, calling for suppression by major military operations. The British policy of establishing an 'Iraq State, which had been announced before this insurgence began was, after the interruption, able to be fulfilled by the installation first of a Provisional Government, then of an elected 'Iraqi monarchy. Throughout the period the administration of the territory, at first British and later 'Iraqi-British, continued to develop and, except where interrupted by disorder, generally to improve.

Events full of significance to 'Iraq were taking place in adjoining countries. An Arab Government of Syria was set up late in 1918 with British support in Damascus and Aleppo under the Amir Faysal bin Husayn, a Turkish-educated prince of the Prophet-descended family of the Amirs of Mecca, who had achieved an outstanding place in the Arab world by his statesmanship and personality; but the increasing conflict of his Administration, both as a political conception and as a physical organization on the spot, with eager French claims to rule Syria—and the powerlessness of British or American policy to modify this—led in July 1920 to the fall and disappearance of the Arab principality: an event which released the Amir, a year later, for other destinies. In Turkey a ruined and seemingly demoralized population and army, powerful only to harass its 'Iraqi neighbour by border menaces, were revived and reinspired by Mustafā Kamal and could by 1921 present a formidable threat to the Mosul wilaya. In war-torn and enfeebled Persia an agreement with the British Government made in August 1919 for the restoration and advancement of the country with British help failed to secure ratification by the Majlis in 1921, though a treaty with the new Soviet State was duly ratified; and this was in turn followed by the rapid rise to supreme power, and later to the throne, of a ruthless and efficient dictator.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 In Great Britain the problem of 'Iraq's future occupied a remarkable share of official and parliamentary time. The territory's status as an ex-Ottoman province must involve peace with Turkey as a preliminary to its own disposal; war-time commitments to the French (the Sykes–Picot agreement), promises to the Arab ruler of the Hijaz, the pressure of President Wilson for popular self-determination, British middle-eastern strategic interests, and responsibility in 'Iraq for order and progress among a public with whom close personal bonds by now existed: all these were elements to be reconciled. Since mere old-fashioned annexation was advocated by no responsible voice and evacuation by few, the problem resolved itself into one of formulating the constitution and status of the future 'Iraq State; and upon this conflicting views were held both in Baghdad and in Whitehall. If the British Government, all-powerful, amply informed, and far from illiberal, had made its decisions with more resolution and more speed: if a plan for 'Iraqi self-government could have been produced and progressively implemented early in 1919: if committee procedures had been shortened, the protests and arguments of A. T. Wilson overruled, and Cox, perhaps, retained in Baghdad: then many troubles, losses, and legacies of bitterness could have been avoided.

Meanwhile, the War was over; and the occupation of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Mosul, and the terms of the Armistice as these were interpreted, involved the Army through its Civil Administration[1]

[1] Among British officers who joined the Civil Administration between the fall of Baghdad and the Armistice were: J. Parlby and W. S. R. May (Finance), A. G. H. Sievwright (Customs), H. E. Bowman (Education): as Judicial Officers, E. Bonham-Carter, E. M. Drower, B. H. Bell, and E. L. Norton: as Levy Officers, C. A. Boyle, M. S. Channing-Pearce, W. G. Buttolph, and F. W. Hall: as Medical Officers, Drs. W. R. Battye, T. J. Carey Evans, T. B. Heggs; in the 'Iraq Police, H. M. A. Cones, T. W. G. Davis, H. C. Prescott, and J. F. Wilkins: in the Land Registry, G. F. Royds: and as Political Officers and in various administrative duties, F. C. C. Balfour, E. S. Berry, B. H. Bourdillon, L. N. Brown, R. S. Cooke, C. K. Daly, A. H. Ditchburn, G. V. B. Gillan, C. J. Hawker, W. R. Hay, S. E. Hedgcock, R. F. Jardine, J. F. D. Jeffreys, H. I. Lloyd, S. H. Longrigg, A. S. Meek, L. F. Nalder, P. F. Norbury, H. C. Pulley, J. Skliros, J. S. Thomson, H. H. F. M. Tyler, R. E. L. Wingate, and L. M. Yetts. This list, irrespective of merit, omits some dozens of officers who held charges less than that of Political Officer of a Division.

In the period between the Armistice and the formation of the Provisional Government of October 1920, the (military) Agricultural Department was transferred to the Civil Administration, with G. S. Cameron, R. J. D. Graham (Director), J. F. Webster, R. E. Cheeseman, and R. Thomas: that of Irrigation, with L. W. Lewis (Director), P. L. Bowers, R. G. Garrow, P. J. Sellier, A. B. Aitken, G. O. Sharpe, and J. Strachan: the Port of Basra, with J. C. Ward (Director): Posts and Telegraphs, with E. Clerici, G. E. O. de Smidt, and D. W. Gumbley: and Railways, with G. Lubbock (Director), J. R. Tainsh, P. Rothera, and O. G. Kiernander. F. Cunliffe-Owen entered the service as head of Repatriation (Refugees), F. W. Pirrie of Surveys, C. R. Chadwick of Veterinary Services. Recruits to Public Works included E. H. de V. Atkinson (Director), A. B. Carey, A. S. Clay, C. T. Lynam, H. H. Wheatley, and J. M. Wilson: in the Government Press, D. W. Cameron and A. S. Parry: in the Finance Department,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

in the immediate government of the whole Mosul wilaya, a territory sharply contrasting geographically and ethnically with lower and central 'Iraq, a land of mountain and mountaineer, roadless and little explored, with which there had been at any time little British contact and for four years none at all. The Kurds preserved all their characteristics of wildness and rapacity, dislike of submission, and scorn of Arabs. War conditions had everywhere produced grave dislocation in supplies, abandonment of villages, and in places famine; but tribal loyalties were strong, man-power intact, the patriarchal dominion of the Aghās still unshaken.

To these age-old elements, partly concealed from the newcomer by facile professions of devotion, others were added as 1918 drew to an end. The Aghās found it inconceivable that the Caliph's government could vanish for ever from qadhā and valley; and what of the incoming Christian English, allies of the detested Russians? It suited many to spread a pan-Islamic propaganda, for which the long delay in peace-making with Turkey was to give ample time; nor was the new rule likely to be more popular from its legend of efficiency and its Arab friendships. From Syria came stories of an Arab State of Damascus, to encourage vague and fragmentary but persistent conceptions of 'Kurdish independence': a possibility which had already occurred not only to the Kurdish *émigrés* of Paris and to Kurdish intellectuals or would-be princelings in the northern Jazira towns, but more plausibly to a Kurdish Committee in Istanbul itself under Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Shamdinan, to his nephew Sayid Ṭaha, watchful at Neri, to the cut-throat Isma'il Aghā (Simko) of the Persian borderland, and to Shaykh Maḥmud in Sulaymaniya. Such ideas were well developed by the disturbing propaganda which was blown ceaselessly across the Turkish frontier—and, it was said, by Bolshevik agents also. To appeals and invitations from Persian Kurds scornful of their own Government, British representatives could but reply negatively; and this, with the almost total absence of British troops in Kurdistan, and stories of their early withdrawal from 'Iraq itself, must further weaken British prestige. Added to all these, the

S. H. Slater, L. M. Swan, and N. F. Smith: in the Judicial Branch, G. Alexander, J. Prichard, and J. Woodman: in Customs, H. L. Cooper and H. M. Monk: in Education, W. J. Fatrell and A. L. F. Smith: in the Police, C. E. Corry, T. E. Furneaux, A. I. Sargon, and H. J. Todd: in the Medical Services, Drs. G. N. Braham, T. P. Buist, W. Dunlop, J. D. Graham (Director), T. J. Hallinan, E. A. Mills, A. C. Norman, H. C. Sinderson, G. W. Spencer, and G. S. Woodman: in Civil Jails, W. B. Lane: in Levies, C. R. Barke: and among Political Officers, R. E. Alderman, C. C. Aston, J. H. H. Bill, J. S. L. Dacres, G. F. Eadie, and W. A. Lyon.

These names, like those on p. 82, n. 1, are chosen by a—not wholly consistent—criterion of seniority of post, and omit many officers of first-class merit. Complete lists of British and Indian officials from 1914 to 1920 are to be found on pp. 343–400 of A. T. Wilson's *Mesopotamia, 1917–1920*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Turks at Jazira-ibn-'Umar, Van, and Bashqal'a, and the Aghās' own guilty consciences, could suggest other stimulants to Kurdish suspicion. What of the Armenians, survivors of massacre and pillage, whom as Christians the British would doubtless reinstate in their former or other homes, amid the hated sound of church bells and the rule of bishops? What of the Assyrians, who too would soon reoccupy their lands and claim the punishment of their old oppressors? Such fears, added to the age-long qualities and defects of the Kurds, could ensure that the task of an incoming Government should be unenviable.

In fact, the attitude of the new administrators, young and enthusiastic, was one of a guileless confidence. Strong in goodwill and in a British prestige which they took for granted, they greatly underrated the dangers of the place and time. They were prepared to like and be liked; and in fact, despite the tragic episodes which marked the next few months, many loyal friendships were made between Kurdish chieftains and British officers. With the early restoration of normal living and better than normal security, much quiet effective administration was carried out, and some at least of the Aghās realized for the first time the possibilities of honest disinterested government, even though this could not but involve some detriment to their own position.

The period was marked by an accelerated penetration of Western conceptions and modern transport into Kurdistan, increased traffic with Mosul and Baghdad on reopened roads, the active encouragement of crop-growing—tobacco, vines, grain, rice, and fruit—the re-stocking of bazaars and the diffusion of comparative wealth. Political Officers were posted from the earliest days of Occupation to Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, and Arbil: to Mosul itself, whither Leachman was transferred from the desert: and to the Kurdish qadhās, where the Qa'immaqams handed over an administration still in being. It was prescribed by Whitehall that the Government of Mosul should, in deference to the French, avoid assimilation to that of lower 'Iraq; the distinction, however, had no practical effect and was unrealized by the public, except for some French-protected Christians in Mosul, who used it to make trouble. Small garrisons were posted at Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, Mosul, Zakho, and Dohuk, but none within the higher mountains.

But even as the improvised Administration was making friendly contacts and giving such limited assurances as were possible, there were soon signs that intensive propaganda from the nearer areas of Turkey was fermenting effectively. The Assistant Political Officer at Zakho, Captain A. C. Pearson, was ambushed and shot by a party of the Goyan in March 1919, and his death unavenged. Three months later Captain D. Willey, with two

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

police officers, Captain H. Macdonald and Sapper R. Troup, was murdered by a party of malcontent chiefs in 'Amadiya town; but on this occasion punitive measures were organized, the Barwari, Guli, and other implicated tribes were punished, and the death penalty imposed on the guilty. Military columns penetrated, not without casualties, and marched and countermarched in the most difficult and rugged country, including that of the Goyan. But it seemed prudent to withdraw the A.P.O. to Dohuk from 'Amadiya, where authority was entrusted to a local Kurdish magnate.

A similar set-back occurred at 'Aqra late in 1919. The decision to administer from 'Aqra the Barzan area jointly with that of Zibar was resented by the half-mad Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan. He was already in fiery correspondence with the Turks at Van and the trans-frontier chiefs; and when the Political Officer of Mosul, Leachman's successor, J. H. Bill, for sufficient reason imposed a fine on two Zibari chiefs in October 1919, these, friendly for the moment with Shaykh Aḥmad, accepted his support in a concerted attack on the Political Officer and Captain K. R. Scott his assistant, who were on tour near Bira Kapra in Zibar country. Both the officers and two gendarmes were killed, and 'Aqra looted. The tribal alliance rapidly broke up, the Barzanis turned for home, and the 'Aqra townspeople rallied and begged successfully for the return of a British officer to protect them. A punitive column burnt the houses of the Zibari leaders, whose efforts to raise a general anti-British revolt were unavailing; nor, across the frontier, could the Qa'immaqam of Neri move Sayid Ṭaha, or the Oramar, to rally to their support.

In the Sulaymaniya province the troubles of the year arose from the making, and the failure, of a large-scale experiment not lacking in imagination and appeal. The problem of southern Kurdistan in November 1918 was that of installing a régime better than anarchy, and harmless to its Persian and 'Iraqi neighbours, without the use of troops—since none were available. Major E. W. C. Noel, a Persian-speaking officer of exceptional capacity, was sent to Sulaymaniya first to install, later to assist, Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji as Governor, and to invite but not to force the chiefs of all or any tribes from the Greater Zab to the Diyalā to place themselves under him. This régime, inaugurated in full session of the Beys, the Aghās, and the Shaykhs at Sulaymaniya on 1 December, started with widespread adhesions to Shaykh Maḥmud. The Persian Kurds were debarred by their nationality from joining; those of Kirkuk, Kifri, and Arbil districts, where the domination of a mountain tribal Ḥukumdar (Governor) was unthinkable, held aloof; but from Ḥalabja to the confines of Rawanduz a score of leaders rallied—with whatever tacit reservations—to Shaykh

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1918-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

008 Maḥmud, and even in the districts of Keui Sanjaq, Raniya, and Rawanduz his authority was for a brief period acclaimed. In Sulaymaniya town the ruins and ravages of war were, under British initiative, rapidly made good. Food and seed were imported, buildings repaired; salaries were distributed, caravans came and went. Kurdish was the only official language and none but Kurdish officials were appointed.

563 The dream of Kurdistan for the Kurds, under British patronage, seemed for a few weeks to have come true as the Aghās flocked to and from Sulaymaniya, the Turks had vanished, the British were encouraging, tactful, and generous. But it was not to be. The experiment lacked in fact all the substance of practical success. Shaykh Maḥmud was, with his personal following and prestige, the only candidate for south Kurdish Government; but he was unbalanced, violent-tempered, and childish. His alleged subjects—that is, their chieftains—were willing enough to receive gifts and honours, but not to accept obligations or to subordinate themselves to the Shaykh's or any other authority. Their political conceptions and experience, their social background, their character and level of evolution all forbade the possibility that Shaykh Maḥmud's empire could, even at the lowest and loosest standard of government, be coherent or lasting. Within a few weeks the interest of the outlying tribes had cooled, the claims of the Ḥukumdar were reconsidered, and as the novelty faded returning prosperity led to a general revulsion against him. The Jaf at Ḥalabja were allowed to secede, and a British officer was installed there; and the place of Noel at Sulaymaniya was taken by E. B. Soane, cynical realist and disillusioned critic of the Shaykh. Relations grew difficult, the ruler had neither wisdom nor knowledge to oppose to his bad counsellors. A crisis could not be long postponed. Late in May 1919 the Shaykh suddenly invoked a band of supporters from across the Persian frontier, imprisoned the British officers in Sulaymaniya, cut all communications, and proclaimed the independence of Kurdistan. The Political Officer at Ḥalabja escaped with the aid of the ruling Lady, 'Adila Khanim; the prisoners at Sulaymaniya were held but not ill-treated. An improvised relief force of Indian troops and armoured cars was immediately dispatched from Kirkuk but at Tasluja Pass was forced to retire. The Shaykh's forces, however, did not increase; no major tribe rallied to him. The collection of more effective British forces, from depleted garrisons in Mosul division, took a month. It was followed by a second advance by two brigades from Kirkuk. Battle was joined on 17 June at the Bazyan Pass, and ended in the rout of Shaykh Maḥmud's forces and his own capture, severely wounded. He was taken to Baghdad and there, recovered from his wound, was sentenced to death; but

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

this was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief to a long term of 563
imprisonment. The British force in Kurdistan broke up into a number of columns which visited many unpenetrated areas, restoring order and confidence. A normal administration with its departments and services was installed at Sulaymaniya under Soane. The area was now to enjoy a tranquil period of revival and progress, with gratifying security produced by a new police force and trade assisted by pioneer road construction. The main bodies of opinion in the area, however, still dreaded unification with 'Iraq.

In the turbulent Rawanduz district, where a Political Officer was first appointed in December 1918, it proved impossible to maintain him without military backing. He was withdrawn in July 1919 to Batas, and a Kurdish aristocrat left to do his best at Rawanduz. The district, under the baleful influence of tribal aspirants to power and an outlawed ex-officer, grew even more lawless and distracted after the 'Aqra disturbances in October. Early in 1920 it revealed conditions of chaos. The Political Officer at Arbil, on a dangerous visit designed to rescue it from these, considered the least of evils to be the installation of a young educated Kurd, Isma'il Bey, as Government representative.

The picture of 'Iraqi Kurdistan in 1919 is, therefore, in spite of incidents of violence, one of restoration in most districts to social and economic normality, and fair hopes of progress. The year ended with the outer areas—'Amadiya, Barzan, Rawanduz—beyond control, while the inner—those of Kifri and Kirkuk, Arbil and Keui Sanjaq, the Mosul plain and foothills, and Sulaymaniya—were peaceably and normally administered. The charm of the Kurdish countryside, its pure air and beauty, its wealth of striking personalities, greatly impressed the officers called to administer or visit it.

The Arab, Christian, or Yazidi villagers of the Mosul plain settled down easily under British rule. Security was good, and surviving Turkish police forces could be largely utilized. Prosperity soon returned to a city and countryside desolated by wartime famine and misery. New hopes and signs of progress were abroad. Rivalries among the Mosul Yazidis were composed, while those of Jabal Sinjar were placed under their aged but forceful Headman-of-the-Mountain, Hamu Sharu. The squabbles and intrigues of local Christian elements taxed sorely the patience of their Political Officers. The best of the village headmen were reappointed, encouraged, and subsidized. Destitute Armenian refugees from Turkey, who abounded in Mosul, were collected in a camp in southern 'Iraq. The missionary enterprise of the Dominicans, whose devoted work the War had interrupted, was eagerly restarted.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Shammar attitude was, as ever, shifty and incalculable; some of their many warring shaykhs correctly visited the new Government at Mosul, others seized the chance of interregnum to loot the riverain Jubur and passing caravans. The elusive veteran al-'Aṣi, nominal head of the tribe, failed to appear. For a large-scale Shammar road robbery in September 1919 a heavy fine was levied and a successful Government counter-raid carried out. The few cultivating sections were confirmed in their lands. The nomad majority remained divided, and a major section led by Daham al-Hadi, grandson of al-'Aṣi, remained beyond control in Syrian territory.

The upper Euphrates area in 1919 showed more than mere tribal restlessness. Its troubles derived from the thrusting trespasses of its neighbours in Syria, now Arab-governed with British subsidy and help. The absence of the Amir Faysal in Europe, and the impatience of his 'Iraqi officers, led directly to frontier aggression with a political motive. In December 1918 a British Political Officer had been sent to fill the vacuum at Dayr al-Zur, without military support. An Arab Mutaṣarrif appointed simultaneously by the Government of Aleppo to the same post was withdrawn, but Sharifian propaganda—that of the revived 'Ahd al-'Iraqi, Covenant of 'Iraq, led by General Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, ex-Corps Commander and now Chief of Staff to Faysal at Damascus—poured into the area, with its call to Arab nationalism and anti-foreign uprising. Attempts made in the summer of 1919 to agree a Syro-'Iraqi boundary ended in an unwise compromise—that of treating the Khabur river itself as the frontier. To this arrangement, made with the French, the Amir Faysal was said to have agreed; but it was unworkable, and the impression prevailed that the British would next evacuate the whole Dayr sanjaq, as their forces were in fact at the moment evacuating Syria. And by the close of 1919 tribal rumours and the abortive appointment of Qa'immaqams by the Syrian authorities to British-occupied towns gave yet more evident signs that a Sharifian offensive was about to be launched.

Among the tribes of central and lower 'Iraq the year following the Armistice brought little change. A few replacements were made in tribal headship, some outlaws were taken back into favour, exiles returned from Turkish territory or from India. Movement was freer with the disappearance of war-imposed restrictions, the resumption of normal marketing, increasing familiarity with the railway and with motor vehicles. Some resounding cases of tribal murder, a few raids of traditional type, the persistence of age-long neighbourly disputes, a mood of growing post-war disillusion, the radiation of anti-foreign influences from the Holy Cities; these were among the phenomena of the tribal world during the year—

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

which, however, with them all, witnessed a greater measure of outward peace than living memory could recall. On the frontiers, the Lurish cultivators and the Mandali folk continued to dispute the rights over the hill-stream water. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still claimed, and at times forcibly exacted, grazing fees from Bani Lam flocks sojourning in his territory. Peace between the south-western 'Iraqi nomads and the subjects of ibn Sa'ud was precarious, though the Amir of Najd was from 1917 onwards deeply involved in Arabian hostilities.

In the cities the changes wrought by the new Administration were more obvious. Politics apart, these lay in the direction of street widening and bazaar cleaning, both well exemplified at Mosul: in the construction of new bridges as at Baghdad, Hilla, and 'Ashar; in a conspicuous rise in the standard of town police work, visibly in the smartness of drilled constables and effectively in the maintenance of good order and the lessening of crime. Other phenomena were the complete transformation of the civil prisons, the erection of a dozen new buildings and the repair of old, a wide extension of the telegraph and telephone service, and medical facilities available for all who came. In municipal administration 'Iraqis were called to an important though not yet a fully responsible share; town pride at least was encouraged, some cherished improvements made possible. But if war-time restrictions and requisitions seemed at last to be relaxing, and the vast camps and store-parks, offices and transport fleets of the all-pervading Army to be diminishing, yet the setting of civilian life was still abnormal and the preponderance of a foreign and military element, however profitable, was to be increasingly resented as the months went by.

2. BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, 1919–20

The administration of occupied 'Iraq remained, until October 1920, the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces exercised through his subordinate, the Civil Commissioner; but in practice the former had no frequent occasion to interfere in civil affairs. Sir Percy Cox, Civil Commissioner until his posting as British Minister to Teheran in May 1918, then handed over his responsibilities to Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold Wilson as Acting Civil Commissioner for the next thirty months.

With the separate status of Mosul soon to become no more than nominal, the whole territory was, from early 1919 onwards, administered from Baghdad on generally uniform lines. At the headquarters of the Administration, which grew with each assumption of new responsibilities, the elements of a Secretariat were formed and something of the formality of organized Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

appeared. Apart from his personal staff, which included Miss G. L. Bell, the Civil Commissioner relied upon five Secretariats. That of 'Revenue', under Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Howell, I.C.S., covered the varied field of land and many miscellaneous Revenues, land registry, land questions, surveys, agriculture, irrigation, and municipalities. The Financial Secretariat, of which Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Slater, I.C.S., assumed charge from Major W. S. R. May, S.C.S., in 1919, included all matters of expenditure, budgets, currency, audit, customs, hostile trading concerns, and Government presses. The Judicial Secretary, Sir E. Bonham-Carter, S.C.S., who replaced Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Knox in 1919, directed legislation, the Courts, and the Awqaf. The Secretariat of Health under Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Battye, whom Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Graham relieved in 1920, dealt with questions of health, sanitation, and allied subjects, quarantine and the corpse and pilgrim traffic, lunacy, the civil jails, and the Weather Bureau. The first Secretary for Public Works was Major-General E. H. Atkinson, who stayed but a few months in 'Iraq; his branch was intended to cover the Railways, the Port of Baṣra, Irrigation, Public Works, and all means of Communication. A number of departments not covered by any secretariat, notably those of the Police and of Education, were grouped under the Civil Commissioner directly.

The administration of tribal, 'political', security and in general social matters, the collection of revenue, and relations with the Army were main functions of the Civil Commissioner's personal office, acting in the provinces through his Political Officers.

Among departments of Government operating with pioneer enthusiasm before and for two years after the Armistice were those of Tapu (Land Registry) under G. F. Royds: of the Awqaf under R. S. Cooke, supported by a strong committee of religious notables: of Surveys under Colonel F. M. Pirrie: of the Government Press under C. F. Weakford. The departments of Posts and Telegraphs, first under E. Clerici and G. E. O. de Smidt respectively and later combined under D. W. Gumbley, were the responsibility of the Civil Administration from June 1919: that of Works was formed as a civil department by Major-General Atkinson late in 1919, and directed by J. M. Wilson from 1920 till 1925. The Courts, administering Turkish civil law and, except for the wider bestowal of magisterial powers on administrative officers, generally following Turkish procedure, were conducted to the general satisfaction in Arabic and, alone of Government departments, used senior 'Iraqi personnel from the first. For criminal cases, a new and well-adapted code—the Baghdad Penal Code—was compiled and introduced.

More must be said of other major departments of the improvised

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and often over-strained Administration. That of Agriculture was, for the first time in 'Iraq, scientifically conceived and served by specialists in botany, soil chemistry, cotton-growing, wool, cattle-breeding, and other branches. Directed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. D. Graham in 1920, and thereafter by Roger Thomas, it conducted demonstrations, published research pamphlets, distributed seed, imported animals; but the times did not permit the development of a department—or indeed the tenth part of one—adequate to 'Iraq's agricultural needs. The Irrigation service, under Brigadier L. W. Lewis and later Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Aitken till 1921, was deep in the study of its problems and in the practical tasks of flood protection and major water distribution, but was equally prevented by the demand for post-war economy from undertaking important works, however desirable; it was perforce contented with some headworks and regulators erected, canal reaches re-aligned or cleared, the Hindiya Barrage in part repaired. These two departments, and that of Surveys, were transferred, with diminished staffs and funds, from Army to civil control in 1919.

The Police, built up by Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Prescott as successor in 1918 to Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Gregson, soon extended their control throughout 'Iraq and gained by their honesty and prowess a general respect such as no *Zaptié* or *polis* had ever known. The 'Iraq Levies, successors of the earlier Shabana forces, were like them military striking-forces organized in the Divisions from varying local material under British officers, with a common headquarters in Baghdad; their function was to relieve the outgoing Army of many duties and to reinforce the Police. A civil Veterinary Department under Major C. R. Chadwick was established in January 1920.

The costly administration of the Assyrian and Armenian refugees devolved upon a separate civil department, at Ba'quba camp, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Cunliffe-Owen. Repatriation, desired by all, seemed sadly impracticable for any: for the Urmiya families by reason of Persian resistance and anti-Christian bitterness, and for the ex-Turkish mountaineers because their homes were in Turkish territory and the future of Mosul itself still doubtful. Signs of divided leadership among the clansmen appeared, and threatened the general allegiance to the Mar Sham'un; and with the passing months of idle waiting, moral deterioration increased. Nevertheless, a strong battalion was raised under British officers from the excellent fighting material in the Camp, and could be used effectively in the 'Amadiya operations of September 1919. This revived hopes of some measure of repatriation, for which the Civil Commissioner and Assyrian well-wishers pleaded; but the vacillations and silences of Whitehall policy led to the disbanding of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

battalion, and to the men's return to the sluggish pauperization of Ba'quba.

The Education branch, founded and first inspired by Major H. E. Bowman, was faced with the problem of providing schooling for the youth of 'Iraq in the absence of funds, buildings, books, equipment or teachers in a tithe of sufficient quantities. At a pace always disappointing, but the fastest financially or functionally practicable, primary schools aiming at fair standards were opened to a total of seventy-five by the end of 1919. Fifty-six of these taught in Arabic, eleven in Turkish, seven in Kurdish, one in Persian. The new-founded Teachers' Training College could supply but a part of their urgent needs, and the scale of secondary classes, confined to the three principal cities, was regrettably humble; nor was the country-wide penetration of 'politics' into the schools, thus early, less to be deplored. Means were found to reopen the Law School, and a commercial and a technical school. The many privately-conducted Mullās' schools, archaic in method, scope, and equipment, continued to produce a bare literacy in their thousands of pupils; but the temptation to multiply inferior Government schools was resisted, and the teaching of English almost wholly withheld in spite of a general clamour for it. Upon the desirability of girls' schools, Muslim opinion was at first divided; five, all primary, had been opened by the first weeks of 1920. The schools of the local Christian and Jewish minorities and those of the foreign missions were fostered by support and subsidy; some of these were of high standard. Some archaeological work was carried out by R. Campbell Thompson at Abu Shahrayn (Eridu) in the spring of 1918, and more under H. R. Hall at Ur and elsewhere in 1919.

Printing-presses were operating at Najf in 1918, at Sulaymaniya in 1919, and in Baṣra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the occupation of these places. Newspapers in English were published at Baghdad and Baṣra, in Arabic at those cities and Mosul, in Turkish at Kirkuk, in Kurdish at Sulaymaniya.

The great increase of goods entering 'Iraq in 1918–19 taxed the young Customs administration of C. R. Watkins and Major A. G. H. Sievwright to the utmost. It was due to cessation of imports into north Persia from Russia, to the increase of 'Iraq's own spending power, and to the general depletion of stocks by war interruption. The Indian rupee, now the universal currency of 'Iraq, supplied an adequate medium; and the rising volume of civilian traffic could be handled easily by the now fully developed Port of Baṣra, which as such came into existence under Colonel J. C. Ward in the autumn of 1919 and was soon afterwards transferred to the Civil Administration. The Railways, when at their greatest

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The railways when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian.

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administration the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic.

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division represented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qaḍhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions

[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

in 1919 were those of 'Amara, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Basra, Dayr al-Zur, Diwaniya, Dulaym, Hilla (including Karbalā), Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Kut al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarrā, Shamiya (including Najf), Sulaymaniya. Of these, Dayr was soon to pass from 'Iraqi to Syrian keeping, Khaniqin and Ba'quba were later to form a single liwā, Kut was to lose its divisional status (but to regain it in 1922), Shamiya to be degraded into a district of Diwaniya, and Samarrā into one of Baghdad; but Karbalā with Najf was later to form a separate Division, as was Arbil. Each Division was the command of a Political Officer, and within it under his Assistants were grouped two or more districts, within which the familiar nahiyas under 'Iraqi Mudirs preserved the routine and nomenclature of their predecessors. At Divisional headquarters the formation of nominated advisory Divisional Councils of notables and officials, under the Political Officer's chairmanship, was a step taken in early post-war days. It intended to associate the public, to some formal and limited extent, with the Administration; but the Councils, however well chosen, were too powerless to be of effective service, and did not survive the stormy days of 1920. The Political Officer represented the authority of the Civil Commissioner (indeed, that of His Majesty's Government itself) and controlled all departments. His powers—administrative, financial, and judicial—were delegated in a suitable measure to his Assistants in districts, whose primary functions were to keep the peace, to know and to handle the tribes, and to collect the revenues.

The merits and shortcomings of this improvised Administration form a study of some interest. To an unusual extent its tone was determined by the high-minded, dominating character of A. T. Wilson, which imposed itself upon the small body of officers who essayed to carry out his policy: a policy of forthright, efficient, paternal Government in the interest of the masses—and especially of the tribesmen—but unsympathetic to local politics or nationalist aspirations. The problem created for his Administration by post-war demobilization and the claims of other services was solved by retaining some but not all of his best officers, and borrowing others from other Arabic-speaking territories, or from regiments leaving 'Iraq. The resulting standard, while not unmixed with inferior elements, was generally high in energy, personal integrity, and good intentions. The complexities of their tasks, and the deeper currents of opposition which developed, were commonly underrated—often with immediately tragic results—by these light-hearted amateur administrators, and even by the few experienced veterans eminent among them. The day-by-day attitude of the Administration was neither illiberal nor repressive, the establishment of cordial relations between governor and governed was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied.

It was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shi'i hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

[1- British civil administration following World War I -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

The Ḥijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Ḥusayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Baṣra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Baṣra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Fayṣal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

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that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.'

The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Fayṣal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them.

The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment.

Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day.

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

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classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Faysal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Husayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

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reaffirmed the Anglo-French Declaration, but showed little intention for the moment of abandoning direct control. Nevertheless, it authorized Wilson to conduct a plebiscite, division by division, to answer the following questions: first, was there approval for a single Arab State of 'Iraq, including Mosul, under British tutelage? Second, should it be ruled by an Arab titular head? Third, who would be preferred as its Amir?

From the public of the 'Iraq of 1918–19 no clear answer to such questions could well be expected. The existing all-British administrative machine, the lack of representative institutions, and the whole structure of society precluded it. But the attempt was made. Meetings were convened in all divisions. The Civil Commissioner hinted in his instructions that only 'satisfactory' replies would be welcome; and these, as received, favoured by considerable majority a united 'Iraq under an Amir whom none could specify, with the continuance of British control. The meetings were doubtfully representative, especially in Baghdad city; the attitude of the Holy Cities was in part negative; some Kurdish districts rejected all Arab rule. A fair semblance of majority preference nevertheless emerged, especially on the inclusion of Mosul; but the inference, too readily drawn, that British control was the wish of all but a handful of 'ungrateful politicians' was not wholly justified.

These results led the Curzon Committee to call next on the Civil Commissioner for specific proposals for the 'constitution of an Arab State or group of States on the basis of the wishes of the inhabitants . . . and of indisputable British control.' Due account was to be taken of the Anglo-French Declaration; the State's Constitution should be flexible, with room 'as time goes on' for increased Arab participation. It appeared from this that the desideratum of British policy, as so far formulated, was a blend of the liberality of the Declaration with the firm reality of British control. The growing murmurs of Arab nationalism in Baghdad, on the Euphrates, and in Syria were unheeded.

Wilson, summoned to London in February 1919, found the Mosul difficulty at least partly solved, since M. Clemenceau in December 1918 had agreed to surrender it from his share of the Sykes–Picot spoils. On this basis, with the French still insisting on their full Syrian sphere of future Government, and the Amir Fayṣal still endeavouring to secure acceptance of his own and his father's once-encouraged aspirations, Wilson could propose his comprehensive 'Iraq State. With no Amir but a British High Commissioner, and with effective British dominance in its administration, it would include Mosul, Dayr al-Zur, and all of Kurdistan that was not destined for inclusion in the Kurdish State for which the

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Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King–Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Basra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposition to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

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Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 1919.

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Faysal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

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186 668 'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni–Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muhammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Faysal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Faysal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

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the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nationalists.

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Ṭalib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections.

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

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4. INSURRECTION, 1920

669 The disorders which broke out among the 'Iraq tribes in the mid-summer of 1920 were immediately caused by elements partly long familiar in 'Iraq—tribal recalcitrance, love of freedom and loot, self-interested Mujtahid promptings, local shaykhly ambitions or rancours, dislike of taxation, grievances against Government as such—and partly by vigorous and well-financed nationalist propaganda and devotion to that cause. They were facilitated by the dispersal, paucity, and static preoccupations of the British forces, and by a military command sometimes clumsily or tardily exercised, sometimes, rightly or wrongly, unsympathetic to the needs or pleas of the Administration. The resulting insurgence reduced the territory for three months to conditions reminiscent of the Turkish régime in one of its more anarchic periods. These conditions affected in all about one-third of the 'Iraq countryside outside the major towns. They were marked by interruption of communications, refusal of revenue payment, reverses to Government forces, bloodthirsty local assaults, looting of buildings and property. No serious urban disorder occurred.

To the officers of the Administration the episode of the *Thawra* —Insurrection—was one of disillusion and disappointment, the partial undoing of two years of devoted work. To them, as to the military commanders, it was from day to day a period of intense strain, with life and survival immediately at stake. To the British Government it was a reminder that its formulation of policy had, less in itself than by its delays and psychological maladroitness, taken too little account of local discontent, or of the force of 'Iraqi nationalism and its power of popular appeal: a reminder also, if such had been needed, of the need for such a régime in 'Iraq as would, by satisfying major elements in that country, lighten the financial burden devolving on the British taxpayer. To the tribesmen of 'Iraq, who suffered severe casualties without recompense of any kind, it offered, not for the first or last time, a sobering lesson in the thankless consequences of serving the purposes of urban politicians and a Persian priesthood.

The town populations and their political leaders, for all the sincerity and zeal of many, took no physical or practical part in the strife, but profited undisturbed from the security which the Administration was able, in spite of them, to maintain in the cities. They were to claim nevertheless, as their successors a generation later still claim, that this 'National War of Liberation', to which heroic proportions have been assigned, had essentially modified British policy and compelled the creation of an 'Iraqi State. An objective comparison of the constitutional arrangements

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formulated and, on 17 June 1920, announced *before* the insurrection—arrangements in fact preparatory to an Arab State acting through elected assemblies, 'Iraqi ministers and high officials—and those introduced by Cox in the autumn of the year, does not support this view. The *Thawra*, besides inflicting tragic losses on its participants, delayed by some months the inauguration of the new State. It may, on the other hand, be argued that in some measure it modified the manner of implementation of British policy, and strengthened the case for the approach by treaty rather than by direct mandatory government.

Although operations by the Euphrates tribesmen showed at times signs of tuition or leadership by trained officers—ex-Turkish officers from the Amir Faysal's forces—yet in general the course of events was but little co-ordinated. It followed no strategy or synchronization more precise than the mere creation of the maximum disturbance, by tribal agency, whenever and wherever possible. This permitted the Administration to remain in being continuously and in most districts. Even a minimum of unified control over the insurgents' operations must have made the British position untenable, and thus rallied the main body of waverers to the cause of nationalism or of anarchy. The lack of cohesion indicates not only the failure of the political element to provide it, but equally the parochial objectives of the shaykhs, the variety of their motives, their lack of the sense of service to a common cause. More generally the differing viewpoints of Kurd, Turk, Turkoman, and Arab, the irreconcilably varying objectives of Persian Mujtahid, 'Iraqi nationalist, and peace-loving merchant or landlord precluded, as did the essential cleavage of town or tribe, any effective unity of effort. Nor can it be forgotten that throughout 'Iraq a high proportion of leading shaykhs and of urban notables withheld all support from the movement, while throughout the period the loyalty of 'Iraqi forces—police and Shabana—to the Administration was outstanding.

The restoration of peaceful conditions in the territory cost some months of exhausting British military efforts, marked not only by some tragic misadventures but also by episodes of great gallantry and brilliant military prowess. These efforts, which included the summoning of important reinforcements from India, cost hundreds of casualties, great quantities of military stores, the erection of hundreds of blockhouses and scores of miles of barbed-wire fencing, and an expenditure calculated at some £40 million: a greater sum by far than had been spent throughout the War on Arab allies in the Hijaz and Syria.

Throughout June 1920 peace throughout 'Iraq was, except for some aftermath of the Tall 'Afar murders, still undisturbed. It

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669 was thought indeed by some observers to be assured by the failure of the tribal forces outside Mosul, the announcement of British policy in Baghdad on 17 June, the forthcoming return of Cox, and the timely arrest of patriot-agitators at Baghdad, Karbalā, Ḥilla, and Diwaniya, whence in some numbers they were dispatched to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf. But such hopes were to be falsified; an eruption of violent lawlessness—one of so many in 'Iraq's long history—was not now avoidable. A petty episode at Rumaytha on the lower Euphrates, unconnected at first with nationalist or any other politics, led in the first week of July to the cutting of the Baghdad–Baṣra railway near this town and near Samawa. Both towns, or the Government buildings in them, were closely besieged by tribesmen. The first and determined efforts of British troops to reach Rumaytha were unsuccessful. It was relieved on 20 July only after serious fighting, and immediately abandoned. The Mishkhab marsh area tribes attacked Abu Ṣukhayr on 13 July, and a week later besieged Kufa, when Captain J. S. Mann was killed by tribesmen. Kifl was assailed and a column of the Manchester Regiment, sent hastily from Ḥilla to its relief, by ill fortune and its own unpreparedness sustained heavy losses in killed and prisoners which raised the spirit and hopes of the insurgent tribes. The Hindiya Barrage and Musayib were evacuated, to be reoccupied in mid-August. British troops were withdrawn with great difficulty from Diwaniya to Ḥilla, south of which the Euphrates channels and townships passed for some weeks out of control. In the Muntafiq, the political offices at Shaṭra, Qal'at Sikr, and Suq al-Shuyukh were perforce abandoned during August, and except at the liwā headquarters, Naṣiriya, a régime of non-Government, but never of concerted insurgent action, prevailed for some weeks. The railway was interrupted, a train looted, two military river steamers (the *Greenfly* and the *S.9*) were destroyed and their crews cold-bloodedly murdered; nevertheless, nuclei of loyalty to the Administration remained under the most powerful of the Muntafiq shaykhs, and conditions could return without military action to something like normality in mid-October.

Disorder at no time spread to the Kut or the 'Amara areas of the lower Tigris, nor, save for isolated episodes which included the destruction by sabotage of the main Motor Transport Stores, to Baghdad city and suburbs: nor, in spite of agitators' efforts, to Baṣra. Mosul and its dependent Kurdish districts were untroubled, in spite of violent trans-frontier propaganda and some formidable tribal raiding. Sulaymaniya, a stranger to 'Iraqi nationalism and chastened by the events of 1919, held aloof. In Kirkuk liwā there was keen tension but no outbreak, except at

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Kifri, which tribesmen occupied for a few days late in August, and whose Assistant Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon, they imprisoned and then murdered. In Arbil liwā the Administration under Turkish-fomented pressure withdrew from outlying qadhās, Raniya, Keui Sanjaq, Baṭas; but, aided by the loyalty of leading Aghās, it could maintain itself in the city and surrounding country. The upper Euphrates was held secure by the influence of the Dulaym and 'Aniza shaykhs, until the sordidly treacherous murder of Leachman on 12 August led to local risings, the looting and isolation of 'Ana and other villages, and the withdrawal of the Administration for a time from Hit. The position was restored with the arrival of small military columns and the re-occupation of Hit on 8 October; but the Dulaym area remained partly disorganized for a further half-year.

Around Samarrā propaganda emanating from that Holy City led to a measure of tribal uprising and, late in August, to an unsuccessful assault on the city. In other areas north and east of Baghdad the forces of violence were for a time dominant and rewarded. The liwā headquarters, Ba'quba, and the qadhā towns of Shahroban and Daltawa were successively attacked, occupied, and partially looted by tribesmen under politicians' inspiration in mid-August, and British officers cold-bloodedly murdered—Captain W. T. Wrigley, Lieutenant J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan, and two British Levy instructors—or politely imprisoned. Here and at Mandali on the frontier hopeful Provisional Governments were set up. The Turkoman-Kurdish towns of Qizil Rubaṭ and Khaniqin were entered and occupied in the same week by the local Kurdish tribesmen. Attacks on the Assyrian refugee camp at Ba'quba were hotly repulsed, by far better fighters than the attackers.

In these accessible areas of central 'Iraq it was easy for the military command, which by the later weeks of September disposed of stronger forces and had regained the initiative, to restore the Administration and to punish the insurgents by the visitations of mobile columns. Disorder here, to the general relief of the public and, not least, of the Baghdad landlords, languished and died; but the agitation and internecine quarrels among the Diyalā tribes remained largely unappeased for a further year. The 'government' of Mandali disappeared early in 1921, the tribal invaders of Kifri and Khaniqin were reduced to hunted outlaws, and calm returned to the urban and suburban populations of the Diyalā and Baghdad townships.

On the middle and lower Euphrates British troops could show themselves in respectable force in the first weeks of October. It was possible to restore the prestige of the Administration in Najf and Karbalā and to relieve besieged Samawa and Kufa, where a

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669 Provisional Government had existed for some weeks and from which the British prisoners captured in July, of the Manchesters and other regiments, were recovered in good condition.

A variety of minor punitive expeditions were led in the little-visited marsh country, and military marches and demonstrations carried out throughout the winter of 1920–1. Communications including the Baghdad–Basra railway were progressively restored. Loyal tribal leaders were thanked and rewarded. The submission of ex-insurgents was accepted, save for some few who, through fear or principle, fled to Syria or the Hijaz. Fines of rifles imposed on tribes by the Commander-in-Chief were effectively collected; some 70,000, including 21,000 of modern type, were handed in within six months by mid-Euphrates tribesmen alone. From the Muntafiq, exceptionally, no arms were collected, and only one expedition in January 1921 visited the Gharraf.

In mid-October Sir Percy Cox returned to 'Iraq as planned to relieve Wilson, his deputy, and to carry out the constitutional programme announced four months earlier. After consultations in southern 'Iraq, he reached Baghdad on 11 October and could rightly wonder, in a proclamation issued on 17 October, what aims the few still active insurgent tribesmen could be seeking. The attempt of the Mujtahids to regain a seriously though but temporarily shaken position by claiming to act as mediators between the Government and the Shi'i tribesmen was frustrated by Cox's refusal. Week by week conditions normalized, and the deferred progress in State-building could be resumed.

5. THE KING

642 Immediate 'complete independence' for 'Iraq formed no part of the programme which Cox was to carry out; after the failure of the insurrectionist movement organized to obtain it, and the collapse in July 1920 of the Amir Faysal's Government in Syria, even its warmest advocate could now scarcely expect it. A Mandate for 'Iraq had been accepted by Great Britain, with all the tutelage which that, however interpreted, must involve; the belated Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed on 10 August 1920, was to permit the 'Iraqi Kurds to adhere, if they wished, to the State into which central Kurdistan might or might not evolve. Cox himself and his advisers, however sympathetic to 'Iraqi aspirations, were convinced that the intended substitution of 'Iraqi for British government, must, for soundness and permanence, be gradual and progressive; indeed, the actual British Administration visibly operating in every department, liwā, and qadhā was a reality which no politics could, for the moment, dissipate. At the same time the more prudent programme of erecting an 'Iraqi Administration,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

sketchy at first but to gain increasing reality, on the intended lines of the Bonham-Carter proposals as considerably modified by Whitehall and by Cox himself, could expect support from the body of moderate or non-political opinion now consolidated by the frightening experiences of July and August, as well as from the British officers who were by a great majority willing and indeed eager to help in establishing a new régime. Extremism was, for the moment, under a cloud with some of its exponents abroad, others temporarily silent. Many or most sincere nationalists were willing for a time to participate in a new order which, incompletely as it could satisfy them, at least represented a substantial advance.

Within a week of reaching Baghdad, where as throughout 'Iraq his reception was cordial, Cox with his advisers—Bonham-Carter, Howell, Philby, Slater, Bullard, Miss Bell—elaborated plans for an interim 'Iraq Government. A Council of responsible ministers was to be assisted by British advisers, and a comprehensive 'Iraqi civil service to assume the reins of Government in the provinces. For the post of President of the Council, Cox was able to overcome the genuine reluctance of the venerable Naqib of Baghdad, Sayid 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani; and the latter on 25 October issued invitations to eminent fellow countrymen selected by himself and Cox for Cabinet positions. The Council which, after only two refusals to serve in it, met on 2 November, contained Sayid Ṭalib Pasha who, but for his too evident personal ambitions, would have been considered for the Presidency: Ja'far al-'Askari, a Baghdadi ex-Turkish officer of unusual personality, who had left the Turkish for the Arab armies during the War and attained high rank under Faysal (p. 119): and Sasun Ḥasqayl, a Jewish financier and ex-deputy who had held high positions in Istanbul. The other ministers were a Baṣra landowner notable, 'Abd al-Laṭif al-Mandil, at the Ministry of Commerce; a retired Turkish General from Kirkuk, 'Izzat Pasha, at that of Works; an ex-Mayor of Mosul, Muḥammad 'Ali Fadhil, at that of Awqaf; a former Qadhi of Baghdad and Mecca, Muṣṭafā al-Alusi, as Minister of Justice; with these, who were all Sunnis, the Naqib was persuaded to appoint a Shi'i divine, Sayid Muḥammad Mahdi Ṭabaṭaba'i, as Minister of Education and Health; and to them were added, without portfolio, a half-dozen[1] of the leading notables of the three cities, including two Christians and a Shi'i, and three outstanding Shi'i tribal leaders. A Kurd of the Baban family refused to take part.

The earliest meetings of the Council discussed and agreed on its

[1] These were: 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Ḥaydari: 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Khayyaṭ: Fakhri al-Jamil: Ḥajj 'Abd al-Ghani Kubba: Shaykh 'Ajil al-Samarmad: 'Abd al-Majid al-Shawi: Shaykh Muḥammad al-Sayhud, the Amir of the Rabi'a: Da'ud al-Yusifani: Shaykh Sālim al-Khayyun: Aḥmad Pasha al-Ṣani' of Baṣra: Ḥajj Najm al-Badrawi: and Shaykh Dhari al-Sa'dun.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 own status and procedure. The supreme authority of the High
645× Commissioner was recognized, and was required for confirmation of almost all Acts of State and the higher administrative appointments. The rôle of the ministerial British Advisers was heavy and all-pervasive. Nevertheless, Cox could announce on 11 November 1920 that, pending the calling of the General Elective Assembly authorized by the Notification of 17 June, a provisional National Government had been established: that its Council of State consisted of a President and Ministers for Interior, Finance, Justice, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and Awqaf, and other ministers without portfolio: and that 'until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect the Council of State Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations, and in general military affairs except as concerned solely the locally recruited forces'.

The British Advisers to the Ministries were appointed at the same time: H. St. J. B. Philby to Interior, S. H. Slater to Finance and to act in Commerce, Major-General Atkinson to Communications and Works, Major G. F. Eadie to act in Defence, Sir E. Bonham-Carter in Justice, E. L. Norton in Health and Education, and R. S. Cooke in Awqaf.

645× The Council of Ministers, dignified and deliberate, proceeded to the dispatch of business. Arrangements were made under pressure from Ja'far Pasha for the organized repatriation from Syria of Fayṣal's 'Iraqi officers, who, hotly nationalist and as yet doubtfully disposed towards the new British-sponsored compromise régime, could not but form an important element in 'Iraq politics. A number of politicians deported in 1920 from 'Iraq to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf for subversive agitation were permitted to return; the remainder were to be released under the general amnesty proclaimed in June 1921. Work was begun in Committee on a revision of the all-important Electoral Law, a task begun by Sayid Ṭalib Pasha's conclave of ex-deputies in August. It proved intractable; the High Commissioner favoured, the ministers disliked, separate representation for the tribes. These, though they formed a great majority of the population, would without such a provision secure no parliamentary spokesmen at all. A first draft of the revised law was unsatisfactory, if only because, among other defects, it ignored the special rights of the Kurds under the Sèvres Treaty. The completion of the draft was willingly postponed by the Minister of the Interior, Sayid Ṭalib, whose own ambitions, it seemed to some, made him reluctant for elections to be held at all until his own plans were mature.

631 The reorganization of the provincial government on a plan

Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qaḍhās, and 85 nahiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction.

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Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 By the early weeks of that year the situation in 'Iraq had vastly improved; there was now time and opportunity to proceed further with constitutional and administrative development, and not least with the selection of a ruler. The insurrection was over, though tribal disquiet persisted in the Muntafiq and in various degrees elsewhere. In spite of obvious imperfections, a Government by 'Iraqis was operating. Ministers were showing goodwill and patience, and the lone hand evidently played by Sayid Ṭalib was 648 not for the moment menacing. A frontier agreement had been made with the French in Syria in December 1920; and though it fixed a boundary which, since it appeared to bisect both the Jabal Sinjar and Albu Kamal, was in fact ignored, frontier relations were by now at least non-violent. The persistent propaganda and trouble-making from across the Turkish frontier had not seriously perverted the 'Iraqi-Kurdish or the Euphrates tribes. Peace between the Allies and Turkey had been made, even though the new conditions now supervening in that country already condemned the Sèvres Treaty to nullity.

008 In London 'Iraq affairs from 1921 onwards were handled by a newly created Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office; and the first action of Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred from the War Office as Colonial Secretary, was to convene a Conference at Cairo which should decide, once and for all, the many outstanding Middle Eastern questions. It met on 12 March 1921, attended by the highest Service personalities, Foreign Office and Treasury experts, Churchill's Eastern advisers including Lawrence, and, from 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox accompanied by General Haldane, Ja'far al-'Askari, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Gertrude Bell, and two of the ministerial Advisers. The agenda, as far as concerned 'Iraq, included the selection of a ruler, the treatment of the 'Iraqi Kurds, the early reduction of British expenditure, and the composition of the forces designed to secure the defence of 'Iraq after the withdrawal of British garrisons.

643 For the post of Amir or King of 'Iraq, no local candidate had commanded anything approaching adequate support. The Naqib was advanced in age, nor could his family produce an acceptable successor; Sayid Ṭalib with his past record and cynically unscrupulous character was more feared than accepted; a Turkish prince, probably Burhan al-Din, suggested in some quarters of Baghdad or Kirkuk, could scarcely be welcome to the British Government; the Agha Khan, gravely proposed, could not be a serious candidate, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still less; the Shaykh of Muḥammara, a self-proposed pretender, was unthinkable, and the Najdi Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scarcely less so. But the Amir Faysal was now available. His candidature had been suggested by A. T.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Wilson in July 1920, when Damascus fell to the French; and Colonel K. Cornwallis, an ex-Sudan officer and Arabist who had served in Syria with Faysal and gained his close friendship, had been authorized by Curzon in December to offer him the 'Iraq throne. The Prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir 'Abdullah, his elder brother. But to the king-seekers of Cairo he remained the only tolerable choice, and a programme whereunder his candidature and election should proceed was forthwith elaborated. The rôle of Great Britain was to encourage him to visit 'Iraq and offer himself as King, and thereafter to 'raise no objection' to his election; but while no forcible imposition was contemplated, such an experiment could, it was evident, scarcely be allowed to fail.

Regarding the Kurds, no decision was reached. It was already clear that the Kurdish State visualized at Sèvres would never exist, and that the Treaty itself had been rendered inoperative by Kamal's unimagined national revival in Turkey. The Kurds of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya, too obviously unfit for self-government, might yet be ill at ease in an Arab State; but the High Commissioner's willingness in that event to govern them directly did not appeal to the 'Iraqi ministers, in whose view the Kurds must form an integral part of 'Iraq. No expedient remained but that which was tacitly accepted, both in Cairo and on the spot: to admit the distinctness of Kurd from Arab by a measure of administrative variation, to treat them with sympathy, and to hope for their ultimate willing adhesion to the 'Iraq State, to which in any case they could not but be economically united. Kirkuk had in fact accepted a Mutaṣarrif in February 1921, and Arbil became a sub-liwā of it under a Deputy Mutaṣarrif; Mosul since the murder of December 1920 remained under a British Political Officer, though unity with 'Iraq had been accepted. Sulaymaniya liwā refused, for the moment, any rule but that of the High Commissioner.

Important decisions were reached at Cairo on defence questions. The British forces were to be further reduced; the Royal Air Force was in 1922 to take over control from the Army. The Levies, increased by the addition not of further Arab but of Assyrian and Kurdish units, were to be handed over by the Minister of the Interior to the High Commissioner and therefrom later to the British Military Command, which would support the expenses of the force.

The Cairo Conference broke up on 25 March. Cox was back in Baghdad by mid-April, to find that the selection of a ruler now dominated all political thought. The lesser local candidates faded from the picture. The Naqib, whose own following was

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613 considerable but heterogeneous, had no personal ambition and veered gradually from an attitude of opposition to one of support for a Sharifian ruler, since the British seemed so to desire. The foreign candidates other than Fayṣal made no general appeal. The conduct of Sayid Ṭalib in Interior, with his many unguarded remarks and profuse expenditure of public money, seemed to indicate a determination somehow to secure the throne, either immediately or as successor to the Naqib. His increasingly intemperate attitude could not be longer ignored; a personality which could have been valuable to 'Iraq, and had been so in fact during the bad days of 1920, seemed too likely to be used for selfish and dangerous ends. After the Pasha had, at a dinner party, threatened to mobilize and use tribal forces in their thousands 'to prevent British influence being used in favour of one of the candidates' (that is, Fayṣal), Cox thought it expedient to have him removed from the scene. He was arrested by the military authorities and deported to Ceylon. The attitude of the High Commission and of British officers in the Government became more openly favourable to the cause of the Sharifian Amir; Philby, Ṭalib's intimate, remained staunchly republican. The expected general amnesty for political prisoners was published on 30 May.

The Amir, synchronizing his arrangements with the British plan, left Jidda with Cornwallis and a small party of supporters on 12 June. Friendly telegrams were exchanged with the Naqib, and even with a possible opponent, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud. Cox suggested to the public of 'Iraq, by communiqué on 17 June, that the British Government would, in the best interests of Iraq, 'place no obstacle in the way' of the election of a Sharifian ruler. Organized by the Naqib and the Mayor of Baghdad, a strong reception committee from the capital proceeded to Baṣra. At this city, which had recently petitioned Cox for a separate and half-independent régime, the Amir's reception on 23 June was reasonably cordial. At the Euphrates towns, especially Karbalā and Najf, it was tepid, but at Baghdad enthusiastic. The Amir's own personality and attitude were, it was soon obvious, his greatest assets, and won him support even from previous partisans of the Naqib or Sayid Ṭalib. He gained ground everywhere. The question became one scarcely of the probability, but only of the mode of his election and enthronement.

It would have been unreasonable and in practice irrelevant to await a second and still distant peace treaty with the ex-suzerain, Turkey, or to prolong exchanges of views with the interested Governments of France and of India. It was possible also to pass over the complaints of the United States spokesmen at Geneva, that their Government had been less than properly consulted on

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the terms of Mandates. Cox's intention had been to convene a Constituent Assembly for the King's election, but this must lead to a delay of some months, during which the possibility of an extremist coup d'état—no good beginning for a constitutional reign—could not be ignored. It was decided to shorten the procedure. On 11 July, a few days after Philby had left a service from whose policy he differed, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution declaring the Amir to be King of 'Iraq 'provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative, and liberal and limited by law.' Accepting the resolution, Cox declared that to obtain due validity it must be confirmed by popular consent evoked by referendum.

This was held late in July. The formula of approval provided by the Government was in some liwās modified or supplemented, and in one words were added demanding complete freedom from foreign control; in another, a Constituent Assembly within three months was demanded. Mosul declarations, generally favourable, spoke of safeguarding Kurdish and other minority rights. Euphrates liwās asked for continued British control. The Kurds of Sulaymaniya abstained from voting. Kirkuk rejected, but Arbil accepted, the Amir. But on the whole a large majority—substantially less, it may be, than the 96 per cent. claimed officially—accepted the new King, and such leading tribesmen as ibn Hadhdhal of the 'Amarat and 'Alī Sulayman of the Dulaym offered their oaths of allegiance even before the enthronement.

Whitehall's last-minute and remarkably maladroit instruction that the Amir, in his very speech of acceptance of the throne, should emphasize the ultimate authority of the High Commissioner, was fortunately withdrawn. No further obstacles remained to the official enthronement. It took place with due ceremony in the early morning of 23 August 1921, at the height of the summer heat, in the Saray courtyard in Baghdad. Faysal I ruled in 'Iraq, inheriting from Sir Percy Cox the official headship of the State.

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V

THE 'IRAQ KINGDOM

1. A REIGN BEGINS

643 THE new King was to reign in 'Iraq for twelve years. Aged 36 at the time of his accession, he possessed unusual qualities of dignity, leadership, and sympathy; and his political adroitness, which reflected a high intelligence used always devotedly, sometimes perilously, in the service of his adopted country, enabled him and it to survive grave dangers and to establish, in so few years, the structure of a State both more imposing and more promising than most observers could have expected. The British decision to encourage the candidature of this dethroned and non-'Iraqi prince for the 'Iraq throne had contained, indeed, the seeds of many blessings for that country.

The King's family joined him at Baghdad from Mecca. His young half-brother the Amir Zayd, then aged 21, was earliest with him, before going, a year later, to spend three years at Oxford. The material surroundings of a throne were soon, humbly enough, provided, and the royal figure became the unquestioned centre of all 'Iraqi political and social life. His name was used in the Khuṭba—official prayers—on and after his first Friday as King. By his tours in all areas and his accessibility he quickly became known to thousands of his subjects; indeed, no contributions made by Faysal were greater or more personal than his equal appeal to town and tribe—a reflection of his own half-urban half-desert background and education—and his power (which at moments failed him) to balance the forces of extreme 'Iraqi nationalism with the exigencies of the British connexion. His relations with the High Commission—now established on the Tigris right bank, physically and officially separated from the Government of 'Iraq across the river—and with the British element inevitably preponderant in Government during the early months, were cordial and appreciative, though his 'Iraqi entourage contained, as was soon to appear, some elements of a less realistic or more fanatical nationalism, which could be damaging. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior since August 1921, acted also as the King's personal Adviser.

642 The constitutional position of the territory was yet singularly unclear. Its elements were a Turkish sovereignty still existing, though dormant: an unratified Mandate, accepted by Great Britain but unwelcome to 'Iraq itself: a constitutional monarchy,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Faysal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

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652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Hilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three 204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq 747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable 814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

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a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary clubs.

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Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Faysal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

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Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

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25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Halabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious Aghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

work in Baghdad. The Hakkari clans were settled, as far as great efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government-owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo-'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian–ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

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648 adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had
186 been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

648x As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922,
186 the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive
631 Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible
186 and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of
668 the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited
x645 upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

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a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British) politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani (Nationalist) and the Nahḍha (Awakening); these were matched by the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot' meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate in elections. al-Khalisi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence. The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23 August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

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668 demonstrators, led by a Court official, on the steps of the palace.
648x An apology was demanded and given, but the King refused to take action against the offenders. Public order hung in the balance; no Cabinet existed. At this moment King Faysal was prostrated by an acute attack of appendicitis. The urgently necessary operation was performed by Dr. Noel Braham on 25 August; but, in advance of the King's recovery, Cox felt bound to take drastic action. He explained to the public the attitude and the responsibilities of the British Government, condemned the dangerous sedition of the extremists, suppressed the two parties and the worst of the newspapers, arrested and banished a number of the more violent politicians. The effect was instantaneous, the relief of quiet-loving elements throughout 'Iraq to all appearances profound. The gradual restoration of the tribal position was aided by the removal of Mutaṣarrifs whose patriotism had been shown by partial and discriminating administration, and by punitive bombing of actual insurgents in Diwaniya and the Muntafiq.

The King, whose operation was successful—and certified as such by doctors sent from the Ḥijaz by his father—on his complete recovery by 10 September publicly thanked the High Commissioner for the measures taken; they had, in fact, saved the State from anarchy and himself, it is probable, from a second throneless exile.
645 The Naqib was asked in the improved atmosphere to form another
648x Cabinet, in which he included Khalidi at Justice, 'Abd al-Muḥsin at Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl, Ja'far al-'Askari, 'Ali Fadhil, and Ṣubiḥ Nasha't at their former Ministries, and a rich Najf banker, Ḥajj Muḥsin al-Shallash at Education. The Ministry of Commerce was abolished. The Cabinet, reassured at last by the argument that entry to the League of Nations—'Iraq's next goal—would of itself end the unpopular Mandate, reaffirmed its acceptance of the Treaty, which was signed at last by the Naqib and Sir Percy Cox on 10 October 1922.

648x The Treaty, which was to last for twenty years after ratification by the Constituent Assembly, reproduced, without direct reference to the Mandate, most of its provisions. It covered the obligation to respect constitutional procedure, freedom of religion and education and missionary enterprise. It included safeguards for the rights of foreigners, equal economic opportunities for all States (whether League members or not, an echo of the Colby–Curzon 'Open Door' correspondence), co-operation with League of Nations international Health measures, and a modern régime for Antiquities. The terms of the Treaty were open to periodical agreed revision, and Great Britain agreed to press the candidature of 'Iraq for the League of Nations 'as soon as possible'. Separate and subsidiary agreements were to be made—and were in fact thereafter drafted—

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covering military co-operation, judicial and financial matters, and the position of the British officials of the Government. In general, the responsibilities assumed by Great Britain for 'Iraq *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations were thus passed to the 'Iraq Government itself for fulfilment, while the fields in which, and the modes by which, Great Britain would continue to assist and fortify the young State were defined. 648*

The Military Agreement provided that 'Iraq should within four years become entirely self-defending, from both internal disorder and external assault. To this end the Government would devote not less than a quarter of its revenue to Defence. In the meantime the British Government, besides retaining forces in 'Iraq at its own expense, would provide that State also with officers, instructors, arms and equipment; and the movements of the 'Iraq Army were to be open to the inspection and advice of the High Commissioner. The consent of America and other Powers to the abolition of the Capitulations was secured, certain judicial guarantees being given in return: for instance, that the subjects of these were to be tried by Courts containing one or more British judges, and their houses searched only with safeguards. British legal experts would be employed by the 'Iraq Government, and all legal provisions affecting foreigners were to be agreed by the High Commissioner before presentation to Parliament. Under the Financial Agreement, the Kingdom of 'Iraq agreed to contract no external debts without the agreement of Great Britain: recognized its liability to assume its due share of the Ottoman Public Debt; accepted the transfer to itself of certain British-owned public works (at a value of some £700,000) and, in principle, that of the Railways and of the Port of Baṣra. Material for the British forces were exempted from Customs duty and taxes.

The general though by no means universal satisfaction of the 'Iraq public at the signature of the Treaty was disturbed, only four weeks later, by the next move of the irreconcilable Shi'i 'Ulamā, who issued Fatwas (religious judgments) against participation in elections for the Constituent Assembly. The effect of these, slight enough in most of 'Iraq, could not but be powerful in the middle Euphrates, where the election machinery which had been set in motion by Royal Irada on 21 October was brought abruptly to a halt; and in northern 'Iraq, simultaneously, the threats and pressure of the Turks had for different reasons a similar effect. Faced with these difficulties, and especially that of Turkish aggression, the Naqib, old and weary and at heart pro-Turkish, resigned an office which he had filled with disinterested devotion. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey succeeded him as Prime Minister, and formed a Cabinet on 20 November. It retained Sasun Ḥasqayl, brought 645*

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'645 Naji al-Suwaydi to Interior and 'Abd al-Latif Mandil to Awqaf, found room for the usual single Sh'i in the person of 'Abd al-Husayn al-Chalabi at the Ministry of Education, and gave the portfolios of Works and Defence respectively to the outstanding ex-Generals, Yasin al-Hashimi and Nuri Sa'id. A few days later Suwaydi moved to Justice, and the Premier abandoned that portfolio in favour of that of Interior. The new Government was committed to acceptance of the Treaty, to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, and to the defence of 'Iraq's integrity against the Turkish claims now clamorously asserted.

3. THE THREAT TO MOSUL

648' 721 The early spring of 1922 had brought indeed no comforting news from the Kurdish districts and the Turkish frontier. In Sulaymaniya a faction demanded the return of Shaykh Mahmud; among the Pishdar the stable element under an outstanding personality, Babakr Aghā, was still opposed by a pro-Turkish section; and in mid-March a new Turkish Qa'immaqam appeared in Rawanduz, followed by forces under the notorious 'Ali Shafiq—'Euz Demir', or Iron-shoulder—to proclaim the coming Turkish reconquest of the wilaya.

Late in May troubles in the Zangana spread to the still smouldering Hamawand. Their chief, Karim Fattah, arranged for the callous murder of two British officers, Captain R. K. Makant and Captain S. S. Bond, and bolted for the Turks at Rawanduz. The attempt of these to extend an anti-British or anti-Baghdad movement was checked momentarily by the dispatch of a Levy column and aircraft of the Royal Air Force, while Simko of the Shikak and Sayid Taha of Neri for their own purposes restrained would-be insurgents on the frontier. But as the British forces withdrew the Turks advanced. They occupied Raniya, were joined by the dissident Pishdar, and the conditions which resulted forced the evacuation by air of British personnel from Sulaymaniya, where a Council under Shaykh Mahmud's brother, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir, was left in charge. The Turks could now occupy Keui Sanjaq and threaten 'Aqra, while British and 'Iraqi forces held only the inner line of Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri. But a simultaneous Turkish thrust in September 1922 to 'Amadiya in the far north, where Assyrian resettlement had been proceeding, was repelled by Kurdish tribesmen and by the quickly rallying Assyrians themselves.

Under pressure of these events the High Commissioner, erring perhaps for once in judgement, arranged for the return of Shaykh Mahmud to Sulaymaniya to fill the vacuum of Government. King Faysal supported the appointment, and lent Kurdish officers from

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his Army; Major Noel accompanied the Shaykh. But the latter, contrary to the most solemn promises, began immediately to correspond with Euz Demir (who despised him as a savage), to intrigue with the active Turkish Committee formed in Kirkuk by the Naftchi family and other irreconcilable Turkophiles, and to claim the title first of Hukumdar (Governor) and then of King of all Kurdistan. The prestige and control of the 'Iraq Government in southern Kurdistan was at this moment, November 1922, at its lowest point, even though Sayid Taha, now a refugee from his home, could with Government help rally something of a tribal force, and British aircraft could disperse the Turks in Raniya. In Sulaymaniya a fantastic régime of extortion and oppression represented 'Kurdish Government', and a mission sent by it to Baghdad proffered highly unrealistic claims.

The first move of Turkish aggression on the northern frontier had been met by a strengthening of British and 'Iraqi forces in Mosul area, and by a temporary residence of the Amir Zayd at Mosul. His popularity, and a visit by the King himself, rallied 'Iraqi and anti-Turkish feeling; but nervousness remained as the extent and actuality of Turkish claims revealed itself. In Europe, meanwhile, the Armistice of Mudania, which in November 1922 closed the Greco-Turkish war and a critical phase of Anglo-Turkish relations, was followed by the first Conference at Lausanne. Lord Curzon here confronted in Ismet Pasha the spokesman of a resurgent and self-confident Turkey, triumphant over disaster and all its enemies. The Turks claimed the Mosul wilaya on grounds of race, alleging that Arabs in Mosul were few, Turks were many, and Kurd and Turk scarcely to be differentiated; on grounds of economics, since most of Mosul trade was with Anatolia: of right, since it had been improperly occupied by the British *after* the Armistice of November 1918: of self-determination, since the population of the wilaya themselves demanded Turkish return. It was indeed essential to Turkey to prevent the detachment from them, under another and perhaps more liberal Government, of a large part of the Kurdish people for whom they themselves proposed (and were later to carry out) a policy of strict assimilation and repression. Curzon refuted the population figures produced, which indeed were ludicrous. He explained objectively the racial groups and their relationships, corrected the economic fictions alleged—since in fact Mosul trade was predominantly with Syria and Baghdad—and reversed the argument based on self-determination; he asserted the claim of a whole and integrated 'Iraq Kingdom with every right to its Mosul province, and reminded Ismet of the Mandate for 'Iraq which had been already allotted and covered Mosul. Nor, in view of the wild terrain and wilder

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Mahmud, supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq. In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

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Oramar Aghās and returned to 'Amadiya in time to help in repelling Zibari and Turkish attacks on it. The frontier line of the future was still unknown. Some Assyrians were content to stay in new homes in 'Iraq, a few had already returned to Persia, others had proved resolute and successful in regaining their ancestral mountains. All were intensely community-conscious, although the unifying authority of the Mar Sham'un, now resident at Baybad, was sadly weakened. Service in the 'Iraq Levies provided employment for 3,000 to 4,000 Assyrians whose families accompanied them, and whose military prowess under British and Assyrian officers, who were often their own tribal Maliks, was admired. It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-'Iraqi relations, which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to Arab and Muslim 'Iraq. A riot in Mosul in August 1923 between Mosulawis and Assyrians was a visible danger-signal; the general 'Iraqi resentment at the arrival of 800 Assyrian refugees from Turkey by way of Syria was another. The warnings of both King Faysal and Sir Percy Cox on the need for mutual restraint and discipline did not prevent further animosity, and in May 1924 a petty squabble in Kirkuk bazaar led to a murderous stampede of Assyrian Levy troops there, with great loss of Muslim life and a legacy of bitter anti-Assyrian feeling.

The recovery of Rawanduz from the Turks, by a well-conducted military operation of the 'Iraq Army, the Levies, and the Police in April 1923 marked a stage in the fall of Turkish influence. Sayid Ṭaha of Neri was installed as Qa'immaqam with a garrison of the Levies. The same military column proceeded next to Sulaymaniya where, since the reduction of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty period by the Protocol to four years (p. 148), it was now essential to make early arrangements for this region's future place in the 'Iraq State. Sulaymaniya was entered in mid-May 1923, and the future discussed with Aghās and townsfolk eager for peace and a secure Government; but since no troops, it was alleged, could be maintained there, the authority of the local Council, left in charge by the retiring column, was short-lived. It was possible to transfer outlying districts of Sulaymaniya liwā—Chamchamal, Ḥalabja, Sangau—to the direct care of the Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk, leaving but a narrow area still exposed to the brutal follies of Shaykh Mahmud; but the latter, heralded by a few days of Hamawand looting, returned in July. Ignoring again the order of the High Commissioner to come to Baghdad, he terrorized the countryside, trespassed into areas now under 'Iraq Government authority,

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where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923–4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome accorded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khalisi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

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the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

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645 Ministries; Sasun Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. A State visit by the King to Karbalā and Najf in December was an outstanding success. The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Khuṭba when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by Sunni and Shi'i alike.

646 The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial
648* by the King on 27 March 1924. Under the presidency of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty and its Protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present; but the atmosphere quickly changed. The 'severity' of some of the Treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by Opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-Mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Mosul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their wilaya. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support on the Treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages. The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the Treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence; two pro-Treaty deputies were severely wounded in the streets, others threatened
[644] with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the Assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

618* The constant efforts of the High Commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the Treaty and the facts of 'Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League, and gave assurances of later modification of the Treaty in 'Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the High Commissioner, the King, the Prime Minister, ministers, Cornwallis, Yasin Pasha, and Opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the 'Waṭanis' to ratification. Dobbs announced finally that 'Iraqi rejection of the Treaty, such as now appeared inevitable, must with all regret be reported to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting, unless ratification had occurred by 10 June; after that date Great Britain must seek means other than a friendly and generous Treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. From this and from his refusal to bargain or to consider amendments Sir Henry was immovable. Like every preceding day, 10 June was filled with conclaves, submissions,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

exhortations, refusals. By late afternoon there was no result, and Dobbs categorically refused a twenty-four hour postponement. Before midnight, however, the Prime Minister, Ja'far Pasha, succeeded in convening 69 out of the 100 delegates in the Assembly Hall. Thirty-seven votes for the unamended Treaty were in the end obtained, with 24 in opposition; the 8 abstentions were due, beyond doubt, to intimidation. Acceptance of the Treaty, even ratified in this sadly abnormal manner, was hedged with conditions which Ja'far Pasha found it necessary to specify—that the British Government should honour its reassurances by amending the Financial Agreement in 'Iraq's favour: that the King of 'Iraq should hasten to negotiate with the British Government to this end: and that the whole Treaty should be null and void 'if the British Government fail to safeguard the rights of 'Iraq in the Mosul wilaya in its entirety'.

The stormy days and nights of Treaty ratification were followed in 'Iraq at large by a period of relative peace; a peace in which every anti-Treaty or anti-British element remained dormant but alive. In the Assembly, a peaceful passage of the Organic and the Electoral Laws marked the jaded weariness of deputies.

The Organic Law, a reasonably adequate result of repeated redrafting, endowed 'Iraq with a semi-rigid Constitution which, proclaiming it 'a sovereign State, independent and free' with a constitutional hereditary monarchy and a representative Government, set forth the rights of the people and the Crown, the legislature and the ministers, established the Courts, and regulated financial and administrative responsibilities. The Electoral Law enfranchised every adult male tax-paying 'Iraqi, and provided for a procedure of primary and secondary election, whereby the secondary electors, one for every 250 primary, elected a deputy to represent every 20,000 voters. The deputy must belong to the same electoral circle, consisting of a group of liwās, as the voter. Separate representation was enjoyed by tribesmen and by the Christian and Jewish minority communities of the liwās of Baghdad, Baṣra, and Mosul.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave Ja'far Pasha the opportunity, which he had been seeking, to resign from the premiership. A new Cabinet was formed on 2 August under Yasin Pasha, to be confronted by pressing questions of the northern frontier and of financial stringency. 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun was called to the Ministry of the Interior, Sasun Ḥasqayl to Finance. To the Ministry of Justice came a young and clever, but unstable and hasty lawyer of good family, Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani; and to that of Communications and Works an imposing and not incompetent younger member of the Pachachi house, Muzaḥim Bey.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shi'i politician, Muhammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Haydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Sa'id became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and 'Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its 'Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by 'Iraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Faysal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Mahmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Halabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Mahmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the 'Iraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the 'Iraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Mahmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

563 721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The provocative arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Hazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house-by-house resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fathi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counter-claims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Mahmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

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648 Baghdad, interviewing leading citizens and distracted by foolish and provocative demonstrations. In Mosul, their next stopping place, popular feeling ran high. Police protection was offered to the Commissioners, but refused. The maintenance of public order, threatened by the emotions of an excited and demonstrative population, of many heterogeneous elements and predilections, was difficult. Much of the Commission's inquiry was held in secret. Witnesses, often self-contradictory in their replies to questions, were in some cases reluctant to speak or, fearing reprisals, would speak to the Commissioners only in strict privacy; in others, appeared to be largely animated by personal ambitions or animosities; in others again, were little appreciative of the alternatives involved. Some were influenced by racial, others by tribal, others by economic considerations, and many evidently by personal frustrations or by the aspiration not for a better but for an ineffective government. The Commission passed in all two months in the disputed wilaya, and spent themselves freely in painstaking and discreet inquiry from every source and class.

The Report, a creditable and enlightening document, was handed to the Council of the League in July 1925, and debated in the first days of September. The Commissioners dismissed the possibility of partition of the wilaya. They reviewed the racial content of the disputed area, accepting generally, though not without reserve, the facts and figures proffered by the British. They found that economic considerations on the whole bound Mosul to 'Iraq. They approved the Brussels Line as being strategically tenable, and, to the dismay of Assyrian well-wishers, disallowed the claim to attach part of the Ḥakkari territory to Mosul. They described conditions in 'Iraq as still unstable, in spite of progress made under the mandated Government, rejected the claim to possession founded upon right of conquest or upon international law: but admitted finally that the bulk of the inhabitants appeared to favour inclusion in 'Iraq as at present constituted and governed, rather than return to Turkey. The Commission's recommendation was, therefore, for the continued union with 'Iraq of the whole territory south of the Brussels Line, on two conditions: the one, [563] that 'Iraq should remain under Mandate for twenty-five years, the other that the racial distinctness and self-consciousness of the Kurds should be recognized by the official use of their own language and by the employment of Kurds in the Kurdish qadhās as administrators, judges, and teachers.

The Turkish representatives at Geneva, hotly nationalist and self-confident, and unimpressed by the Commissioners' facts or judgments, rejected the Report *in toto*, withdrew their promise to accept it as binding if approved by the Council of the League, and

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questioned the status of the Commission itself. An urgent request was addressed, therefore, to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague on 19 September, to pronounce whether the Report, after approval, ought to be considered as an act merely of mediation, or as a recommendation, or as an award. The Turks refused to attend the Court, which met a month later, but were willing to provide documents and to reply to questions. The Court ruled on 21 November that the decision to be taken by the Council would be a binding award and would definitely determine the Mosul frontier, provided that, except for the votes of the interested parties, it be unanimous.

While the International Court still sat, complaints of serious violation of the *status quo* reached Europe from the area intersected by the Brussels Line. An Esthonian officer, General F. Laidoner, was appointed by the Council of the League to proceed to the spot with a small staff—a Czechoslovak and a Spaniard—and from there urgently to report. He spent the month of November 1925 in investigation, always south of the Line since the Turks refused all access north of it. Most of the violations reported were, it appeared, trivial or normal episodes; but north of the Line gross abuses on the part of the Turkish soldiery were confirmed, followed or accompanied by wholesale deportations of Christian villagers, thousands of whom had staggered into 'Iraq. The Laidoner Report describing these outrages was laid before the Council on 10 December, and could not fail powerfully to affect it.

The Turkish representative, Munir Bey, continued to treat the Council's decision, yet to be made, as a mere recommendation which his Government would at best consider. Meanwhile, he claimed Mosul to be still held by law under Turkish sovereignty, and bound so to remain until this was renounced. Meetings of the Council and of its *ad hoc* sub-committee went on, in the absence, at times, of the Turkish spokesmen. On 16 December a specific resolution was submitted and unanimously adopted. It provided for confirmation of the Brussels Line, and for the submission by Great Britain within six months, first of a new Anglo-'Iraq Treaty with a duration of twenty-five years (unless 'Iraq should earlier become a League member), and secondly of proposals to carry out the Commission's recommendations for specially adapted forms of Kurdish administration. This resolution ended the task of the League of Nations in connexion with the Mosul dispute, and became its final decision under Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty.

The verdict was received in 'Iraq with a profound satisfaction, which, as do few issues in 'Iraq, united all classes and elements of opinion. It was beyond question a wise and just decision, and an instructive example of international co-operation for the settling of

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disputes. To all who were cognisant of the distribution, characteristics, and interests of the races and communities within the wilaya, and the progress made in the past six years in administration and economics, the alternative of handing the territory back from a comparatively liberal 'Iraqi or Anglo-'Iraqi orbit of Government to the rancorous and rigorously centralizing Turkish Government of the time had appeared intolerable, and might well, if adopted, have disrupted the 'Iraq State.

Action in 'Iraq to implement the decision was taken with all speed. Ministers were instructed by the Prime Minister (himself half-Kurd) to effect in full the policy of distinguishing Kurdish from Arab areas by the appointment thereto of Kurdish officials in all departments. The new Treaty with Great Britain, passed by Parliament on 19 January 1926, not without the bitter resentment of Yasin Pasha and his People's Party at the longer period of tutelage, provided for 'active consideration' by the Mandatary in 1928, and thereafter at four-yearly intervals up to the end of the twenty-five year period, of the possibility of recommending 'Iraq for admission to the League, which would end its mandated status. It provided also for revising 'on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq or for any other reason' the provisions of the much criticized subsidiary Agreements.

It remained for the British Government to secure what Geneva had failed to gain, the agreement and co-operation of the Turkish Republic. The Mosul decision was hailed there with a savage outburst in the press, with which Muṣṭafā Kamal did not hesitate to identify himself. Even the idea of war between Turkey and Great Britain was not ignored by his Supreme Military Council when it met at Ankara on Christmas Day 1925. But less disastrous Councils prevailed; they were induced by the conciliatory influence of Rushdi Bey and of the British Ambassador, and indeed by prevailing conditions in Turkey itself. On 18 July 1926 the Republic ratified a tripartite Anglo-Turkish-'Iraqi Treaty whereby the Brussels Line was accepted as the frontier of 'Iraq and Turkey. A policy of good relations athwart a neutralized frontier, with a permanent Frontier Commission to maintain them, was adopted. 'Iraq at the same time undertook to pay to its neighbour, for twenty-five years, a tenth part of whatever royalties it might obtain from its oil deposits, if these should be found to exist. The Mosul Question was at an end.

Conditions in the Kurdish areas of the wilaya itself in 1925 and early 1926 were more peaceful than for some years past. In Sulaymaniya liwā the opening of communications and the construction of police posts and blockhouses restricted the movements of Shaykh Maḥmud and his outlaws. 'Iraq Army and Police action

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kept him from trespassing into Halabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility
657 of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for
166 the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648× The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Ridhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Government no ground even for diplomatic representations; he rebelled feebly, only to be crushed, superseded, and removed to Teheran. After an abortive uprising by the local Arab tribesmen—Cha'ab and Muhaysin—and the usual sequence of protests and counter-protests between Baghdad and Teheran, 'Arabistan—henceforward Khuzistan—became a normal province of Persia.

Minor cross-frontier raiding was thereafter settled normally between the nearest officials of the two States. More serious trouble in the areas of Khaniqin and Qaṣr-i-Shirin late in 1925 was composed by a more formal joint meeting in March 1926. A hopeful sign of co-operation was the Persian request (conveyed, as was habitual, through the British Minister in Teheran and High Commissioner in Baghdad) for 'Iraqi help in establishing a new trade route from the Kirkuk railhead to Tabriz. It was necessitated by the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, and would involve a mountain road by way of Ṣawj Bulaq and Rawanduz. The 'Iraq Government began its surveys and ordered bridging material from Europe. Farther south, an old disturber of the peace reappeared, Salar al-Dawla. This unbalanced but persistent royal pretender, basing new hopes on the change of dynasty, entered and crossed 'Iraq disguised in the spring of 1925, made for his old haunts in the Kirmanshah province, and sought to raise the Persian Kurdish tribesmen once again to his threadbare standard. The outlaw band of Shaykh Maḥmud was the first to join him, but they had few imitators. The High Commissioner was able by messages to dissuade all but a handful from so hopeless an enterprise, and the Air Officer Commanding flew to concert plans with the Persians at Teheran to prevent a rising. It lacked all serious support, and Salar al-Dawla retired to Syria. But in August 1926 he returned, again reached the Hawraman area, and raised some force of hungry riff-raff which looted a few villages before dispersing. No other help was forthcoming. The Prince re-entered 'Iraq in disguise, was recognized and arrested at Arbil, and was detained at Baghdad while his disposal was considered.

Towards Syria the attitude of the 'Iraqi political public was one of resentment against the French Mandatary; it led to sympathy for all Syrian nationalists and for such rebels against the régime as the Druz in 1925, but it was certainly without ideas, such as have been sometimes ascribed to King Faysal, of armed intervention. Syrian doctors and teachers were employed in 'Iraq, and Syrians were well represented on the King's personal staff. The reopening of the routes from 'Iraq, whether by Euphrates-side to Dayr al-Zur or across the Jazira from Mosul, was a desideratum which led to a series of conferences at Mosul, Dayr, al-Qa'im, and Albu Kamal between 'Iraqi and Syrian, French and British representatives from

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1921 to 1924. These were in effect successful in reopening the routes, with fair security, and in composing a part of the age-long feuds of the 'Amarat, 'Uqaydat, and Dulaym. Within 'Iraq responsibility was fixed on the Dulaym villages, under the supervision of Shaykh 'Ali Sulayman and patrols of the Dulaym Camel Corps. In safeguarding the Nairn route (p. 172), from the autumn of 1923 onwards, full French co-operation was enjoyed, though the events of 1925 found them powerless to keep order. A transit-trade agreement made in 1925 regulated the commerce of the new route. Mutual assistance over anti-locust measures was ensured in and after 1926.

The least favourable feature of 'Iraqi-Syrian relations was the continued lack of an agreed frontier, since the impracticable boundary of 1920, still nominally in force, was in fact necessarily ignored. Worse than this was the persistent tribal raiding. Ṭai and Yazidi, Dulaym and 'Uqaydat mutual offensives were frequent; but the most conspicuous offender was Daham al-Hadi, a dissident shaykh of the Shammar who, at feud with 'Ajil al-Yawar the 'Iraqi-recognized paramount chief, had moved into Syria and from there raided both the main body of the Shammar and the 'Amarat of ibn Hadhdhal. It proved impossible in 1925 to arrange a tribal conference—the decisions of the Albu Kamal meeting of 1924 had not yet been honoured; and in the year following a major raid by Daham was repelled by combined action of 'Ajil, the Royal Air Force, and a squadron of armoured cars. 'Ajil pursued his fleeing rival, looted his flocks, and was in turn repaid by the continuance of guerrilla warfare, with no end in sight.

The hope of good-neighbourly relations between 'Iraq and Najd was long to be disappointed. The Hashimite monarchy in 'Iraq and the resulting 'Iraqi sympathies could not be cordial to a Sultan of Najd who was both Wahhabi by religion and hostile to King Husayn and the house of Hashim to the point, ultimately, of war and triumph over them. These elements could perhaps be palliated by diplomacy; but to impose peace on the tribesmen in their deserts was far more difficult. A major raid by the Ikhwan leader, Faysal al-Dawish of the Muṭayr, and his allies on the Abu al-Ghar post and the Muntafiq shepherds in March 1922 was repelled by Air Force action; but in spite of ibn Sa'ud's apology and the chastisement of Humud al-Suwayt of the Dhafir, it added to the alarm felt in 'Iraq, which in turn was exploited for internal political purposes. A result was the assembly of a conference between the two States at Muhammara. This succeeded on 1 May 1922 in drafting a Treaty which was signed by representatives of both. It laid down the principles of tribal allegiance, assigned the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amarat to 'Iraq, provided for a later Commission to

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define the ownership of border wells, and agreed on means for the prevention of raids and safeguarding of pilgrim routes. The detailed provisions thereafter agreed were embodied in a Protocol signed at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr) on 2 December 1922. This provided for the first time an 'Iraq–Najd frontier intended to be definite, with a Neutral Zone for shared grazing rights.

But these improved relations did not endure. The Najdi refugees in 'Iraq continued to provoke reprisals by raiding into Najd, an inveterate habit which no Governmental action could correct. To practise it with complete irresponsibility, and to ignore both territorial boundaries and would-be superior authority, was a part of the desert way of life which no new age had yet amended. After the failure of British efforts to assemble a conference of the two rulers themselves, a meeting of 'Iraqi and Najdi spokesmen at last met at Kuwayt, under a British chairman, in December 1923. It proved powerless to reconcile differences, adjourned, resumed its debates, and still failed to agree; and its last hopes were dissipated by a raid on the 'Iraqi tribes on the fullest scale by ibn Dawish in March 1924. The death-roll of tribesmen approached 200, the looted animals 30,000. The aggression was repeated on a lesser scale by another two months later, by two more in December, and yet another in January 1925. At the same time the prestige of ibn Sa'ud had been greatly enhanced by his victories in the Hijaz, which were to end in the elimination there of the Sharifian monarchy and a Wahhabi guardianship of the two Holy Places.

But better times on the frontier lay ahead. A garrison of the 'Iraq Army, with armoured cars and wireless, moved out to the desert post of Abu al-Ghar. Air reconnaissance was provided. In May 1925 the provocative refugee tribes were moved into the 'Iraq hinterland farther from temptation, and others who would follow them into 'Iraq were turned back. An Ikhwan raid on the Dhafir in June was declared to be contrary to the orders of ibn Sa'ud, then busy in the Hijaz. British representatives on behalf of 'Iraq took council with Sa'udi delegates at Baḥra in the Ḥijaz, and a Treaty was signed on 1 November at that village. Sir Gilbert Clayton who negotiated it, visited Baghdad and explained the agreement in person to the King and Cabinet, by whom it was approved. If implemented with intelligence and goodwill, its provisions could cover reasonably, it seemed, the problems of mutual raiding, compensation, trans-frontier migration, exchange of information, and the channels of official communication. The extradition of tribal offenders was not agreed.

The Baḥra treaty did much for 'Iraqi-Najd relations, but could not avail to stop all inter-territorial raiding. Caravans between the

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Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1931–6

These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a nahiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Haydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Tahsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners similarly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

loss. In the 'Iraq Government service, 'Iraqis of goodwill and sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher as well as lower positions in provincial and central government. The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests, withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the 'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less, expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq: and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 recommended higher Customs-duty rates. A large part of its suggestions, especially as regards new taxation and reorganization, was not adopted. The 'Iraq Government was destined, indeed, to remain solvent but impecunious for years to come. The country was visited in the same period by Cabinet Ministers from England, Mr. L. S. Amery and Sir Samuel Hoare.

*645 The Hashimi Ministry, the last to govern without a Parliament, served with valuable results for a year. Among other measures it legislated for the Fao bar-dredging scheme, the 1925 oil concessions, a trade agreement with Syria, and the regularization of the position of British officials. Promulgation of the Organic Law was postponed from July 1924 to March 1925, to permit the preparation of election rolls, a lengthy and difficult task, and the liquidation of the Mosul Question before the new régime, awaited as a great stride forward from mere Cabinet government, was attempted. Preparations for the assembly of Parliament in Extraordinary Session (since an Ordinary Session could open only in November) were completed by late June 1925, and a change of Ministry due to differences between Yasin Pasha and his Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, gave to a new Government the task of inaugurating the parliamentary régime.

The premiership was entrusted to 'Abd al-Muḥsin. His Ministry included Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, the shrewd cosmopolitan lawyer Ra'uf al-Chadirchi for a short period, Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, the worthy Shi'i 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Ḥikmat Sulayman (younger brother of the Turkish General Maḥmud Shawkat Pasha), the keen nationalist Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, and by later substitution Nuri Sa'id and the Kurdish artillery officer and writer, Muḥammad Amin Zaki. The elections completed, and the twenty senators duly appointed by the King, Parliament was opened with ceremony on 16 July 1925. The selection of Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani as President of the Chamber brought Ḥikmat Sulayman to his place in Interior. The veteran nationalist Yusif al-Suwaydi, father of Naji and Tawfiq, became President of the Senate.

646 Parliamentary government, in the procedures of which the British had no part, began creditably. The standard of debate was respectable, the Opposition, headed by Yasin Pasha, not immoderate. The life of Parliament in this its first session was twice prolonged, and lasted until June 1926. It dealt with a heavy programme of legislation, including a first amendment to the Organic Law designed to provide for a possible Regency and for extraordinary sittings. The budget was adopted and passed. An altercation in the Chamber led to the retirement from the Presidency of Rashid 'Āli, to be succeeded by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The latter's place in Interior was taken by the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and half established by the British, had well begun. With many shortcomings and omissions it operated already more widely and more effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and nahiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

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was H. F. Forbes, I.C.S., in 1920–1, B. H. Bell in 1921–2, and thereafter G. Alexander until 1934. Davidson on transfer to the staff of the High Commission handed the Adviserships of Justice in 1922 to E. M. Drower, who held it till 1946. The Turkish Majalla, Code of Civil Procedure, and Commercial and Maritime Codes remained in force. Criminal justice was in the hands of single magistrates with first, second or third-class powers, and Courts of Sessions which possessed also appeal jurisdiction, while limited magisterial powers were still possessed by certain administrative officials and municipal bodies. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, beloved of administrative officials but disliked by the legally-minded. The rights of foreigners, preferential though no longer Capitulatory, were defined in the Judicial Agreement. Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a Bar Association for the body of excitable, ill-disciplined advocates, into whose numbers the Law School poured annual recruits.

The forces of law and order were at this period four in number: the 'Iraq Army, British forces of ground and air, the 'Iraq Levies, and the Police. The 'Iraq Army, based on voluntary recruitment from 1921 onwards and within its limits conceived on the most modern lines, by 1925 rose in strength to 7,500 men. It remained constant at about this establishment for the next eight years. There were six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, two mountain and one field battery, and all necessary services. The officers had almost all served in the Turkish Army, but in the lower ranks at least were adaptable to new standards. Units of the Army took part in many small operations against tribal enemies and saw more serious service in Kurdistan, not without losses. Great attention was paid to its Training Centre and its Royal Military College. The British Military Mission was re-formed and increased in 1925.[1] By this date the Army's rôle of successor, for all ground purposes, of the British forces was clearly indicated. The latter were progressively reduced, actually to vanishing point in 1929. In March 1921 there were 33 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry regiments, 16 batteries, and Sapper and armoured-car companies: these by 1926 were reduced to three battalions, two by 1927, one by 1928, and vanished entirely in 1929. The British military element, so characteristic of 'Iraq under the Occupation, was thenceforward to be absent until 1941. The Royal Air Force—under successive commanders of high rank, nearly all of whom were

[1] Successive heads of the British Military Mission, and Advisers to the Ministry of Defence, were: Colonel P. Joyce, 1921; Major-General A. C. Daly, 1925; Major-General G. G. Loch, 1928; Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, 1931; Major-General C. J. Bruce-Hay, 1934; Major-General H. W. M. Watson, 1937; Major-General G. G. Waterhouse, 1938; Major-General D. G. Bromilow, 1941; Major-General J. M. L. Renton, 1944.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most frequent collaboration was with the Levies.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards. The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Basra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

619 721 166 622 In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

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8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

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In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director-general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in succession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

242 651 farmed it with improved techniques; and an 'Iraqi-Syrian group, that of the 'Asfar concession', signed with Government in 1924 an ambitious land-development and irrigation agreement, involving the construction of the Ḥabbaniya reservoir, a Faluja barrage, and a dam on the Diyalā. Limited cotton-planting without notable success was carried out in 1925 by an Asfar affiliate, Diyala Cotton Plantations; but the terms of the main concession were soon afterwards called in question by popular outcry, its semi-monopolist nature was revealed, and the whole enterprise was perforce reconsidered.

242 Meanwhile, a Government anti-locust organization, on the scale which this ruinous pest demanded and using every known method, came into being in northern 'Iraq while Government participated in interstatal plans jointly established in Damascus. The deplorable harvest of 1924, the result of excessive cold and rainlessness, 654 was a reminder of the precariousness of agriculture. The small 231 Veterinary Department under Chadwick, besides its work with Army and Police horses and its civil animal hospitals, did what it could to control the endemic and epidemic diseases of the 'Iraqi flocks and herds, especially rinderpest which caused great annual losses.

653 Roads, mechanical installations, and buildings were the responsi- 494 bility of the Public Works Department, of which the Directorship was passed by J. M. Wilson, in that office since 1920, to A. S. Clay in 1925. Roads were still at this period unsurfaced and deep in mud or dust, but constant care kept them somehow open. The mileage of road and track available for wheeled transport increased threefold, and hundreds of passenger and freight-carrying cars plied on every route. The care of these, with their accompanying repair shops, supplies, and dealers formed a new branch as much 491 of industry as of travel. A trans-desert motor route, passing by Ramadi and Ruṭba to Damascus and the Levant, was inaugurated in 1923 by two New Zealanders, the Nairn brothers, whose headquarters was at Damascus. It had immediate effect on 'Iraq's foreign orientation. The service in 1926 absorbed its first (Syrian) competitor, which, using a track by Hit and Palmyra, had been the victim in 1925 of a savage attack by Dulaym tribesmen. The Ruṭba–Damascus section of the Nairn route became unusable in the summer of 1925 by reason of the Druse rebellion, and for a year thereafter convoys were diverted to 'Amman and Haifa through 205 the forbidding lava country of Transjordan. The carriage of mails by the desert motor route became usual, until air-mail services superseded it. Postal arrangements within 'Iraq, now under 'Iraqi administration with British expert advice, grew more comprehensive and included all normal post office services. Telegraphs were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

reconstructed, offices multiplied, and a mid-desert wireless-station was installed at Ruṭba.

Tigris river navigation did not, and was unlikely to, exceed substantially its pre-1914 scale. The pace was slow, navigation difficult and the Railway in powerful rivalry. The 'Euphrates and Tigris' fleet, managed by 'Mespers', still handled the bulk of the traffic, with its three ancient and two modern paddle-steamers (p. 111). These were increased in 1924 by the acquisition of two stern-wheelers, the *Kadri* and the *Ihsan* both built in 1918, and of the 1908-built *Baghdad*, originally owned by the Idara Nahriya. These three had belonged to the long-established Khudhayri company which was absorbed by 'Euphrates and Tigris' in 1924. A few other Khudhayri boats remained in commission, and the Royal Air Force maintained both the Inland Water Transport dockyard at Baṣra and a few vessels for their own supplies. The Port of Baṣra, administered by J. C. Ward as Port Director under the Finance Ministry of the 'Iraq Government since 1920, was still in 1926 owned by the British Government pending completion of capital repayment by instalments and the creation of a Port Trust. From 1922 onwards the Port was organized on a permanent and self-supporting peace-time basis and supplied all normal facilities both for 'Iraqi trade and for the oil-tanker fleet of Abadan. In 1923 it undertook, by a loan from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the dredging of a deep channel through the Fao bar which before 1920 was impassable at high water by any ship drawing more than 20 feet. The agreement provided for a channel of 28-foot depth at high water and 300-foot width, and 12 miles long. Work began in 1924, and the Rooka Channel of these dimensions was opened for traffic in 1926.

The status of 'Iraq Railways, directed by J. R. Tainsh since 1921, was similar to that of the Port: they were British-owned and after 1923 'Iraqi-administered with the aid of British executives and technicians, in anticipation of future purchase and adjustment. The Baṣra–Baghdad line was reopened in April 1921, and thereafter a Musaiyib–Karbalā extension, a line from Mafraq to the Hindiya Barrage and spurs giving access to Khaniqin and to Baṣra city were completed between 1921 and 1924. The Kut–Baghdad line, the Jabal Sanam quarry line south of Zubayr, and that from near Khaniqin to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq (Qurait) were closed in the same period. Permanent bridges were built in 1924 and 1925 at the Euphrates crossings and an extension from the Khaniqin line across the Diyalā to Kifri and Kirkuk was finished in 1925. The main workshops were brought from Shu'ayba to Shalchiya, in the western outskirts of Baghdad, in the same year. The Tigris wagon-ferry link at Baghdad between the

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

two-metre-gauge systems (Baghdad–Baṣra and Baghdad–Kirkuk) remained a source of delay and trouble, and the floods of 1926 destroyed much railway property. But the reopening of Persian pilgrim traffic after 1924 brought welcome revenue to the railway. The Indian labour disappeared in thousands year by year, replaced by 'Iraqis.

Industry in modern guise was slow to appear. Cotton-ginning and mechanical transport maintenance, ancillary to other forms of enterprise, have been mentioned. Of modern manufacture there was none, though various possibilities were often discussed. The future source, however, of the country's greatest single enterprise and wealth advanced during these years from the conference-room into the open: mineral oil.

The Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913–14 had allotted to Turkey, and therefore ultimately to 'Iraq, the western half of the Naftkhana border area south of Khaniqin; and the Turkish, and thus by inheritance the 'Iraqi, Government had accepted that this Transferred Territory should be treated as still included in the grant made to D'Arcy in 1901. Negotiations on this basis between the Anglo-Persian Company and the 'Iraqi Ministry of Works were concluded in 1925, and later reopened to produce a revised and modernized agreement in May 1926. Drilling had early located a producing well, followed by others, and it was decided to convey the crude oil by pipeline the twenty-mile distance to Khaniqin. The refinery which, with Government encouragement, the Company decided to erect at Alwand outside the town, but still within the Transferred Territory, was begun in June 1926. 'Iraq seemed thus assured of its own petroleum supply, with all the importance of this to mechanical transport, pump-irrigation, and perhaps future industries.

The Vizirial promise given to the Turkish Petroleum Company on 28 June 1914 had in the seven years following been first doubted but later affirmed by the Foreign Office. It was questioned but later accepted by the French who in 1920, under the Cadman–Berthelot agreement at San Remo, inherited the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. shareholding in the Company; and it was viewed askance by the Americans who demanded an Open Door to 'Iraqi development with no complication of old unratified promises. This diplomatic obstacle was removed by the allotment of half the Anglo-Persian share to a group of American companies by an agreement reached in principle in 1923, but not implemented formally until 1928. Thus the shares of the Company in its final form were held as to 5 per cent. as ever by Mr. Gulbenkian, and as to 95 per cent. equally between the Shell Group (as the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company), the Anglo-Persian (as the

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D'Arcy Exploration Company), the French Government-sponsored Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and the American companies grouped *ad hoc* into the Near East Development Corporation. This shareholding was unchanged thirty years later, except in the internal holdings within the American group, where the six early participants narrowed finally to two, the Standard Oil (New Jersey) and the Socony. The Turkish Petroleum Company approached the successor Government first in 1924 for a suitable implementation of Sa'id Halim Pasha's promise. Discussions were prolonged, Government a hard bargainer, and the Company's ideal of an all-'Iraq 'blanket' concession impossible of realization. The agreement signed in March 1925 covered the whole of Mosul and Baghdad wilayas and, since Parliament did not yet exist, was ratified by the Council of Ministers and the King. It provided for exploration by the T.P.C. within a time limit, for the selection of limited plots for the Company's own exploitation, with the obligation to let the remaining territory pass for development into the hands of the highest bidders. The royalty payable on petroleum obtained was to be four shillings (gold) per ton. Upon these bases, later to be revised, geological work in the field could begin, with great energy and expense, before the end of 1925. Concentrating first upon the known seepages and visible surface structures of the southern districts of Mosul wilaya, the Company devoted 1926 to extensive exploration. It was accompanied by the making of roads, the laying of water and fuel pipelines, and the erection of buildings. Fifty British and 2,500 'Iraqis took part. Drilling sites were selected in the Jabal Ḥamrin, near Ṭuz Khurmatu, in the neighbourhood of Kirkuk, and near Qaiyara and south of Sharqaṭ on the right bank of the Tigris. Drilling was to begin early in 1927. The claims put forward by the heirs of the late Sultan Abd al-Ḥamid, a formidable body of Turkish princes and princesses, to the ownership of all the oil of the old Ottoman Empire, and much besides, were not then or later taken seriously in 'Iraq.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahḍha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Ali Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Basra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indications, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

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ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day, by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

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by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's membership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Hilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The
648 former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called
[665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the
668 efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahḍa Party lost
186 support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

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Shallash, Barrak—were unchanged, Da'ud al-Ḥaydari (son of the venerable Ibrahim Effendi) came to Justice, Khalid Sulayman (brother of Ḥikmat) to Education, and Amin Zaki to Defence. The Ministry of Awqaf ceased as such to exist, and became a department under the Prime Minister. The replacement or re-selection of half the senators, now due, was carried out by Royal Irada.

But events were at hand to resolve the Treaty deadlock. The replacement as High Commissioner of that able and loyal friend of 'Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs, by Sir Gilbert Clayton who had already represented 'Iraqi interests in Arabia and stood high in Arab esteem, was thought (perhaps mistakenly) to presage a more pronounced 'pro-'Iraqi' attitude; in fact he repeated his predecessor's advice to Whitehall for the adoption of a liberal policy. The advent of the first Labour Government to power in the United Kingdom, and its early pronouncement on British policy towards Egypt, were more significant and raised not unjustified hopes in Baghdad. These were redoubled when, in response to its appeal, the 'Iraq Government was informed that the limiting provisos of the 1927 draft Treaty were no more; His Britannic Majesty's Government, resolved to support 'Iraq's League candidature without condition in 1932, would be glad meanwhile to regulate future Anglo-'Iraqi relations by a new Treaty to be arranged forthwith. The League Council was informed accordingly.

2. PROGRESS TO GENEVA

But the course of Treaty-making, from which the main difficulties seemed now to be removed, was interrupted by tragic events. The sudden death of Clayton in Baghdad on 11 September, greatly regretted, was followed by an interregnum of three months in the High Commission until Sir Francis Humphrys, of the Indian Political Service and lately British Minister at Kabul, took his place. In the meanwhile the Ministry of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi fell late in August, and a new Government was formed by 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun. Consisting of strong Progressive and non-party elements, it included Naji al-Suwaydi at Interior, Nuri Sa'id at Defence, Amin Zaki at Works, Naji Shawkat, an able if impulsive administrator and lawyer-politician of good family, at Justice; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab came to Irrigation and Agriculture, 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Chalabi to Education, and Yasin Pasha, the head of the People's Party, to Finance. But the Prime Minister had long been under heavy strain: he had experienced ingratitude and disappointment. The conscription issue was bitterly controversial, and the Treaty negotiations to which he next proceeded were embarrassed for him equally by British caution and by 'Iraqi impatience. Unexpectedly, and to the universal regret, he

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committed suicide on 13 November. 'Iraq lost in him a leader and true aristocrat of high character and gifts.

He was succeeded on 18 November, three weeks before Humphrys's arrival, by a Ministry of closely similar composition, with the addition of Khalid Sulayman. It was headed this time by Naji al-Suwaydi. This eager nationalist devoted his first energies to the transfer into 'Iraqi hands of the remaining executive powers in Government, as the country's new position, when achieved, would demand. The public, the King, and the press looked for immediate *carte blanche* for all 'Iraqi officials in everything; and from the contrary insistence of the High Commissioner on a slower and ordered transfer of duties re-arose the sadly habitual ill-feeling of the *Wadha' al-Shadh*. Some progress indeed was made, reductions of British staff were effected—at times by mere refusal of budget allotment—and new Regulations for the changed times proposed in every Ministry; but party back-sliding, the oncoming economic crisis, and lack of immediate Treaty progress, which was attributed as ever to British obstruction and was the subject of angry student street-demonstrations, led to the resignation of the Suwaydi Cabinet after a mere four months of life.

The succeeding Ministry was formed on 23 March 1930. Headed by Nuri Sa'id, who enjoyed the confidence of both parties, it included Jamil al-Madfa'i—hero or villain of the Tall 'Afar incident of 1920 and by now a sober and experienced administrator—at Interior: 'Ali Jawdat at Finance: Ja'far al-'Askari at Defence: Jamil al-Rawi, a senior official of good type and family, at Communications and Works: Jamal Baban, a lawyer who claimed Kurdish origin and some right to use the famous Baban name: and 'Abd al-Husayn al-Chalabi again at Education. Under this Ministry a direct attempt at Treaty agreement was made, and three months' negotiations, from April to June, sufficed to produce agreement. The text was signed on 30 June.

The 1930 Treaty, with its attached Annexure and Exchange of Letters, was one of close alliance between friendly nations. It carried the promise of mutual war-time help and the obligation of close consultation; but, except as thus specified, the defence of 'Iraq was to be its own affair. 'Iraq acknowledged the importance to Great Britain of its 'essential communications' through the country, and permitted British occupation of two air bases by forces of agreed strength, the one near Basra and the other west of Euphrates: in effect, Shu'ayba and Habbaniya. These were to be guarded by 'Iraqi forces at British expense. Their occupation was to begin within five years from the signature of the Treaty, and until then the camps and air-fields of Hinaydī and Mosul would be retained. The presence of these forces was not to 'constitute in any

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manner an occupation', and 'in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of 'Iraq'. The latter's forces were to be aided by Great Britain with arms, equipment, and training: in time of war British forces were to enjoy 'all facilities and assistance' in 'Iraq's power to give, and free movement by land, air, and water. The British representative at Baghdad was to hold ambassadorial rank and to enjoy precedence over other diplomats. The Treaty was to have a life of twenty years.

A new Financial Agreement, for which the Treaty provided, arranged for the cession of abandoned British camps and aerodromes to 'Iraq within five years, for the transfer of the 'Iraq Railways to an *ad hoc* Corporation, and for that of the Port of Baṣra to a Port Trust. Foreign officials needed by the 'Iraq Government were to be British, and the conditions of service of those already employed would remain unaffected.

Even before Treaty revision had reached its final stage, negotiations had been in progress for the replacement of the 1924 Judicial Agreement, in which the surviving remnants of the old Turkish Capitulatory régime ill accorded with 'Iraq's future status. The new Agreement, initialed by Nuri Pasha and the High Commissioner on the same day as the Treaty and ratified on 4 March 1931, provided for 'a uniform system of justice . . . applicable to all 'Iraqis and foreigners alike'. To facilitate this a number of British lawyers, later determined as nine, were to be employed for a period in the Courts and the Ministry of Justice. Certain alterations in the Criminal Code and in the rules of evidence were to be made (and were made in fact) before the Agreement took effect. Communicated to the League of Nations, this Agreement was approved on condition that all ex-Capitulatory Powers accepted the new position of their subjects in 'Iraq under it. They did so without exception within a few months: an acceptance which went far to render 'Iraq's new status acceptable to other nations.

Even accompanied as it was by an understanding with the High Commissioner for the immediate reduction of British officials, whereunder the ubiquitous Administrative Inspectors were in fact diminished in number and largely recalled from the provinces to Baghdad, the Treaty was received without enthusiasm in 'Iraq, and was, for opposite reasons, sternly criticized by many spokesmen in Great Britain. By the 'Iraq minorities immediate alarm was felt, as will appear later; by the ultra-nationalist politicians it was hailed, by reason of such British privileges as were to survive, as a mere continuance of 'slavery'. The Prime Minister decided upon a general election to strengthen his Ministry's position and to determine, at least ostensibly, the nation's attitude. The Nationalist Party, not content with an attempted boycott of the elections,

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and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however, declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva. Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and, with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Haydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Hizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MS

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

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648 accepted gladly a *Special Report on the Progress of 'Iraq* for the period from 1921 to 1930. The Commission was requested by the Council in June 1930 to formulate the conditions which should be fulfilled by a mandated territory for which the claim of emancipation was made. In the debates which followed, extending over two years, the part of the British spokesmen at Geneva was consistently to emphasize 'Iraqi progress, to explain observed deficiencies, and to adopt towards the future an attitude of optimism which reflected a sincere desire (whether believed or not by the political world of Baghdad) to be rid finally of mandatory responsibilities; nor was it unrealized in Whitehall that a League refusal to accept 'Iraq as a member would infallibly be ascribed by the latter to British contrary intrigues.

The many petitions received at Geneva from the 'Iraq minorities offered the clearest field in which 'Iraqi pretensions could be questioned: that is, the probable fate of the Kurds and the Assyrians—most persistent of petitioners—after British withdrawal. 'Iraqi policy on these matters seemed in fact at this time to be correct and reasonable, and the High Commissioner, cross-questioned, could specify the favourable steps already taken, could expect their continuance, and could accept British (as distinct from corporate League) 'moral responsibility' in this field should 'Iraq prove after all unworthy. The Mandates Commission reported accordingly to the Council in June 1931 that the conditions for emancipation seemed to be fulfilled—a settled and self-defending Government, good public security, sound finance, a respectable judiciary, a competent Administration—but that certain specific guarantees should still be given by the liberated nation. These were to concern the rights of minorities and of foreigners, freedom of conscience and religion, the honouring of financial obligations assumed for it by the Mandatary, the protection of previously acquired foreign rights, the observance of international Conventions, and most-favoured-nation treatment for all States-members of the League. A draft Declaration containing these guarantees was in due course prepared at Geneva and handed to the 'Iraq Government, whose Parliament debated and ratified it, with surprising complacence, in its session of 1931–2.

Satisfied by these provisions and procedures, with whatever tacit doubts, the League Council expressed on 28 January 1932 its readiness to terminate the Mandate as soon as the 'Iraq Declaration had been received. It was transmitted to Geneva in the summer of 1932 and, duly binding 'Iraq to correct and liberal treatment of all its nationality, minority, religious, and linguistic problems, it included a series of specific obligations assumed by 'Iraq towards the League. These assurances were accepted by a Committee of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the League in October 1932 and in turn satisfied the Assembly, still inclined as it was to uneasiness on the Assyrians' behalf, that no further formalities were needed. Those nations who had formerly benefited by Ottoman Capitulations and who had accepted the 1930 Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement as safeguarding their subjects during its validity were now asked, and agreed, to renounce such rights henceforward permanently. With the continuing pressure of Great Britain, and the evident impatience of 'Iraq, no opposition remained to be faced; a unanimous vote of the Assembly, with the participation of fifty-two States, approved 'Iraq's membership of the League on 3 October 1932. Speeches of welcome and appreciation marked an occasion of great cordiality and some historic interest. Nuri Sa'id Pasha spoke for 'Iraq to the British representative, Sir John Simon, of the 'sincere and abiding gratitude to the British people': which indeed he, his King, and a number of the more responsible 'Iraqis may, not without reason, have briefly felt.

3. REFLECTIONS ON A MANDATE

The termination of the Mandate, popular with the main body of British opinion, had also its critics in the United Kingdom. It was by these pronounced to be premature, to represent a precedent for the abandonment of imperial interests, to fail fully to secure all-important strategic communications, and to be dangerous or fatal to the 'Iraq minorities. Such criticisms, freely ventilated in press and Parliament, were shared in part by other European and American opinion, especially in so far as they suggested that confidence in an unaided 'Iraq Government's treatment of its smaller communities was misplaced. Observers in France regretted that an internationally supervised sphere was to become an all-British preserve, while this emancipation of Arab ex-Ottoman wilayas could not but react lamentably in Syria, where French policy was following very different lines. The world's verdict, however, not only on the British abandonment of this Mandate but retrospectively on their conduct of it, was by majority eulogistic. Life and reality seemed to have been given for the first time to the ideas which had inspired the mandatory conception; a politically backward population had indeed been formed into a nation, helped with its Constitution-building and administration, advised by experts, protected by armed forces, and at the earliest moment freed from tutelage. Such a record, in praise of which many of the great and good, and many 'Iraqi and non-'Iraqi Arabs, have joined, was hailed as representing something of a 'reversal of imperialism'. Scarcely conceivable before the twentieth century, it belonged characteristically to the climate of the Western political thought

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 which followed the Armistice of 1918. Idealism was not absent from the motives which dictated British policy; respect for the rights of the weak, and scrupulous trusteeship, were no novelty in the best British statesmanship. But other motives were also present: that, especially, of retaining the bulk of the advantages which 'Iraq could offer (East–West communications, strategic listening-posts, and an open field for commercial activity) without continuing to bear the strains and responsibilities of diarchy, or the odium of seeming in some degree to oppose the force of a local nationalism which had itself owed much to British precept and example.

Working through a body of British officers, advisory or technical, many if not most of whom gave years of service to 'Iraq as loyal and effective as that of any 'Iraqi, the outgoing mandatory Power had in fact shown a praiseworthy zeal and sympathy in twelve years of co-operation with an 'Iraq Government which Britain itself had called into being, and with a public with many individuals in which relations were those of cordial friendship. Not the least contribution of the British staff was the continuity which, free from the too frequent vicissitudes of 'Iraqi politics and officialdom, they could ensure to the Administration.

Few nations in this mandatory position would, perhaps, have asked so little by way of commercial or any other privilege, easy as this would have been in spite of all League of Nations Open Doors. Not only were public services, Courts of Justice, and defence forces installed as good as could be created with available personnel and funds, and no doubt superior to those of contemporary neighbours, but the essential duty of training 'Iraqi administrators to readiness for independence had received a successful attention unknown either in French Syria or in British Palestine. Relations with neighbours had been regularized, frontiers defined. Northern 'Iraq had been saved by British efforts from detachment to Turkey; and, for all the easy cynicism which imputes British efforts to safeguard Mosul for 'Iraq solely to hunger for its oil resources, it is the plain truth that British motives in this matter were rather those of a conscientious trustee and a lover of right and reason. Nor was any discovery of oil made in northern 'Iraq until a year after the Mosul settlement had been concluded.

There is no great validity in 'Iraqi reproaches that under the Mandate education or the Health services or the Army, according to the predilection of the critic, were starved. Funds were rigidly limited, none could or can suggest how they might be increased. Accusations of British political maladroitness, errors of timing and too hesitant advances must be judged according to the viewpoint of the observer: the verdict presumably will depend on the assess-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ment, from phase to phase, of 'Iraqi reliability and prowess in government. It is untenable that the British were at all times perfect in tact or judgement, or were wholly uninfluenced by their obvious interest in 'Iraqi stability and good order. But it is none the less regrettable that, though the realist looks admittedly for no more than rarest glimpses of 'national gratitude', the end of the Mandate left much of the 'Iraqi political world and most of the young intelligentsia still persistently rancorous against the British connexion, to which all the shortcomings of their State and the frustrations of their own class were ascribed. Most of the press was consistent in this indiscriminate Anglophobia.

In 'Iraq, as in all British-guided territories of Asia and Africa, the educated class had brooked no delay in its demand for political power and the removal of restraints, even while it exhibited, apart from its normal anti-British attitude, a dangerous immaturity and irresponsibility. Why then, it is sometimes asked, do or did the British continue to favour the education of a class—lawyers, writers, politicians—which will not only, all too probably, miss the best essentials of Western culture but will inevitably turn against its educators? If it were possible, in the close-knit modern world, to keep a territory in happy isolation and to deal paternally with placidly backward populations for their own good, the question might be difficult to answer; such a public might well be happier before the emergence of a political life of its own than after it. But such isolation or willing humility does not in practice nowadays exist; nationalism and political ambition cross every frontier; nor can a denial of education in the forms which will inevitably be demanded—the 'modern' or Western forms—be reconciled today with the function expected of a trustee. Still less would this denial be possible if, as in 'Iraq, such education had already well begun under Ottoman rule and a self-governing national State was the clear objective. If the British were certainly at times inept in their handling of the local intelligentsia, a policy of stifling or deliberately frustrating such a class was in practice inconceivable.

The Mandatary indeed, concerned above all with security and continuity, saw no alternative to accepting the existing governing class of landowners, senior hierarchs, and urban notables in their pre-eminence in public affairs: it did little to press the advance to ministerial level of the emerging, younger middle class. That this attitude, and the willing acquiescence of the present power-holders in it, led the young and would-be more progressive elements by reaction into the ways of extremism and subversion is partly true, and is confirmed by some of the groupings soon to appear. But this was probably not in practice avoidable, nor could a short-term tutelary Power be well expected to force an inexperienced and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 numerically small element, without rural or tribal roots, upon the country as its governing class.

A similar charge of ultra-conservatism is based on the mandatory régime's inability to solve the basic practical problems of the territory: those of insecurity, chaotic land tenure, backward agriculture, undeveloped irrigation, general poverty and disease. It can but be replied that funds were limited, that much technical progress was in fact made, and that the field lay always open to such 'Iraqi initiative as conditions and funds available might permit: moreover, a new land tenure system or settlement policy so comprehensive and so effective as to alter the face of 'Iraq must involve such fundamental measures and so deep an integration with the very roots of 'Iraqi society that its initiation would come better, or indeed necessarily, from the representatives of the nation itself than from those of an alien Mandatary.

Behind all thoughts of the merits or demerits of Great Britain as a Mandatary must lurk the deeper question of what measure of success is likely ever to attend the effort of any Western Power, with its strong prepossessions grown from its own evolution, character, and environment, to mould an eastern and Islamic population into something resembling itself. Left to themselves, such peoples have long been used to borrow from Western resources and techniques those items which appeal to them—too often the unessential, the trivial or the vicious, and those of which they see the need for self-preservation—while retaining, by habit or preference, their own basic ideas, methods, and tempo. The resulting régime—that for instance of nineteenth-century Turkey or Persia—is still their own; the Western elements are absorbed, accepted; the old social and political evils (as the reforming West sees them to be) are endured fatalistically, with discontent confined at most to a narrow questioning class. But the case is otherwise when, with whatever motives, a European Power installs itself in the territory of a backward country and, to reform and develop it, sets up Western forms, insists on Western methods and objectives, and amid a puzzled and soon resentful population seeks justice and efficiency as conceived in Europe. In a better world the relieved population might realize all the blessings of improved law courts, security, developing agriculture, schools and hospitals, and be correspondingly grateful; in practice it is otherwise. The mandatory conception, as applied to any but primitive unselfconscious peoples, in itself implies a belittling of national status, a blow to pride; nor has a Mandatary been found whose local representatives have managed to produce these blessings without offence to local leaders and vested interests, or without incurring the odium of being uncomfortable strangers with exacting and unfamiliar

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

standards—and non-Muslims at that!—and without, perhaps quite involuntarily, adopting something of the airs of superiority and social exclusiveness which are of all things the least tolerable to the educated society of the modern East. These dangers the British were ill equipped to avoid; it followed that their unpopularity in 'Iraq, after years of Mandate, was widespread. It prevailed, with many individual exceptions, not only in ministerial and official circles but also among the very classes to whom their work had been the most advantageous.

It is certain that some measure of reform and reorganization was, in the clear interests of human welfare, desirable in the 'Iraq of 1918; certain too that it could never have been carried out without damage to the immediate interests of some loudly protesting class, be they Shi'i 'Ulamā, intellectuals, landlords or tribal shaykhs. Could such reforms have come from within, without Mandate or imposed foreign help? Only, one may judge, too slowly, too uncertainly, and in the end inadequately. Or would a Mandateless 'Iraq State, with its 'full independence' from the outset, have been willing of itself to employ foreign helpers and give them adequate authority and continuity? It is improbable; but if so, such a method might have yielded better results than a Mandate, if genuine popular goodwill is, as it must be, the true criterion. But to neither the excited spokesmen of nationalist 'Iraq in the Baghdad or the Damascus of 1919, nor to a British Government then harassed with the stresses and counter-claims of inexpert peace-making, was such a solution likely to occur. The Mandate was inevitable; its administration had had great merits, with real but less tangible defects; and its conclusion was welcome to all.

4. THE MINORITIES

The problem presented to the Sunni government and governing class by the Shi'i element, a minority in political status though a majority in numbers and containing eminent men of religion, landlords, business men, and the most militant tribes, was little considered at Geneva. Nevertheless, it equalled that of the Kurds in delicacy and in its need of a solution, and its dangers were to be notably shown within a few months of 'Iraq's attainment of independence. But as the Shi'is were 'Iraqis, lived in the heart of its territory and included no elements of obvious interest to any outside Power save Persia, the Shi'i problem lay beyond the observation of the world's statesmen. It was indeed a question less of minority rights than of a temptation which 'Iraqi politicians found irresistible: that of using the weight of Shi'i religion and tribal power as a weapon, fatally dangerous, in domestic politics.

The lesser true minorities—the Christian sects, Yazidis, Jews,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 795 and Turkomans—made little history. The first-mentioned were accepted as equals in 'Iraqi society and administration as completely as any non-Muslim could expect; and when the announcement of British withdrawal led in 1929 to some heart-searching among the timorous, the heads of the communities had no difficulty in reassuring their flocks and urging continued loyalty to their King. A ministerial tour among them in 1931 led to great cordiality and the official thanks of the Apostolic Delegate. It was found not too difficult in 1930 to draft and pass into law new statutes for some of these Christian minorities, defining the powers of their priesthoods and councils. The measure of self-management which they accepted was bound, in a modern State, to fall far short of old millet autarchy.

The tiny community of inoffensive Baha'is in Baghdad was in these years the victim of an episode—that of the long-famous case of the Baha'i Houses—sadly destructive of confidence in 'Iraqi justice. They had begun in the middle 'twenties to repair their properties in the city. Fanatical Shi'i neighbours resisted this, petitioned the King and obtained from him, although the case was still *sub judice* in the Baghdad Peace Court (which later gave judgement for the Baha'is), a direct order for the eviction of the owners and confiscation of the keys. This action and the subsequent majority verdict of the Court of Appeal in favour of the Shi'i aggressors represented to objective observers an apparent overruling of justice by the rancours of local politics. It was ventilated at Geneva and was the subject of repeated protest by the High Commissioner, but in vain. The case, in itself petty and embarrassing enough to the 'Iraqi authorities, was a sinister warning to other non-Muslim elements.

563 The unselfconscious Turkomans of Kirkuk, Kifri, and their villages made no efforts to emerge from a useful and honest obscurity; they created no problems since the Mosul settlement, and were represented in 'Iraqi officialdom far beyond their numerical proportion. The Jews were still compact, assiduous, self-sufficient, and unambitious. They had had their outstanding Finance Minister, kept their place in the Government offices, dominated many of the markets, owned property, and supported their own schools and hospitals; and when 'Iraq approached its independence, were not so foolish as to compromise their future by open protest. The art of living in 'Iraq, and surviving bad times, was no new one to them. It was true that 'Iraqi, like all Arab, feeling was strong against the Zionist movement in Palestine; ugly and violent street demonstrations, accompanied by the usual marshalled schoolboys and armed roughs, greeted Sir Alfred Mond when he visited Baghdad on business in February 1928; and in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

year following demonstrations in the mosques and city, a two-minute silence in Parliament, black-edged newspapers, and telegrams to London marked 'Iraqi disapproval of the 'pro-Jewish' policy of Great Britain. But the day when these feelings would descend with personal violence on the heads of the timid and law-abiding Baghdadi Jews, anxious only to find a secure place in the State and to dissociate themselves from Zionism, lay still some years ahead. 563

The Yazidis, no longer eminent as of old either as harriers or as harried in tribal warfare, turned to restlessness towards the end of this period through the heedless and dissolute ways of their Mir, Sa'id Bey. He was accused of misusing the revenues and neglecting the shrine of Shaykh 'Adi and its pilgrims. A meeting of the Yazidi notables was held in Mosul in 1931, attended by the High Commissioner. Government attempted to produce a satisfactory statute for the outlandish community; but it proved intractable, and the Yazidi elders reported after full deliberation that no way could be devised to change their Mir except assassination. Rival Mirs nevertheless claimed support, and faction tore their settlements in the Mosul plain and Sinjar, to be settled only by time, intrigue, and murder.

The Kurds were a far more formidable minority. Added to the other elements making for separatism—those of locality, character, culture, and tradition—their specific nationalism, which flourished in a restricted circle centred in Sulaymaniya town, had survived their incorporation in the 'Iraq State, the failure of successive campaigns, the stern suppression of their Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Persia, and even their own profound disunion. The 'Iraq Government had made meanwhile a not discreditable effort to honour in their favour the League of Nations recommendations of 1925. They were given a generous share of Government appointments, a minister in the Baghdad Cabinet, and their quota of Deputies delighted to serve as such. Nevertheless, a petition submitted by some of the last-mentioned in 1929, asking for increased expenditure in Kurdistan and the formation of an all-Kurdish four-liwā province of their own, showed their determination to maintain all of their special claims; nor did their spokesmen forget that the twenty-year prolongation of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922—a specific condition of the Mosul settlement—was largely on their account. 563 668

Meanwhile it was possible in 1927 to arrange tolerable terms of surrender with Shaykh Mahmud. But he refused, after all, to honour them, and it proved necessary to dislodge him from his last stronghold in Panjwin by forces of the 'Iraq Army and the Levies, and by bombing and cavalry patrols to disperse his widely-ranging

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia
668 removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject.
563 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in
669 September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific
721 warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1815-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

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Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Harir area of Rawanduz qadhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

1z Longrigg G-4.5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions.

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Harir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian—continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Mahmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retrospect, to be regretted.

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The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate profoundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Hakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The High Commissioner's deputy at Geneva in November 1930 gave reassurances, which he believed to be justified, on the future prospects of this and the other minorities. In the same year Sir Francis Humphrys dealt with the Rassam petitions and pledged the 'moral responsibility' of Great Britain for the future attitude of the 'Iraq Government. Returned to 'Iraq, and faced with a situation deteriorating largely through the Assyrians' own activities, he again recommended the Government to show all possible goodwill by resuming its taxation-remission policy. This was done, with good effect. It would have been followed by re-attempting, on attractive terms, the long postponed Baradost settlement, had not the outbreak of Barzan–Baradost hostilities precluded it.

In October 1931 a conference of Assyrians convened at Mosul by the Mar Sham'un dispatched petitions to Geneva. They requested that since the community could not face conditions in 'Iraq after termination of the Mandate, it should be transferred *en bloc* to some Western-governed territory elsewhere, or to Syria. These petitions, however, were not considered by the Mandates Commission for thirteen months, and meanwhile the alarmed Assyrians decided on direct action. The Mar Sham'un prepared in May 1932 a plan to concentrate the whole community in the area of Dohuk–'Amadiya in July, and a general 'cessation of service' by all the Levies on 1 June was threatened in a memorial handed at Hinaydi to their Commander, Brigadier J. G. Browne, himself a tireless upholder of Assyrian rights and later historian of the Levies. The intervention of the High Commissioner postponed a crisis, and yet another petition to Geneva was prepared; but the threat of mass resignation was repeated in the event of its having no early or favourable issue. This petition demanded recognition of an Assyrian Millet and of its Patriarch's temporal and spiritual authority, with an Assyrian deputy in Parliament, community schools, and a subsidy for the Patriarch himself and for his Church. It asked also for the annexation of Hakkari territory to 'Iraq, or alternatively the formation in 'Iraq of an all-Assyrian liwā to the north of Mosul, with a new and well-considered Settlement and clear land-titles.

The Levy strike was in fact averted by the arrival by air—an operation then hailed as remarkable—of a battalion of British troops from Egypt. Its four companies were posted to the four main Levy stations. The Mar Sham'un, influenced by this step and by Humphrys's representations, agreed to order the Levies to remain at duty until the petition of 17 June should have been considered at Geneva. The Levy personnel at Hinaydi, who alone continued insubordinate, were reduced by the release of some 250 men; elsewhere the impending reductions of Levy strength

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.
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In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central
647 Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-
647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Adviser-ship to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Acting Adviser, and thereafter by E. G. Hogg, from the Sudan, in 1931. Hedgcock and the present writer left the Ministry in 1930 and 1931. Provision for Capital Works under a five-year plan was separated from the current budget, and a main part of the oil revenues, which first accrued in 1932, was allotted to this object. An Economic Advisory Board was set up. Chambers of Commerce were founded in Baghdad and Basra. A second advisory visit by Hilton Young, the 'Iraqis' financial consultant of 1925, was paid in 1930, and other foreign experts—notably A. Sainsbury, expert in income tax—assisted in the institution of new taxation and the fixing of civil service establishments. Income tax in modern form was first imposed in 1928, but proved relatively unproductive; in effect it was paid mainly by officials and foreign companies. A major change in the taxation of agricultural produce was made in 1931, based on a new system of tax collection at markets—the 'place of consumption' method—without the need to assess or measure the growing crops. A financial Inspectorate was introduced. Efforts both resolute and skilful were made in 1927 to free 'Iraq from the burden of its share of the Ottoman Debt, of which £ (Turkish) 7 million had fallen to its share, with a further £T2,500,000 of accumulated interest. The Minister of Finance arranged to buy Ottoman Debt securities in the open market and, after handing these to the Debt authority to an extent of £1,228,000 sterling, could arrange to pay off the small remainder by instalments. Thus, at the cost of finding funds from current revenue for debt extinction, the State could enter the League happily unencumbered.

The proposed foundation of a National Bank, often discussed, was still postponed. The Indian rupee currency, which had served 'Iraq well for fifteen years, was superseded early in 1932 by an 'Iraqi currency employing the dinar (equivalent to a pound sterling), divided into a thousand fils. Currency resources and the note issue were supervised by a Board in London, and rested on a basis of sterling assets. The confident reception of the new currency was the more gratifying as 'Iraq suffered not only temporarily from a number of 'slump' bankruptcies, but chronically from an adverse trade balance. A wide visible gap existed between the value of its exports and that of its unavoidable imports of fuel, manufactured articles, and some foods. The invisible exports which were assumed to fill the gap were the expenditure by the British forces, diplomatic and archaeological missions, charities and foreign schools, pilgrims, tourists and foreign companies, and the profits of the Persian transit trade. The progressive slackening of the last mentioned, in spite of lowered transit dues, was a serious feature of the times. Persian restrictions, Russian competition, the diversion of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muḥammara and the new Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long-profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia. The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*, and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived creditably, municipal development and the public services were expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns. The technique of brick-making; the methods in the building industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

European dress was
ever more generally adopted in the larger towns, and spread significantly to urbanized tribesmen. Among upper-class women, though the veil was still almost universal among Muslims, Western clothing was worn increasingly. The desire for material progress was reflected in the eagerness of the rich to acquire motor-cars, gramophones, and the toys and amenities of Europe; but inability to pay for these gave rise to demands for limitless credit.

Interest at the International Labour Office in conditions among 'Iraq's industrial workers led to some answering efforts to produce suitable legislation; but the smallness of this class in an unindustrialized country made European criteria and standards largely inapplicable. The first seeds were sown, however, of a social interest in labour matters.

To the whole community and to urban society in particular with its still prevalent poverty and low purchasing power the Government's Health and Education services contributed valuably. The former improved its quarantine and pilgrim services, multiplied its countryside dispensaries, improved its specialist institutes, and dealt well with the cholera epidemics of 1927 and 1931. It was significant that out-patient attendances, less than 750,000 in 1921, had more than doubled by 1926 and quadrupled by 1930. In response to foreign purchasers' outcry, the Health Department imposed measures of cleanliness in the date industry. In 1927 it founded the Royal Medical College; this, a medical school of good standards, took at once a high place in 'Iraq's higher and professional education. A School of Pharmacy had existed since 1922. The Government adhered during these years to a number of international conventions on medical as on many other matters.

The 'Iraqi schools seemed to foreign observers at this period—and indeed at others—to lack something of the best spirit of education. There was criticism of lax discipline, uncritical self-flattery, a worship of modernity and materialism; politics pervaded too many of the schools, always in the form of a crude xenophobia eager for street demonstrations. Nevertheless, an educational system grew and multiplied its facilities, fought for budget allotments, developed an Inspectorate, codified its Regulations. A Hygiene Directorate was formed in the Education Ministry, later greatly to develop. The year 1930 saw the first Government secondary schools for girls; the days of Muslim hesitation over female education were almost over. For boys the secondary period was prolonged from four to five years, three 'intermediate' and two 'senior'. The dispatch of students for higher education abroad grew commoner. Technical education remained unpopular: it did not lead quickly enough to the goal chiefly envisaged, a Govern-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ment appointment. A School of Agriculture, founded hastily and inefficiently in 1928, was perforce discontinued for lack of pupils two years later—to be afterwards refounded. A Health Officials' school, in connexion with the College of Medicine, in 1932 replaced the existing Pharmaceutical School: a year later a Nursing school was inaugurated, to which a midwifery section was to be added in 1936. The training of rural teachers at the primary teachers' stage was discontinued; but its necessity, urged by the American mission which visited 'Iraq under Dr. Paul Monroe in 1932, was later to be recognized. The provisional plan of 1923 for higher teacher-training was also discontinued, for later amendment. Another American secondary school, this time a Jesuit enterprise, was founded in Baghdad in 1932, and accepted pupils of all faiths. Government secondary schools by 1930 numbered fifteen, primary nearly 300. The theological college of Al al-Bayt closed its doors in 1929. The Law School, 'Iraq's nearest approach to a university course, kept all its popularity and produced civil servants as well as advocates. Separate Assyrian schools taught little but their own brand of religion. Kurdish schools, thirty in number by 1930, included one intermediate, and one for girls. Annual grants were made to the schools of the minority communities and foreign missions; their standard, not least in European languages, was generally higher than in those of the State. About 8 per cent. of all Government revenues was at this time spent on education. Lionel Smith retired from the Advisership to Education in 1930, and was not replaced.

Greater sums than this were needed for the services of security: a fifth or more of Government income maintained the 'Iraq Army, and nearly a sixth the Police Force. Since the Levies, reduced to two battalions in 1928, were used decreasingly on operations, and the Royal Air Force, reduced from eight squadrons in the period 1922 to 1926 to four in 1930, was soon to be no longer available for internal operations, reliance must be on the Police and the 'Iraq Army; no pains, therefore, were spared to augment and improve these. The Royal 'Iraqi Air Force came into existence in 1930, with five light aircraft. The Army, to which Great Britain contributed a grant until 1932, was developed with the close guidance of a British Military Mission which, increased from six officers in 1921 to forty-six in 1930, was then reduced to twenty-six. It trained its own officers at military and staff colleges, and by the dispatch of selected men to Sandhurst or Quetta. Recruiting in the period 1926 to 1932 was voluntary, numbers sufficient, training and maintenance adequate, discipline good. The strength of the Army by 1932 approximated to two brigades. It was unfortunate that its most frequent operations, against Kurdish insurgents, were in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechanization of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Hilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily developed during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Faysal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

were decked for road traffic, passable tracks were pushed far into the Kurdish hills. A 900-foot steel bridge over the Euphrates at Faluja was begun by British contractors, Messrs. Balfour, Beatty & Co., in 1927 and, after interruption by floods and a law case, completed in 1932. Permanent steel bridges across the Tigris at Baghdad and at Mosul were planned, and the latter well begun in 1932. A significant project was the road begun in 1927, and after remarkable engineering feats completed five years later, to connect the 'Iraqi system at Arbil with that of Adharbayjan at Tabriz. The 'Iraqi section, first used by experimental convoys in 1931, passed through the fabulous Rawanduz Gorge and was completed by the Persian section to the shores of Lake Urmiya; but its power to divert the Tabriz trade from Batum or Trebizond to Baghdad was doubtful. The close of the period saw the increased use of a direct Baghdad–'Amman route, and the first experiments in developing a pilgrim highway from Najf to Madina.

The Tigris steamers operated by the Lynch Company and their local competitors doubtfully held their own against rail, air, and road competition, and had little scope for development. The veteran *Blosse Lynch* and the *Baghdad* were sold as scrap in 1927, *Mejidieh* in 1928, and two R.A.F.-owned steamers, the *S.*16 and *S.*14 were acquired in 1927 by the Euphrates Company, to be renamed *Blosse Lynch* and *Mejidieh*; they were joined by the *Tigris* in the same year. The *Zobaida* ceased to be in commission after 1929. At Basra Port the bar-dredging operations at Fao, provisionally completed in 1926, were carried further in 1928–30. They resulted in a dredged channel—the Rooka—giving 30 instead of 28 feet of water at high tide (as compared with 26 feet in 1920) and easier movement over the inner bar. The bulk of the Port traffic consisted, as ever, of oil tankers proceeding to and from Abadan, but the Shatt was used regularly also by the Strick, British India, City, and other British lines, by the (German) Hansa Line and by an occasional ship of the U.S.S.R. or of Sweden. The new Port headquarters ranked among 'Iraq's most imposing buildings. The dredging loan of £460,000 from the Anglo-Persian had soon been repaid, and substitution of 'Iraqi for British and Indian personnel continued. Colonel Ward's Port administration, grouped as a department under Finance, was normally prosperous though badly afflicted by the slump of the years 1929 to 1932. It continued to pay to Great Britain the annual instalments fixed in 1922 as the cost of acquisition, but formation of the Port Trust then envisaged, and again provided in the 1930 Treaty, was not yet in sight.

The history of 'Iraq Railways was at this period uneventful. Their status as between British ownership and 'Iraq Government

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930 Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930 and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway development were followed, both of international interest: the first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F., and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain, a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the (French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr. Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west air services on postal communications was profound. Both were used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized. In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts of the public and Government were active in this direction. No minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 654 135 Ruṭba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial development proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

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382 471 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the earning of royalties. The agreement once passed by Parliament, at the cost of one ministerial resignation, the Company could plan and execute its twofold desert pipeline and its mid-desert pump-stations: works which called for its utmost efforts, human and financial, for the next three years. These and the continuing field operations in Kirkuk area constituted by far the most important man-made enterprise of 'Iraq's long history and, it could be hoped, the most advantageous to its Treasury and public.

The internal structure of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was completed by the definite admission of its American shareholders, the Near East Development Corporation, in 1928. The I.P.C. fields headquarters in 'Iraq moved from Tuz Khurmatu to Kirkuk in 1931, while that of its pipelines was established at Haifa. The annual payments, of which Turkey received 10 per cent. under the 1926 Treaty (p. 156), were made in sterling at the Bank of England exchange rate as between gold and sterling.

The area of north-western 'Iraq released by the I.P.C. in 1931 was next year allotted by Government to the B.O.D. Company, a British group, with considerable Italian, German, and other foreign shareholding, which had tried vainly to acquire 'plots' under the I.P.C. Concession of 1925, and in 1929 had protested at Geneva against its exclusion. Inheriting the test-drilling results of the I.P.C. west of Tigris, the B.O.D. bound itself to pay in advance of production an annual dead rent of £100,000 (gold), rising to £200,000: to export a stated minimum of 1 million tons per year within a seven-year time limit: and to allot to Government without charge a fifth of its crude production in addition to the royalty of 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The Company proceeded forthwith to the further exploration of its territory, forming an operating company, Mosul Oil Fields, for the purpose.

The Anglo-Persian meanwhile, with its smaller concession in the Transferred Territories and its revised 1926 agreement (p. 174), formed the Khaniqin Oil Company as its subsidiary for production within 'Iraq, and completed its Alwand refinery near Khaniqin in May 1927, when King Faysal opened it. Thereafter north and central 'Iraq were supplied at favourable prices with petroleum products from this source; southern 'Iraq still drew from Abadan. A network of distribution facilities soon covered the territory; it was managed by the Rafidain Oil Company, an Anglo-Persian distribution company formed for the purpose. Drilling at the Naft-khana field was limited hereafter by the K.O.C. to its actual needs, and at Chiah Surkh, where it had been abandoned in 1904, 1912, and 1924, it was resumed in 1930; but production still proved impracticable.

The daily lives of more 'Iraqis could be affected by progress in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The daily lives of many Iraqis could be affected by progress in
312 agriculture than by even the greatest industry, and such progress in
653 this period was not negligible. The grandiose irrigation schemes for which the press and public called were not, indeed, at once attainable; maintenance, minor improvement, and research were rather the order of the day. Nevertheless, some works of fair magnitude were carried out. New headworks and canalization on the Diwaniya and Daghara branches of the Euphrates were undertaken, and improvements in the water-supply to the Suq rice-lands. Swamp-drainage at Karbalā was primarily a public health measure. A permanent weir across the Diyalā replaced annually renewed antiquated works and secured supplies for the Ruz, Khurasan, and Maḥrut canals. The Laṭifiya Canal, the new Iskandariya, the Shayshubar were dug or re-aligned. A clearance of the Baṣra creeks and a major regulator, opened by the King in 1930, on the Bad'a in Muntafiq country were works of great local value. With them went continuous researches, surveys, experiments in desalination and drainage, and efforts to maintain and improve the 'bunds', breaches of which could ruin a countryside as they did in the disastrous floods of 1926 and 1929, and the necessity for which only the completion of the long-standing flood-diversion schemes could remove. Such was the Ḥabbaniya project, conceived by Willcocks twenty years earlier and closely restudied from 1927 to 1932; in the last of these years tenders were called for and the work seemed imminent. Other major plans, postponed by lack of funds and incomplete data, were the Tigris barrage at Kut al-Amara to restore the Gharraf and to control the 'Amara rice-lands: the smaller Abu Ghurayb canal from the Euphrates left bank, begun in 1932: an 'Aqar Quf drainage project near Baghdad: a proposed reservoir at or near Qizil Rubaṭ to conserve Diyalā water for summer use: a new head for the Ḥilla branch: the Ishaqi Canal, to take Tigris water from opposite Samarrā: and work on the main Euphrates channel near Shinafiya. The Irrigation Department was administered from 1925 to 1928 by L. E. Bury, who acted also as Adviser to the Ministry of Works and after 1927 to that also of Irrigation and Agriculture. W. Allard succeeded as Director of Irrigation from 1928 to 1933, and as Chief Engineer under an 'Iraqi director in 1933–4. Wheatley resumed the adviserships of Communications and Works in 1929, and held it for the next eight years.

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654 Of the need to improve agricultural methods, if these canal works were to yield all their value, the public was little aware. In spite of continued research and experiment, the main agricultural problems of the territory were yet unsolved—those of soil deterioration, antiquated techniques, inferior crop varieties, low and impure yields, and harvests endangered by flood or drought.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Their solution must depend on the simultaneous and widespread working of forces of rural education, reliable security, sound land tenure and properly financed enterprise. Meanwhile, the annual locust campaigns in northern 'Iraq were developed jointly with neighbouring countries. Progress was made in hill-country tobacco-growing and treatment of the leaf on modern lines. Silk experiments continued, though with scant success. Cotton-growing was still restricted by unskilled cultivation and by pests. The produce of the great date-groves of southern 'Iraq was bringing difficult problems not only of improved culture but of organization and disposal, and civil war raged between growers and packers. Of the attempts at modern estate development (p. 17) none had yet succeeded. The projected Agricultural Bank could not, it was found, be inaugurated until clearer land-titles gave security for loans. The Asfar Concession was limited and revised to provide for the acquisition and development by the Company of the Latifiya estate, south of Baghdad; the Irrigation Department constructed the main canal at the Company's expense, and promising operations on the 65,000-acre area began under European management.

The main agricultural development of the time was that of river-side pump irrigation. This had been initiated before 1914 and moderately extended between 1920 and 1925. Aided by important fiscal privileges, it began thereafter to show remarkable increase, to the point of becoming a main feature of 'Iraq's economy. Installations in the liwās of Baghdad, Diwaniya, Kut, 'Amara, and Diyalā had by the end of 1930 brought the number of pumps to over 2,000, representing a million-acre increase of cultivable area. There was evident value in thus attracting capital to agriculture, utilizing the cheap oil available, exploiting the high-lying virgin lands, and avoiding the precarious chances of flood irrigation. But the development was not free from trouble. The attraction of cultivators to new lands rather diverted them from old than increased their numbers; improvement in yields, due to fresh lands and secure irrigation, was not matched by superior type or purity of crops. Estate management attempted by townsmen was sometimes short-sighted and uneconomic, and the hard times and low prices of 1930–1 brought ruin to many hopeful enterprises. These, moreover, jointly undertaken by an urban capitalist—often a Deputy or city notable—and a tribal shaykh or *sirkal*, were productive of puzzling difficulties of land tenure and rights. Neither the traditional occupancy of the tribe, nor the share claimed by the incoming capitalist, had any basis in law. Agreements between the parties often proved unworkable, and in practice did not always bring blessings to the cultivators. These conditions indicated, yet

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

423 again, 'Iraq's imperative need not only of a land settlement but of new thinking on the subject of land-holding; the connexion of the pervasive instability and frequent injustice of land tenure with the level of security, with progress in agriculture, with social development, and with fiscal methods was long established. The formation of a State Domains Department, the bringing of old land records from Istanbul, the appointment in 1929 of an abortive Muntafiq Land Commission, the uncounted hours spent by every Qa'immaqam and Mutaṣarrif in the piecemeal 'settlement' of land cases were all signs that Government was aware of this, its greatest, problem. In 1929 an expert from the Egyptian Service, Sir Ernest Dowson, was invited to study and report comprehensively on 'Iraqi land settlement. His report, submitted in 1932, contained a full analysis of present evils and their cure. It led to the establishment of a Settlement Department under the Ministry of Finance, the passage of a law recognizing and regularizing rights of *lazma*—heritable occupancy—over Government land, and the appointment of Settlement officers—Ditchburn, Aston, Lyon, and Jardine, all from the ranks of the Administration Inspectorate—as Presidents of Land Settlement Committees to start operations in the field. These were steps of great significance to 'Iraq's economic history.

7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1927–32

648x The 'Iraq Kingdom during the last years of the Mandate was able, with the help of its ally, to extend and normalize its foreign relations. This was done by adherence to many international conventions,[1] by bilateral treaties or agreements, by consular or diplomatic representation, by stabilization of frontiers and by exchanges of State visits. While much of this represented normal international co-operation or courtesy, some, on the part of a State on the verge of emancipation, indicated eagerness to see and be seen in world circles. The sensitivity of adolescence in matters of prestige was enhanced by Arab pride and the assertion of an Arab national individuality new to the modern world; indeed, the move towards Arab Unity in more than the sphere of mere culture and sentiment was already implicit.

Until 1931 the duties of Foreign Minister were nominal, and the portfolio held always by the Prime Minister. The 'Iraqi representative in London became Minister in 1928, and the dispatch of Ministers to Ankara and Teheran followed the regularization of

[1] The subjects covered thereby, from 1926 to 1939, included Customs and transit, the rules of war, sea and air navigation, electric and water power, posts and telecommunications, health and drugs, locust control, cinematograph films, and workers' conditions.

1r Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

relations with Turkey and Persia, shortly to be described. These appointments were reciprocated. Consuls-General were posted to Cairo in 1928, Beirut in 1932, and Consuls in the same years to other cities in the Middle East. Foreign representatives, welcome as signs of their countries' recognition of 'Iraq, appeared in Baghdad and Baṣra from 1926 onwards from a dozen European nations—Ministers from Turkey, Persia, France, and Germany, and Consuls from Poland, Italy, Belgium, Egypt, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Holland, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and Afghaniṣtan. The tripartite British-American-'Iraqi Pact of 1931 gave American recognition, and secured to American citizens the privileges of League members. With Egypt an Extradition Treaty was made in 1931. Official visits, ending with a Treaty of Friendship, were exchanged with the Yaman in 1931 and 1932. With the mandated Amirate of Transjordan visits of the two fraternal rulers were exchanged before and after the death of King Ḥusayn at 'Amman in 1931. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in that year, and in 1932 the mid-desert frontier, from the Najd border to Jabal Tanf, was amicably defined.

Of 'Iraq's closer neighbours more must be said. With Persia, now fast advancing materially and administratively under its Pahlavi dictator, good progress was made in these years in direct frontier contacts and by the Shah's official recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom; but pretexts enough for further quarrelling remained. It was possible in 1927 to end the futile nuisance of Salar al-Dawla's annual visitations, by his dispatch on an allowance to Palestine. The Mandali water dispute was arranged by a Mixed Commission, frontier cases in the Khaniqin sector were settled by the neighbouring governors, Simko lurked quiescent in 'Iraq till his migration to Turkey in 1928. The trans-frontier migrations of the Pishdar and their behaviour in Persia were handled, at the instance of the High Commissioner, by meetings of the neighbouring authorities. In the Baṣra area trouble arose in 1927 among the Muḥaysin tribe, who live on both sides of the border. It sprang from the activities of the 'Iraqi Census Department. The Muḥaysin tribesmen in 'Iraq, their Persian passports (as they complained) confiscated and the menace of 'Iraqi conscription looming nearer, fled into Persia and were joined there by other tribesmen of 'Iraqi nationality. The latter Government, moved by the protests of the Shah's officials, ordered Muḥaysin registration to cease; but it was restarted vindictively by the local Persian Consul who, offering Persian nationality to scores of 'Iraqis, emboldened these to defy their Government. Angry demonstrations were checked by police intervention and the arrest of ringleaders, but peace was restored

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

only by the receipt of Persian orders to their Consul to desist. The traditional and resented Shaṭṭ al-'Arab boundary remained a source of Persian rancour. British diplomatic intervention was effective in 1928 in preventing the imposition of maximum Persian import duties on goods from 'Iraq, a measure which threatened ruin to the transit trade; but the presence and grievances of many thousands of Persian subjects in 'Iraq—and of those also who, to escape 'Iraqi obligations, claimed that status when convenient—could not fail to supply endless material for dispute and protest.

The humiliating refusal of Persian recognition of the 'Iraq State was due in fact less to petty disputes and neighbourly jealousies than to the anomalous position of this large expatriate colony. It had long claimed the privileged status accorded in 'Iraq to the subjects of some Powers of Europe. But Persia had never been a Capitulatory Power in the Ottoman Empire, and was unlikely to grant 'Iraqis in Persia corresponding treatment: and the demand for special rights denied to 'Iraqis themselves was unwelcome to the 'Iraq Government, the more so by reason of the numbers involved. Persia would withhold recognition until its claim be granted: 'Iraq refused to consider such claim until after recognition. Deadlock was complete, and all governmental negotiation between the two States remained perforce in British hands. The revision in 1929–30 of the Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement of 1924 offered, however, an opportunity for removing the root of the trouble. The Persian delegate at Geneva applauded the principle of the new Agreement, which was one of equality for all, and the British Minister in Teheran could assure the Shah's Government that in this and all matters—notably the Shaṭṭ boundary—British good offices were available to remove causes of dissension. The effect was instantaneous. In May 1929 full recognition of the 'Iraq Kingdom was accorded by the Persian Government, whose Minister appeared in Baghdad. A 'Provisonal Agreement', covering most-favoured-nation treatment, consular and diplomatic representation, and trade and transit was signed in August, and 'Iraqi Consuls were posted to the Persian cities. Thenceforward the treatment of common interests and problems proceeded with fair success by direct 'Iraqi-Persian approaches. The 'Provisional Agreement' was annually renewed while drafting of the permanent Treaty proceeded slowly. The troublesome Pishdar movements were kept under control. Kurdish Aghās seeking refuge across frontiers in this or that territory were removed to safety from border districts. The Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his sons, dispossessed anachronisms now exiled in 'Iraq, were brought to Baghdad in 1929 when a foolish revolutionary attempt on Persian soil drew attention to them. Joint military operations by forces of the two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

countries were directed with good results in 1931 and 1932 against the veteran trouble-makers of the Hawraman, Maḥmud Khan Dizli and Ja'far Sulṭan. The annual movement of the Jaf migrants from the Ḥalabja and Kifri plains into Peraia met in 1931 with tightened control from the Shah's modernizing officials; taxation and attempted arms-control caused outcry which a reasonable inter-governmental compromise was able to placate. No source of justifiable trouble, it seemed, was now outstanding except—a major exception—the river boundary below Baṣra. A visit by the High Commissioner to Teheran early in 1932 was followed by another, made with full formality, by King Fayṣal and his Prime Minister in April of that year.

Relations far more cordial than could have been expected were maintained with the Turkish Republic. The now feasible re-establishment of social contacts restored many friendships and offered much familiar common ground; nor, once the settlement of 1926 was loyally accepted, was there any substantial clash of interest. The rehabilitation of trans-frontier trade and communications was, however, a slow process in the disturbed condition of eastern Turkey.

The standing Frontier Commission was first convened in the autumn of 1926, and thenceforward met six-monthly in great amity for some years; later meetings were infrequent, since there was little to be done. A joint Delimitation Committee, under a Swiss president, worked for six months in 1927 and, with its careful mapping and its hundred concrete boundary pillars implanted, produced acceptable results. Ministers were exchanged between Baghdad and Ankara; the genial Ṣubiḥ Nasha'ṭ, early among these, died in the Turkish capital. The trans-frontier raiding of Kurdish tribes, the safety-seeking manœuvres of Simko (whose type of, and fortunes in, Kurdish nationalism matched those of Shaykh Maḥmud), the incursion of Turkish tribal subjects in search of refuge in 'Iraq's most inaccessible corners: none of these affected Turco-'Iraqi goodwill, nor disturbed what passed for security in central Kurdistan. The King and Ministers visited the Turkish capital in state in July 1931, escorted by his own Air Force; and early in 1932 Nuri Pasha revisited it for the signing of Turco-'Iraqi treaties of Residence, Commerce, and Extradition. The Amir Zayd accepted the post of 'Iraqi Minister to Turkey and stayed there for some years.

'Iraqi-Syrian relations were on two levels: those of neighbouring Arab countries, and those of the French and British Mandataries. The latter had much improved since the strains and ill-feeling of the period from 1918 to 1921; common interests in the carriage of mails, desert security, extradition, transport and transit, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

locust-control had grown, though the discrepancy of the two policies towards their wards was manifest. Desert life was characterized by the usual hostilities between the Ṭai, the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar and the Shammar, which were composed in 1927, and those of the warring Shammar factions themselves—'Ajil against Daḥam—and their tax-avoiding migrations. A successful large-scale assembly of tribal and Government representatives met at 'Aqra in the spring of 1927 and agreed to the cancellation of a score of outstanding claims. Such meetings were repeated in and after 1931. The mass movements of the great 'Aniza sections ignored, as ever, the frontiers assumed by their nominal Governments; in 1929 the bulk of the Ruwalla and Saba'a poured into 'Iraq for grazing and passed across the desert motor route, but tribal fighting, for which the 'Iraqi 'Amarat were all too ready, was avoided by their withdrawal. In 1931 progress in Paris conversations on the still undetermined frontier had so far advanced that application could be made to the League Council to appoint a Commission to trace a boundary based on that of 1920. A Swiss president, with a Spanish and a Swedish member, were appointed for the task. The first of these, Colonel de Reynier, lost his life in an aircraft accident on his way eastward, and was replaced by a fellow countryman, Colonel Iselin. The Commission finished their task in May 1932 and offered their recommendations, which were not unanimous, in September. These were adopted by the League. They involved the inclusion of the whole Jabal Sinjar within 'Iraq, with compensating transfer of territory to Syria elsewhere. The subsequent Delimitation Committee, with the same Chairman, finished its work in 1933. It was notable that in frontier dealings thereafter, as well as before, 'Iraqi tribal and other interests were defended by 'Iraqis, Syrian by Frenchmen.

The grievous events of the 'Iraqi–Najd border in 1927–9 illustrated, all too typically, the effects of confronting the proud but primitive and fanatical bedouin of north-eastern Arabia with a territorial frontier, which they could neither locate nor comprehend, as opposed to one tribally indicated; with an attempt at national discipline in their own country, which they resisted with savage individualism: and with modern weapons, which they resented as evil and unjust. With the penetration of Western conceptions into Arabia, the erection there of a relatively formidable central Government, and habituation to guns and aircraft, the same conditions are unlikely to recur; indeed, they may have passed for ever from the world.

The good effect of the Baḥra agreement lasted for two years, and although the establishment of the frontier tribunal envisaged in it was for many months delayed, the peace was kept in the wastes

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

south-west of the lower Euphrates and Kuwait. But these hopes were to be dashed. The Muṭayr were led by the truculent Fayṣal ibn Dawish, already insubordinate to his overlord. They attacked in November 1927 the 'Iraqi outpost at Buṣaya, seventy-five miles inside the 'Iraq border. This tiny mud fort and that of Abu Ghar, ninety miles inland, were held each by a platoon of troops. At least a score of 'Iraqis were slaughtered by the Muṭayr, who were convinced that these outposts were provocative. Strong protest was made to Riyadh, and the Muṭayr pursued by Air Force machines; but they rallied and returned to penetrate yet farther into 'Iraq territory and slaughter riverain shepherds and their children at Jumayma in mid-December. The effect on 'Iraq tribes as remote as the 'Aniza was profound and deplorable; nor would ibn Sa'ud admit, in the correspondence which followed, the legitimacy of the 'Iraqi forts, even though the raids had been made not under but in defiance of his orders. The R.A.F. flew repeatedly over Najdi camps, the 'Iraq Government garrisoned the desert posts of Salman and Shabicha; but the Muṭayr again in February 1928 attacked 'Iraqi and Kuwayti tribes, south and south-west of Baṣra. Ibn Sa'ud was divided between anger at his subjects' indiscipline and resentment at their punishment by foreign arms. Successful in preventing the repetition of major raids, he declined a meeting with the Political Resident in the Gulf, and showed himself intractable regarding the desert forts when visited at Jidda, in May 1928, by Cornwallis and Sir Gilbert Clayton. These abortive conversations were resumed in August, after the pilgrimage, with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi now attending as 'Iraqi representative. They failed again, and the frontier continued to live under the menace of Najdi ferocity. In January 1929 a raid by the 'Ajman killed twenty 'Iraqis in Kuwayt territory, and attacked a motor convoy in which Americans were travelling, killing one of its passengers, Dr. Bilkert, a missionary. This was followed by a greater assault on 'Iraqi tribesmen by 'Uṭayba, with wholesale looting and the slaughter of over seventy people: and this again by Muṭayr and 'Ajman raids with heavy loss of life, still on 'Iraq tribes (the Bani Malik) and still in Kuwayt territory. The activity of the R.A.F., the steadfastness of the 'Iraqi posts at Salman, Buṣaya, Shabicha, and Nukhayb alone saved south-western 'Iraq during these weeks from the same submerging waves of bloodthirsty Wahhabis as had flowed over the Kuwayt principality.

The ruler of Najd again asserted, and no doubt with truth, that the raids were unauthorized, and turned his arms at last against his own disloyal lieutenants. In March 1929 his forces heavily defeated ibn Dawish. The rest of the year was passed by the royal and the rebellious Wahhabi forces in civil war, in which those of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

sovereign gradually isolated and finally crushed the rebel Muṭayr, 'Ajman, and 'Utayba. This marked the end of a movement of fanaticism and disobedience among the north-eastern Sa'udi tribes which had greatly embarrassed their King and cost 'Iraq dearly in life and property.

The way was now open for the consolidation of the better relations promised at Baḥra. In January 1930 ibn Sa'ud met the Political Resident, and sat in conference with the King of 'Iraq on board H.M.S. *Lupin* in Gulf waters. The meeting was successful; courtesy and good sense triumphed over deep dynastic and cultural divisions. The vexed question of the 'Iraqi desert posts was to be settled by later talks or by arbitration. A treaty was to be drafted. The destruction and bloodshed which the rebel Wahhabis had caused would be compensated: and in fact a quarter of the sum ultimately assessed, £30,000, was quickly paid. The potentates parted with a cordiality not wholly insincere, and raiding ceased. In April 1931 the 'Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Sa'id, with Ṭaha al-Hashimi, brother of Yasin Pasha, visited Mecca for the signature of a combined Treaty of Bon Voisinage, Friendship, and Extradition. The visit was returned in 1932 by the Amir Fayṣal, the second surviving son of the Arabian ruler. 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, on whom the highest 'Iraqi order was bestowed, adopted the royal title in the autumn of the year, and announced the renaming of his territories of Najd, al-Aḥsā, and the Ḥijaz combined as the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

1. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tures; and the introduction of these, with the gradual rescue of agriculture from primitive method and low yield, was a certain feature of the future. 'Iraq's irrigation problems—flood-protection, conservation of dry-season water, distribution, drainage—had been partly solved at least on paper, and more than one important scheme was formulated in readiness for execution; smaller works had been carried out, others were imminent. The complex problem of stultifying and perverse forms of land tenure had been unravelled, the way was open for clearance and rebuilding, and Settlement Committees were already in the field. Mineral wealth had been sought—but found wanting, save in the vastly important presence of a single asset, petroleum. The development of this had begun well, its potentialities were unlimited, and its contribution to 'Iraq's finances could already be foreseen as essential to all its hopes. Industry, willingly fostered, had indeed lagged behind for lack of raw materials, markets, and aptitudes, but could be expected to find a modestly increasing place in 'Iraqi economy. Trade was at the level, and on the lines, indicated by tradition and by present needs, and had well survived a world-wide depression. The means of communication of every type had immensely developed in the last half-generation, and would certainly be improved to meet the needs of an expanding economy and social and international needs. At least the elements of well-conceived public services already existed, and if funds permitted would gradually increase the social area of their activity.

This security and these beneficent developments and social services had called and would call firstly for a reasonably efficient and comprehensive Administration, and secondly, for a sound and benevolent authority in the State itself, with a political life based on stable foundations. As to the first, the Administration which existed in 1932, while imperfect and in places rudimentary, not only was far superior to its Turkish predecessor, but seemed likely with time to shed the features which at present depressed it below the level of which the best 'Iraqi officials—keen, intelligent, honourable—were certainly capable. As to the second, the main bases of public life and legislation, there is more to be said.

'Iraq had adopted, as its form of government, representative parliamentary democracy. The choice could be criticized; but there had been no alternative. 'Iraq was no Najd, with full consent to a patriarchal tyranny: and no Persia or Turkey, which could throw up an efficient military dictator. It had as its only guide a political class which claimed to be liberal, wished to go on where the revolution of 1908 had left off, and was scornful of earlier forms; nor did it contain a personality capable of single rule, or a group capable of acceptable oligarchy. Neither to the British,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradi- 665 tion of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free 204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 645 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the 666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of 652 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part which, in the event, was to be that of the Army.

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government—dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

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565 184 as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

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that the incomparable services of King Fayṣal would not be available for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment. 182

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi 186

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186 politics cost the careers and sometimes the lives of some of its best sons, and deprived its people of real advantages.

648x In the international field, three main tasks would devolve after 1932 on the 'Iraqi nation: the first, to profit to the full from the support and help which its ally was prepared, without interference or self-seeking, to offer it: the second, so to align itself in world politics as to secure its own safety in whatever power-struggles might lie ahead: and thirdly, to take such steps as popular feeling might indicate in the direction of closer relations with the rest of the Arab world. The first of these tasks, which called for nothing more than the maintenance of mutually friendly relations with the British, was no arduous one; there was indeed no field of clashing interest between the two allies, and the anti-foreign extravagances of the press could no doubt be rightly assessed by both parties. In world affairs outside 'Iraq, its Government had no choice to make until the rise of Nazi power in Germany, and the attractiveness to many 'Iraqis of its forms and methods, created the temptation of a move of 'Iraqi policy away from Great Britain and towards her probable enemies: a temptation which an 'Iraq Government, a decade later, failed to resist. In the Arab world, forward movement was inevitable and was likely to be viewed with general sympathy. 'Arab Unity' had made its appearance in ministerial programmes before the end of the Mandate and, though not all statesmen gave it identical interpretations or priority, to none did it fail to appeal. Unity of a sort, indeed, was implicit in the shared linguistic and cultural environment of Arabs, their common traditions, religion, and pride, from 'Iraq to Morocco; and politically it both reflected the inspiring memory of the medieval Islamic (though in fact mainly non-Arab) empires and was the heir of the generalized Arab nationalism of the early years of the twentieth century. 'Iraqis were mindful, more particularly, of the war-time promises to King Ḥusayn, when a single Arab State seemed to be envisaged, and of the urge to weld a greater Arab nation as a heavier counterpoise to the dominance of Europe, to correct the resented post-war parcellation of the Arab lands, and to enjoy a wider economic and social life. But there were factors, not easily to be dissipated, which must be expected to render political unity difficult to achieve. Such were the effects not only of sheer geographical separation but of the distinct local loyalties which, with the fullest encouragement of their respective Governments, had developed since 1918. Such were the differences in orientation, commercial interests, personal leaderships of dynasty or statesmen, and stages of evolution reached in the various Arab lands: and such the difference, in general, between inherited but untested fraternal sympathy, and the uneasy and exacting demands of

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political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Ali, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Naṣrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education: and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

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*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Ḥikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

*645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national co-operation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

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arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, Yasin Pasha, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Ḥaydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has been said in these pages. The Mar Sham'un, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Isma'il, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Sham'un's favour in the Dohuk–'Amadiya area. The 'Iraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Sham'un on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of 'Iraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Sham'un to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Sham'un addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both 'Iraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Ḥikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

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Patriarch should not leave Baghdad until further notice. He remained accordingly at the Y.M.C.A. hostel. Telegraphed directions from King Faysal in London on and after 19 June ('under British pressure', as Baghdad statesmen averred) bade his ministers pacify and release the prelate; but these were not merely set aside as being too clearly destructive of Government prestige, but aroused anger in Baghdad at so misplaced an intervention. The Ikhā Government was in fact already gaining credit even from its critics for firmness against the 'Assyrian menace'. Moderating suggestions for the removal of General Bakr Ṣidqi from the military command at Mosul had been refused. This officer, a harsh and ambitious egoist not destitute of some social and considerable military gifts, had long been bitterly anti-Assyrian and already saw himself, perhaps, as their authorized destroyer.

The situation in the Assyrian areas and in Mosul deteriorated as summer set in. Yaqu and his friends had for months been touring with a formidable armed party, flouting Government's authority and orders and urging non-cooperation with the Settlement. Only after the dispatch of 'Iraqi troops to posts in the Dohuk area, with the object of assuring order and discouraging Yaqu, was it possible for Lieutenant-Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector of Mosul liwā (and subsequent historian of these events) to make contact with Yaqu and with friendly firmness bring him to Mosul. News of this submission was telegraphed to the King in London, who again suggested the release of the Mar Sham'un, to be again refused. Yaqu's submission, however hesitating and insincere, was clinched at Mosul by a written promise to desist from agitation. This was followed by a meeting on 10 July at which a full statement of the Assyrian position in 'Iraq, and the difficulties which confronted their emigration from it, was made to them by the acting Mutaṣarrif and by Stafford. The next day all was cordiality between Government representatives and those of the party opposed to the Mar Sham'un. The latter's following, to whom the reasons for his detention in Baghdad were patiently re-explained, agreed to send spokesmen to visit him there. They left Mosul, Yaqu and Luqo among them.

They proceeded, however, not as expected to Baghdad but forthwith across the Tigris into Syria, there to demand permission to enter from the French officer at 'Ayn Diwar post; nor can it now be certainly established whether this decision was a sudden unpremeditated gesture of despair (as upholders of the Assyrians allege) or part of a plan inspired by, or at least known to, either the Mar Sham'un (who denied it) or his family in Mosul. Without waiting for permission, for which the frontier officer telegraphed to Beirut, the impetuous leaders sent word back to their villages alleging,

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with patent falsity, that the French welcome to Syria had been cordial, land was available, taxes on crops would be remitted. The clansmen, to a number of some 1,000, leaving their homes and families unprotected—certain sign that no act of violence was at that time contemplated—swarmed across the river at Faysh Khabur and below it, at a point where frontier rectification was presently intended (p. 218) in accordance with the recent delimitation.

The news of these moves reached Mosul on 20 July. It was received with suspicion, not unmixed with hopes that riddance of the Assyrians was in sight. Reports of river crossings multiplied, and qadhā officials did nothing to check the welcome exodus. The Army command, who not unwillingly saw in these movements a menace by the redoubtable Assyrian fighting men, dispatched troops to the Tigris to watch events from forward posts, and to deal, by disarmament, with any parties who might return into 'Iraq.

A new phase opened with information, on 27 July, that the French were allowing no more Assyrians to enter: if indeed any had yet entered Syria, since the western river bank was at the moment still 'Iraqi territory, untransferred. They declined also to apply, as might have been possible and as the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister specifically requested from the French chargé d'affaires, the Syro-'Iraqi Frontier Agreement whereunder tribal immigrants would be disarmed and moved inland from the border. A meeting between French and 'Iraqi officers was held at Faysh Khabur on 26 July, another on 2 August. At the latter, the French officer declared that the Assyrians would not be accepted in Syria, and that 336 rifles had been taken from the 415 armed men who had approached the frontier; and he took note of the emphatic 'Iraqi request that no armed Assyrians should recross into 'Iraq or that, if recross they must, sufficient notice should be given to the 'Iraqi authorities. The failure to observe this agreement, due rather to inefficiency than to malice, was a main factor in the tragedy which followed, and caused much of the 'Iraqi bitterness against the French.

News of these events, represented as a dangerous movement, aroused violent anti-Assyrian and anti-Christian feeling in Baghdad. The Government, delighted to play the rôle of protector of 'Iraqi interests against a grave danger, did not minimize 'the menace', did not contradict whispers that Great Britain was behind this plot of their protégés, and let the public offer an indifferent welcome to the King as he returned alarmed and apprehensive from Europe on 2 August. He was to stay for a month in his capital, powerless to influence a position whose facts he never appreciated, and whose emotional violence swept all before it.

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During the first three days of August a few individual Assyrians recrossed the river to 'Iraq to surrender their arms after angry quarrelling with their too hopeful leaders. On the afternoon of the 4th considerable parties, to whom the French had restored their arms, began unannounced to recross, determined to regain their unguarded families. Animated by whatever disastrous folly or malice, some individuals from among them discharged shots at 'Iraqi troops whose pickets faced the river and who were prepared to receive the surrendered arms. The scale of the fighting increased as more of the excitable mountaineers hurried to the front; the Army replied with spirit and substantially held their positions; and a hotly contested combat continued all night and until long after sunrise. The losses of the Army were some thirty killed and forty wounded, those of the Assyrians about half these numbers. In the early morning some 200 of the Assyrians made for the hills in small parties, seeking their homes; the rest with Yaqu and Luqo again crossed to the Syrian side where they were bombed by the 'Iraqi Air Force and, to a number of 533, were interned by the French. The broken stragglers together with villagers and wayfarers on the left bank were rounded up over a wide area and shot by the Army out of hand.

At no time, it is certain, could any Assyrian movement, however widespread and determined, have in any degree threatened the 'Iraqi State; yet such was the feeling aroused by past rancours, by fear and present anger, and by stories (not, it is probable, all untrue) of Assyrian atrocities to the dead or captured, that the 'Iraq Army launched from this point onwards a campaign of singular truculence. It was accompanied by a wave of unprecedented bitterness against the British. Anti-Assyrian measures taken during the following days included the hasty arming of Kurdish irregulars, the search of all roads and tracks for stray Assyrians who were shot at sight, the raising of a force of supernumerary police, and the terrorization by the Army of civil officials who might attempt (as some did) to interfere. The Minister of Defence, Jalal Baban, and the Director-General of Police, Ṣubih Najib, on a flying visit on the 7th showed their zeal by projects to arm and inflame the Kurds against the Christians. Patrols of the R.I.A.F. vied with each other in reports of 'dangerous concentrations' of the now terrified Assyrian villagers. 'Iraq Army troops in Dohuk and Zakho massacred in cold blood not fewer than 100 Christian peasants in those villages. The Kurdish and Arab tribes —of the Kurds, the Sindi, Quli, Sulayvani: of the Arabs, the Jubur, Shammar, Ḥadidiyin—and parties of Yazidis were allowed to understand that the Assyrian settlements would not be protected; and looting, wholesale and unchecked, stripped and ruined almost

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

all their villages in Dohuk, Shaykhan, and Zakho qadhās. Those in the qadhās of 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zibar, and Rawanduz, where the civil Government could maintain its powers, were unmolested. Refugees, penniless and hungry, poured into Mosul and into the large central villages of Al Qush and Simayl (Simmel). 563 721

The Minister of the Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, toured the affected areas from 11–15 August. He became aware that the immediate requirement of policy was not to continue the current butcheries and lootings but to conceal from the world the truth, which with horror he learnt for the first time; for he had visited Simayl. Here, from 8–11 August, Assyrians belonging to the village and from outside it had clustered for safety round the police station, disarmed but solemnly reassured by the sergeant. Their terror increased when tribesmen were allowed unchecked to enter and loot their homes, their priest was removed, and their Arab fellow villagers moved out with the flocks. On the morning of 11 August, a motor machine-gun company of the 'Iraq Army entered the village in good order under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the massacre of every man in the village. The work was complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, some 315 in number, including 4 women and 6 children.

It is not doubtful that this operation, revolting in its senseless cruelty, was planned and ordered by the Commanding General, Bakr Ṣidqi Pasha, though he had arranged himself to be absent in Mosul on that day. He intended, it was believed, a similar exploit at Al Qush, but was dissuaded. The 'Iraqi official account of the Simayl massacre as the work of tribesmen is contrary to the facts.

The historian has neither need nor wish to pass judgement upon the series of events—not without their parallels, of St. Bartholomew or Glencoe—which began with the foolish and provocative manœuvres of, or indeed the actual attack launched by, Assyrian fanatics and ended with the shocking climax of the Simayl massacre. With their motives of folly, falsehood, hatred, and brutality they show humanity at its lowest. The attitude of the 'Iraqi authorities, central and local, to the Assyrian problem and people had been up to 4 August forbearing and indeed generous: the conduct of the 'Iraq Army thereafter was, in its sustained brutality, beyond defence. These actions were in large part concealed from the public, who were instead deceived by stories of widespread Assyrian rebellion, the gallantry of 'Iraqi troops, and the treacherous designs of Great Britain. This must explain the failure by Government or the public to give expression to any feeling of regret more forthright than the half-excuses of Yasin 563

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 Pasha at Geneva, or to any condemnation of the guilty officers. These were, on the contrary, fêted and promoted amid acclamation. The Mar Sham'un, on his side, was successful in disseminating an almost equally false picture of the Assyrian part and of his own misleading of his community; he sustained with complete success in Europe and America the part of an injured martyr.

As the storm passed gradually from the Mosul hills, troops withdrew and the villagers counted their dead and surveyed their ruined homes, a camp was opened at Government expense at Mosul for the destitute—strange reversion to the conditions of Ba'quba in 1919! Hundreds of Assyrian Levy dependants were transported to their lines at Hinaydi. Mosul filled with unemployed and unemployable refugees. Restoration of the villages was slow, the fields unsown, the population cowed and spiritless. Official orders for restoration of the loot by tribesmen were almost wholly ignored, promised compensation was never forthcoming. The rift between the Assyrians and the 'Iraq Government was complete; hatred and distrust had triumphed. In Mosul anti-Assyrian popular feeling was rabid, and leading members of the now terrified community, including the father, brother, and aunt of the Mar Sham'un, were deported from the town. Fantastic rumours of impending British or French action were believed, and the press surpassed all previous exploits. The Amir Ghazi, visiting the town on 27 August, was hailed enthusiastically by the exponents of an anti-British bitterness without precedent. In the Kirkuk oilfield there was tension but no demonstrations; at Bayji some anti-Assyrian rioting cost lives and property. The political public of central and southern 'Iraq, fed on stories of rebellion gallantly mastered, raged against the British and the expectation that they would intervene on their protégés' behalf. The Army soared heavenward in popular enthusiasm, its units and commanders returning to Baghdad were accorded the welcome of war-scarred heroes. The ministers indeed, rescued by this unifying enthusiasm from serious trouble on the Euphrates, dared adopt no other policy. The King, whose intervention on behalf of the Mar Sham'un in July was not forgiven, and from whom much of the ugly truth was concealed, found himself almost ignored amid the plaudits for his son and the generals; he returned, ill and dispirited, on 2 September to Europe for medical treatment.

The Mar Sham'un, whose personal safety in Baghdad could no longer be assured and was indeed hourly threatened, was removed to security in Cyprus by the Royal Air Force, to be there joined by his family. The 'Iraq Government granted him a monthly living-allowance on the condition of abstention from further provocative politics, a condition which he contravened from the first hour of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

accepting it. From Cyprus he continued to bombard the League of Nations with petitions.

The return of Sir Francis Humphrys to Baghdad on 23 August, with the realization that the British pro-Assyrian intervention was imminent, gave some relief, not least to the uneasy but defiant Cabinet. The tension and emotion of mid-August gradually died down. Then, on 8 September, the news reached Baghdad that King Faysal, with King 'Ali, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Haydar at his bedside, had died suddenly of heart failure at Berne.

3. THE HASHIMI MINISTRY

The shock of this irreparable loss, dramatically sudden and coinciding with a wave of ungrateful depreciation, transformed public opinion in an hour. The late King regained, and deservedly, all his place in 'Iraqi esteem: esteem which was indicated, on the arrival of his body from Trieste and Haifa on 14 September, by a funeral without precedent in 'Iraq in its expression of nation-wide grief. His services had indeed been beyond price to the State of which he was both the spirit and the embodiment; and in days to come they were to prove irreplaceable. None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen; none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factious ministers. Many of the troubles of the period from 1933 to 1941 would, it may be, have been avoided if his wisdom and experience had been spared to the 'Iraq State for those years.

The heir apparent, succeeding to the throne as Ghazi I, swore his oath of office, exchanged telegrams with King George V, and received the resignation of the Cabinet. He was twenty-one. Active, warmly patriotic, and not unamiable, he was popular with the public and with the young 'Iraqi officers with whom, after an unsuccessful period at Harrow, he had been educated; but his lack of intellectual equipment and of interest in public affairs, and his devotion to pleasure and to sport, forbade the hope that he would prove adequate to the royal functions in 'Iraq.

Rashid 'Ali Gaylani, reinstated as Premier without change of ministers, could profit by the Sunni–Shi'i peace which, following the Assyrian crisis, had descended upon the Euphrates, and from the return of Anglo-'Iraqi relations to normal after the savage press attacks and public demonstrations of August. But, whatever his past commitments, he could not now do other than reaffirm 'Faysal's policy', which was that of the Treaty and friendship with Great Britain. Abu al-Timman's Nationalist Party, persistent even in these circumstances, issued on the third day of the new reign

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 yet another manifesto hostile to the Ikhā Government. The Premier decided to strengthen his position by an appeal to the electorate: that is, by the installation of a new and more amenable Chamber. But the King, advised by 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi, President of the Royal Diwan, refused a dissolution: a rebuff at which two of the ministers resigned, followed on 28 October by the fall of the Cabinet.

The incoming Premier, Jamil al-Madfa'i, a sound and loyal but uninspiring figure unlikely long to survive, claimed general support and did not press for elections. His ministers included Jamal Baban at Justice, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Naji Shawkat at Interior, Rustum Haydar at Works, Nasrat al-Farsi at Finance, and a young Shi'i newcomer of high quality, Salih Jabr, at Education. Starting with the usual changes among the higher officials, Madfa'i restrained as best he could the mutual bickering of his uneasy team, and directed the arrangements for the wedding on 25 January 1934 of King Ghazi with his first cousin, Princess 'Aliya, daughter of King 'Ali. His Ministers survived the month-long boycott in Baghdad of the Electric Light Company's current, organized by coffee-shop proprietors, Jewish profiteers, and direct-action' politicians. But the acrimony created in ministerial circles—and the resulting cleavage on significant Sunni–Shi'i lines—by discussions of the Kut barrage project led to the resignation first of Rustum Haydar, then of the Prime Minister himself on 10 February 1934.

The King, under advice, still refused to order the holding of general elections, the sole condition on which the Ikhā would reassume office. Instead, he thought it prudent to call again upon Madfa'i. The latter dropped the ministers whose disagreements had upset his former Cabinet—Nuri Sa'id, Rustum Haydar, Naji Shawkat, Salih Jabr—and introduced Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Abbas Mahdi, Rashid al-Khawja, Jalal Baban, and for a time Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji, who had been Foreign Minister in 1930–1. The re-formed Ministry, however, was little more successful than the last. The decline of the Administration since the late nineteen-twenties was widely asserted, and was blamed unjustly on the Prime Minister by his opponents; the Ikhā press was, as usual, virulent in attack; and even the anniversary celebrations organized in June 1934 in honour of the 'Iraq Rebellion' of 1920 were unsuccessful as a diversion. Support from the Palace was tepid, and the extent to which the young King was by now recognized to fall short of his father must anyhow have lessened the value of such backing. The Cabinet's unpopularity was increased by its inclusion of a second Suwaydi when Tawfiq replaced 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs; and intrigue against the Prime Minister in high opposition circles near the Throne was not lacking. The

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passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received with seeming indifference. 645*

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Haydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but necessary to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Wahid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Wahid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) Mill Iraq Mill

669 not less hot for 'Shi'i rights', sought the favours of the present Ministry. Without, for the moment, overt violence a dangerous mood was gaining possession of the tribes of Diwaniya liwā and spreading to Ḥilla. It was shown by excited meetings, tribal war-dances, the flourishing of arms. Appeals reached the Najf 'Ulamā, notably Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kashif al-Ghaṭā, the leading Arab Mujtahid, for unifying support. Telegrams were dispatched to the King, a monster petition organized, and finally in January 1935 an audience with him was obtained. These moves produced no result. 'Ali Jawdat laboured to restore order by persuasion, by censorship, by prohibition of meetings and suppression of newspapers; but such measures and the distractions provided by the ceremonial opening at Kirkuk of the Mediterranean pipeline, by disastrous spring floods, by the funeral of King 'Ali, and by crises in the negotiations with Persia were all in vain. The ineffective Ministry resigned on 23 February 1935.

*645 668 To replace it, the King's advisers recommended the formation of an Ikhā Ministry, without further elections and without the inclusion of Yasin Pasha or Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, whose intrigues it was believed had largely created the present near-anarchy. But the Ikhā having refused these conditions, no alternative appeared to the formation of another Madfa'i Ministry. Formed on 4 March, it contained respected personalities—Nuri Sa'id, 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab, Amin Zaki, Ghanima, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Rashid al-Khawja—but had no substantial advantage over its predecessors. It commanded little royal or popular support, and could work neither by inspired diplomacy nor ruthless firmness. Jamil al-Madfa'i hoped for the pacification of the Euphrates by 'legal' means, sent ministers to tour the distracted area, tried vainly to persuade the senators to resume their duties, and appealed to the Opposition and the press for 'unity'. When the tribal position had further deteriorated, with actual insurgence in the Daghara and the Fayṣaliya areas of Diwaniya and among the 'Azza north of Baghdad, he sent troops to the Euphrates districts; but these were too few, ineffectively directed, and thereby merely provocative. The tribal political leaders and their mentor Kashif al-Ghaṭā—sadly embarrassed by rival claims to his support and glad to take refuge in pious platitudes—produced in the end a not immoderate statement of Shi'i claims, bearing scores of personal seals. Organization of the counter-faction among the Euphrates shaykhs was attempted, but could do little in immediate relief. Stronger military steps were deprecated in favour of a 'political solution' by the Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, nor would the King permit them. After a mere thirteen days of office the unhappy Madfa'i Ministry resigned.

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It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Ali Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Faysal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
668 rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

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cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Pichkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qaḍhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

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645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by 'Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes —a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost 'Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Faysal and for 'Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in 'Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the 'Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an 'Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left 'Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an 'Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

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same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. Fainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Adviserships to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shatra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyala, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
36 epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
631 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
466 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
554 improvements and considerable building and town-planning. Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pāsha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
184 devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
702 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.
701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken
by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained, during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the 'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Habbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Government since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Ali, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1i Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Ālī, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 669 Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari by Army officers half-way between Baghdad and Ba'quba, under the direct orders, it was believed, of Bakr Ṣidqi. Ja'far as Minister of Defence had left Baghdad by car with a letter to Bakr from the King, intending to meet the Commander, inform him of the change of Government and arrange for a cessation of violence. His body, that of a sincere and devoted patriot and an honest man, was hastily buried by the roadside while the Army pursued its triumphant march to the capital. The troops entered the city ceremonially in the early evening, with Bakr Ṣidqi at their head.

*645 The Cabinet formed and announced by Ḥikmat on the same day reserved the Ministry of Interior to himself, brought three members of the Ahali group, Abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Yusif 'Izz al-Din to Finance, Works, and Education, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Justice, Naji al-Aṣil to Foreign Affairs. Ṣidqi's fellow conspirator 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri was rewarded with the Ministry of Defence, while Bakr himself superseded Ṭaha al-Hashimi as Chief of Staff. Great enthusiasm, real or feigned, greeted the new Government. The announced programme, and a broadcast by Abu al-Timman, were rich in optimism and promises. Giant demonstrations were arranged in Baghdad, and the capital's main streets were a stage for the dancing and singing of crowds of tribesmen and workers. The outgoing Ministry was everywhere denigrated. Its members, whom Bakr would have preferred to assassinate with other likely opponents, vanished temporarily from public life: Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Ali to Syria under escort, Nuri Sa'id by R.A.F. aircraft to Egypt. Other ex-ministers and some high officials retired amid the many changes made in personnel by the incoming ministers.

The Prime Minister, who kept at all times correctly in contact with the British Ambassador—and lost some nationalist following by so doing—assured him and the world that this was no military dictatorship; it was merely parliamentary and democratic government supported by a devoted Army. Bakr Ṣidqi, in fact, interfered little in current administration. He had no obvious policy save a crude Anglophobia, and limited his exigencies to nomination of his friends to certain appointments and insistence on priority for the Army's needs. A vindictive proposal to inquire into the private fortunes of ex-ministers was at first accepted but finally abandoned.

*645 665 Opposition nevertheless was not slow to organize, and could muster effective elements. Moderate opinion everywhere saw with consternation the open assumption of power by a selfish and short-sighted military movement. The new Government in its proclaimed programme had said little of anti-Treaty proposals—indeed, had spoken of friendship with all countries and was pledged to maintain the Treaty. In spite of some self-justifying gestures to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Wahid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 668 northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

646 665 The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in 468 office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers, and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

*645 665 Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy régime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

*645 The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and his entourage, further corrupted by greater power, lost the respect of the better elements by their drunkenness and arrogance. His marriage to a Viennese dancing girl was frowned upon. His part in the murder of Dhiyā' Yunis, ex-Secretary of the Council of Ministers and friend of the exiled Yasin Pasha, was everywhere believed, and not less his directing hand in an assault made on a veteran Arab patriot and fighter (but critic of Bakr) Mawlud Pasha Mukhliṣ. The death in Damascus of Yasin himself in June 1937 rallied popular feeling to the side of this strong and sincere half-sinister, half-charming personality, whose services his country had so ill requited. The suicide of Ja'far Pasha's brother, the death of other friends simultaneously with that of Yasin, and the murder of a Baghdad notable, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Sinawi by a Kurd whom Bakr protected, led to grim jests at the General's expense.

The impatient demands for Army expansion were financially embarrassing to the Government, and much unwise spending, accompanied by the raising of funds 'for the forces' by public subscription, did not make them more popular with the political public. All officers concerned in the coup d'état of October 1936 were indemnified under a law of April 1937; but the sycophantic suggestion to erect a statue to Bakr Ṣidqi, as Hero of the Revolution, was not adopted. The conscription machinery still worked largely amiss, though against less resistance; and most units were below strength. Relations with the British Military Mission were for a time uncordial. The provision by Great Britain of armaments and equipment raised questions of particular difficulty; the time coincided with large-scale rearmament in the United Kingdom, and many 'Iraqi demands for guns, aircraft, and equipment remained, to their angry impatience, unsatisfied. This failure, exploited by the adroit propaganda of Herr Grobba, the German Minister, and on a passing visit by Dr. Schacht himself, was in pointed contrast to the flattering offers of German and Czech arms manufacturers, and led to the placing of 'Iraqi orders for armaments with the Krupp and Skoda Companies and elsewhere, and for aircraft—of types wholly unsuitable—with Italian suppliers. Some of the material so ordered was delivered; the rest, to a value of some £500,000, was countermanded when the Ministry fell.

It was not for the Army alone that funds were needed; Ḥikmat's ambition was to signalize his 'revolution' by the initiation of the important works so long projected—roads, buildings, the railway extension, and completion of the Kut Barrage. Messrs. Baring Bros., again approached, could offer £3 million on favourable terms, and Parliament in the spring of 1937 authorized this borrowing. The 'Iraq Petroleum Company, however, whose royalties were the proffered security, declined on principle to pay

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

these to any party other than the 'Iraq Government itself. A much less favourable offer, of a loan of £1 million only, was the result. It was duly negotiated, but neither the Government nor the British lenders escaped criticism. This was 'Iraq's first self-incurred external debt.

The presence of forces hostile to the régime did not materially interfere with an Administration equal in quality to its predecessors but, in disappointment of early hopes, not superior to them. In foreign affairs and in some internal developments, which later pages will describe, some progress was made. But to one problem no approach to a solution appeared—that of the Assyrians. Their case, after the massacre of August 1933, had been hurried on to the agenda of the League Council by the Mar Sham'un's telegrams from Cyprus; and in October the 'Iraq Government, through the mouth of Yasin Pasha, offered a disarming admission of 'unjustifiable severity' by the Army and regrettable tribal looting. He pleaded for a fresh start for the Assyrians—in another country! The British attitude, disappointing to the more fervid partisans of the Assyrians, was determined by the desire to preserve and support the independent 'Iraq State: by realization of the grave consequences of any physical intervention, to which anyhow British opinion could never be reconciled: and by awareness that the faults were far from being all on one side. The Council agreed, accordingly, that a Committee of six, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Spain, should by every means seek alternative accommodation, somewhere in the world, for the Assyrian community.

This Committee's attempts were immediate and vigorous, but sadly unsuccessful. A project for settlement in Brazil seemed promising, but fell to the ground when the Brazilian Government reversed its welcoming attitude. A British plan for settlement in Guiana, and a French project for the banks of the Niger, came equally to nothing after League missions, with Brigadier Browne, had visited the territories. By the end of 1934 no progress had been made.

In 'Iraq their resettlement on the land proceeded with weary slowness in spite of Government encouragement and the offer of a house-by-house subsidy. The great majority of the community favoured withdrawal from 'Iraq; and false hopes of this were kept alive by the Mar Sham'un's partisans, while the anti-Patriarchal party declared roundly that they would never settle in the same territory as the Mar Sham'un and his following. The camp at Mosul was, with increasing reluctance, kept in existence at Government expense, but was reduced by encouraged departures; its inmates fell from 1,250 to 650 during 1934. More hopeful was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the French reception in Syria of the families of the 550 Assyrians interned there since August 1933. Aided by a grant of money from 'Iraq, these women and children joined their men on the upper Khabur in September 1934 to a number of over 1,500. Movement from the Mosul camp and streets to the Khabur continued in 1935 to a number of some 1,500, and a more grandiose scheme for a large-scale settlement in the Ghab lands on the Orontes in Syria was formulated by the League Committee. A project for its finances, with 'Iraq and Great Britain as main contributors, was established and a Trustee Board appointed. In 1936 an immediate transfer of 15,000 Assyrians was planned, which would dispose of almost the whole remaining community except those native to 'Iraq; but the difficulties of the Ghab project were found insurmountable, and its abandonment made possible a move only of smaller numbers, 2,500 in all, to the Khabur settlements. No further progress was made under the Ḥikmat–Ṣidqi régime, and the permanence of the Assyrian remnant in 'Iraq was perforce accepted. Their economic rehabilitation was by now fairly advanced, and their final adaptation to 'Iraqi conditions and citizenship could be hoped.

The event which caused the fall of the Sulaymani Ministry after less than nine months of uneasy life was due neither to constitutional procedures, which rarely operated to change Governments in 'Iraq, nor to any grouping of the Opposition forces. Its origin lay in rancour within the Army itself, where careers had been ruined and malevolence excited by the abused omnipotence of Bakr. The bodyguard by which at all times he went surrounded had saved him from previous attempts on his life during 1937; but when on 8 August, *en route* for a visit to Turkish manœuvres, he waited on the Mosul airport, his murderers, by whomever instructed, could carry out one of the alternative plans prepared. He was shot dead at point-blank range by an 'Iraqi soldier, and his companion Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, chief of the R.I.A.F., lived but a minute longer.

The bodies were taken to Baghdad and buried with full military honours. Little regret, but rather the almost unanimous relief of public and press, accompanied the General to his grave: not unjustly, since the pages of 'Iraq history which he had written were in all ways deplorable. In Mosul the Military Commander, General Amin al-'Umari, arrested the murderer, cordoned the airport, and assumed sole charge of the city. Ordered by Baghdad to arrest further named individuals as accomplices, he at first complied, then realized the dangerous possibilities of a general purge of Bakr's known opponents. Six days after the murder he took the grave step of publishing a proclamation in which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

accused the Government of a policy of unjust reprisals and, for himself and his troops, repudiated all Baghdad authority. The Army units in Baghdad were largely favourable to Bakr's faction; 'Umari had, by messages, secured the support of the Diwaniya, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya garrisons; civil war seemed inevitable. But Colonel Sa'id Takriti, commanding the troops stationed at Wishash outside Baghdad West, by siding with 'Umari and the evident majority of the forces, ensured the ascendancy of the element hostile to Bakr. The proclamation which he issued asserted loyalty to the King (who himself favoured the same side), support to Amin al-'Umari and the policy of no reprisals, removal of Bakr's nominees from command, and—vain words!—Army abstention thenceforward from politics. The Prime Minister, who had designated 'Abd al-Latif Nuri to succeed as Chief of Staff and Madfa'i, hastening home from Syria, as Minister of Defence, realized the preponderance of feeling hostile to his régime and could turn nowhere for support. He resigned office on 17 August. The Royal Irada appointing Jamil al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister was issued on the same day.

5. LAND, AIR, AND WATER

The foreign trade of the territory, limited in scale as it was, showed in these years a healthy and indeed encouraging picture. The abiding adverse trade balance was still redressed by other elements. The volume of exports increased notably from 1935 to 1937, and steps were taken by the improvement of date-packing, grain-cleaning, and wool-dipping to remove some of the features which damaged the reputation of 'Iraqi produce; but the fluctuation of both quantities and prices of the country's staple exports from year to year was still pronounced. The export of crude oil began late in 1934. That of gold bullion, thanks to high gold prices abroad, continued and largely depleted 'Iraq's stocks. The small exportable cotton crop went regularly, after 1936, *en bloc* to Japan. Imports, generally constant or increasing in volume, were subject to the revised Customs tariff drawn up in 1933 by League of Nations experts on lines favourable to local industry. Great Britain easily maintained its lead as supplier, with the United States almost monopolizing the import of motor vehicles. Germany, with its alert credit-giving marketers and the ubiquitous German-Jewish Haavareh Agency, perceptibly increased its share in chemicals and machinery. Japan by conspicuous efforts raised its proportion of the import market, between 1930 and 1936, from 2 to 20 per cent. This was made up of cotton, woollen, and artificial silk piece-goods and some hardware, and its extent led the 'Iraq Government to insist on Japan's acceptance of 'Iraqi produce

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 opening at Kirkuk in January 1935, its twin 12-inch pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli came into operation. This achievement marked the end of ten years of patient and well-directed work since the grant of the first concession, and by its employment of 'Iraqis in their thousands, its expansion of communications and the example which it offered of successful large-scale modern industry, it added great advantages for the 'Iraqi public to the direct enrichment of their Treasury. The gradually developing works in Kirkuk oilfields, the main depots at Bayji and Haditha, the mid-desert pump-station townships with their connecting roads, pipeline, and telegraphs became a characteristic feature of the modern 'Iraqi scene, while its production, of 4 million tons of crude oil a year from 1935 onwards, placed the country immediately as the eighth oil-producing country of the world. The B.O.D. Company, whose shareholding was in these years predominantly Italian, German, and Franco-Swiss, soon found itself embarrassed by its obligation of annual payment to Government, and by its failure, in spite of an active drilling campaign from 1933 onwards, to discover other than viscous, scarcely marketable oil. The Company's plan in 1935 of diminishing their cash payments by building a Qaiyara–Tall Kochek railway, which could convey their oil to seaboard and link 'Iraq with the Turkish railway system, was after hesitation rejected by Government. Their financial position grew desperate, and a reconstruction of their Board in 1936 marked the transfer of control of the Company to the I.P.C. group; and the latter emerged soon afterwards as outright owners of the B.O.D. and Mosul Oil Fields, with the disappearance of all non-British shareholding in it other than that of the I.P.C., French, and American constituents themselves. The problem of its viscous and sulphurous oil remained to be solved. The smaller Rafidain and Khaniqin Companies (p. 211) continued respectively their work of producing and refining oil in the Transferred Territories, and of marketing it throughout 'Iraq. The project of a Government-owned refinery, for which the I.P.C. concession provided, was conceived during this period but was to prove slow of realization.

Road-surfacing was among the uses of oil products in 'Iraq, but neither this nor the too limited funds available could do much at present to provide the country with roads of high or even tolerable standard. Some further sections such as that from Ramadi to Ruṭba were metalled, others were indifferently or barely maintained, all were at worst passable; road maintenance, costly and inconspicuous, was given habitually a low priority in Government allotments. Traffic on the Najf–Madina route increased. The route from the Euphrates to 'Amman and Haifa developed as a powerful rival of the northern track to Beirut. The Rawanduz road, dis-

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

appointingly, carried little traffic other than some oil supplies to northern Persia. Following completion of the great Faluja bridge (p. 208) other steel bridges were constructed: on the Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri, the Greater Zab at Aski Kellek, and elsewhere. In Baghdad the replacement of the two pontoon crossings by permanent steel bridges was at last decided, and contracts were awarded to Messrs. Holloway Bros. in 1936, a major step in the development of the capital. The new spans of the Mosul bridge were finished. Municipal street-making proceeded everywhere, and not least in Baghdad.

Little changed in the field of Tigris river navigation. Fears that the Kut barrage would make steamship navigation impossible were aroused but could be allayed; a move made in 1934 by local rivals to question the rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Company led to nothing. River traffic on the whole diminished. The *Zobaida* was sold to India in 1935, the *Blosse Lynch* and *Tigris* as scrap in the same year and the *Khalifa* in 1937. In 1936 the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation split again into its original components, the Lynch Company and Messrs. Gray Mackenzie. Four small gunboats were acquired by Government in 1937 for riverain police work, but were little used. The Port of Basra rendered steady service to the country. Its volume of traffic permitted it to pay regularly its capital instalments to the British Government, and by 1937 a debt of only £300,000 remained. The Port Trust, to be set up under the 1930 Treaty, did not appear; the Port was still administered by a Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Its bar-dredging scheme operated with great success, repaid its loans, and kept open and improved the deep channel.[1] Two new dredgers were acquired. The Port administration completed a modern airport at Basra, furnished with a hotel and all facilities, and provided Basra city and suburbs with electric power and a modern water-supply. The ocean traffic using the Port increased substantially after 1935: first two, and later four, Japanese lines appeared, with one each of German, Indian, and Italian ownership and an occasional Russian, Swedish, and Greek steamer. The great bulk of the tonnage remained, as of old, British and British-Indian.

The 'Iraq Railways maintained their solvency and functions in spite of tribal interference, fluctuating traffic, largely obsolescent equipment, and serious road competition. The operation of the system was modernized as far as was practicable, and a rapid Baghdad–Basra daily service introduced. Negotiations with the

[1] The low-water depths in the Rooka channel (p. 208), achieved by successive phases of the bar-dredging scheme, were in 1926, 18 ft., in 1928–9, 20ft., in 1935–8, 23 or 24 ft.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Basra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qadhās.

Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Basra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Habbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Basra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broadcasting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallah, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes to construct model villages, good in conception but at present trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

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241 312 [45] [185] Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

from the Lesser Zab west of Altun Kupri and irrigating land in the Ḥawija was begun in the same year. Schemes for a Diyalā dam, and for a restoration of the ancient Ishaqi canal were studied, but the long-favoured Ḥabbaniya scheme seemed unable to come to life. It was re-formulated in 1932; tenders were invited next year but none accepted; and in 1934 the project seemed likely to be reduced to the scale of a mere flood reservoir, whereafter, for a time, no progress in the scheme was made. Its place as first favourite was taken by the Tigris barrage, to control the Gharraf river from its point of bifurcation opposite Kut. This project, which allowed by means of locks for continued Tigris navigation and for fish movement, was put to tender in 1934. Work was begun by the chosen contractors, Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Co., and by mid-1937 it approached completion—the second of the great Willcocks schemes to be realized; but the dependent canalization necessary to ensure its full value would require much further time and effort. The collapse in 1935 of the Diyalā weir, built in 1928, was a setback which called for large-scale restoration, and steps to this end were taken in 1936–7. The upkeep and improvement of existing canals continued with increasing use of 'Iraqi technical personnel, and with it further study of the abiding problems of flood protection, drainage, water economy, and silting. There was little money to spend.

6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Both events within 'Iraq and the external contacts natural to a modern State led during these years to greatly widened relations between Baghdad and the world outside. The process of establishing these was continuous; prestige and strategy both played their part; and no sphere of Government activity was freer from party politics. The system continued whereunder 'Iraqi representation abroad was entrusted to the diplomats and consuls of Great Britain, save only at Geneva and at the small but increasing number of capitals to which 'Iraqi Ministers were appointed. The Soviet Union alone refused to accept this system, or to recognize 'Iraq.

Italy, to which a State visit of King Fayṣal had been planned before his death, courted 'Iraqi goodwill. In spite of Sanctions, in which 'Iraq conformed to the British attitude towards the aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, Italy secured 'Iraqi armament orders in 1936 and later fêted and decorated 'Iraqi visitors to Rome (where a Legation had been opened in 1934) and subsidized in Baghdad a newspaper Fascist in tone, the *Sha'ab*. On the whole, however, Italian activity was less evident in 'Iraq than in the Levant States, and foreshadowed the assignment of that territory, with Persia, to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 the intended German, not Italian, share of the Middle East. Germany itself gladly paid for teachers of German in the 'Iraq capital, hoped to supply arms and offered long-term credits, signed a commercial treaty in 1935, and increased its shipping and trading efforts. The Nazi Government welcomed the Amir Zayd as 'Iraqi Minister in Berlin, presented a German decoration to King Ghazi, and in Baghdad brought the more discreet resources of Nazi propaganda into use. These processes were ably directed by the charm and duplicity of the German Minister, Dr. Grobba, aided for a time by Dr. Jordan, the Inspector of Antiquities and an ardent Nazi.

The Soviet Union had no diplomatic exchanges with 'Iraq, though Communist elements perceptible there, which were denounced with violence by the Ḥikmat-Ṣidqi régime, may have been subsidized from Moscow. Russian attempts in 1932–4 to penetrate into 'Iraqi markets were discontinued. Relations with France, which had little direct interest in 'Iraq other than cultural, were uncordial; the seeming reluctance of the French to emancipate the Levant States from Mandate led 'Iraqi publicists to favour all forms of Syrian anti-French nationalism, and to ask the Vatican, with success, to remove the Apostolic Delegate, a Frenchman, from Mosul. With other Powers of Europe—Austria, Sweden, Spain—missions or diplomats were exchanged. The slight increases of contact with the United States were marked by the appointment of an 'Iraqi Vice-Consul to New York, and by some talk of a commercial treaty; American mission schools flourished in Baṣra and Baghdad, their archaeologists excavated, their drillers and welders served irreplaceably in the oilfields. The Japanese appeared only in the commercial field (p. 203).

The status of 'Iraq in the Arab world was conspicuously enhanced by its new independent rank and visible advance; and in no Arab territory, as an earlier page has indicated, was more thought or more cordial approval given to Arab Unity or pan-Arabism. Even in 1932 King Faysal had projected an Arab conference in Baghdad, and plans for an Arab Federation were formulated on lines then thought practicable, notably by its protagonist Nuri Sa'id. No 'Iraqi politician could afford to be backward in service to this cause, with its gratifying appeals to history, to Islam, and to racial pride—and with its anti-Western connotation. It resulted that active or passive moves in this field were made in this period, with the effect of strengthening the bonds of Middle Eastern Arabism.

As they saw a rapid growth of anti-Zionism in 'Iraq, so these years involved the Baghdad statesmen increasingly in the outskirts of the tragic and tragically mishandled 'Palestine Question'. The Arab strike in that country in 1936 led to days of mourning in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Baghdad, collections for Palestine martyrs, and deputations to the British Ambassador. Individual 'Iraqis, notably an ex-officer of Syrian origin, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, sought guerrilla service in Palestine and returned as heroes; and it was an appeal by 'Iraq jointly with Sa'udi Arabia and Transjordan that brought the Palestine strike to an end. The same States persuaded the Palestine Arabs in 1937 to state their cause to, instead of boycotting, the Peel Commission. The latter and its report, which advocated Partition, evoked further warnings from 'Iraq to the British Ambassador and the League of Nations, and specific protests against Partition from the Premier and his colleagues. These feelings, shared by so many Englishmen, were unquestionably sincere and affected all politically conscious 'Iraqis; but the Palestine Question as a rallying ground for all-party nationalist sentiment was, at the same time, a boon to successive 'Iraq Ministries. There were, in quieter periods, many exchanges of visits between 'Iraq and Palestine in the social and educational fields; the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was a discreet visitor to Baghdad in 1933. The direct Baghdad–Haifa road was opened and improved, telephonic communication established, and Customs arrangements at Haifa adjusted in 'Iraqi interest.

Relations with Syria were, in sentiment, all cordiality and sympathy for a not-yet-liberated Arab sister nation; 'Iraqi publicists found many occasions to criticize French tenacity and to preach the unity of Arabs. In the administrative field the frontier was demarcated on the ground, not without friction, in midsummer 1933, and subsequent agreements covered matters of *bon voisinage*, tribal raiding and the like. Meetings of the frontier authorities of the two States were held at Palmyra in 1934 and at 'Aqra in 1936. 'Iraqi insistence was on negotiating with Syrians rather than with Frenchmen, particularly after the grim episodes of the Damascus riots and bombardment of 1936.

From Egypt a number of teachers were obtained for 'Iraq's higher education, and visiting Egyptian engineers reviewed 'Iraqi irrigation projects. The conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was hailed in 'Iraq as aligning Egypt with herself as an ally, and the presence in Baghdad of the persuasive 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam as Egyptian Minister further improved relations. A direct telephone service between Baghdad and Cairo was opened, and a commercial treaty projected.

With the mandated Amirate of Transjordan 'Iraqi relations were strengthened by the completion in 1934 of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's trans-desert pipeline and road, and the augmented trans-frontier traffic. Royal visits were exchanged between the Hashimite rulers, though the Amir 'Abdullah was at times criticized

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 in Baghdad for seeming lack of anti-Zionist fervour. His southern neighbour, ibn Sa'ud, enjoyed calm and normal relations with 'Iraq, in contrast to the storms and bloodshed of earlier years. Royal and ministerial delegations passed between Baghdad and Riyadh, pilgrims travelled from Najf directly across Najd to the Holy Places, the two States concerted measures for intervention in Palestine, and a treaty of alliance between them was signed in 1936. The Imam of the Yaman, who had received a distinguished 'Iraqi mission and sent pupils to the Baghdad schools and Military College, adhered in 1937 with caution—but with no prospect of practical results—to the 'Iraqi-Sa'udi Treaty.

A sad condition of mutual recrimination prevailed between 'Iraq and the small independent shaykhdom of Kuwayt. The Shaykh's title to certain date-garden estates on the Shatt was questioned, his claimed exemption from taxation of their produce gave rise to dispute; and the mediation of the British Ambassador and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf failed to produce an amicable settlement. Yet more irritating was the continuance of large-scale smuggling from Kuwayt into 'Iraq—the staple industry, with pearl fishing, of the Kuwayt of the pre-oil period. The Shaykh, not indifferent to the rich gains of this traffic, would accept none of the suggested measures to stop it. The pursuit of smugglers by the 'Iraq Police led them at times, it was claimed, into Kuwayt territory; every year had its tale of border affrays, with bitterness and outcry on both sides. The Baghdad press found here another subject for invective and, to the Shaykh's alarm, even asserted 'Iraq's claim to Kuwayt itself as a sometime appendage of the Basra wilaya.

The Turko-'Iraqi Commercial Treaty signed in 1932 was ratified two years later. Frontier liaison was well maintained. 'Iraq maintained a legation at Ankara and a Consul-General at Istanbul. The Mosul crisis faded into the past. The tithe of oil royalties was paid regularly to the Turkish Treasury. The popularity of Turkey in 'Iraq, with a long tradition of social intercourse and cultural borrowing, stood high; the achievements of its Government and President were impressive; and individual 'Iraqis of all parties returned from their visits to Ankara filled with admiration [illegible] Turkish pattern of progress and authority. The approach railway to the 'Iraqi frontier, common signature of the Sa[illegible] Pact (p. 268), common interest in the European movements of the time, and a visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Rüstü Aras to Baghdad in 1937, were all events making for yet closer relations.

With Persia—officially 'Iran' in and after 1935—the case was otherwise. In spite of the Accord of 1929, periodically renewed, and the royal visit of 1932 and the 'Frontier Settlement' Agree-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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ment of that year, contacts between the two Powers did not cease to be uncordial. Every month brought cases of alleged non-co-operation among frontier officials, trespass by armed forces, tampering with border waters or estates, or misconduct on the reaches of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. No progress was made towards ratifying the Treaties—of Frontier relations, Commerce, Neutrality, Navigation, Residence—prepared in 1932. The Government of Teheran continued at first tacitly and later specifically to withhold recognition of the results of the 1914 Boundary Commission. It denied, on the 'Talweg' principle elsewhere usual in river frontiers, the claim of 'Iraq to own the whole Shaṭṭ waterway from bank to bank: a claim based on the Erzerum Treaty of 1847 and on much subsequent history, and one the more important to 'Iraq since, in contrast to Persia's long coastline, she possessed no access to the sea save by the Shaṭṭ. A British plan for an Anglo-Persian-'Iraqi joint Conservancy Board for the navigation and control of the river was unacceptable to Persia. Bilateral conversations having failed, 'Iraq in November 1934 carried the matter to Geneva. The case was heard on 14 January 1935 by the Council of the League, before whom all legal, historical, and geographical arguments on both sides were rehearsed. 'Iraq's offer to refer the case to the International Court of Justice was declined by Persia. The efforts of the Italian rapporteur, Baron Aloisi, failed to bring the two parties together, though talks were renewed in Rome, Geneva, Teheran, and Baghdad in 1935. In the year following, the proposal for a Shaṭṭ Conservancy Board was revived; but Persia remained suspicious of the participation of Great Britain, who, as owner of nine-tenths of the shipping concerned, expected to be a party and signatory. Nevertheless, the anxiety of Turkey that the difference between these neighbours should be adjusted, and the nervousness at Italian aggression felt currently by all the less powerful nations, inclined both sides towards agreement; and an 'Iraqi note to Teheran in November 1936 was found to provide a basis for this. On 4 July 1937 a treaty was signed at Teheran providing for specific acceptance of the 1914 boundary, with the grant to Persia of a four-mile anchorage area, from east bank to Talweg, in the Shaṭṭ reaches opposite Abadan: a solution, at long last, of the most persistent of 'Iraqi-Persian differences. A protocol was signed providing for upkeep of the navigable channel, dredging, port dues, quarantine, and smuggling; but no authority was set up to perform these duties, Persian suspicions reappeared and increased, and the administration of the river remained in the hands of the Port of Baṣra.

The way was now clear, for the first time, for the consummation of another project. Alarm at Italian ambitions had, as early as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

1648 summer of 1935, driven Turkey and Persia, joined by 'Iraq, to consult at Geneva on the formation of a Middle Eastern Pact for their mutual support. A draft was initialed in October, but signature necessarily awaited the long-deferred solution of 'Iraqi-Persian difficulties. The five-year Pact in its final form embraced also Afghanistan, with whom 'Iraq had ratified a treaty in 1934. It was signed by its four participants at the Sa'dabad Palace at Teheran four days after the 'Iraqi-Persian Treaty. Of value, if any, rather moral than material, it could be thought to represent at least a first step in regional security in western Asia, and linked 'Iraq with the non-Arab world. The Pact covered abstention from mutual interference, joint consultation, the sanctity of frontiers, and pledges of non-aggression. It reaffirmed loyalty to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the Briand–Kellogg Pact. A permanent council was set up for the carrying out of the Pact, and this, at its first meeting, on the day of signature, resolved on steps of mutual assistance towards obtaining seats for its members, each in turn, on the Council of the League.

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

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VIII

PRELUDE TO WAR

1. THE FOURTH MADFA'I MINISTRY

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THE Cabinet which Jamil al-Madfa'i chose and announced on the day of his own appointment, 17 August 1937, was to hold office for sixteen months; and, under the moderate if uninspired leadership of this blunt and honest statesman, it was not unsuccessful in restoring confidence and normality. He retained the Ministry of Defence temporarily in his own hands, installed experienced administrators—Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Ibrahim Kamal, Jalal Baban—at Interior, Finance, and Works. Two Shi'is, Riḍhā al-Shabibi and 'Abbas Mahdi, were appointed to Education and Justice, and the subtle and vigorous Tawfiq al-Suwaydi to Foreign Affairs. The names were well received. The Mosul garrison announced their withdrawal from politics. The statesmen exiled by Bakr Ṣidqi returned to Baghdad, one by one, from Syria and Egypt. But though social and business circles, the tribes, and even the general public seemed little agitated by this and other crises, the political and military coteries, in which guilty consciences were frequent and reprisals habitual, were not to be so easily reassured. The coup d'état of Bakr, the unavenged murder of Ja'far Pasha, and the factions and rancorous intrigues of 1934 and 1935 had left sinister legacies of bitterness among civilian and military careerists and their followers. Peace and unity were neither probable nor universally desired.

Aware of the evils of Army dominance, Madfa'i pensioned 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, found non-military appointments or retirement for Bakr's less tractable partisans, and in General Ḥusayn Fawzi appointed a Chief of Staff apparently free from supra-military ambitions. The greater weight of authority in the Army swung to the anti-Ṣidqi faction; but in spite of protestations all the materials for another military coup remained, and Madfa'i was as powerless to disperse these as he was unwilling to use them.

His policy was one of appeasement. The general sympathy with his reburial of Ja'far Pasha in the Royal Mausoleum, an obvious act of piety, did not commit him to the exclusive support of the parties which had approved the Hashimi Ministry. He refused all vindictive action, pardoned and restored the Diwaniya shaykhs exiled by his predecessor, announced the Utopian programme which, with but slight variations, was common to all incoming Ministries, and called for general elections.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members, selected with the greatest care, did not include Hikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Hikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Habbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was awarded by the Basra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Basra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Adviserships in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis sent engineers and pilots to Italy to study the aircraft which they had over-hastily acquired. Far more significant than any of this was the progress of Hitler's Germany in the minds and counsels of the 'Iraqi people during these years. More Germans appeared in Baghdad, full of long-credit commercial offers and sympathies for Arab Palestine; their wireless transmissions were increasingly heard, their invitations to high officials to visit Berlin were accepted, their Youth Rally in Germany was attended by 'Iraqi schoolboys. Among the intelligentsia and politicians, and even more among Army officers to whom Nazi philosophy was congenial, the German influence spread notably during the period. Among the young the wearing of uniform in and out of school, the organization of summer camps and the success of the Nazi-spirited 'Iraqi Youth Movement, the Futuwwa, all led directly away from democratic and towards Hitlerite sympathy.

The treaty with Persia was ratified in March 1938, not without unexpected demonstrations of 'Iraqi public disapproval, and the agreed Commission for frontier definition was set in motion. A weekly Baghdad–Teheran air-line began to operate, under Persian ownership. Annoyance with Kuwayti non-cooperation over smuggling, and the desire for an alternative Gulf port, led to a claim by the 'Iraqi Foreign Minister for annexation of the principality to 'Iraq; and the demand was repeated insistently by an unusual instrument of statecraft, King Ghazi's private and personal broadcasting service. An intervention of the British Ambassador deprecated both the claim, which was historically baseless, and the means of enforcing it.

But the shadow of Palestine fell more heavily over 'Iraq than all other foreign interests. Zionism and the threatened partition of Palestine had long been the concern not only of Government and the politicians, but of a fair proportion of the urban public at large. 'Iraqi delegates led by Tawfiq Suwaydi attended the League of Nations meeting in the autumn of 1937, and foregathered in October with other Arab representatives at Bludan in Syria. The 'Palestine Defence League' was active in Baghdad with demonstrations, prayers, and money collections. The Arab rebellion and terrorist campaign in Palestine, which began late in 1937, were followed in 'Iraq with sympathy, embellished as they were by the crude propaganda of the German wireless. The evolution of pan-Arab feeling, which the plight of Palestine had notably evoked, was aided by such events as the holding of an Arab Medical Conference in Baghdad, another of veterinary surgeons, the visit of an athletic team from Damascus to Baghdad, and an excursion of 'Iraqi boy scouts to the Lebanon. There were joint Syro-'Iraqi celebrations of the anniversary of Yasin Pasha's death, and distinguished Arab

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visitors made their appearance at the Muthannā Club, which had been founded in 1935 as a pan-Arab centre and the home of the Palestine Defence League. Nevertheless, the *fatwas* of 'Iraqi divines favouring immediate Jihad in Palestine were discredited by their Government, the more violent demonstrations dispersed and later forbidden, and bomb-throwing in the Jewish quarters, reported in August 1938, was suppressed. Mawlud Mukhliṣ represented 'Iraq at the Parliamentary Conference on Palestine in Cairo in October; Nuri Sa'id handed proposals of his own, conceived with moderation and good sense, to the British Government; and Tawfiq Suwaydi was not less active in Geneva and London. In the London Conference, which met on 7 February 1939—its composition clearly foreshadowing the future Arab League—Nuri, by that time again Prime Minister, was as ever prominent through his constructive proposals and authoritative by the contacts he had maintained in the Arab capitals and with the now exiled Mufti. The British White Paper of May 1939, the initial Arab opposition to which must soon have turned (and in fact turned) to acceptance, was for the time unable to appease the powerful Arab sentiment against Zionism and its supporters. No element in all 'Iraqi-British relations of the period 1937 to 1941 was more powerful in poisoning them than the tragically mishandled Palestine Question.

In the Munich crisis of September 1938 the attitude of Madfa'i and his Cabinet was strictly correct to their ally and stern towards Dr. Grobba and his countrymen. The event indicated nevertheless to 'Iraq, in a new light, the menacing cleavages of Europe, and evoked from sections of the public and Army the admiration for German ruthlessness and successes to which the last few years had predisposed them: and, with that admiration, the beginnings of reluctance to support a pacific and reputedly pro-British Prime Minister. The orientation of 'Iraq towards or away from the Axis Powers became, from Munich onwards, one of the questions dividing the Baghdad politicians, to whom respect for the 1930 Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, in spirit or letter, was no matter of course. This division contributed an element to the weakness of Madfa'i's position, which by the autumn was apparent. Major changes in the Cabinet were necessitated in October by a series of personal attacks on Muṣṭafā al-'Umari; he was transferred to Justice and 'Abbas Mahdi to Works, the Prime Minister himself taking the portfolio of Interior. To Defence was appointed Ṣubiḥ Najib, an ex-officer who had served for some years as Director-General of Police, and more recently as Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he was however junior in rank to many of the serving generals, who resented his promotion as minister.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 668 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Basra concession, others—Rashid 'Ali and Hikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Sidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Ali led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Salah al-Din Sabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Mahmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Taha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Husayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Taha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Taha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Taha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

[656 661]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Nuri Pash, perhaps with the reluctance which he professed, accepted the premiership for the fifth time on Christmas Day 1938. 645×

2. DEATH OF THE KING

The new Ministry was greeted by the usual hopes for a firm and stable régime at last, the usual apprehension of faction, reprisal, and further military intervention. A Cabinet of average merit was announced; but once again no firm basis of shared principles was present to unite the ministers. Naji Shawkat was summoned from the 'Iraqi Legation at Ankara to be Minister of the Interior, Rustum Ḥaydar went to Finance, the capable Turkoman, 'Umar Nadhmi, to Works, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari to Justice, Ṣaliḥ Jabr to Education, Ṭaha al-Hashimi to Defence. Rashid 'Ali was taken to preside over the Royal Diwan. The Prime Minister's inaugural speech was admirably balanced, wise, and high-minded; it deprecated military adventures and urged all parties to accept the rule of law and true democracy. The banned newspapers were relicensed, the exiled politicians returned. Postal censorship was abolished, dismissed officials were reinstated, and permission was given for the formation of political parties, though these failed for the moment to take shape. Words of mingled reproof and encouragement were addressed to assembled Euphrates shaykhs.

In Parliament, however, the usual asperities were not slow to repeat themselves, and redoubled after the departure of Nuri Pasha to London early in 1939. The exiled victims of the Madfa'i Ministry demanded vengeance for its high-handed illegalities, and as a first step pressed for reference of disputed points of law to the Special Court provided by the Organic Law; and the Ministry, itself indifferently united, decided to reinforce its position by general elections which might produce a more amenable Chamber. The Irada ordering the dissolution of Parliament appeared on 22 February, a few days before the State visit paid to Baghdad by the Crown Prince of Persia. 646 665

The return of the Prime Minister from London late in February was followed by the issue of a ministerial programme on the habitual lines. A few days later the discovery of a conspiracy was announced, understood to involve not only Ḥikmat Sulayman—the *bête noire* of Nuri Pasha—but a formidable list of other politicians and officers. The plot, it was revealed, had aimed at the murder of no less than fifty leading personalities, the assassination of the King, and the enthronement of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah—or, as some preferred, of the Amir Zayd. A State of Emergency was immediately proclaimed at al-Rashid Camp, a number of arrests were made, and a special court martial was convened with civilian judges as equal members with the military. On the strength of 645× 669

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Ḥikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Ḥikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Faysal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Faysal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governess, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

own subjects. It evoked extraordinary emotion. The fantastic story that his death had been 'arranged' by the British Secret Service was propagated by the German wireless, and perhaps also by Dr. Grobba. It was believed by the more feeble-minded part of the hysterical city mob, and was responsible for a shameful and brutal attack, immediately following a memorial service to King Ghazi, on the British Consul at Mosul, Mr. G. E. A. C. Monck-Mason. Surrounded by a rabble of excited demonstrators, he was stoned and then struck fatally on the head, on the veranda of his own Consulate. The Prime Minister, deeply afflicted by this outrage, offered apologies to the British Ambassador and ordered compensation to be paid to the Consul's widow. His funeral at Mosul was public and impressive; 'Iraqi officialdom and the Army were well represented. Severe sentences were passed on a small number of the participants in the attack, in which as usual students had been prominent; the murderer himself was not discovered.

3. FIRST MONTHS OF WAR

The five months preceding the outbreak of the Second World War were a period of outward tranquillity in 'Iraq. The King's funeral visitors returned home, the Regent settled to his task. The Sa'idi Ministry, resigning office on 4 April in accordance with the Constitution, was reinstated by Royal Irada two days later, without change of personnel. The Minister of Interior, Naji Shawkat, whose tepid support on the conspiracy case and on others had created a breach between him and the Premier, resigned late in April. Nuri Pasha himself took the portfolio of Interior, and brought 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs. The elections were completed in May, though martial law was still in force until August in Mosul and Baghdad. Parliament was opened by the Regent on 12 June. His Speech from the Throne appealed to all for tranquillity and restraint. Chosen by the habitual procedures, the Chamber included a large majority of Nuri Pasha's supporters and, contrary to all precedent, was destined for a life of four years. Nevertheless, the shadow of the Army still lay heavily over 'Iraqi politics, and the Chamber itself contained deputies enough willing to renew all the old animosities. Among them were followers of the German lead which was still ceaselessly offered, convinced Anglophobes still resentful of the 1930 Treaty and its alleged limitations on 'Iraqi freedom, thwarted members of the intelligentsia, and pan-Arabs bitter at the Palestine White Paper which 'Iraq, at this stage, rejected. The cause of the Palestinian Arabs was not visibly advanced by the journeys of the Prime Minister to 'Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in August, ever seeking a formula

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

to ensure Arab rights in the Holy Land, or by that of the Foreign Minister 'Ali Jawdat to Sa'udi Arabia in June.

The child-King was taken to the Lebanon for the summer, and there hailed by village enthusiasts by the roadside as 'King of Syria'. In Baghdad a new British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, to whom the Middle East and its problems were unfamiliar, succeeded Peterson in March 1939.

The financial needs of the State, which thanks to over-spending were now serious, were met by a grant of credits by the British Government for the pressing needs of the Railway, and equipment for the Army. Nearly £4 million was thus made available on the security of 'Iraq's oil revenues and with conditions of moderate interest and repayment spaced over seventeen years. An interest-free loan was granted at the same time by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company in return for a seven-year postponement of its export obligation under the B.O.D. Company's concession; it was payable in six half-yearly instalments of £500,000 each, and repayable at leisure out of royalties.

The Railway section from Tall Kochek to Mosul was completed, at unexpectedly high cost, and trains could now run from that city to Istanbul. The Kut barrage and Gharraf headworks were completed in March 1939: the official opening had been King Ghazi's last public act. With its fifty-six mechanically-operated gates, overall width of 1,615 feet, lock, and fish-ladder, this important work had cost £1,200,000 and, given full dependent canalization (at present lacking), was capable of the controlled irrigation of a million acres. The seven-gate Yau regulator, at the end of that branch of the Kufa channel, was erected in 1939–40, also by Messrs. Balfour Beatty. A new and improved Diyalā weir (p. 263) was undertaken in 1939 and completed by the end of 1940. Execution of the Ḥabbaniya project, which had been revived urgently after the Euphrates floods of 1938, was entrusted in June 1939 by contract to Messrs. Balfour Beatty for £700,000 for the first phase, that of the intake canal to the lake at Ramadi and the controlled outlet from the lake to the vast Abu Dibis depression. Work on these was pressed forward. The first of the two steel bridges at Baghdad, built under contract by Messrs. Holloway Bros., was completed; it formed an imposing structure, 700 ft. long and 50 ft. wide, and, named al-Ma'mun Bridge, was opened with ceremony by the Regent. Bridge tolls were abolished throughout the country. A long-standing project drew nearer to realization when a Government bank, to be known as the Rafidain Bank, was established by law though not yet opened; its initial capital was fixed at £500,000, subscribed in part by the State. A revised version of the capital works programme was evolved by Rustum

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished, only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

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The 'Iraq Government hailed with pleasure the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Agreement of 19 October, which provided for joint military action by the signatories in the event of 'a European Power'—which, said the Turks, could never be Russia—'bringing war to the eastern Mediterranean'.

In spite, then, of the pronounced German leanings in the Army and in a number of statesmen, and of deep and general resentment over the Palestine Arab plight and the withheld emancipation of Syria, the tone of the Government remained, during these weeks, cordially favourable. The arrival of the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin al-Ḥusayni, in Baghdad in October as the honoured—but, it was asserted, non-political—guest of the Government had no immediate ill effects. The position was unaltered by Cabinet changes in mid-October, when 'Umar Nadhmi was appointed to Interior, 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs, the Futuwwa enthusiast, Dr. Sami Shawkat (brother of Naji) and Sādiq al-Bassam to the two newly created Ministries of Social Affairs and Economics, and Jalal Baban to Works. The 'Iraqi broadcaster in Berlin, Yunis Bahri, was condemned to death in absence, but was in fact to live and flourish for many years to come. Parliament met on 1 November and moved, once again, to press Great Britain towards a better realization of the Arab case in Palestine; the Prime Minister paid a rapid visit to Cairo for more talks on the same subject. No adverse importance could attach to the arrival of the first Japanese Minister in Baghdad in December, his task being merely to develop commerce between the two countries.

With the new year, 1940, 'Iraqi conditions were outwardly unchanged. The cleavage of its politicians on pro-Axis and anti-Axis lines was not yet fully explicit, their own feuds were unappeased, and all alike were watchful of developments in Europe. The coalescence of the anti-British elements into an active military and civil faction resolute to construe the 1930 Treaty as consistent with 'complete neutrality'—and, if need be, to leave the Allied for the Axis camp—did not occur until after the German victories of mid-1940 and the fall of France; but the influence of the Palestine and Syrian questions and the efforts of the Mufti, who played a part ever less concealed in inspiring anti-British sentiment, were in play throughout the year. The Russian agents and propaganda observed and condemned 'imperialism' in Great Britain's relations with 'Iraq; and German money as well as encouragement was received by willing hands in Baghdad, including those of the Golden Square.

A severe and, as it transpired, a fatal blow was struck at the Sa'idi Ministry on 18 January. This was the murder, by an ex-police inspector of German sympathies, of Rustum Ḥaydar, the

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Minister of Finance, who by long and devoted service deserved as well as any man of his adopted country. He was buried with the fullest honours at the side of Ja'far al-'Askari. The murderer, Husayn Fawzi Ibrahim, at first denied all accomplices but later changed his story to incriminate leading personalities alleged to be hostile to the dead minister: Ibrahim Kamal, who had been Minister of Finance under Madfa'i, Subih Najib, the late Minister of Defence, two leading lawyers, an ex-Mutasarrif and a former Director-General of Police. Nuri's Cabinet, weakened by the loss of Rustum's calm and confident ability, was torn by instant dissension. Its Shi'i members pressed for a court martial and the full rigour of the law; others would limit proceedings to the normal Courts and the actual criminal. To fail to meet the stronger demand would outrage Shi'i feeling; to meet it with vigour would invite the charge of pursuing personal feuds under cover of the crime. In this dilemma Nuri Pasha resigned office on 18 February.

The succession was widely expected to fall to Rashid 'Ali, Director of the Royal Diwan since April 1939; he had as yet taken no open part in forming 'Iraq's war policy. But the moment seemed auspicious to the Army Chiefs once more to intervene. The group led by the Chief of Staff Husayn Fawzi and Amin al-'Umari, who were generally opposed to Nuri and Taha al-Hashimi, requested Rashid 'Ali to accept the premiership, and addressed the Regent with the same proposal. But the rival and stronger senior-officer faction, that of the Golden Square, heard of the manœuvre. They met and invoked Nuri, and stood the troops at al-Rashid Camp to arms as their rivals had already done at Wishash. Nuri and Taha were able by night to reach the young Regent, now facing his first of many crises, and advised immediate action against the Chief of Staff and his following. Rashid 'Ali declined to attempt the formation of a Ministry, and pressure by the Golden Square, as well as the Regent's own inclination, led Nuri Sa'id back into office on 21 February. The crisis of military intervention thus passed; the all-powerful Four were momentarily satisfied, and their rivals in the higher command were dismissed from military employment. But the affair of Rustum's murder remained to be faced.

The reconstructed Cabinet, to the bewilderment of the public, differed from the old only in an exchange of portfolios between Sami Shawkat and Salih Jabr, and the appointment of Ra'uf Bahrani to the Ministry of Finance. The inaugural speech of Nuri was correct but banal; ministerial and public attention concentrated on the Haydar case, which was referred to a court martial. The murderer himself was found guilty and hanged; Subih Najib, perhaps as a sop to Shi'i opinion, was sentenced to a year's

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 imprisonment for 'exciting hatred against the Government'; all the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Ṣalih Jabr, dissatisfied, resigned from the Cabinet; nor was this the only evidence of Cabinet disunion. Tired and ill at ease, and likely to be pressed by public opinion and the Army clique further from his policy acclaimed as 'pro-British', Nuri was more than willing to relinquish the premiership, and on 17 March again resigned office.

619 These vicissitudes of Baghdad politics had, as usual, no great effect on events outside the council chambers. Tribal life was scarcely conscious of the current crises—or, indeed, of the World War itself. A violent tribal battle between two sections of the 'Aniza cost, it was said, 200 lives. Hostilities between the 'Ubayd and Shammar, which flared up late in 1939, were not prolonged. 'Ajil al-Yawir, Paramount Chief of the Shammar, great in stature and shaykhly qualities, died late in 1940 and was succeeded by his son, Sufuk. Northern 'Iraq watched with head-shakings a scandal among the Yazidis, where the child-wife of Sa'id Bey, their Mir, fled in dudgeon to Syria. A military mission of 'Iraqi officers left Baghdad for the Yaman, at the Imam's request. The second of the 499 Baghdad steel bridges built by Hollowayś, 900 feet in length and named after King Fayṣal, was completed.

4. GAYLANI AND HASHIMI

*645 The advice of Rashid 'Ali, as head of the Royal Diwan, to the Regent was to install, if he could, an all-party Ministry capable of uniting loyalties and avoiding the pressures of the Army. A meeting at the palace was attended by all ex-Prime Ministers—Nuri Sa'id, both the Suwaydis, Madfa'i, Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Jawdat. These offered the Regent their promise to support whatever constitutional Government should be appointed. Nuri himself proposed the appointment of Rashid 'Ali, to which the Regent agreed; and thus was formed the first Ministry for four years to assume office in 'Iraq without military pressure. It carried high hopes of stability. The Cabinet announced by the new Prime Minister on 31 March contained Naji Shawkat at the Ministry of Justice, Naji al-Suwaydi at Finance, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Ṭaha al-Hashimi at Defence, 'Umr Nadhmi at Works, Muḥammad Amin Zaki at Economics, and the two Shi'is, Ṣadiq Baṣṣam and Ra'uf Baḥrani, at Social Affairs and Education. Rashid 'Ali retained the portfolio of Interior in his own hands. The reappointment of Nuri and Ṭaha seemed to stand for continuity, and suggested the united front of a 'National Coalition Government' which it claimed to be. The ministerial programme declared an attitude of perfect correctness towards the British alliance.

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped. A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp, in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality, shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Fayṣal Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramaḍhan fast was enforced by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced. The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 657 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultivators. The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasit in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

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648* In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Lutfi Haffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

June enabled the former to report on his return that the Turks advised solidarity with Great Britain. Naji Shawkat, however, now leader of the impatient anti-British party in the Cabinet, was far from accepting this advice as final; he stayed longer in the Turkish capital, visited Istanbul, and was received by von Papen himself, with the motive, no doubt, of inquiring into the German attitude to the Arab world in the probable event of an Axis victory. The result of these conversations was a German declaration of its pro-Arab sympathies, which was broadcast on 23 October 1940 and many times repeated. Meanwhile, telegraphic communication between Baghdad and Rome and Berlin was pointedly reopened.

By the end of 1940 the cleavage both in public feeling and in the Cabinet was clear to all. The party of Nuri Sa'id, Madfa'i, and the Treaty-keepers had lost ground; that of Naji Shawkat, the Generals, and the press was in the ascendant. Naji again visited Ankara in September and stayed for some weeks 'for health reasons'. The Italian Legation in Baghdad, which had been merely tolerated, became popular, and the time seemed to be near when efforts should be made to establish a detailed basis for German collaboration. The Prime Minister, still anxious to keep a foot in either camp, was in close relations of sympathy and policy with the Axis party, and his position must assign him in some measure the leadership of it; but, faced with the unconcealed displeasure of Whitehall at his shortcomings as an ally and his more than suspected German contacts, he continued to profess loyalty to 'Iraq's Treaty obligations and pain at the unjust suspicions of Sir Basil Newton and Mr. Eden; and he was in fact far from wishing at present to precipitate a crisis with Great Britain. Nuri, who contemplated resignation from the Ministry in protest, was checked for the moment by his fear, which the Regent shared, that in his absence worse influences would prevail. A hint conveyed from the Regent to the Premier that his own resignation was desirable was countered by a visit of three ministers to the Palace—Taha, Naji al-Suwaydi, and Rashid 'Ali himself—to protest, correctly enough, that in 'Iraq the monarch had no right to dismiss Ministries—least of all at the bidding of a foreign Power! Gaylani refused to resign; the Regent, in turn, refused to attend his office or to sign State papers.

Further Palace talks evolved the suggestion that, Rashid 'Ali remaining as Premier, Cabinet unity might be achieved by the simultaneous resignation of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat. In pursuance of this Nuri resigned on 21 January 1941, and Naji four days later. They were replaced by 'Ali Mahmud al-Shaykh, a lawyer and extreme nationalist, and Yunis al-Sab'awi, a young

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

645 Mosulawi politician–journalist. But the uneasiness of the Regent had meanwhile increased, Rashid 'Ali showed a rising confidence based on his ever closer relations with the Generals, and it was clear that no palliatives could meet the case. On 26 January the Cabinet, in spite of the Premier, decided by majority that, to avoid a crisis, its remaining members should resign and thus dissolve the Ministry. The resignations were prepared; but General Mahmud Salman, on behalf of the Golden Square, assured the Regent in audience that the Army was resolved on maintenance of the Gaylani Government, on pain of direct military action which he urgently threatened. The Amir, yielding to force, agreed to refuse the resignations and by filling the vacant places in the Cabinet to keep it alive. On 28 January he issued Iradas appointing a lawyer deputy, Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud, and a wealthy and widely travelled ex-official of Foreign Affairs, Musā al-Shahbandar, to ministerial rank.

But the Gaylani Ministry had after all but three more days of troubled life. The tone of the Chamber at its meeting on 30 January was highly critical of the Prime Minister, and the latter demanded from the Regent an Irada to dissolve it. The Amir, to gain time and to escape the duress under which the Army had placed him, left Baghdad for Diwaniya and lodged there with the loyal Commander of the 4th Division, General Ibrahim al-Rawi. This move evoked the telegraphed resignation of Rashid 'Ali, in terms of barely suppressed impatience. The Regent thereon summoned elder statesmen to Diwaniya, and learned from these that the alternatives open were those of civil war or a Ministry under Taha al-Hashimi, whom alone the Golden Square would accept in lieu of Gaylani. An Irada for the new Ministry was issued on 1 February, and the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah returned to Baghdad three days later. All now depended, it was clear, on the loyalty of the Army chiefs to Taha, and his power to control them.

The new Prime Minister retained the portfolio of Defence in his own hands. He gave those of Interior and Justice to 'Umar Nadhmi, of Finance to an able financier, 'Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari, of Economics to Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, of Education to Sadiq Bassam, and of Social Affairs to the veteran nationalist and landowner, Hamdi al-Pachachi. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was entrusted to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. Through the visit of the last-named to Cairo late in February to meet Anthony Eden the Ministry might, had time allowed, have received some further infusion of pro-British sentiment, which prevailed already in some of the Ministers as well as at the Palace; and advice in this sense was given by the American Minister, Paul Knabenshue, and by President Roosevelt's visiting envoy, Colonel Donovan. The

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Ministry itself was well received by Parliament, gained some popularity by increasing officials' salaries, and worked acceptably at salvage and relief works necessitated by the disastrous floods which had breached the railway and inundated farm lands. It felt strong enough to refuse the application of Rashid 'Ali and his band of close associates—Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Mahmud al-Shaykh, Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud, Yunis al-Sab'awi, Da'ud al-Sa'di—for the formation of a People's Party.

But the task of conciliating the Army leaders, the Gaylani group of politicians hungry for power and embittered against the Regent, and the Amir himself with his moderate and orthodox advisers, proved impossible of achievement. The Prime Minister could not or would not adopt a determined policy in either sense. The Golden Square, who had already abandoned their loyalty to Nuri, now abandoned it to Taha equally, and were identified ever more closely with Rashid 'Ali's faction. They felt their own position to be threatened; and the first stroke they had been led to fear fell on 26 March with the announced transfer of one of them, Kamil Shabib, away from Baghdad; other repostings were no doubt to follow, and the Regent's campaign to break the Square would develop. The order of transfer was ignored; Taha was powerless to enforce it; and the solemn promise of the Generals on the last day of the Parliamentary session, 31 March, that 'on their military honour' they would abstain from political intervention, was obviously valueless.

On the night of 1 April the four Generals and the acting Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, met to proclaim a State of Emergency at al-Rashid cantonment, and marched troops to points in Baghdad city and around the Palace. Their spokesmen, visiting Taha by night, demanded his resignation; but he refused to join a movement now frankly revolutionary, and his Cabinet remained in being for one further day. Events, however, swept it aside; the Regent escaped from his palace on the night of 1 April and took refuge for some hours with Knabenshue, who drove him to Habbaniya in an American Legation car next day. Here he met for a few minutes Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, arriving at this most uneasy of moments to assume the post of British Ambassador, and from Habbaniya was flown to Basra. There were hopes that a strong base of support might be found at the Port, and the Amir issued a manifesto calling for this. But the Basra garrison, hesitant at first, received orders from Baghdad to detain him, and arrested and replaced the Mutasarrif, Salih Jabr, who had loyally received him. He was forced to embark for safety in a British warship anchored in the Shatt, and was later flown, with 'Ali Jawdat and Madfa'i, to 'Amman.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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5. THIRTY-DAY WAR

In Baghdad the Golden Square and its forces assumed control. Once fully dominant, the Generals proclaimed the formation of a Government of National Defence, embodied in a Council which included their own four members and the Chief of Staff, with Rashid 'Ali as its nominal head, accompanied by two of his close followers. General Amin Zaki issued on 3 April, in terms strongly hostile to the Regent, a broadcast appealing for universal support. He was followed by Rashid 'Ali, who justified his position and the Army's and stated his policy to be one of 'refraining from exposing the country to the dangers of war', while also 'fulfilling all the international obligations of 'Iraq'.

The legislation of the new régime was less easy. Parliament was summoned by one of its Vice-Presidents, 'Alwan al-Yasiri: a step in itself illegal, since under the Constitution a Royal Irada was required. At the meeting of the Chamber on 10 April Rashid 'Ali obtained from the frightened deputies (many in fact strongly favourable to the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah) their votes for the deposition of the Regent, and for the appointment in his place of an elderly but respectable poor relation of the Hashimite family, the Amir Sharaf. The Prime Minister swore henceforward to observe the Constitution, the new Regent took his oath of office, and the régime announced itself as now legally constituted. The Amir Sharaf accepted the resignation of Ṭaha, three days old, and called formally upon Rashid 'Ali to form a Ministry. The portfolio of Finance was allotted to Naji al-Suwaydi, that of Defence to Naji Shawkat, Justice, Economics, and Foreign Affairs were given to Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Yunis al-Ṣab'awi, and Musā al-Shahbandar, and Education to Dr. Ḥasan al-Salman. The Prime Minister did not fail to announce, in the strict tradition of incoming Premiers, that a new age of all the public virtues and blessings had begun. Of the normality of his own position he admitted no doubt; there had been, at the worst, just one more coup d'état, a purely domestic affair! In the eyes of his supporters, of the Youth Movement, and of part of the urban public, a strong Government free from lingering commitments, hotly patriotic and backed by the Army, had at last been established. In the tribes, apathy and vague uneasiness prevailed. The more critical or conservative townsmen and most older politicians viewed with alarm the implied flouting of the British, the commitment to Germans and Italians, the precipitate flight of the Regent, and the present crude domination by Army leaders always disliked and feared by the civil public. The release of convicts serving sentences for their share in the Monck-Mason murder was significant. Leading statesmen loyal to the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Haydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Ali personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Ali' first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

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brigade strength. A second unsatisfactory interview took place between Premier and Ambassador; each maintained his position; and Rashid 'Ali, hinting at serious consequences, laid all blame in advance upon the British. The troops landed, not without signs of popular and military disfavour which stopped short of serious physical opposition. They occupied the Port area and power-station, and prepared for the advent of greater forces. The 'Iraqi garrison of Basra moved out, under pressure, to the river bank fifteen miles north of the Qarmat 'Ali river junction.

In spite of the efforts of the British community and most 'Iraqis to maintain normal activities, the position in Baghdad was by these events so strained that British women and children were dispatched on 29 April, by the Ambassador's instructions and with the Prime Minister's specific guarantee of safety, to Habbaniya, whence in the days following they were taken by air to Basra and out of 'Iraq. All other British and United States citizens, with some few exceptions—who were to fare badly in the succeeding weeks—were collected on 30 April for safety at the British Embassy on the right bank of the river, at the American Legation in the 'Alwiya suburb, and in Mosul at the British Consulate. Some 360, joined by a few local Jews and Indians, were to spend the next month within the Embassy precincts, which were barricaded and controlled. Official records and cyphers were destroyed. The captives continued precariously to enjoy the Government services of electricity and light, telephone (with interruptions), and water, and to obtain food and other articles from the town. A further 150 were kept, not without 'Iraqi protest at an unneutral act, under the protection of Knabenshue but were unable to communicate with the Embassy. The King and his mother remained for three weeks at their palace outside Baghdad, and thereafter made their way in safety to a hill-station in northern 'Iraq. The British banks in Baghdad were forced to hand over their keys and balances.

During the night of 29–30 April the 'Iraq Army Command moved troops—an Infantry Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, and a Machine Gun Company—by a measure described as precautionary, from al-Rashid camp to the high ground immediately dominating Habbaniya. This force grew, in the two days following, to one of nearly 10,000 men, fully armed and equipped and provided with 50 guns and a number of tanks. The Habbaniya cantonment contained, besides some thousands of civilian workers, 1,200 of the Levies—half Assyrian, half Arab and Kurd—an Armoured Car Company, 80 aircraft of various and mostly obsolete types, 30 trained pilots and as many pupils, about 1,000 other R.A.F. personnel, the infantry half-battalion flown from Basra, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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ancient howitzers. The camp itself, containing maintenance installations, stores, and a Flying Training School, was militarily indefensible.

The British position in 'Iraq, it was now clear, was more than precarious; it could be sustained only by immediate military reinforcement. The flooded countryside and the 'Iraq Army's control of the Basra–Baghdad railway precluded the dispatch of land forces northward from the Port; and none, indeed, reached Baghdad by that route until mid-June. But the resolution of Churchill and the British Cabinet to hold their position and insist on their Treaty rights in 'Iraq never faltered. General Wavell in Cairo was directed to dispatch forces from Palestine to the relief of Habbaniya and for the restoration of the situation: instructions which were received with dismay, since the Commander-in-Chief was already distraught by wide and varied commitments in Greece, Crete, Syria, the Western Desert of Egypt, and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a force consisting of a brigade of mechanized cavalry, armoured cars, field and anti-tank artillery, a battalion of the Essex Regiment, three squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force, 200 heavy lorries to supply Habbaniya, and a mechanized Desert Regiment of the (Transjordan) Arab Legion under Brigadier J. B. Glubb, was collected and placed under Major-General J. G. W. Clark. His task was to open and hold the lines of communication to 'Iraq, and in that country to relieve Habbaniya, restore the British position, and make possible the restoration of a legal and friendly Government. Moving eastwards by the 'Amman–Baghdad road, a part of this force, formed as 'Kingcol' under Brigadier J. Kingstone, crossed the borders of 'Iraq on 10 May. With Glubb's detachment acting as a forward screen, the column was able to occupy Rutba, which the 'Iraqis abandoned with little resistance, and to reach the Euphrates. The desert pumping-stations of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company, two of which had been heavily looted, could thereby be brought again under control. 'Aniza tribesmen had done much damage to the works proceeding at Lake Habbaniya, and to the machinery in use there.

The fortunes of war at Habbaniya, meanwhile, had bordered on the miraculous. On 1 May the Air Force Commander there, Air Vice-Marshal H. G. Smart, summarily rejected the request of the 'Iraq Commander that all flying should cease; he demanded, on the contrary, the withdrawal of the 'Iraqi forces from positions which were clearly hostile and must place his camp at their mercy. No reply was given; the 'Iraq Army held its ground; and at dawn on 2 May it was bombed by British aircraft. The 'Iraqi artillery replied by shelling the buildings of the Habbaniya camp. For three days this bombardment continued, half-hearted and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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ill-aimed, and failed[1] to hit the vital water-tower on which the garrison depended, or to prevent the evacuation by air of the women and children. British aircraft meanwhile constantly attacked the 'Iraqi forces and gun positions, and destroyed wherever they found it the greatest part of the small but not despicable R.I.A.F., which had consisted of some fifty first-line aircraft, including American bombers and fast Italian fighters. Small reinforcements of aircraft, notably Blenheims, reached the British at Ḥabbaniya from Egypt, and a detachment of Gurkhas were flown from Baṣra. R.A.F. losses in effective aircraft were heavy. Vigorous patrols from the British land forces operated at night against outposts on the plateau, and were little opposed. The 'Iraqi troops made no ground attack at any point on the seven miles of scarcely defended perimeter, which with their numbers and weapons they could have penetrated almost at will. Before dawn on 6 May they withdrew from the plateau, moved eastwards, and halted at Sinn al-Dhibban athwart the Ramadi–Baghdad road, offering the easiest of bombing targets. A sortie from Ḥabbaniya here attacked and dislodged them, taking 26 officer prisoners and over 400 other ranks, with vehicles, guns, and war material. The remainder retired to Faluja. The troops at Ḥabbaniya rested and reorganized, kept watch on the 'Iraq Army garrison behind them at Ramadi, and harassed the enemy with their aircraft.

At Baṣra, meanwhile, the public were sullen and hostile. The newly installed acting Mutaṣarrif was instigated to active unfriendliness by orders from Baghdad, but from fear of reprisals felt unable to carry out his instructions to intern the whole British community. In spite of resistance from the police, which led to the necessity of disarming them, General Fraser was compelled to occupy part of 'Ashar on 7 May. In the unoccupied quarters of this suburb and of Baṣra city, looting by hooligans was widespread. The Mutaṣarrif abruptly left Baṣra on 16 May and anarchy reigned until the formation of a temporary Committee of Notables under Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan a week later secured some sort of order. In Mosul the Mutaṣarrif, Taḥsin 'Ali, was removed by the Gaylani Government and the local general substituted, but not until British wives and children had been evacuated to Turkey or, in the case of the B.O.D. Company's families, to Syria. The internment of Englishmen and (to their indignation) Americans in the British Consulate was accompanied by offensive restrictions and complete isolation: by the sight of German aircraft overhead and rumours of Axis military stores arriving by train: and by an ugly attitude on the part of the truculent Mosul townsmen. Officialdom,

[1] In the opinion of some observers, the ineffectiveness of the shooting was intentional.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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as usual, was divided. British personnel of the I.P.C. at Kirkuk were interned, sometimes amicably sometimes rigorously, in various premises of Kirkuk town and fields headquarters. All active operations ceased at Kirkuk, Qaiyara, 'Ayn Zala, and elsewhere, while control of the installations was assumed by 'Iraqi staff until Germans should arrive to take charge. Looting of vehicles, stores, and domestic effects was considerable and at certain pumping stations wholesale. The Khaniqin Oil Company's personnel at Naftkhana and at Alwand Refinery were brought in some cases to Baghdad, in others to Ba'quba where they endured a sordid and dangerous captivity.

The 'Iraq Government, as was apparent after a week of 'war', had evolved no military or political plan to meet an emergency which it had itself precipitated. Security was generally maintained throughout the territory, but the rigid censorship, administrative obstruction, military control, and clashing authority slowed the pulse of all national life. Railway communication was interrupted or ceased. The Army, itself far from single-minded, was handled without grasp or resolution; its Intelligence Services were lamentable, its movements uncoordinated, and the great bulk of its effectives never brought into action, or near it. Its unit commanders took varying views of the situation; many would have refused orders to fight, had they been given. The bombs of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, from the head of the Persian Gulf, descended daily or nightly upon garrisons, barracks, and airports at Qarmat 'Ali, Nasiriya, 'Amara, Samawa, Diwaniya, Ramadi, Qaraghan, and Mosul. The black-out and camouflage operations in Baghdad created more public alarm than confidence, rumours were wild and alarming, and official communiqués of a grotesque falsity were daily issued. The press seethed with its usual diatribes and exhortations. The Mufti, Hajj Amin, emerged to proclaim Jihad against oppressive and infidel Britain, and was supported by other divines. Diplomatic recognition of 'Iraq by the U.S.S.R. was, indeed, announced by the Russians on 12 May, but this move, foreshadowed already by negotiations of some months' duration, was of no helpful significance to 'Iraq. The Axis Powers made no gesture of recognition for the new régime in 'Iraq, though their wireless was ceaseless in its blandishments and encouragements.

But to Gaylani and his ministers this was no substitute for material aid, for which no prior arrangement had been made unless in the vaguest terms, and no concerted time-table prepared. A Turkish offer on 4 May to mediate had been rejected off-hand by the British Government. Naji Shawkat hurried to Turkey on the 8th, failed to convince the Foreign Minister at Ankara of his claims to support, and waited for some days till the return of von Papen from Europe. But he could accomplish nothing, and the attitude

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of Egypt and of Sa'udi Arabia, to which Naji al-Suwaydi proceeded on urgent mission, was equally comfortless for the Baghdad Government. Only behind the scenes and beyond 'Iraqi vision were plans being formulated between German, French, and Italian spokesmen—Abetz and Darlan in Paris, Darlan and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ciano and Ribbentrop in Rome—for the use by Axis forces of the Syrian aerodromes, ports and railways, and for the dispatch of French military stores and expert helpers to 'Iraq. For this purpose the Turkish railway was in fact used, to the extent of a few train-loads late in May, with the acquiescence of the Turks which von Papen had secured. But these materials played no part in the campaign; the arrangements, like all those for the German help for which the harassed ministers in Baghdad now prayed, were improvised only after the adventure in usurpation had begun, and without direct German-'Iraqi contact at staff levels. All were inadequate, all too late.

Nevertheless, the German and Italian aircraft and technicians who began in small numbers to arrive in 'Iraq in the second week of May, were of greater and could have been of decisive value. They made their base on the Mosul airfield, were seen at Kirkuk where oil technicians were shortly to follow them, and took part in the operations now impending at Faluja. It was a matter of course that all acts of the German aircraft, which included frequent bombing of Ḥabbaniya, were claimed in 'Iraqi communiqués as feats of the R.I.A.F. A Messerschmidt circling Baghdad airport was in error attacked by 'Iraqi rifle-fire and on landing was found to contain the body, shot through the head, of the son of Marshal von Blomberg.

'Kingcol', the main reinforcement to the British forces, arrived at Ḥabbaniya from the desert on 18 May, in time to join in a concerted attack on Faluja, which the 'Iraqis had lost but retaken ten days earlier. The town was outflanked by airborne troops and by detachments ferried over the Euphrates; and, after a short bombardment, was entered and held with its great bridge undamaged. Assyrian Levies took a conspicuous part in the operation. An 'Iraqi counter-attack in strength was repelled. Major-General Clark was now free to order an advance on Baghdad, where fantastic stories of the strength—and tanks—of the British forces were accepted; but widespread flooding across the direct route, and the tactical desirability of first cutting the approaches to Baghdad from Mosul, led to a delay of some days. A party of the Arab Legion under Glubb crossed the Jazira, cut the Mosul railway near Samarrā, and returned; later, joined by the Household Cavalry, they crossed again to the Tigris, occupied Mushahida, and turned south towards Baghdad. The force encountered enemy troops near Taji, and took up a position in brickfields near Kadhimiya.

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The Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad was captured, released, and sent home. The main body of Clark's force now advanced due east by way of Khan Nuqta. Scarcely 1,300 strong, and incomparably weaker in guns, equipment, and supply resources than the opposing 'Iraqi units, it was yet scarcely opposed and, after ferrying across flooded areas, reached the outskirts of Baghdad on 29 May. Its weakness, its flood-restricted movements, and its long and vulnerable communications rendered its position precarious, or indeed alarming; not only was Baghdad easily defensible, but a determined move by a mere fraction of 'Iraq's available forces could not have failed to dislodge and destroy an invader whose only strength was in determination, bluff, and high spirits. In fact, the short war was almost over; the 'Iraq Government and its resistance simultaneously disintegrated and collapsed.

The public had become aware that its Government's challenge to Great Britain had been taken up, that actual war was in progress, and that British forces had appeared, in the air, at a score of places. The Army, never popular and not greatly respected, had done nothing to restore confidence. Communications were cut everywhere, commerce dead, prices soaring, the capital three-quarters isolated. At the Port, British-Indian troops were pouring in, and opposition was already changing to indifference or pleasure. Lieutenant-General E. P. Quinan, accompanied by Brigadier W. Slim (the future C.I.G.S.), arrived to take command on 7 May. 'Iraqi troops at Mosul and Kirkuk seemed generally to support the Government, but made no move; a part of those in Baghdad were in sentiment favourable rather to the banished Regent, and the Golden Square, who had perverted their loyalty, were now powerless to lead them. Desertions were increasing, and became a menace to security. Most townsmen and villagers in the provinces were anxious only to see peace and order restored, though support to the Gaylani régime had been at first not inconsiderable. The youths of Baghdad, armed during May by orders of Rashid 'Ali, boasted and strutted in uniform but were no military asset. No tribal leaders placed themselves behind the Ministry; Shaykh Mahmud escaped from Baghdad, reached Sulaymaniya, and essayed to raise forces to 'support the British'. There was neither time nor need for Glubb Pasha to fulfil the mission charged with which he had led his men to 'Iraq, that of raising the tribes against the usurping Government.

Early in the last week of May the ministers, preceded by their families, started to leave the capital. Naji Shawkat, Shahbandar, 'Ali Mahmud, and Suwaydi left for Persia or Turkey. The Mufti hastened to Teheran. On the 28th Rashid 'Ali himself fled from the city. German and Italian subjects—among them Dr. Grobba,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

727 lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, pre-
648 ceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Habbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag
728 of truce that night. Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between
648x the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He
579 returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Habbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Dhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it represented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfa'i assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra.

The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or praise, the name of Rashid 'Ali. His part in it was in fact both unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid 'Ali's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the 'Iraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army.

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied 'Iraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the 'Iraq Army at Habbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by 'Iraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

IX

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. PAIFORCE

721 THE directive with which General Quinan landed at Baṣra bade him develop that port as a major military base, secure lines of communication through 'Iraq, and safeguard oil supplies. The first of these duties occupied his forces for some weeks in isolation, except for nightly air convoys to Ḥabbaniya, from the campaign up-country; all routes were cut by the 'Iraq Army, wide areas were flooded, and the need was urgent to organize facilities in the Baṣra and Shu'ayba neighbourhood to accommodate the incoming troops and supplies. The Commanders-in-Chief of India and of Middle East, Generals Sir Claude Auchinlek and Sir A. Wavell, met at Baṣra on 23 May to concert plans. On the 27th a column left Shu'ayba for the north and, after meeting slight opposition at Ur and repairing the railway as it went, arrived outside Baghdad on 12 June; and on the latter day a second force embarked at 'Ashar in an improvised fleet of river craft, and reached Baghdad a week later. On the 18th Quinan with his reopened communications could assume control of all troops in 'Iraq, and the command, hitherto handled operationally from Cairo, reverted to the orbit of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

Its urgent tasks during the summer of 1941 were to place and maintain small garrisons at Kirkuk, Mosul, Faluja, Ḥaditha, Ruṭba, and elsewhere: to be prepared to aid the 'Iraq Police in the maintenance of order: to increase immediately the capacity of the already congested Port: and to develop, for use by major forces, base areas at Baṣra, Shu'ayba, Kut, and Musayib. New air-fields were sited in northern 'Iraq, and steps taken to improve the means of communication by rail, river, road, and telegraph. In June and July small forces were sent to take part in General Maitland Wilson's campaign in Syria against the Vichy French; and in August, with the increased forces then available, it was possible for Quinan to undertake by way of Baṣra and Khaniqin the almost bloodless invasion of Persia which ended with a change of Government and policy in that country, and swung it from dangerous sympathy with the Axis to friendly co-operation with the Allies.

The winter of 1941–2 was of exceptional severity. After a plenary conference in Baghdad in September of the British Ambassadors and Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East it was decided to devote the ensuing months to continued development of the

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territory as a communication and defensive area. This was achieved by the expansion of inland bases and of the Port, where new wharves were constructed, cranes erected, roads and buildings provided: by assuming control of and greatly extending the Inland Water Transport services (on lines reminiscent of the First World War), with the import of a score of small steamers and many barges from India and America, and the requisition of the bulk of existing 'Iraqi resources: by perfected telegraphic and wireless networks: and by the improvement and local duplication of the railway line, and the construction of a new line from Kut to Ba'quba. A German threat, against which these preparations were designed, could come by way of Anatolia or, after Hitler's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, by the Caucasus and Adharbayjan. The whole of northern 'Iraq must, therefore, be strengthened, and General Quinan prepared positions for this purpose within the triangle contained by the Turkish frontier, the Diyalā, and the Tigris. These works involved great efforts and no small hardship; they called for the use of large forces of local labour and for the provision of the camps, transport and equipment, and the feeding and medical arrangements necessary to maintain them; and they absorbed the two weak Indian divisions—the 8th and 10th, after the departure of the 6th for Persia—which with miscellaneous units formed the 'Iraq garrison at the time. The decision to assist the supply of the Russian armies by supplies conveyed from the Gulf across Persia demanded a formidable organization for procurement and forwarding, based on Baṣra; and in this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the British companies at Baṣra played an invaluable pioneer part. It led to a great expansion in the Persian railway and road systems, not least in the close neighbourhood of Baṣra and the 'Iraq frontier where the teak-built 1,150-ft. Hull Bridge across the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab was the first bridge in history to span this river. The railway terminal at Khaniqin became simultaneously an important forwarding base.

So passed the winter of 1941–2. The British forces in 'Iraq and Persia, then as always predominantly Indian in composition, were regrouped in the early days of January 1942 as the Xth Army, and passed again to the Middle East Command. During the spring the tasks of the winter were continued, with the scale of traffic constantly increasing on rail and river, on the desert highway to Palestine, and in base and advanced areas. If the invasion of Egypt by Axis forces in the spring of 1942 led to the dispatch of some combatant units from the Xth Army to the Levant, the deeper penetration of Nazi forces into south Russia in the summer, with the threat of access to Persia and 'Iraq by the Caucasus, seemed to

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721 increase the danger to these countries. This serious situation led early in August to the British decision to reinforce the Xth Army; it was to become an effective fighting formation instead of one specialized for defensive and forwarding functions, and thereafter as the 'Persia–'Iraq Force', or familiarly 'Paiforce', was to be the responsibility of a Commander-in-Chief of its own, directly subordinate to the War Office. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson was selected for the command, and reached Baghdad in August. The fresh troops destined for 'Iraq–Persia started to disembark at Basra in and after September 1942. They were the 5th and 56th British Divisions, soon to be followed by the 7th British Armoured Brigade from India, and the 5th Indian and 3rd (Carpathian) Polish Divisions from Middle East. These troops were as far as possible moved to areas in northern 'Iraq and northern Persia, though retirement to the vicinity of rail-heads was inevitable for supply reasons in the winter. The Poles, who were arriving at Khaniqin as refugees in increasing numbers from Persia, were placed under military training and later added to the Polish formations created in Middle East under General Anders.

Two Corps, the 3rd and 21st Indian, were organized from the troops available in Paiforce: they consisted in all, by the end of 1942, of two British divisions and a British armoured brigade, three Indian divisions and an Indian armoured brigade, and one Polish division with the expectation of another still under formation. The 'Iraq Army for its part was prepared, should the threat from the north-east materialize, to take its place with these in the defence of the passes leading from the Urmiya district. The successful defence of Stalingrad, however, gave time for the preparations in 'Iraq and Persia to be perfected; and in the early months of 1943 the final blunting of the German menace absolved Paiforce, after all, from a fighting rôle. It was possible before the middle of that year to transfer a number of formations and units to North Africa, there to join in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. General Wilson was transferred in February 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, under which Headquarters Paiforce was thenceforward grouped for the remainder of its lifetime. He was succeeded in Baghdad by Lieutenant-General Sir H. P. Pownall, who was in turn relieved a year later by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith. These officers, as it fortunately happened, each possessed the qualities of comprehension and sympathy which the location of their forces in the heart of an allied country demanded.

The tasks of Paiforce during its later career were the maintenance of communications and stability in the area, and the training of troops, especially the Poles, for use in other theatres. Its further duty in Persia was the increase of supplies to Russia by the

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trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

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and benevolent advice to the Government. He was helped in keeping touch with all parts of the country by a small staff of Political Advisers resident, as observers only, in north, central, and southern 'Iraq. While an element of Anglophobe bitterness persisted among disappointed Army officers, ex-internees, and rancorous intelligentsia, the general tone of the public, especially in village, tribal, and non-political circles, was complacent or friendly to the British 'occupation'. Many joined Miss Freya Stark's 'Brotherhood of Freedom', a movement which claimed 600 committees and stood for a broad sympathetic support of democratic values; and many were receptive of direct British information and propaganda, realized the help which the Army was able repeatedly to give in civilian needs and interests, and heard with pleasure of the foundation in London of an Anglo-'Iraq Society in March 1944.

The Ambassador was relieved by Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, formerly British Minister in Jidda, in the spring of 1945. The reduction of Paiforce was by that time well advanced. It had diminished the scale of its construction works (with resulting local unemployment), had removed most of its emergency railway lines, had parted with control of the river transport, and narrowed the perimeters of its vast Shu'ayba and Musayib camps. It was to disappear finally in 1947, after disposing locally of vast quantities of stores, and to leave behind it a considerable legacy of permanent improvement in the form of buildings and equipment in the Port, railways, and roads of the territory.

2. THE MIDDLE WAR YEARS

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The crisis through which 'Iraq had passed in May 1941 justified, when once the position was restored, the firmest of Governments. The sullen disaffection of the Army, the weakening of the Administration, the muttering among members of the disbanded Youth Organizations, the threats of fugitive Gaylani partisans that their struggle was but beginning: these features increased the dislocations and abnormalities of national life and, as war conditions began to assert themselves, called for a strong and a skilful hand.

It was not forthcoming. Madfa'i, whom patriotic duty alone had induced again to accept power, treated the situation as merely the aftermath of one more political episode and adopted easily the rôle which had fallen to him after Sidqi's murder—that of 'dropping the curtain' on past misdeeds. The gap between the measures which he took and those indicated by 'Iraq's position and needs was indeed so clear that his early supersession was inevitable.

The Cabinet which he installed was one of experienced politicians, with no new blood. Nuri Sa'id, whose presence in the capital could have been embarrassing to Madfa'i, betook himself to Egypt

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as Minister. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to 'Ali Jawdat, Interior to the tough and experienced Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Works to Jalal Baban, Finance and temporarily Justice to Ibrahim Kamal—in whom many saw a future Prime Minister—and Economics to Naṣrat al-Farsi. The two Shi'i Ministers were Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education, and Ja'far Ḥamandi at Social Affairs. This Ministry met cordially the suggestions of its ally as regards the stationing of troops at strategic points, the acceptance of joint control at the Port, and a censorship suited to war conditions. The Italian Legation was expelled, a few subversive Palestinian and Syrian teachers repatriated, and the enemy propaganda machine thereby seriously dislocated. Normal administration was everywhere restored, and local authorities encouraged to initiate progressive works. The tribes were quiet, the Kurds for the moment inactive. The accidental shooting of their Qa'immaqam by the Yazidis had no repercussions. But the Ministry failed in a firm orientation of war policy, and notably in its half-hearted attitude to the known trouble-makers, indulgence to whom among the menaces of war was dangerous folly. The policy of the Cabinet was appeasement. Few arrests were made, although those few included 'Abd al-Wahid and others of the incorrigible Euphrates shaykhs. Mutaṣarrifs through misguided clemency were discouraged by ministers from firm action, and too little was done to purge the Administration itself. Preparations for an internment camp at Fao were allowed to drag on.

The resignation of Ibrahim Kamal in September seemed likely to be followed by the formation of a Ministry by this able, impatient statesman; but he commanded insufficient support, and the Regent preferred, since a change was necessary, to send to Egypt for Nuri Sa'id whose qualities were those which the times demanded. Jamil al-Madfa'i resigned on 7 October, and two days later a Royal Irada announced that Nuri had formed a Cabinet, his sixth. He brought the vigorous and competent Shi'i, Ṣalih Jabr, to the Ministry of the Interior—the first Shi'i ever to fill this post—and to act also in Foreign Affairs. 'Ali Mumtaz went to Finance, Ṣādiq Bassam to Justice, Taḥsin 'Ali to Education, Muḥammad Amin Zaki to Works, 'Abd al-Mahdi to Economics, Jamal Baban to Social Affairs. It was upon the two first-named of these ministers that the chief burden of administration must fall.

Cabinet changes occurred in February 1942 when Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for four months only), and in April when Da'ud al-Ḥaydari replaced Bassam at Justice, and 'Abd al-Mahdi took from Amin Zaki the portfolio of Works. The Prime Minister retained that of Defence and pressed on the British Ambassador his desire and that of the Army for a

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specific rôle to play in the defeat of Hitler; but his offer of two brigades for North Africa was not accepted. With the Regent's support he showed, nevertheless, appropriate vigour in the arrest of the disloyal, though certain well-protected Nazi sympathizers remained untouched (and even retained high office) and zeal was for a time diminished in mid-1942 by the successes of General Rommel in the Western Desert. The camp at Fao was soon in use. It was followed later by another at the desert post of Salman, and yet another on the riverside at 'Amara, to which all the detained were ultimately transferred; the number of these rose at its greatest to some 350. A number of 'Iraqi fugitives captured by the British in Persia were held for a time at Ahwaz, and later taken for trial to Baghdad or for internment to Rhodesia. The Ministry of Education was submitted to a complete and much needed overhaul. Some dozens of the less efficient officers of the 'Iraq Army—or, said his enemies, of those unfriendly to Nuri—were removed, and conscription applied with a wiser indulgence in tribal areas.

Relations with Japan and with Vichy France were broken off soon after the Sa'idi Ministry took office. A Minister, 'Ali Jawdat, was sent for the first time to Washington in March 1942, soon after the regretted death of Paul Knabenshue in Baghdad; and the benefits of American lend-lease supplies were enjoyed from May onwards. The Prime Minister was able late in the same year to obtain a resolution of the Chamber in favour of adhesion to the United Nations Declaration of 2 January 1942, and was known already to be contemplating a declaration of war against the Axis, a condition of such adhesion. A treaty was concluded with China, whose Minister to 'Iraq resided at Teheran.

The Axis press and propaganda-machine continued to paint 'Iraqi conditions as those of brutal British domination, slave labour, daily conspiracies, sabotage, and tribal ferment: grotesque perversions which were supported by the presence in Europe of Rashid 'Ali (who broke his parole by leaving Turkey), Naji Shawkat, Fawzi Qawuqchi, the Mufti, and others. These fugitives were received by Mussolini, Ribbentrop, and Hitler himself, and broadcast their version of the 'Iraqi situation on demand. Meanwhile, their former colleagues in 'Iraq fared less well. A special Court was set up by the Sa'idi Ministry late in 1941 and in March 1942 sentenced to death, in absence, Rashid 'Ali and two of his ministers, Yunis al-Sab'awi and 'Ali Mahmud al-Shaykh, and three of the Golden Square, Fahmi Sa'id, Mahmud Salman, and Salah al-Din Sabbagh. Long sentences of imprisonment were passed on Naji Shawkat and the Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, and shorter on the former Minister of Education, Dr. Hasan Salman, and the Director of Propaganda, Sadiq Shanshal. The trial of other and

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similar offenders was postponed until they could be produced before a Court; these were Naji al-Suwaydi (who died soon afterwards in Rhodesia), three other ministers—Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Musā al-Shahbandar, and Ra'uf Baḥrani—Kamil Shabib, the fourth member of the Square, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani, the late Prime Minister's cousin. The delivery to 'Iraqi justice of a number of offenders caught by the British in Persia led to the re-trial of some of those already condemned in absence. The death sentence was now passed and executed on Yunis al-Sab'awi, Fahmi Sa'id, and Maḥmud Salman; prison sentences of seven and five years respectively were passed on 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and General Amin Zaki. Ṣādiq Shanshal was acquitted, and the other sentences confirmed. Many attempts, of familiar type, were made during the trials to influence the course of justice.

The personal stresses arising from these measures, and more generally from Nuri's policy of whole-hearted support of Great Britain even in the darkest days, led to ministerial uneasiness which was increased by differences on the measures demanded by the now serious economic situation. It was shown by the attempted resignation during the summer of 'Ali Mumtaz and 'Abdullah Damluji, and produced an effect of partial paralysis of the administration. The Ministry resigned on 8 October 1942 after exactly a year of life, and was succeeded by another, the seventh, under the same premiership. Retaining Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Nuri Pasha allotted Interior to his brother-in-law Taḥsin al-'Askari (brother of Ja'far), Foreign Affairs to Dr. 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh—a graduate in economics and dentistry—Justice to Da'ud al-Ḥaydari, Education to Taḥsin 'Ali, Economics to the Najfi business man Muḥsin al-Shallash, and Social Affairs to another ex-Mutaṣarrif and judge, Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, a Kurd only in name. This composition was shortly afterwards modified by the retirement of 'Abd al-Mahdi and Shallash in favour of Salman Barrak of Ḥilla in Economics and the young Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Uzri, in Social Affairs.

The establishment of this Ministry was followed by a State visit of the Regent to Cairo where he was royally received by King Faruq, revisited Victoria College, and passed on to inspect the field of Alamein. His nephew, King Fayṣal II, now growing into an intelligent and promising boy, broadcast in English and Arabic on his eighth birthday, 2 May 1943.

Among the Ministry's first acts was to declare war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, alleging the sinister interventions of these Powers in its affairs, and issuing a Green Book in support of its policy. The Turkish Minister assumed charge of French and Japanese, the Swiss Consul of German interests. Cordial telegrams were

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721 exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at
645 best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the
722 Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

361 Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which
185 was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of
744 office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far
871 from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

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secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in Baghdad in 1941, the King Faysal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Hasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Hira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Committee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

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642 1943 and the draft law resulting from their efforts was passed by the deputies and Senate in May and June. Requiring, under the Constitution, ratification by a new Parliament, it was accordingly re-presented to and passed by the Chamber which after general elections—the first since 1939—met on 9 October. The amendment provided that, for the succession to the Throne in the absence of an heir apparent, a male heir presumptive from the family of the late King Husayn—in this case the Regent himself—should be nominated. The prerogative of the King was increased by empowering him to dismiss a Prime Minister, a provision the previous lack of which had led repeatedly to violent and illegal changes of Government. The number of Cabinet Ministers could be increased without limit, and could include a Deputy Premier and ministers without portfolio; but it could not be less than seven. Senators ceased to be limited to twenty, but were not to exceed a quarter of the deputies. Parliament was deprived of the power to pardon persons convicted of crimes against the State. Meetings of the Chamber could be held, if need be, outside the capital—a clear echo of the Regent's sojourn in Diwaniya and Baṣra in 1941. Finally, it provided that constitutional practices current in other countries, could, if not contrary to the Constitution, be adopted by resolution of both Chambers.

*645 The general election of mid-1943, which followed the dissolution of the Chamber in June, had been preceded by yet another reconstruction of the Cabinet. Ṣalih Jabr moved to Interior, Taḥsin al-'Askari to Works; the Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs, al-Uzri and al-Barrak, were unchanged; Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban came to Justice, vacated by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari. The able lawyer Naṣrat al-Farsi was appointed to Foreign Affairs, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Education, and Jalal Baban to Finance. Taḥsin 'Ali went to the Royal Diwan. But the reformed Cabinet was from the first uneasy; with the heat of summer, the frequent absences of the Prime Minister in Syria and Egypt, and a Palace attitude of little confidence, it could do little. It was further weakened in September by disagreements both among ministers themselves and between the Premier and the Regent as to the personnel of the new Parliament, in whose selection the executive was to play, as usual, a major part. The first week of October witnessed the resignation of Naṣrat, whose portfolio was assumed temporarily by al-'Askari: of Ṣalih Jabr, who was replaced by a competent Mutaṣarrif, Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab, nephew of 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab; and of Jalal Baban,
646 whose duties fell to 'Abd al-Ila Ḥafidh. The new Chamber contained sixty-five of the former deputies, some of doubtful quality but none notably Anglophobe; fifty-one of its members had in April 1941 voted, under whatever pressures, for the deposition of

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the Regent. The opening of Parliament and passage of the Constitutional Amendment was followed by the departure of the Prime Minister once again to Egypt, in pursuance of his now absorbed interest in the pursuit of Arab Unity.

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Late in October, just as news was reaching Baghdad of incipient trouble in the Barzan mountains (p. 324), the Regent (now also Crown Prince) left for Britain in response to an invitation from King George VI. He had been preceded there by Da'ud al-Ḥaydari as Minister, and was accompanied by Dr. Sinderson Pasha and a military staff. He was met by the Duke of Gloucester, stayed for two days at Buckingham Palace and later elsewhere in London before returning to Baghdad in mid-December by way of Lisbon. He both received and created an excellent impression.

At his capital he faced immediately the task of installing a Ministry more united and more competent. But his relations with Nuri Pasha were passing through an unusual phase of impatience or mistrust, and their conversations were uneasy. Ibrahim Kamal, whose abilities had been too little used, was unwilling or unable to accept the premiership, of which it was believed that he had the offer; and Nuri, who had resigned office, was after all invited to form another Cabinet, his eighth. Announcing it on Christmas Day 1943, he was supported for the first time by a Deputy Prime Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and by new ministers in the person of Mājid Muṣṭafā, an influential Kurdish ex-official, as Minister without portfolio for Kurdish affairs, and by Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba, a Shi'i judge. The other ministers were all, to the dismay of reformists, stalwart representatives of the long-established governing clique. They included two Shi'is besides Kubba—Salman Barrak at Economics and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Works—'Umar Nadhmi the Turkoman at Interior and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, Maḥmud Ṣubḥi al-Daftari, 'Ali Mumtaz, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Education respectively. Nuri's offer of the Cabinet post of Social Affairs to Kamil al-Chadirchi, and on his refusal to Muḥammad Ḥadid, was declined.

3. THE PACHACHI MINISTRY

The eighth Sa'idi Ministry was from the first an unhappy one. Its leader, never interested for long in domestic administration, was now exhausted by his many cares and frequently absented himself on visits to the Arab countries. His team included personalities doubtfully acceptable to the Regent, and Court circles led by Taḥsin 'Ali joined the opposition in a policy of pin-pricks. The appointment of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as deputy to Nuri Pasha was questioned, and he resigned in March 1944. Arab Unity, the visits of Arab statesmen from abroad, and the increasing threat of

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American-sponsored Zionism in Palestine, continued to rally all Cabinet personalities, and indeed all strata of opinion; but the dilemma of policy presented by the Kurdish question had the opposite effect, and the more liberal attitude of Nuri Sa'id—and his British advisers—found hot opposition elsewhere. Even the necessary and overdue creation of a Ministry of Supply (with which no senior minister could be found willing to be saddled) was criticized by the many who prospered on the lack of economic control. At the same time the personal strains and economic perplexities of the times doubled the normal difficulties of administration.

Amid these currents of uneasiness, which were manifest in growing criticism and angry scenes in Parliament, the policy of clemency towards internees was continued. More were released from 'Amara in February 1943; and the journalists among them immediately relieved their feelings by Nazi-praising press articles until threatened with rearrest. In the next two months more internees were set free, and a score of 'Iraqi exiles were escorted home from Southern Rhodesia. A number of these were sent for trial; and four months later sentence was passed on General Kamil Shabib of the Golden Square, of death by hanging: on the puppet Regent, the Sharif Sharaf, of three years' imprisonment: on the ex-ministers Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud and Musā Shahbandar, of five years each: on Ra'uf Baḥrani, of two years: and on 'Abd al-Qadir Gaylani, of three months to be followed by reinternment. The bulk of the released internees resumed their campaign of opposition to their country's policy and to the British connexion—and were in many cases reinstated unchastened in their old posts. The state of the Army, though perceptibly improved, was still far from satisfactory and offered a fair field for the reforming zeal of the incoming Inspector-General, Major-General Renton, who succeeded Bromilow in May 1944.

By the early summer of that year the position of Nuri's Ministry had become untenable. His appeals to the Regent for support unheeded, he resigned on 3 June. As his successor the Regent chose the elderly and half-invalid but respected Ḥamdi al-Pachachi. A Cabinet selected in detail (it was said) by the Amir himself and known thereafter as 'the Regent's Cabinet', retained two members of the last Sa'idi Cabinet, Aḥmad Mukhtar at Justice and Kubba at Social Affairs. Foreign Affairs and (temporarily) Supply were allotted to Arshad al-'Umari, an outstandingly successful Mayor of the Capital. Economics went to the Kurdish specialist, Colonel Tawfiq Wahbi, Defence to Taḥsin 'Ali from the Palace, Works to 'Abd al-Amir al-Uzri, an American-educated engineer who had been Director of Irrigation, Interior to Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Finance to Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and Education to Dr. Ibrahim 'Akif al-Alusi. The

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Cabinet thus contained two Shi'is and two Kurds, one real and one nominal. Nuri himself felt the need of rest and declined to join the Ministry; Ibrahim Kamal would accept nothing but the premiership. The Cabinet's announced programme included the purging of officialdom, the improvement of supply arrangements and of public security, the undertaking of new works—especially in northern 'Iraq—the development of the social services, and full support of Arab Union.

The early weeks of the Pachachi Ministry were unpromising. The Prime Minister was ailing, and at his best no administrator. Arshad al-'Umari sought, it seemed, to dominate his colleagues and to control appointments. Taḥsin 'Ali resisted, while his colleagues approved, a scheme of Army reform produced by Renton, involving a regrouping of the Army and its reduction in strength from four to three divisions. The Cabinet was from the outset divided in its Kurdish policy, with Taḥsin 'Ali and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari notably suspicious of the devolutionary concessions promised by Nuri Pasha and now supported by Arshad and the Prime Minister. In August, two months after its appointment, the dissensions of the Ministry compelled it to resign: but only to re-form immediately with personnel unchanged save by the omission of Taḥsin 'Ali. Acting charge of the Defence Ministry was given to Arshad until the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff, General Isma'il Namiq, to that post in December; and that of Supply to Ṣaliḥ Jabr, the Minister of Finance, until the Christian Director-General of Finance, Yusif Ghanima—himself a former Finance Minister, and latterly Director of Antiquities—accepted the unenvied post in September. Kubba was replaced at Social Affairs by a fellow Shi'i, the lawyer 'Abd al-Majid al-'Alawi, in December.

The Ministry thus revised was to remain in office for a further eighteen months, a long tenure by 'Iraqi standards. It survived the last year of the war and the first six months of peace; but distant armistices, though celebrated by public holidays and largesse to officials, little affected the course of politics or administration at home; the world war, when once the possibility of fighting in western Asia had receded, was by no means the chief factor in Baghdadi preoccupations.

The period, whose chief external interest is that of eager 'Iraqi participation in the movement towards Arab Unity and in that of post-war world organization, was at home one of nearly normal administration and of well-kept internal security. The only breach of this, the rebellion in Kurdistan, attracted little interest among the general public. The Pachachi Ministry encouraged a continuance of the already active municipal development. A Committee to consider post-war problems was set up, but, being

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composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemployment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active operations could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

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19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Ali, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplication of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when outlawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Ali in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

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668 eager for any ally who would help to overthrow a régime which seemed to bring them only poverty and hopelessness; and many who had acclaimed such an ally in Nazi Germany now looked instead to Soviet Russia. This Communism of the 'Iraq of 1944–5 had little intellectual background, although it attracted the intelligentsia, and showed scarcely a link with the doctrine, or even with the agents, of Moscow. It was organized by secret meetings, leaflets, the still untraced news-sheet of Comrade Fahad, and busy talkers among the railway and oil company workers. The application of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his friends in April 1944 for permission to form a People's Party was refused by Nuri Pasha; they addressed their protest significantly to the Russian Consul at
668 Kirmanshah. The opening of official 'Iraqi-Russian relations in
648* September of that year was as welcome to the local Communists and Reformists as it was alarming to the conservatives. M. Krikori Titovitch Zaitzev, an inoffensive personality, was appointed first Russian Minister in Baghdad in November, and came into residence early in 1945; the first 'Iraq Minister to Moscow, 'Abbas Mahdi, assumed his post late in that year. At the same period the Communist Party ventured with new confidence to address the Prime Minister—with copies to many authorities outside 'Iraq—demanding the 'abolition of all reactionary laws' and pardon for all imprisoned Communists and Kurdish rebels.

648* Emerging from the war undamaged and enriched, 'Iraq could look to play in international affairs a much more confident part than in the 'thirties, and would expect the treatment due to a State with all the appearance of present stability and hopeful promise. From the French its Foreign Ministry was estranged by 'the events' of Syria and the Lebanon; a mission from the French Committee of National Liberation was coldly received, and no French representative was now found in Baghdad. The United States, whose interest in future markets and civil airports was undisguised, still occupied but a small place in the 'Iraqi purview, and one for the moment discredited by the American attitude to Zionism. Nevertheless, their future part in Middle Eastern affairs was already foreshadowed, and the invitation of President Roosevelt to the Regent to visit America was welcomed. Delayed by the President's death, the Amir, accompanied by Nuri Pasha and Da'ud al-Haydari, and leaving his uncle the Amir Zayd as Regent, arrived in America in the midsummer of 1945 as the guest of President Truman. He toured the country, visited the Governor-General of Canada, and concluded a successful journey by visits to London, Paris, Rome, Istanbul, Ankara, and Beirut.

The nation's participation, as of right, in the important international conferences of the period tended to widen the views of at

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least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Naṣrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Ṣidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Aṣil, now Director of Antiquities, was present.

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was now exercising an influence on Government greater than any Palace influence since the death of Faysal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946.

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4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically, the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

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British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Basra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria. The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to reduced outputs of the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

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722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all
434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods.
457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot
647 of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent inter-territory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of M.E.S.C. 722 647

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939. The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then sixfold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier. 722 511 435 652 435

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Basra were highly prosperous throughout the war. 652

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded
496 hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 3 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Lynch fleet had been diminished in 1938 by the loss of the *Mejidieh*, sold to Anglo-Iranian, and in 1941 by that of the *Malamir* and the *al-Kadri*, burnt out and scrapped respectively. Their rivals, notably Ḥannā al-Shaykh and 'Abd al-Karim Khudhayri (Khedery), were more than holding their own: but the competition of the railway and the roads must grow rather than diminish. To the road system, indeed, Paiforce contributed much, notably in the completed trans-desert highway to Jordan, in the re-surfacing of many road stretches, and in the maintenance in being of 'Iraqi transport fleets by the provision of tyres. Nevertheless, the upkeep of civil motor vehicles in war-time proved most difficult, and the numbers in use decreased. The air communications of the territory were not improved during the war; but before its end projects for a national air line were under formation. The European services crossing and visiting 'Iraq recommenced in 1945 after war-time curtailments, and the Egyptian Misr Airways restarted its Cairo–Baghdad service. A contract was given in 1945 to the Marconi Company for the erection of a new wireless transmitting station.

The course of foreign trade was notably deflected from its usual channels by the war. In 1939 the United Kingdom was its principal customer, followed by the United States, each of these countries taking approximately one-third of the total visible exports; but by 1944 the principal buyer was Palestine with Transjordan, followed by Persia. Visible exports, amounting to ID 4 million before the war, reached through enhanced prices ID 9 million before its end. The transit trade, reduced in 1939 to a value of some ID 3 million, reached ID 13 million five years later, thanks to the passage of goods to Russia. Imports rose from a value of ID 9 million before the war to ID 14 million in its last year; the United Kingdom's share in these fell from 33 to 11 per cent., that of Japan from 18 per cent. to nothing, while India's share rose from 8 to 30 per cent., Syria's from 2 to 16, the United States' from 8 to 12.

The desire for industrial expansion, always a cherished ambition, was stimulated by the war-time shortages and an increased local market; contrary factors were the shortage of raw materials, competition for skilled workers, and the impossibility of importing factory equipment. Of the seventy enterprises benefiting in 1944 from the law of 1929 most were on the humblest scale, with the importance only of pilot projects which could indicate to the middle class the possibility of a career outside Government service, the professions, or politics. Some war-time progress was made in brick manufacture; workshops produced hand-tools from scrap metal; the crushing of oil-seeds—cotton, sesame, and linseed—

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

382 722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Sa'udi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Basra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shu'ayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at 'Ayn Zala or elsewhere, though at Basra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move of politicians in opposition.

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

5. KURDISH ALARMS

563 668 During the bad days of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Kurds did nothing to add to the anxieties of Government, though close observers were aware of the lack of loyalty, sometimes of scornful dislike, still felt towards Baghdad in the Kurdish mountains. Since nothing would induce them to forget their un-Arab distinctness and racial pride, the preservation of peaceful administration would depend, it seemed, on minimizing friction, on ensuring for the Kurds a maximum of sympathetic discrimination, and on the power to strike effectively at need. Nothing occurred to simplify dealing with this greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, and the near presence of a disturbing influence in north-west Persia was to prove an added embarrassment.

Shaykh Mahmud, whose foolish movement of defiance continued even after the restoration of the lawful Regent and constitutional government, had been allowed to live in one of his own villages. In Persian Kurdistan the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in that year led to collapse of the central authority; and the vacuum of power was soon filled by the self-appointment of Kurdish chiefs to local rule, with the enforced acquiescence of Teheran. Among many old unwanted trouble-makers who returned from exile was Ḥama Rashid Khan, an 'Iraqi by birth but now claiming dual nationality; he achieved a brief independence at Saqiz until 1942 when he was driven out, re-crossed to 'Iraq, and submitted to detention at Kirkuk. Approaches from Persian Kurdish leaders to the British Embassy in Baghdad for inclusion in a 'British Zone' were (as so often before) refused, to the bewilderment of the chieftains, who found incomprehensible the British support of Persian or 'Iraqi Governments; but after some months the endless squabbles among the Aghās enabled Persian troops to re-enter most of the towns, assert some sort of authority, and drive a number of leaders into 'Iraq. Mahabad (Ṣawj Bulaq) alone the Persians failed to enter, and it became the centre of an all-Kurdish enclave. A vigorous Kurdish society, the Jiyana Kurd or Kurdish Resurrection (called also simply the Komalla Kurd), was formed in Mahabad, and its publication, the *Nishtman* (Homeland) magazine, reached 'Iraq. Similar clubs were founded in the northern liwās, and the Kurdish intelligentsia had formed a Hewa (Hope) Society, later to be joined or superseded by a Rezgari (Rescue) Group, insistent on 'national rights' against all oppressors.

No overt trouble, however, arose for a time, and the Barzani leaders, Shaykh Aḥmad and his younger brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, who were living on allowances away from their homes, gave no offence until the midsummer of 1943. In that month Mullā

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Muṣṭafā, always unbalanced and now inflamed by new grievances at the cost of living, escaped from Sulaymaniya, regained Barzan, and raised a force to join that of a Turkish-Kurdish outlaw, Sa'id Birokhi. The latter was captured by a Turkish column, but the Mullā, waxing in strength, successfully attacked Government posts and carried out profitable raids. A message from Nuri Pasha, conveyed through the still detained Shaykh Aḥmad, urged him to surrender. He refused, flouted all authority, and tampered with the loyalty of Kurdish officers of the Army. A column of the latter, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, left Margasur to deal with the rebels, but poor leadership and many desertions led to ignominious failure, and a column of Indian troops occupied Diyana as a precaution against further loss. The Government, forced now to prefer negotiations to force, offered Mullā Muṣṭafā the chance to cross into Persia, or to live with the Pishdar; he declined both offers, again demanded 'Kurdish rights', and was warned by the British Ambassador (to whom as usual he appealed) that British support would be given not to him but to the Government he was offending.

A visit in January 1944 by the Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Mājid Muṣṭafā, was successful in restoring some sort of relations, and the Mullā was claimed in Baghdad communiqués to have 'submitted unconditionally to the Regent'. Thereafter, Mājid Muṣṭafā toured the Kurdish area, removed unpopular officials, arranged for a distribution of barley, and installed an able Kurdish General and graduate of the British Staff College, Baha al-Din Nuri, as Mutaṣarrif of Sulaymaniya.

But a policy of sympathy in the Kurdish liwās, supported generally by the Premier, was opposed by some of his colleagues; the undertakings given to the Mullā were likely to be lost in delays and evasions, and the Barzani leader in his frustration again demanded British intervention. The last ministerial tour of Nuri Pasha, in May 1944, was to Kurdistan, where threats of renewed trouble were now persistent and Kurdish-Arab feeling ran high in the Army. He proposed the establishment of an all-Kurdish liwā formed from the Kurdish qadhās of Mosul, and the appointment of officials to it by the Kurdish representative minister in the Cabinet; he added the offer of a Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, the improvement of social services in the north, the grant of agricultural loans, and reconsideration of the unpopular tobacco monopoly. But his Cabinet colleagues refused to support him, the plan for the liwā of Dohuk was unacceptable to the Regent, and the Sa'idi Ministry fell amid doubt and disunity. The anti-Kurdish feeling in much of the Baghdad political world had again prevailed: it was based, as ever, on the fear of separatism,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

563 668 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Tahsin 'Ali. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 669 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament, and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Minister of the Interior; and Barzan area was transferred from Mosul liwā to Arbil. But the restless ambition of the Barzani was incorrigible. Alleging British support—a fantastic fiction believed by many both in Barzan and in Baghdad—he harried the valleys far beyond his own area, seized Government stores at Margasur, and occupied police posts. Forced to act, the Army advanced in September in three columns towards his fastnesses, while the R.I.A.F. bombed his followers and properties. A police column advanced from 'Amadiya, and the Turks aided by closing their frontier. The Army column from 'Aqra was soon in trouble and its line of retreat threatened. It was rescued, and the position restored, only by the success of the Minister of Interior in raising, for ready money, irregular tribal forces under such of the Barzani's neighbours as welcomed the chance to pay off old scores and be subsidized for doing it. Mullā Muṣṭafā and his army, hard pressed from every side, crossed now 2,000 strong into Persia, there to find ready welcome and support. He could now drink deep of Russian-sponsored Kurdish nationalism in its active centre at Mahabad: could consult with the ambitious Qadhi Muhammad, leader of the movement, with open Russian support: and could concert plans with him and his Democratic Party for a Kurdish State astride the frontier, a State to be closely associated with the Adharbayjan Republic now similarly forming under the Russians at Tabriz. On 15 December 1945 a Kurdish People's Government was inaugurated at Mahabad by Qadhi Muhammad in the honoured presence of Mullā Muṣṭafā and Soviet officers. A week later Qadhi Muhammad was elected President, a Parliament was formed, and the Mullā with other supporting tribal leaders was promoted Field-Marshal and decked in full Russian uniform.

It was natural that Baghdad's request for the disarming and extradition of its rebel subjects should be unheeded. But at least the campaign was over and the enemy, by whatever means, dispersed; the Army could be thanked for its efforts and decorated by the Regent, while the Prime Minister himself toured the north. All efforts were made to re-establish administration and show goodwill by the early erection of schools, dispensaries, and police posts. A court martial was convened at Arbil for the trial of Barzani rebels, and summoned more than a hundred, including Mullā Muṣṭafā and Shaykh Aḥmad, to appear before it. The two brothers and thirty of their followers, including three Army officers, were condemned to death in absence, and seventy more to life imprisonment.

Though a period of peace followed, no part of the Kurdish problem had been solved. With their social structure, ideas of 'Government', and feudal leadership, any early prospect of a real national autonomy must be fanciful, unless total anarchy be

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 tolerated; but much, it seemed, could yet be gained in goodwill, and thereby in tranquillity, by a greater sympathy in Baghdad for Kurdish prejudices and their more innocuous demands. But the policy of the Cabinet seemed, on the contrary, to be one of assimilation and claimed obedience: the attitude of the C.U.P. to the Arab territories a generation earlier! The Kurds, reached now by waves of suitably adapted Communist-Nationalist propaganda from north-west Persia, and unhappy as ever in their subjection to an Arab Government, represented a profoundly unsatisfactory and even a menacing element in the national life.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE

648 The connexion between 'Iraq and Persia was, throughout the war, less one of peoples or of Governments than of military forces and communications common to both. For the vast Paiforce traffic of men and supplies, the Perso-'Iraqi frontier did not exist; the two territories formed a single unit for defence and for affording access to the Russian forces. Contact between the States and peoples was restricted by limited movement, communications almost monopolized by military needs, and diminished pilgrimages: only in north-eastern 'Iraq the Kurdish cross-frontier movements brought subjects of the two countries closely together. A futile gesture of revolution in Khuzistan in 1943, by a son of the deposed Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammara, was easily quelled and its author brought back to Basra. The Sa'dabad Pact, under which there had been talk of action early in the war, was in fact inoperative, though it formed an official bond not only with Persia but with Turkey.

'Iraq's connexions with the latter were, as ever, close in the social and considerable in the commercial fields, but slight in the political. Frontier dealings were friendly, neighbourly co-operation frequent. Both desired to maintain trans-frontier trade in spite of wagon shortage on the railway and the dearth of goods, and a Turkish commercial mission visited Baghdad in 1945. Arab displeasure at the loss of Alexandretta in 1938 lessened with time. The presence of the Amir Zayd, with a Turkish wife, as Minister at Ankara, and the frequent visits to that capital and to Istanbul of 'Iraqi personalities, made for good relations. The Regent, whose impending marriage to a daughter of President Inönü was a picturesque if absurd rumour of 1945, visited Turkey more than once.

But the heart of the political world was engaged far more with its Arab sister-States. Contacts with Transjordan were slight but cordial, with exchange of royal and ministerial visits and a link of British military traffic. Towards Sa'udi Arabia, feeling was cool; the ruling houses were mutually repugnant, the Sa'udi conception of Arab Unity was not the 'Iraqi, and the safe refuge of Rashid 'Ali

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

at Mecca was resented. With Egypt, equally visited by the Regent and his statesmen, there was common ground (with some rivalry for the leadership) in their ambition for Arab Unity; Egyptian experts and teachers were borrowed; a 'Bureau for Intellectual Co-operation' was established at Cairo and a branch of the Egyptian Ittihad al-'Arabi Society at Baghdad. Social relations were slight, sentiment tepid or critical.

The Arab Unity movement had before 1944 reached a stage where formal realization must be the proximate step. All the justifications for it were, in the judgement of its enthusiasts, more than ever forceful; the General Islamic Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem, the Bludan Conference of 1937, the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Cairo in 1938, the meeting of representative Arabs at the London Conference in 1939: all these were precedents for formal meetings of their statesmen, and practical work for an Arab Confederacy (or League, or State) to handle would not be lacking. In 1941 Anthony Eden, for Great Britain, expressed his country's general sympathy with any move towards closer association which Arab leaders themselves might make.

In Palestine the White Paper of 1939 was still the British policy and must have attracted general Arab support as soon as (or if ever) it showed signs of being resolutely carried out. But the first two years of the war, though the 'Arab Rebellion' was over and the Mufti a discredited exile, gave signs enough that the Palestine question was still unsolved and Arab fears justified. Jewish opposition to the White Paper was unabated, illegal immigration grew formidable, and Jewish terrorism increased. The attitude in Baghdad was until early 1942 one of nervous watchfulness, though Balfour Day was still the signal for anti-Zionist demonstrations. In the latter year news from New York of Jewish acclamation of their Biltmore Programme—one of a Jewish Commonwealth and Army, with unrestricted immigration—dismayed the Baghdad publicists, and led to consultations among Arab spokesmen on the renewed menace, of which the most sinister feature was the evident signs of support for Jewish claims in America and Europe; indications of this were given by Wendell Willkie in 1942, by Lloyd George in 1943, and by twice-repeated resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress favouring free immigration and a Jewish State. Arab protests against these resolutions, addressed to Washington and London, were met by vague reassurances by President Roosevelt, who affirmed, to the Regent among others, that any Palestine solution would be evolved only after 'consultation with both Arabs and Jews'. Visits by 'Iraqi statesmen to Jerusalem were frequent; the connexion of the Palestine question with a closer Arab Unity grew more obvious;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and the 'Iraq press spoke henceforward in a tone of alarmed anti-Zionism. Nervousness could not but increase among the thousands of Baghdadi Jews, to whom Zionism was distasteful and potentially ruinous. To fight the battles of Arab Palestine in the field of world opinion was the motive for the establishment in that year of the Arab Bureaux in London and Washington, to which the Government at the instance of Musā al-'Alami subscribed £100,000. In November 1945, the war over and some sort of solution now inescapably necessary, news arrived of the appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The views of the British Labour Party, now in power, were known to be hostile to the White Paper and substantially pro-Zionist; President Truman, in advance of all inquiry, was pressing the British to admit more Jews to Palestine; and the World Zionist Council in August had endorsed the extreme Biltmore demands. Little optimism could be felt in 'Iraq or elsewhere that the rights of the Palestine people, whose homes, country, and very lives were at stake, would be respected. A boycott in 'Iraq of all goods from Palestine was announced to take effect on 1 January 1946.

Events in Syria had evoked an interest scarcely less than those of Palestine; indeed, at every stage in Syrian history since the fall of its brief Sharifian monarchy 'Iraqi statesmen had shown warm fraternal feeling. The suppression of the Syrian Constitution before the outbreak of war, and of the Lebanese immediately after it, and the administration of both by nominated Governments, had been criticized in Baghdad. The collapse of French power in Europe was followed by the arrival of the Italian Armistice Commission in the Levant, and a period of uneasy waiting upon events with all political activities forbidden. The future of the Levant States was freely discussed in 'Iraq and Cairo, and Nuri Sa'id as Foreign Minister had visited their capitals in July 1940. Local disturbances in Syria led early in 1941 only to a change of administrators, and hopes based on the movement of Rashid 'Āli (whom a number of exiled or locally-employed Syrians in Baghdad had supported) were doomed to failure. But the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by British and Free French forces, beginning on 9 June 1941, was the occasion of a Declaration by General Catroux of the independence of the two Republics, and with this the British Government specifically associated itself. The declaration, with the use of the words 'an independent Sovereign State', was repeated late in September; but functionaries amenable to French wishes were meanwhile installed in power, and 'Iraq and other Arab Governments throughout 1942 withheld recognition until the reality of the promised new status should be assured by the establishment of free constitutional government.

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This took place in the late summer of 1943, and 'Iraqi recognition of the two States was marked by the appointment of their Consul-General Taḥsin Qadiri as Minister. Imperfect as was in fact the 'independence' enjoyed, its defects might have passed without protest but for 'the events' in Beirut on 11 November, when the French Delegate-General arrested the Lebanese President and his Cabinet, dissolved the Chamber, and suspended the Constitution. The press and politicians of Baghdad, sincerely dismayed, excelled themselves in telegraphic protests to Paris and London, and the storm died down only with the reversal of the Delegate-General's action and his recall. Exchanges of visits between Lebanese, Syrian, and 'Iraqi statesmen provided fresh chances for consultation not only on their own affairs, but more broadly on Arab Union; which at this stage 'Iraqis—and their pioneer in this field, Nuri Sa'id, in his Blue Book in 1943—conceived as a drawing together in some form, as a first and immediately realizable step, of the whole Fertile Crescent with the Jews as a semi-autonomous community within it. This conception, designed to solve the Palestine question as well as that of Arab Unity, was in fact later modified and indeed repudiated.

But others outside the Fertile Crescent were no less partisans of Union. The project of which Nuri had been the chief apostle, and to which Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, Jamil al-Madfa'i, and other leaders were hardly less devoted, had been accepted also by rich and populous Egypt in spite of her clear differences of culture, race, and history from the other Arab countries; and the Wafd leader, Muṣṭafā Naḥḥas Pasha, now Prime Minister, was after all to be the organizer of the first formal steps. He invited the Arab States to send delegates to Alexandria in the autumn of 1944. A General Conference met at the Antoniades Palace late in September, when delegates of seven independent Governments—Egypt, 'Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Sa'udi Arabia, and Yaman—were joined by Musā al-'Alami from Palestine. The 'Iraqi representatives were Ḥamdi al-Pachachi, Nuri Sa'id, and Arshad al-'Umari.

The Alexandria Protocol, which resulted from this meeting, visualized a League of Independent Arab States. The function of its Council, which was to meet periodically, would be to execute the agreements reached by States among themselves, to co-ordinate their policies, and in general to care for all common interests. The use of force as between members was forbidden. Dealings between member States and the outside world must not be contrary to the text or spirit of the League Constitution nor detrimental to any member. The Council would offer its mediation in disputes between members. Co-operation in economic and social problems was not forgotten, and commissions of experts in these fields

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648 would elaborate programmes of joint action. Full support for the Arabs of Palestine was pledged.

The Protocol, though destined to be superseded eight months later, was a significant document in its suggestion of a closer union subsequently, its insistence on common and equal policies—such as would preclude, for example, a special position for France in the Levant—and its treatment of Palestine as a responsibility of the whole Arab world. The text was favourably received in 'Iraq, and the Regent in his Speech from the Throne in December 1944 could acclaim a long step forward in Arab co-operation. The Preparatory Committee which had drafted the Protocol proceeded next to appoint a subcommittee to prepare a final Constitution. This body had completed its work by March 1946, and on the 22nd of that month representatives of all member Governments, who included Arshad al-'Umari, 'Ali Jawdat, and Tahsin al-'Askari for 'Iraq, signed the final Pact of the League, which was to come into force as soon as ratified by four States. It provided for a permanent headquarters at Cairo, a Secretary-General, a Presidency passing between the States-members in turn, a Council with equal representation for all to meet twice yearly or more often, and admission in the future for any independent Arab State in addition to the present signatories. Suitable provisions covered withdrawal from the League and 'consideration' by the Council of any State which failed in its obligations. Members were to respect each other's domestic systems and concerns, and any could, if they wished, reach closer bilateral agreements than those which bound members in general. The provisions of the Protocol regarding the objects of the League and abstention from the use of force were repeated; decisions, unless unanimous, would bind only those States which had accepted them, except in certain-named administrative matters. In the enforceability of Council decisions regarding the *inter se* disputes of members, the Pact was less binding than the Protocol; such decisions would be valid only if the State concerned had sought mediation, and only if its independence, sovereignty, and territory were not involved. The Protocol limitations on the foreign policies of States-members were omitted, as was the article which anticipated closer future union. Special Standing Committees were to be formed—with the possible co-operation of the other Arab countries—for economic and financial affairs, communications, nationality and extradition, social and cultural affairs, and public health. If the Pact in general represented a weakening of the mutual ties formulated in the Protocol, such a development was due to the hesitation of certain of the Governments, which 'Iraqi spokesmen did not share.

Nevertheless, the signature of the Pact, which the 'Iraq Parlia-

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ment ratified on 28 May, was an event of great importance to that country, the interest of whose statesmen in inter-Arab policy had long led the Arab world. The League in its present purely consultative form was far from the earlier proposal to integrate the Fertile Crescent, and from much of the enthusiastic, unrealistic thinking and propaganda of the inter-war period; but, being based on the independence of the various States, it thereby met most of the considerations (p. 228) adverse to a unitary or federated Arab State. At the same time its formulation of a political type of modern and reasonable pan-Arabism and its provision for joint consideration and action by the fraternal States, confronted the outside world with a new international phenomenon, and both gave a new inspiration to, and imposed new limitations on, the Foreign Offices of its members. The League, which during its first years was to be sorely tried and largely to fail, was nevertheless conceived with wise and realistic moderation, and could be capable, if shrewdly and opportunely used, of strengthening the hand of 'Iraq and the other States in their foreign dealings. The initiative of Egypt in the foundation of the League, its Cairo headquarters, and its Egyptian Secretary-General deprived 'Iraq of its position as the foremost champion of Arab Unity.

The events in Syria and the Lebanon, which had been considered in conference by the Hashimite rulers and statesmen at Shuna in February 1945, provided topics for the first meeting of the League Council. The position of deadlock reached in 1944 between the French claims to a 'special position' in the Levant and the local demand for the full independence already promised deteriorated in the spring of 1945; fighting occurred in May at points in Syria, Damascus was bombarded by French guns, and only a British intervention, bitterly resented by the French, prevented widespread disorder. The Council of the Arab League was urgently convened on 4 June, and later meetings, attended by the 'Iraqi Premier and colleagues, were held in July and November. The Secretary-General, 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Azzam, visited Baghdad in September. Feeling in 'Iraq was strong and sincere; the atmosphere in the Chamber of Deputies was one of passion, fiery telegrams were dispatched to all parts, and a 'Tribal Conference' was convened under a Sa'dun chairman. Though Government forbade disorderly demonstrations it is probable that only the decisive British action in Damascus on 30 May prevented an attempt at 'Iraqi armed intervention there, which would have had universal support. The year 1945 ended with the centring of attention on the Anglo-French Statement of Policy of 13 December, which provided for the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Levant Republics.

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END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

1. GATHERING STORM

645 THE resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of uneasiness while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 23 February 1946 to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Ṣaliḥ, a Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif hostile to Ṣaliḥ Jabr: 'Abd al-Wahhab Maḥmud, a Baṣra lawyer with a stormy political past: and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-Hadi al-Ḍhahir—a third Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

652 Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1946–7 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1945 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under [666] Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of liwās into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties combined to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Liwā Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

668 Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

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though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President.

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and permitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old cōterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the

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665 668 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlaḥ*, was similar but less stable in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648 Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

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'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions.

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies.

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities

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were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

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designed to obtain (by steps undecided and unspecified) Arab rights in Palestine and the French evacuation of Syria, the two States were feeling their way to a closer understanding in the political, cultural, and military fields. On the 'Greater Syria' plan of King 'Abdullah, which he urged with increasing openness after the War, 'Iraq's attitude was one of cautious avoidance of commitment, though individual statesmen in Baghdad were frank in their support. A visit by the King to Baghdad and Mosul late in 1946 advanced the cause of 'Iraq–Jordan solidarity, but not that of Greater Syria. 'Iraq meanwhile had taken its place at meetings at Cairo and at Bludan, and in the late summer of 1946 had dispatched its representatives to London for the would-be Round Table Conference on Palestine. Their attitude at it could not be in doubt; the general strike organized throughout 'Iraq on 2 November (Balfour Day) showed the continuing popular fervour against Zionism. A Legation was opened in the Yaman and wireless communication established between Baghdad and Ṣan'ā. The Government recognized the Indonesian Republic, had views on the disposal of ex-Italian North Africa, cordially supported an Egypt now in the throes of post-war negotiation with Britain, and was gratified by the election of a representative on the Trusteeship Council of United Nations. The Legation in London was raised to the status of an Embassy, to which the Amir Zayd was appointed. The British Ambassador at Baghdad announced his willing abandonment of his special right, under the 1930 Treaty, of precedence over other diplomats. The United States Legation became an Embassy.

An unexpected appeal repeated insistently during later 1946 reached Baghdad from the Arab tribes of Khuzistan. The low prestige of the Persian Government after the war in its outlying provinces, the conditions of near-anarchy produced by the Tudeh Party, and a resurgence of Arabism led the long-expatriated tribesmen of that Persian province to beg, in petitions addressed to Basra, Baghdad, and the Arab League, for the grant of 'Iraqi citizenship. An Arab State of Kuzistan was visualized, and the woes of these rightless Arabs became a theme of the parties in Baghdad; but no more was heard of the movement after the winter of 1946–7, and Perso-'Iraqi relations remained suspicious and irritable in spite of common interest in the menace of Communism and the safeguarding of peace in Kurdistan and on the frontiers.

The forces hostile to 'Umari had by mid-November gained a strength which compelled his resignation. The formation of a coalition Ministry to conduct the elections was entrusted on 21 November to Nuri Sa'id. He formed his Cabinet, dissolved Parliament, and prepared for elections under the new procedure

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with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and Muhammad Hadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education, resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, reformed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah Hafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi (reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence, Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal, Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā, the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British, notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against 'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats, the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

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in Government and notably by the Liberal Party under Sa'd Ṣalih: their programme was generally one of neutrality (or, as some said, friendship) towards Russia, armed intervention in Palestine, and comprehensive hostility to the British. The Prime Minister spoke of revision of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, help to local industry, a State-owned oil refinery, a National Bank, more and better education and a university, public works, greater administrative devolution, encouragement to trade unionism, and the firmest resistance to Communism. He could count upon the Regent's support and that of Nuri Sa'id, and could well hope thereby for a successful term of office.

But, politics apart, he was faced by serious difficulties. One of these was the deterioration of the administration, which little was done to restore. Another and more pressing was the worsening financial position. A budget submitted tardily for 1947–8 showed that the main revenues had since 1944 been far from keeping pace with increasing costs, and represented a proportion of the national wealth far smaller than before the war; many fixed dues and charges remained at their old levels, neither land-revenue nor customs receipts had moved upward proportionately to costs, and the social services had been allowed to develop since the war with more generosity than prudence. The year opened with but a small residue of the war-time surplus, and a clear deficit in the year's estimates. A galling shortage of hard currency was felt by merchants eager to import, and the year's harvest was so far below average that it was necessary to take thought for the import of grain; hoarding and unwise exporting had by the later months of 1947 led already to a serious deficiency of food stocks. The flotation of an internal loan of ID 1 million at 3 per cent., ostensibly for capital works, could serve only for current exigencies, and the issue of a second million at 3½ per cent., reluctantly subscribed in January 1948, did no more. The sensitive question of 'Iraqi sterling balances in Britain (which amounted currently to some £60 million) was settled after long consultations by an agreement of 13 August 1947 whereby a sum of £15 million, with further releases for special purposes, was to be made available in instalments between that date and July 1952. In November a supplementary agreement, replacing various interim arrangements, regulated Iraq's allowance of hard currencies, and permitted an expenditure in hard currency of £5,500,000 for the twelve months from June 1948.

The withdrawal of the last British troops in October, with large transfers of war material to the 'Iraq Army, left only the Shu'ayba and Ḥabbaniya garrisons authorized by the 1930 Treaty. But the Treaty itself was under heavy political fire throughout the year. Talks proceeded in the Embassy, Ministries, and the Palace, and

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the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Habbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

It was regrettable that Ṣaliḥ Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with
665 each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

648 During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

was judged satisfactory in Baghdad by the responsible elements which had already approved it, and by the Regent. The latter in an exchange of telegrams with King George VI held that the new Treaty was 'in the interests of both countries, and would consolidate their friendship'. The 'Iraqi delegation in Great Britain, passing a few days of holiday, felt no suspicion that their own countrymen would not accept an agreement which represented so obvious and advantageous an advance on the 1930 Treaty, and which seemed in no way calculated to offend national *amour propre*.

They were rapidly undeceived. The absence of the principal ministers from Baghdad, and their failure to explain and defend the new Treaty on or in advance of its publication, afforded a welcome opportunity for an attitude of emphatic 'patriotic' rejection to the parties and the town mob, who, directed by able organizers, had for weeks or months past been prepared for this event. The particular clauses of the new Treaty were little in question; nor was the upheaval more specifically anti-British than was necessary to afford a common rallying call, of proved efficacy, to diverse elements. If to some politicians and malcontents the continued British connexion and the presence even of British technicians was offensive, to far more the occasion was a suitable one to relieve their feelings of dismay at the now serious food shortage, the economic inequalities, an unpopular Prime Minister, an Administration with obvious shortcomings and much suspected corruption, and the resented exclusion from power of young politicians and publicists and of the old embittered adherents of Rashid 'Ali and his Generals.

The immediate reaction of the Baghdad public to the announcement of the Treaty was a three-day strike of Law and Engineering students, and the holding of demonstrations, impressive in their size and fervour, organized by the National Democratic, Independence, Liberal, and Communist Parties. Strikes were called in offices and workshops, and violent attacks made on the premises of British or suspected-British concerns, notably those of the *'Iraq Times*. Marches and countermarches, with ugly clashes with the police, filled the streets of the capital. Demonstrations, which early firmness might have controlled, were soon beyond discipline, the mob joined in with enthusiasm, and the communiqués of the Deputy Premier, Jamal Baban, and his now frightened ministers were unheeded. Police action in opening fire to restore a semblance of order was both unsuccessful and savagely resented. Not less than fifty persons were killed and between 100 and 200 injured, including many of the police. Mass movements which started on 16 January grew in scale on every succeeding day. The restoration of order must, it appeared, devolve on the Army, if on anyone; and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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it was found by ministers and perhaps by the Regent imprudent to invoke this force, whose attitude was incalculable and whose leadership was in parts rancorously Anglophobe. The morale of the police themselves, execrated by the mob and unsupported by their superiors, fell rapidly. In the provinces, farther from the inspirers of the trouble, the Mutaṣarrifs were usually able to control or at least to limit the organized street marches, and in most centres they preserved nearly normal conditions. In Sulaymaniya the demonstrators praised the Russians, detested all Arabs, abused the British, chased an English teacher from the town, and burnt the British Institute.

The Regent, against whom as a reputed Treaty advocate a part of the disorder was aimed—and indeed talk of a Republic was not lacking—convened a Crown Council on 21 January and, after five hours of discussion, felt the necessity of reversing his attitude and disclaiming the Treaty. He issued at its conclusion a statement that the Treaty was found to be unsatisfactory: that it did not 'realize the national aspirations of 'Iraq or consolidate the friendship between the two countries': and that he would ratify nothing that failed to secure for the country all its objectives. Notwithstanding this volte-face, the demonstrations continued unabated, with decreased police control and clear signs of the disintegration or disappearance of a part of the force. Public funerals attended by thousands were given to students who had fallen. The return of the Prime Minister to Baghdad, still convinced that all was the work of a few agitators and a misled public, availed nothing; his personal safety was with difficulty assured by a roof-top garrison at his private house. The press and crowd raged against him unchecked by police rifle-fire or by the arrest of Communist firebrands; and his public statement, still confident in tone, fell on deaf ears. The street riots and marches reached a climax on 27 January, with many deaths and injuries; a crowd demanded at the palace the resignation, or even the death, of the Prime Minister. Ṣalih Jabr was compelled to yield. He resigned office and fled for his life to his tribal home country on the Euphrates, and thence later to Jordan and to England. A hundred thousand people attended the funerals of 'the Martyrs' and the party spokesmen demanded the final abrogation of the Treaty. The days following showed little improvement in public order. Mass meetings in the streets continued and dominated the town with patriotic banners, threats of death to their enemies, the cry for free lands for all, and destruction to foreigners. Parties from the provinces, among them Kurds demanding the release of Barzani leaders, joined the crowds in the capital; business and social life were completely disrupted and the police largely disappeared from the streets. Throughout

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

these proceedings there was no hope of freedom for the expression, much less for the acceptance, of the opinions of the many who believed the Portsmouth Treaty to be a realistic and beneficent measure, of great advantage to the State.

On the disappearance of Ṣalih Jabr the task of forming a Government was entrusted to the 66-year-old Shi'i nationalist, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. Ignoring the claims of all save one of the party chiefs who had created the present troubles, he surrounded himself with tried statesmen of former Cabinets. With three Shi'i ministers—Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba at Supply, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Finance, and Riḍhā al-Shabibi at Education—he secured the services of Madfa'i (for a short time) at Interior, Arshad al-'Umari at Defence, Ḥamdi al-Pachachi (a sick man who died three months later) at Foreign Affairs, Muṣṭafā al-'Umari at Economics, 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice, Najib al-Rawi and Jalal Baban at Social Affairs and Works. Naṣrat al-Farsi, Mawlud al-Mukhliṣ, Ḥikmat Sulayman, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh had been expected to be members; the first-named with Da'ud al-Ḥaydari and for a few weeks the Amir of the Rabi'a, Muḥammad al-Sayhud, became ministers without portfolio. The team was strong in experience and personalities but, though supported by most of the parties, it lacked both cohesion and any policy save mere appeasement. After an early Cabinet meeting it announced that the Treaty would not be ratified; it was 'not a fit instrument for strengthening the ties with Great Britain'; but another Treaty might perhaps be considered. Parliament was prorogued for fifty days, and on 25 February the Chamber, pronounced unrepresentative and illegally elected, was dissolved and new elections were ordered. Sir Henry Mack succeeded Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird as British Ambassador in the same month.

The period during which the rolls of voters were completed and primary elections carried out was disturbed and unhappy, with erratic Government intervention which reflected individual ministers' predilections but no plan. The parties, unsure of success, already protested at 'Government interference', and two of them announced a boycott. Ministers vied with each other in disclaiming any part in opposing the rioters' violence during 'the revolution' on 20 January and appointed a committee to inquire into police action. Student parades and outcries continued, to the wearied disgust of quiet-loving citizens. Meetings, flag-wavings, and rifle-shooting in Sulaymaniya and other centres led again to violent clashes and disorder. The British Consulate at Kirkuk was attacked. The announcement that the British Military Mission was (in fact, at its own suggestion) to be withdrawn in May was hailed as a national triumph. The Anglo-Jordan Treaty on 29 March was another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital. The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence, was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Haydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

721 But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately
648 conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrangements inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣalih Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

deputies and Senate in November that 'unified military and political plans for the redemption of Palestine' should be adopted; the idea was already unrealistic before the end of the year. Units in Palestine and Jordan were visited repeatedly by the Regent, who did more than the ministers of his bewildered and irresolute Government to inspire such national effort as was possible. The nominal and absentee 'Government of all Palestine' announced by the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin—an irritant certain to envenom inter-Arab relations—was recognized by 'Iraq to please the Egyptians.

3. *PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . .*

The general elections were carried out four days after the first truce in Palestine had become effective, and when Parliament met on 21 June the resignation of Muḥammad al-Ṣadr's Ministry was offered and accepted; it had possessed little authority, had failed to restore order save by imposing martial law, had neglected current administration, had allowed an alarming financial deterioration, and now bequeathed a disheartening legacy at home and abroad.

The Regent's choice of a successor fell unexpectedly upon a statesman formerly prominent but, through long residence in Europe, now in imperfect touch with current politics: Muzaḥim al-Pachachi. He claimed to be of no party and selected a Cabinet of long-familiar figures; Muṣṭafā al-'Umari was to serve at Interior, 'Ali Mumtaz at Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba at Justice, Baṣṣam at Defence, Jalal Baban at Works and Social Affairs, Rawi at Education, and a single newcomer, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a young Ḥilla landowner, at Economics. 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, a Beirut-educated Kurdish deputy from Ruwanduz, who had been interned in 1941, relieved Jalal Baban in Social Affairs in August. These ministers, whose appointment showed once more the small part played by party affiliations in the making of Ministries, were with changes to remain in office for half a year, and could achieve something but not much towards redressing 'Iraq's present misfortunes of penury, insecurity, and foreign entanglement.

The finances of the State went from bad to worse. No budget for 1948–9 was submitted until the end of the financial year; normal revenues fell off through bad trade, another bad harvest, tax evasion, and feeble administration; and a certain deficit on the year's work could not prevent the allotment to the Army of nearly 40 per cent. of available funds, and a substantial contribution for the care of the Palestine refugees. Oil royalties were halved by the stoppage of the Haifa pipeline, which, whatever the resulting losses to the Treasury, no Cabinet would dare to reopen in spite of approaches made by the British, French, and American Governments

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 and by the Company itself; the Ministry and the parties, on the contrary, launched a demand for higher royalties on such oil as was still exported, and negotiations with the 'Iraq Petroleum Company on this and other issues[1] were begun. A loan from Egypt was discussed and a visit received from Ḥafiḍh 'Afifi Pasha; another internal loan was proposed but not issued; and late in the year experts of the International Bank, to whom application for a Development Loan had been made, were welcomed in Baghdad. An extended scarce currency agreement concluded with the British Government in July 1948 allotted $25 million for a twelve-month period. An import licensing system, intended to relieve the highly adverse trade balance and exchange position, was imposed in the autumn. With all this, the Treasury remained empty, was subjected to abnormal demands by the Army, and, without hope of paying its debts, faced the further necessity to import and distribute grain. Reductions in officialdom, a partial standstill in public works, royalty advances from the I.P.C., were expedients which barely maintained its solvency. The stronger remedies proposed by 'Ali Mumtaz were not supported by his colleagues, and he resigned. The depression and general indigence led to food riots in Baghdad, Baṣra, Kirkuk, Arbil, and Khaniqin, and to strikes which included one among the oil workers and another among railwaymen. The contribution of these conditions to the political restlessness of 1948–9 was considerable.

648* Meanwhile a large part of the Army remained in Palestine and Jordan. To restart active operations was altogether impracticable; but to recall the forces would have clashed dangerously with the emotional patriotism of the students who, having suffered no inconvenience from the war, pressed by demonstrations for further fighting and especially for help to the still-engaged Egyptian Army. The Palestine position was indeed the greatest of Muzahim's problems, and not least by its exposure of the sad disunity of the League in its first severe trial; the Arab States' varying attitudes to the war and the truce, to armistice proposals, to a unified military command, to the Mufti's absurd 'Government of all Palestine' and to Jordan's administration of eastern Palestine, showed how little of unity save its bare façade had survived. Nor did unanimity exist even at home; the pro-Mufti and pro-Hashimite groups could not agree; realists and visionaries saw the whole Palestine issue with different eyes; the problem of the refugees, indifferent to some, cried aloud to others; the Kurds, and not they

[1] The other demands were for the payment of royalties, expressed in 'shillings (gold)', at the free-market conversion rate of gold as opposed to the Bank of England rate (p. 211): 'Iraqi participation in the enterprise: and the allotment of more and higher posts in it to 'Iraqis.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Mutaṣarrifs protested to the Minister of Interior at the military reign of terror in their liwās and forced the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam. The arrest of the Chief Rabbi and the conviction and hanging of a rich Jewish merchant, Shafiq Adis—but not of his Muslim associates—was disapproved by much of the public. The press was allowed full freedom to attack the British as having created all the troubles of Palestine as well as of 'Iraq: to call the oil companies truculently to account: and to assail with rage the well-reasoned pamphlet which Nuri Sa'id issued, on his return home at midsummer, in justification of the Portsmouth Treaty.

The reinstatement of the Treaty supporters was, indeed, a feature of these months; Ṣaliḥ Jabr was welcomed back to Baghdad in July, Nuri could re-enter politics in the same summer, Shakir al-Wadi succeeded Baṣṣam as Minister of Defence in October, Jamali was sent as Minister to Cairo, and all were once again candidates for high office by the end of the year. Party activity was limited by the abnormal conditions, and the National Democrat and the Liberal Parties, both handicapped by shortage of funds, complained of undue restriction and ceased active operation in December. The Independence Party remained vigorous. A series of Cabinet changes was made in October, after months in which portfolios passed from hand to hand among acting ministers. Shakir al-Wadi came to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Interior, and 'Ali Jawdat from Washington to Foreign Affairs. Muḥammad al-Sayhud, Amir al-Rabi'a, rejoined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, and Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, who while under medical treatment in London gave up his post at Interior but remained in the Cabinet, resigned a month later. 'Ali Mumtaz, resigning from Finance in November, was replaced after an interval by the experienced Director-General of Customs, Khalil Isma'il, and 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan on becoming President of the Chamber was succeeded at Economics by 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, the Minister of Social Affairs. Najib al-Rawi, Minister of Education and 'Iraqi representative at Lake Success, returned home. The Speech from the Throne on 1 December, when Parliament met, was politically colourless.

The Pachachi Ministry, clearly unable to master its manifold problems, survived the last weeks of 1948 only by the support of the Portsmouth Treaty-makers, Nuri Sa'id and Ṣaliḥ Jabr. Muzaḥim's favour of Egypt as the strongest Arab Power and his favourable response to interventionist demonstrations on 30 and 31 December clashed with Army views—indeed, with those of every realist—and created an impasse from which a change of Government was the only outlet. He resigned office on 6 January 1949.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca, 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Dhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣalih Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣalih Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg - G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid
661 the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

648 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

reopening of the Haifa pipeline; but this to 'Iraqi ministers (whatever their own views as expressed in private) was a political impossibility, and the loan was withheld. The dinar followed the pound sterling in its devaluation. The National Bank of 'Iraq opened its doors on 1 July 1949 and assumed charge of the note issue from the Currency Board which, now disappearing, had given 'Iraq good service for twenty years.

Successful extraction of 'Iraq from its costly, dangerous, and ineffective position in Palestine was by now urgently necessary, and the bellicose enthusiasm of the last days of the Pachachi Ministry gave no lead towards a reasonable policy. Militarily, the war was lost and over; politically, the need was to save for the Palestine Arabs as much as possible from an Israel now firmly established and possibly expansionist. Nuri Pasha was prepared to accept Partition in the form proposed in November 1947, but not as modified by later Jewish conquests. He postulated an Arab Jerusalem, a disarmed Israel, an internationalized Haifa, and the repatriation of the refugees. These terms were unobtainable; and a visit by Madfa'i to Arab capitals to secure unity in demanding them revealed disunity instead, and could not prevent one Arab State after another signing separate armistices with Israel and going their separate ways. By March the Prime Minister saw the position as hopeless; by April the removal of 'Iraqi troops had begun, by July it was complete, and the reabsorption of the army into 'Iraq and its distribution to peace-time stations was carried out without mishap. It was thereafter 'Iraqi policy to shun the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, and to hope for an internationally imposed settlement more tolerable than the present. The nation stood alone with Jordan in demanding an all-Arab Jerusalem but joined other States in November in their approach to Washington to compel Israel to carry out the 1947 territorial arrangements which the Lausanne protocol of May 1949 confirmed.

With Palestine lost and its lessons partly learned, and Greater Syria—the *bête noire* of Egypt, Sa'udi Arabia, and two-thirds of Syria itself—now a dead issue save in the tenacious mind of King 'Abdullah, 'Iraqi thoughts turned again to the unity of the Fertile Crescent, or at least of 'Iraq with neighbouring Syria. A memorable booklet, *The Warning of Palestine*, published by Musā al-'Alami, and popular enthusiasm for the young Faysal II when he passed through Syria in 1948, had brought the old project again into prominence. The coup d'état of Colonel Ḥusni Za'im in Damascus on 30 March removed a chief opponent of the plan, President Shukri Quwatli, and Za'im's need of support might lead him, it was thought, to welcome a fraternal 'Iraq. But a rapid visit by Nuri Pasha to Damascus produced only a strong mutual antipathy;

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the new and unbalanced dictator turned violently against his eastern neighbour, looked successfully for support in Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia, and propagated false stories of 'Iraqi troop concentrations. A second Syrian coup, which substituted Colonel Hinawi for Za'im, permitted further and friendlier contacts, and revealed a fair body of support in Syria for a Syro-'Iraqi rapprochement in some form. But it advanced no further; Great Britain and America did not desire at this time that the risks of a major constitutional change should be run, and refused either to approve or disapprove; and Egypt as a counter-move proposed an 'Arab Collective Security Pact' alleged to be preferable, in Syrian and every interest, to a mere bilateral unity. 'Iraq, whose devotion to its favoured project seemed to exceed that of Syria, resented the Egyptian intervention; a peace-making visit of delegates to Cairo effected nothing; and the League cleavage into two groups, one the Hashimite and one the Syro-Egyptian-Arabian, became by mid-1949 more conspicuous. The controversy among members, indeed, after Jordan's absorption of eastern Palestine in April seemed likely to precipitate a crisis. Whispers were heard of 'Iraq's as well as Jordan's retirement from the League, and pointed criticism of its Egyptian Secretary-General, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, were expressed in Baghdad.

A State visit by the Regent to Teheran in June 1949 could effect no permanent improvement in relations with Persia, though a treaty of mutual assistance and good relations was signed on the 23rd of that month and the respective Legations were raised to the rank of Embassies. Steps were taken later in the year to set up the awaited Frontier Commission, but a suddenly announced Persian decision to expel all resident 'Iraqis (largely Jewish) led to a crisis in March 1950. In spite of suggestions made in 1947, and some body of present favourable opinion, no steps were taken to revive the Sa'dabad Pact. A Pakistani Minister had arrived in Baghdad late in 1948, and a treaty of friendship between the two countries was ratified early in 1950. The Turkish attitude of toleration to Israel, her general detachment from the squabbles of the Arab States, and her support of Husni Za'im who antagonized and insulted 'Iraq, diminished for a period the 'Iraqi public's cordiality towards Turkey; but the change of Government at Ankara early in 1950 aroused great interest in Baghdad.

The fall of the Sa'idi Ministry was foreshadowed by the early autumn of 1949, when ministerial differences on Arab inter-statal affairs, financial embarrassment, and still more the restlessness and fatigue of the Prime Minister himself and his preoccupation with his new party, pointed to an impending change. When Parliament met on 1 December the Regent's consultations with possible suc-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

cessors as premier had already gone far but indecisively; as usual a broad Government of co-operation or coalition was desired, but could not be formed. On 12 December the offered resignation of Nuri Sa'id was at last accepted and an Irada appointed 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi to succeed him—without, as ever, any visible regard to parties, policies, or the deputies.

The Ayubi Ministry now formed contained Muzahim al-Pachachi as Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, a sure sign that the Egyptian school of thought would temporarily prevail. An experienced minister 'Umar Nadhmi was brought to Interior and to act in Defence, 'Ali Mumtaz to Finance, and Najib al-Rawi to Education. 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dhahir came to Economics, the Kurd 'Ali Haydar Sulayman to Works, and newcomers, Sa'd 'Umar, a young Shi'i lawyer from Karbalā, and Husayn Jamil to Justice and Social Affairs. 'Ali al-Sharqi, an elderly Shi'i senator, became minister without portfolio. The Cabinet, whose members were by majority opposed to the policies of Nuri Sa'id, depended nevertheless on the votes of his Constitutional Union Party which dominated the Chamber; and it could not but be short lived. By putting an end without mishap to martial law throughout 'Iraq it succeeded where others had failed, but for the rest it upheld and announced no policy, and invited severe criticism by adjourning the Chamber for forty-five days. When Pachachi had visited Egypt and there agreeed to abstain for a term of years from all plans for union with Syria, the Ministry found itself deeply divided and resigned office; the Foreign Minister and his leader had completely misjudged their own colleagues' opinion, and Muzahim's policy was rejected no less by the council of elder statesmen whom the Regent convened on his return.

Before Nuri Sa'id returned from his health cruise in Gulf waters the Cabinet had given place, in the first week of February 1950, to a successor Ministry under Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, who himself retained the post of Foreign Affairs. His Cabinet represented mainly the followings of Nuri Sa'id and Salih Jabr, and included the latter as Minister of Interior. Strong in appearance, the Ministry was after seven months of office to prove disappointing in achievement. It used the services of the Kurdish savant, Tawfiq Wahbi, Shakir al-Wadi, and Dhiya' Ja'far at Social Affairs, Defence, and Economics respectively, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Sa'd 'Umar at Education, the able London-educated 'Abd al-Karim al-Uzri (brother of 'Abd al-Amir) at Finance, and Hasan Sami Tatar, a Kirkuk lawyer, at Justice; the last-named, not a deputy, retired in August under the six months rule, and was succeeded by Jamil al-Urfali, a lawyer and economist. Three ministers held office without portfolio: Hazim Shamdin Aghā,

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a Kurdish deputy from Zakho with long parliamentary experience: Jamil al-Urfali and Khalil Kunna, an internee of 1941 days but now related by marriage with Nuri Sa'id.

The Suwaydi policy was announced as one of Arab fraternity, closer relations with other eastern Powers, internal and legal reform, and industrial and economic development. In fact the year 1950 was one of marked material improvement; the financial year 1949–50, itself better than its predecessor, had ended with a smaller deficit and during 1950 the Treasury began to refill. Considerable economies were made in the costs of administration, elsewhere than in the social services. New taxation and Customs revenue began to be productive, and by the end of the year the Minister of Finance could announce that the bad times were over; and in fact the financial year 1950–1 was to end, thanks to increased oil royalties, with comfortable balances in both current and capital works budgets. The loss, nevertheless, of Jewish skill and enterprise in the field of trade and banking, and the new and onerous obligations under the Banking Law of January 1950, proved economically a handicap. More import licences could not at present be allowed and stocks in the country remained short. Prices of imports, including food, rose with the outbreak of the Korean war. The harvest of 1950 was good in spite of disastrous floods and a phenomenal hurricane at Baṣra in May; the value of exports nearly doubled as compared with 1949, and greatly increased oil revenues were now in imminent prospect (p. 365). A new hard currency agreement was made with Great Britain in August 1950, and negotiations reopened shortly afterwards for its prolongation or amendment. A substantial loan in dollars was granted by the International Bank in July towards the Tharthar scheme (p. 370) and another by London in sterling for railway works already in progress.

The Suwaydi and its successor the eleventh Sa'idi Ministries found the Arab inter-statal position no less baffling than before. In addition to the normal clashes of interest and sentiment between the nations, special features of embarrassment were present in the fact of Israeli establishment and consolidation, the disposal of eastern Palestine, the usurpation of power in Syria (where a third coup d'état early in 1950 removed Colonel Hinawi to install Colonel Shishakli), and in the strained relations between Egypt and Great Britain arising from their unfruitful negotiations. No decisive steps were taken towards union with Syria in 1950, though the Syrian Prime Minister visited Baghdad during the year; the 'Iraqi attitude was one of 'We are ready, whenever you are. . . .!' The prime cause of the country's uneasy position in the League was her support of Jordan, with whose ruler further visits were

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exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available. Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4; 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

eminent; and many who reached Palestine bitterly regretted their change of home.

An episode in the Chamber on 7 March, early in the Suwaydi Ministry's life, led to the resignation—in despair, they said, of fair parliamentary treatment—of the whole body of deputies opposed to Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party who in fact maintained the Ministry in power and dominated the Chamber. The gesture was regrettable as ending all pretence of government on party lines; but the sympathy accorded to the retiring members did not survive their own squabbles and evident lack of common purpose, and the elections held early in June to fill their places produced amenable members. No considerable Opposition elements remained thereafter in the Chamber, before which stretched a life of two or three more years. But within the Cabinet a tripartite balance of power was uneasily maintained between the Prime Minister, the supporters of Nuri Pasha (himself absent), and those of Ṣaliḥ Jabr; between the latter two statesmen the old cordiality was fast disappearing, and Ṣaliḥ Jabr's share in building the party itself was little remembered. The Prime Minister was by midsummer maintaining himself with difficulty; favourite projects of his own, such as a new press law, were frustrated by his colleagues. The absence of the Regent and of Nuri in London precluded a change of Ministry until the autumn, but on 12 September Suwaydi was forced to resign.

Four days later the formation of an eleventh Sa'idi Ministry was proclaimed. Even in the process of its establishment Nuri found something of Suwaydi's difficulty in reconciling personalities each in itself valuable; he could not use simultaneously both Tawfiq and Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and preferred for the moment to be content with a skeleton Cabinet which he proposed to strengthen and broaden as opportunity might offer into a real Ministry of National Union intended, as he announced, for urgent economic and administrative work. As it was, he kept the post of Interior in his own hands, combined Defence and Foreign Affairs under Shakir al-Wadi, Works and Finance under 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, and gave the Ministries of Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Economics respectively to Ḥasan Sami Tatar, Khalil Kunna, Mājid Muṣṭafā, and Ḍhiya' Ja'far. But it became early apparent that the breach with the followers of Ṣaliḥ Jabr was widening; and the latter, in whom many observers recognized Nuri's ultimate successor, founded early in 1951 his own Socialist Party of the Nation, a group generally conservative (in spite of its singularly ill-chosen name) and, while largely personal to Ṣaliḥ, relying also on organized Shi'ism and seeking Kurdish support. The Iṣlaḥ Party of Sami Shawkat merged itself in the new group. At the same time

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 665 opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Riḍhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Ḍhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

643 King Faysal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

652 There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

assessment and collection of the main customary sources of revenue —Customs and Excise, taxation on natural commodities, the tobacco monopoly, income and property taxes—were continued with the full use of improved records, techniques, and expert advice: it was probable that, even apart from the expected oil revenues, the position of the Treasury need not again cause anxiety. From this should follow the liquidation of Government debts and loans, the better housing and payment of the Administration itself, and the possibility of a gratifying expansion of the social services.

The estimates for 1950–1 allotted, out of a total ordinary expenditure of ID 24 million, 30 per cent. to the Army and R.I.A.F., 16 per cent. to education, 13 to general administration purposes, 11 to the Police, 8 to health services, and 22 in all to other departments and functions. Capital works expenditure in that year was to amount to just under ID 4 million.

Receipts from the territory's greatest single source of wealth, its oil deposits and the industry developing them, had since their first appearance normally been allotted to capital development. This rule, partly broken in lean times, was reinforced by the structure of the Development Board set up in 1950 under a law which called for the diversion to it of all revenues from oil.[1] These receipts, amounting to less than ID 4 million in 1949 and little more than 6 million in 1950, would, it was already clear, be more than doubled, more than quadrupled, in future years (p. 376). The division of the State estimates into an ordinary and a capital-works budget ceased with the establishment of the Development Board.

The Board, disliked by some 'Iraqis as an irremovable Government-within-Government, seemed to others and to most foreign observers to offer hopes of a continuity, efficiency, and freedom from political considerations which had scarcely existed before.[2] It consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the time, and six non-official salaried members to be named by Royal Irada and to hold office for five years. Three of these were to be expert in Finance, Irrigation, and another (unspecified) field and, in defiance of anti-foreign prejudice, a British Secretary-General and Finance expert, Sir E. Miller, and an American irrigation engineer were recruited. The Board, in which Arshad al-'Umari seemed likely to be the leading figure, was in

[1] This was modified in 1952 by amending legislation which provided for the Board's retention of 70 per cent. of oil revenues and the allotment of 30 per cent. to 'general revenues': an arrangement which wisely permitted the devolution to provincial authorities of many smaller development works and services.

[2] The Board, however, was soon under attack by part of the press, irresponsible and malicious as ever, for having failed in a few weeks to 'raise the standard of life of the masses'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

439 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

1t Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 439
'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the 453
exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the 436
National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and 241
was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. [162]
Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi 185
farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices, throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist. Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers and exporters.

Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected, tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield, quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world: caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many centres. The department was in touch with local industry which could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley, beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself in rural education and established agricultural schools in every liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323) was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

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Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Isḥaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

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Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Habbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Dhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Habbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Hammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Habbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Udhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Udhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

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those to whom mere shaykhly birth or recent business enterprise had brought title-deeds was obvious and envied. There was indeed room for criticism on various lines. The Government had parted with its right of free disposal of wide lands hitherto legally unencumbered though in fact occupied; this might obstruct later development plans. Vested interests had been over-generously recognized: land reform on an equalitarian pattern was, as the left wing of Baghdad politicians (and some foreign observers) insisted, as far off as ever. Nevertheless, within the limits of society and economics as they were, a great work of stabilization had been done. Disputes were few, confidence had been increased, and a return to the pre-settlement conditions of agrarian jungle law was unthinkable. For both the small and the large holding, for peasant-proprietorship, the capitalist's scientific farm, the Land Development Company and large-scale Government enterprise on its own vast unencumbered estates, there was clearly room in the 'Iraq of the future.

Though the limits within which industry was likely to develop were by the mid-century well understood, not least by the Director-General and the Committee for Industrial Research, there had been a measure of expansion during the last five years. The legal basis for its encouragement, which was the policy of every successive Ministry, had been altered by the cancellation of the 1929 law and of licences issued under it in favour of a new law of 1950. The latter granted important privileges to undertakings which were power-operated, employed 90 per cent. or more of local workers, cost at least ID 5,000 to erect, and used more than half 'Iraqi capital. By 1951 thirty-five projects had been accepted as fulfilling these conditions, and the Industrial Bank made loans to a number of them. Of the industrial output of such enterprises some was on the humblest scale and of slight interest; such was the production of sweets, macaroni, date-treacle, articles made in Kurdish marble, ceramics, wax matches, buttons, reprocessed glass, unglazed tiles, and aluminium pots. Manufactures on a less inconsiderable scale were those of flour, vegetable oils, cardboard and wrapping paper (made from wheat and rice stalks), soap, knitted goods, sausages and preserved meat, methylated spirits, 'araq, concrete pipes, plastics, steel windows, and tubular furniture. An earlier brewery having failed, a modern brewery using local barley began the production of excellent beer in 1949. An ambitious enterprise for the manufacture of jute gunny-bags was in course of establishment. Brickworks had continued to develop on modern lines, and were capable of meeting all local needs. 'Iraqi cigarettes had gone far to supply the country's smokers, from modernized as well as hand-operated workshops; only Kurdish-grown tobacco was used.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Association, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Tuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 the promise or certainty that still greater developments were closely at hand. The project of a Government-built refinery, revived in 1945, was by the end of 1950 near to fulfilment with plans completed and funds available. The Khaniqin Oil Company's oilfield and small refinery, at Naftkhana and Khaniqin, were still in use on the restricted scale suited to the supply of products to northern and central 'Iraq; distribution of these throughout the country by the Rafidain Company showed no new feature until in 1951 supplies from Abadan ceased to arrive at Baṣra, and others from the north had, with difficulty and cost, to be improvised. The development work of the Mosul Petroleum Company—former B.O.D. reborn as a twin brother of the Iraq Petroleum Company—on the Upper Tigris right bank was pursued from 1947 onwards by the drilling of further wells at 'Ayn Zala and its neighbourhood, but revealed only a field of moderate dimensions and uncertain performance: it had not yet led—but under the B.O.D. concession must shortly lead—to commercial production. A pipeline from 'Ayn Zala to the I.P.C. pump station K.2 near Bayji was in 1950–1 under construction with a view to the export of M.P.C. oil thereby. In the Baṣra area, on the other hand, the B.P.C. had eagerly resumed its exploration after the war; after geophysical operations it started drilling at Nahr 'Umar and Zubayr with immediate success, and concentrated its exploitation upon the latter site, which was situated twelve miles south-west of Baṣra. Further wells were drilled, field installations erected, a pipeline to Fao laid in 1950, and the export of oil, at an initial rate of 2 million tons a year, became possible in the last days of 1951. The Zubayr oilfield, which might well be reinforced by others in the same province, would take its place as a valuable part of 'Iraq's resources.

The operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company itself after the war were still more impressive. The later war years witnessed no more than limited production under restricted war-time conditions and the resumption after 1943 of export to the Mediterranean was on the pre-war level barely exceeding 4 million tons a year. After the armistice, with the gradual removal of restrictions on supplies and man-power, the Company could effectively revive its 1938 project for multiplying its pipeline through-put, and in 1946 it began construction of a 16-inch pipeline[1] parallel to the existing 12-inch line from Kirkuk to Haifa, and another a few months later to Tripoli. The former, complete by early 1948 save for the section through Palestine, was perforce left unfinished in the conditions of war and future uncertainty which followed the establishment of the State of Israel in May of that year, and, with the 12-inch line, could not be operated; the cost to the 'Iraq Government was a loss

[1] The largest-diameter pipe then obtainable from sterling sources.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding loss of royalty revenue. On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1]

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. The needs of the labour force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. The industry brought also substantial indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

651 648 471 Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and substantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

considered project; and meanwhile, Fao bar-dredging operations, designed to maintain a low-water depth of 23 feet in a substantially widened Rooka channel, proceeded throughout 1943 to 1950. But heavy floods and consequent silt movement caused serious difficulties and, the existing channel proving barely maintainable, the project of a new channel re-aligned in terms of the changed sea-bed conditions was in 1951 under close consideration. To its realization—the more necessary since 'Iraq's own oil traffic from the Zubayr field was likely to increase many-fold—the loss of the rich Abadan tanker revenue was a serious impediment;[1] but in general the future of the vital Fao channel, and indeed that of the Port in general, was under wise and far-sighted review.

The tonnage of steamers using the Port was more than half—and in some years more than two-thirds—British, with Dutch, American, Greek, Swedish, and Norwegian shipping well represented. The establishment of an all-'Iraqi Shipping Company continued to be an object of ambition among the interested and the nationally-minded, as a means of undercutting the freight rates charged by foreign lines. The post of Port Director was assumed, after two short tenures, in 1947 by Colonel G. T. Johnson, and in 1951 by R. C. Kelt. Accelerated steps were taken from 1948 onwards for the training, largely in Europe, of 'Iraqis for all posts in the administration, including the highest: an 'Iraqi Port Director was a probability of the near future.

Though transport by the 'Iraq waterways had as ever its irreplaceable part both in the lives of the riverain towns and as a main Baṣra–Baghdad artery, available traffic did not permit—as for a generation it had not permitted, save in war-time—any considerable development of the Tigris steamships. Military transport ceasing with the war, and competition by road and rail and air ever increasing, the Euphrates and Tigris Company in 1946 disposed of most of its surviving fleet, including the *Zenobia*; and early in 1951 it went into voluntary liquidation and sold the bulk of its towing-units and barges to its principal local competitor, Ḥannā al-Shaykh. The latter and members of the Khudḥayri family remained active on the river to fill the place which, after ninety years, was now abandoned as unprofitable by the Lynch enterprise.

The 'Iraq Railways, which had embarked in 1945 (p. 320) on important projects of construction, were faced also by a heavy programme of needed rehabilitation, improvement of services, and addition to rolling-stock. The five following years saw the com-

[1] The action of the Persian Government in bringing its oil industry to a standstill involved, besides its own ruin, a loss of at least £1 million a year to the finances of Baṣra Port and its dredging scheme.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

pletion of the Kirkuk–Arbil extension and its Lesser Zab bridge: of the railway and road bridge[1] at Baghdad, opened late in 1950: of the Musayib bridge leading to Karbalā: and of new stations at Ba'quba, Diwaniya, Naṣiriya and elsewhere. New rolling stock was ordered and by 1950 delivered. Progress was made in erecting a grandiose combined station and administrative headquarters at Baghdad West, and in redesigning the yards and depots there; but the high cost of these projects, the diminution of receipts by road and air competition (in spite of good traffic in grain and oilfield materials), and losses due to repeated river flooding rapidly exhausted the war-time surplus and led to the need to borrow first from Government in 1946, then from London—a loan of £3 million —in 1950, before supplies and contractors could be paid and work could proceed. Working conditions in the railway system were disturbed by the strikes elsewhere mentioned in 1945, 1946, and 1949. The Jewish employees of the traffic branch were replaced in 1949 by imported Pakistani staff, and the training of 'Iraqis to replace these and the few remaining British executives was accelerated. The status and composition of the Railway Board was unchanged, though criticized by the press as outdated and insufficiently 'national'. The post of Director-General was passed by H. C. Smith to W. J. Moffat in 1950, and an 'Iraqi, General Isma'il Ṣafwat, assumed the post in 1952.

'Iraq Airways was initiated by the Railway as a subordinate enterprise in 1945, and started service in 1946 with five light aircraft hired from Great Britain. In the following year the hired aircraft were replaced by its own machines, and it extended its range from Baghdad–Basra outwards to Mosul, Cairo, and Damascus, and by 1948 could, thanks to reciprocal agreements, offer transport weekly or monthly to Teheran, Karachi, and Ankara. The service, to which British Overseas Airways Corporation acted as technical advisers and agents, was efficiently maintained but, thanks to competition and high costs, financially unprofitable. British, American, Dutch, French and other foreign airlines continued to use 'Iraqi airports. An expenditure of over ID 2 million on aerodromes formed part of the six-year development plan. The meteorological service, begun in 1936 in a single room, now maintained under the Ministry of Defence a dozen stations and many rainfall-observation posts, used its own wireless links, and broadcast weather reports for Baghdad area half-hourly.

Telecommunications had, by the close of the period, reached a high standard. Trunk land-lines had been overhauled, often duplicated and widely extended; automatic telephone exchanges

[1] The bridges were built by Messrs. Holloway Bros.; earthwork on the Kirkuk–Arbil line was handled by Messrs. Balfour Beatty.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

existed in Baṣra and Baghdad and their suburbs; and the telephone and telegraph had become familiar or indispensable to all classes save the most backward. The new wireless transmitting station completed in 1951 at Abu Ghurayb, with the most modern design and range, secured communication with Europe and America and was used for the national broadcasting. The Development Board planned an expenditure of ID 2 million on telecommunications between 1951 and 1956.

Progress in road improvement was delayed during 1946–50 by the financial narrowness of the post-war years. This and bridge-building formed an important part of the projects[1] intended for realization in 1951–6 through the Development Board. The completion of this programme would fundamentally transform the conditions of transport and travel in 'Iraq, with far-reaching economic consequences. The 'Nairn route' to Damascus was still in regular use; its traffic was highly organized, with air-conditioned vehicles, by the original company and its imitators. The Rawanduz road was little used; the tracks leading into Najd and Persia carried no important traffic; and the trunk route to Jordan or Palestine (p. 321) lost its value when the State of Israel blocked the sea-outlet it had offered.

5. TOWN AND COUNTRY, MID-CENTURY

The population of 'Iraq, declared by the census of 1947 to be 4,800,000, had by then doubled since the century opened. Its distribution[2] was in general unchanged as between towns, inlying villages, tribal country districts, and nomads; about a quarter were town-dwellers, a fifteenth nomads, the remainder settled cultivators. Wide areas of steppe desert and of barren mountain remained, as for the foreseeable future they must, almost uninhabited; the widest of such regions, those of the administratively separated northern and southern provinces of the Shamiya desert, amounted to some two-fifths of 'Iraq's whole surface. The average density of population for the whole territory was of the order of eleven persons to the square kilometre, or, omitting the desert provinces, eighteen. The liwā with the greatest population was that of Baghdad with 800,000 people; next came Diwaniya, Muntafiq, and 'Amara. The greatest density was of 49 persons to the square

[1] The projects considered as 'main roads', with their bridges, were estimated to cost: Baṣra–'Amara–Kut–Baghdad, ID 2,800,000: Baghdad–Kirkuk–Arbil, 2,500,000: Baghdad–Sharqat, 3,450,00. Elsewhere, ID 4,450,000 was allotted for 'mountain roads', 6,176,000 for miscellaneous bridges, 1,550,000 for a Ḥilla–Najf road, 1,300,000 for Ḥilla–Diwaniya–Shamiya, and 5,250,000 for numerous other routes.

[2] For distribution of the population by administrative units, see Appendix B.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial—within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

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563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 692 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 697 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Hamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

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619 511 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty 619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions 178 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first 511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards [177] security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

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old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State.

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

[1] The mausoleum of King Faysal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class professional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Salah al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Hajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

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antiquities, Kurdish lore and tribal traditions, some of whom had produced monographs of interest and value. Returning graduates from foreign universities had reached, at the least, the standard indicated by their doctorates, but few had been attracted by the deeper or more humane culture of the West. The study of Islamic dogma and history was still practised in both Sunni and Shi'i circles of the professional divines, and still attracted pupils; but its seeming divorce from the living world repelled the more active and vital of the rising generation; it offered a career less interesting than the professions or politics; and its appeal was without force to a society in which Islam seemed to have lost much (and in politics nearly all) of its hold. Professional standards, on the other hand, in medicine, archaeology, police and military studies, engineering, economics, and the applied sciences had risen beyond comparison above those of a generation earlier, and gave scope for the best qualities of the 'Iraqi mind.

The output of original literary work was small. The modern (linotype) presses installed since the Second World War produced mainly governmental or institutional works or pamphlets, largely educational. Western publishing methods were not in use; books were printed at the author's expense and sold with difficulty through a bookseller; workmanship in book production, especially in binding and illustration, was notably poor. The lack of demand (especially after the Jewish exodus), the unwillingness of the rich to patronize letters, and at times a capricious censorship, had discouraged writers; there were but humble traces of creative effort, and these confined to the fields of poetry (in which 'Iraq had always held its own in the Arab world) and to a lesser extent of fiction writing; women writers had earned a place in both. Interest in contemporary Arabic literature other than newspapers was slight, and the study of earlier Arabic works, though regarded as something of a national asset, did not greatly attract a younger generation, who preferred the writings of modern Europe. The dozen of monthly or quarterly magazines, which appeared at Ḥilla, Mosul, Baṣra, Najf, Arbil, and Kirkuk as well as at Baghdad, were in most cases the organs of various societies or government departments, and though competently written they had few subscribers and no great literary pretension. Kurdish literary activity, though on a diminutive scale, was of vitality and promise. 'Iraqi artists, on the other hand, were producing work of some interest, if almost wholly Western in inspiration; musical and dramatic studies were pursued at the Institute of Fine Arts, and more than one 'Iraqi musician—and at least one 'Iraqi cinema actress—had attained a creditable place.

The circumstances of its public life and the lively intelligence of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

its educated class should have made the 'Iraqi press both high in quality and great in influence. It was, in fact, superabundant in quantity, with dozens of ephemeral sheets appearing and vanishing, and it was written not infrequently with point and humour; but journalism had on the whole, it seemed, failed to attract the best minds and brains of the country, and as a profession was ill regarded by the public. With rare exceptions[1] inconsistency was habitual, and the selection and presentation of news capricious and unskilful and lacking in Western—or even Egyptian or Lebanese—technique. A news-service was scarcely attempted, and mere political rhetoric and the wearisome use of outworn phrases took the place of fact, analysis, or sober comment. Broadcasting from Radio Baghdad, which after 1951 used the new and fully modern transmitting station of Abu Ghurayb, offered daily a ten-hour Arabic, a three-hour Kurdish, and a one-hour or half-hour English programme. The service, though still uneven, had improved materially in recent years in editing and in reliable audibility. It was aided by some of the best among 'Iraqi writers, and was rich in its Arabic musical programme; but frequent administrative changes had affected its quality and continuity, and many listeners preferred to hear foreign stations, notably London, Paris, and the *Sharq al-adnā* station of Cyprus.

The educational system operating in 1950 represented, with whatever shortcomings, the considerable outcome of a sustained and meritorious effort. An immense work lay ahead: but the period of slow and difficult beginnings lay behind, and ground was being yearly gained. The faults of 'Iraqi education were those of superficiality, impatience, indifferent standards, and the persistent infusion—unchecked by legal prohibitions—of 'politics' in the schools. Its virtues were those of genuine enthusiasm, the use of modern techniques, and much improved teaching and supervisory staffs. Many and better school buildings were, it was hoped, soon to follow. Instruction was free at all levels, the governing Regulations modernized, and primary education in theory compulsory. The High Council of Instruction, representative of all the higher institutions of learning, assisted the Minister and his Directors-

[1] The best of the papers were two or three independents, notably *al-Zaman* and *al-Sha'b* and those associated with the political parties. The latter were the moderate *al-Ittihad al-Dasturi*, *al-Akhbar*, and the evening *al-Ḥawadith* of the Constitutional Union Party: *al-Umma* and *al-Nabd*, of the Socialist Party of the Nation; *Liwā al-Istiqlal*, of the Independence Party: the near-Communist *Ṣadā al-Ahali*, of the National Democratic Party: and the *Jabha al-Sha'biya*, of the Popular Front. These papers appeared in 1951 to be fairly stable and self-supporting and, being party organs, relatively immune from Government suppression. Provincial daily papers included three (and often more) each at Baṣra and Mosul, and others at Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, in the languages there spoken; they attained a fair standard.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

871 General in policy and co-ordination. Female education had secured equal rights with male; of 6,000 primary teachers in the Government schools, nearly a third were women, and a similar proportion among the secondary and higher teachers. Between government and private (including foreign) schools of all grades not less than 200,000 children were being educated, a figure annually and rapidly increasing. A small remnant only of the Jewish schools remained in existence; that of the Alliance Israélite had been closed. The Tafayyudh Society, founded in 1919 as a popular non-political educational body, continued its work to combat illiteracy and maintained its printing-press. Students still enjoyed important exemptions and privileges in their military service obligation.

874 Vocational schools covered technical instruction, domestic science, agriculture, public health, and police duties. The teachers' training facilities had been increased in 1949 by additional training classes instituted at a number of existing secondary schools, and standards had been raised. The university, in spite of repeated

873 expert recommendations, was still an unrealized project; but higher education was available at the Law School, the Engineering College founded in 1942 and broadened in 1951, the Royal College of Medicine with its associated schools of Pharmacy and Nursing, the College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences founded in 1949, the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and Economics founded in 1951, the Royal Military Academy and Royal Staff College, and the Higher Police Training School. Considerable numbers of pupils attended European or American universities; these would increase with the greater funds which were soon to become available and with the development of oil company programmes of technical and scientific training. Public libraries existed at every liwā headquarters.

172 The department of Antiquities had continued to develop its admirably enriched Museum (which it was soon to exchange for more adequate premises), to deal with the learned world, and to conduct or supervise the excavation of ancient sites. In the period from 1946–50 expeditions from the department were active at Tall Abu Shahrayn, near Ur: on the lower Diyalā: in the Arbil plain: in the neighbourhood of Chamchamal and of Sulaymaniya: and at Ḥadhr near Sharqat. Expeditions from American seats of learning—Chicago, Pennsylvania, Harvard—dug at sites in the district of Kirkuk, in those of Chamchamal and Baradost in Kurdistan, and near 'Afak on the middle Euphrates, and a mission of the British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq excavated for three seasons at Nimrud. The work of these scholars of whatever nationality drew, with great goodwill, the attention of the academic world to 'Iraq's archaeological wealth and present fortunes. Both

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the American School of Oriental Research founded in 1923 and the British School founded in 1929 maintained headquarters in Baghdad, and both published the results of their researches.

In the field of Public Health the Government services had achieved much, but not the impossible. They had faced an immense field to cover and to conquer, had started from nothing, and had been always restricted by lack of funds and trained officials; and meanwhile, inevitably, the disease- or weakness-producing factors in the territory, and the apathy and conservatism of its people, continued. The problem of general malnutrition and resulting lack of physical vigour was, in fact, the problem of poverty: the cure, still distant, lay as much or more in increased wealth as in increased enlightenment; and the same was true, in spite of active and multiplying maternity and child-welfare clinics, of an infant death-rate still tragically high. Little, save increasingly comprehensive and practical study, had yet been done to combat the curse of hookworm, malaria, or bilharzia; a comprehensive effort against these diseases and against tuberculosis, eye-disease, and the typhoid group must call insistently for more time, more funds, and more specialized staff. Steps taken against epidemic disease had been successful; plague and cholera had scarcely appeared for a quarter-century, and smallpox was well handled with full modern resources. Urban sanitation had been improved, sewage schemes adopted, and sanitary inspector training developed; but conditions in this respect over most of the territory remained wholly primitive, and the majority of 'Iraqi doctors were little interested in public health administration. The country at large was served by some eighty hospitals, of which three-quarters were general and a quarter specialized for fevers, mental and venereal diseases, leprosy (at 'Amara), children's and chest and eye diseases; a quarter of the whole were in Baghdad. Non-governmental hospitals were those of the oil companies, foreign missions, and the minority communities. The Jewish Mir Elias Hospital was still open, for patients of all creeds; all other Jewish hospitals and dispensaries had been closed. The Railways, the Port, the Police, and the Army maintained their separate Medical services. The supply of doctors, thanks to the Royal Medical College, had much improved since the thirties, but some reliance on foreigners was still necessary; some thirty of these were so employed in 1951 and recruitment of more was in progress. Registered practitioners in all numbered some 300 in 1945, 420 in 1949. The reluctance of 'Iraqi doctors to serve in the remoter regions—or, indeed, elsewhere than in Baghdad—was still an embarrassment. Nevertheless, the busy and valued hospitals and dispensaries maintained in all parts of 'Iraq were playing a major stabilizing as well as a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

743 humanitarian part, and high hopes for the future could reasonably be formed.

6. THE STATE

000 The closing pages of this work will be given to a review of 'Iraq's relations in the mid-twentieth century to its neighbours and to the world at large, and to the structure of its public life.

643 The record of the League of Arab States had by 1950 been written in terms sadly reminiscent of other Leagues based on international concord: like the League of Nations and the United Nations organization itself, it had shown the extreme difficulty of co-ordinating national differences and asperities. Previous pages have described both the general factors unhelpful to Arab Unity, and the particular issues which since 1945 had led to cleavages; nor was the situation at the close of our period hopeful of the recovery of a consistent united front between the Arab States. If generous single gestures could still be made—the dispatch, for instance, of 'Iraqi forces to Damascus in the spring of 1951—and pacts of collective defence could be drafted, the pressure of national loyalties and interests and persistent antipathies must preclude, in the foreseeable future, anything more than occasional co-operation and the preservation of some façade of unity. The Powers, especially Great Britain, were currently accused by some of desiring complete or regional Arab Unity, by others of working to destroy it; either attitude was somehow a manifestation of imperialism. In fact, nations of the West seemed generally favourable to League solidarity in so far as it could promise to produce cohesion and stability in western Asia; but they were otherwise willing, or indeed forced, to leave the issue in the hands of the concerned nations. 'Iraq's leading part in inter-League politics and her lively interest in *'Aruba*, Arabism, wherever involved, were likely to be permanent features of her foreign policy, at the risk of distracting her rulers from domestic interests and demands far more important to the 'Iraqi masses.

In relations with Persia there was no reason to expect any change in the actual attitude prevailing on either side of the Perso-'Iraqi frontier; it would doubtless continue for many years to be one of bickering, even of antipathy, but also of the recognition of a broad common interest. Nor need relations with the Turkish Republic deteriorate in the absence of any particular clash of interests such as might, indeed, come into existence through tension caused by frontier troubles, or by interference with upper Euphrates or upper Tigris waters, or by a differing international alignment; the attitude of 'Iraq was in 1950 one of guarded amity, least cordial among those pan-Arabists who feared the diversionary effect of non-Arab friendships.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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The Middle East apart, the country had taken its place as a nation of the world,[1] and could not escape the responsibilities or dangers of such membership. Its attitude to the Soviet Union, behind a façade of correct diplomatic exchanges, was in fact determined by its rigorous attitude to local Communism, of which the Soviet Legation could not but be reckoned a main supporter. That Russia was powerful, expansionist, and a near neighbour was not unknown to the politicians, nor that Communism would be fatal to law and order as they conceived it, and to private property; but vigorous local anti-Communism did not prevent a substantial part of the political world from advocating strict neutrality as between Eastern and Western blocs. Indeed, an avowed pro-Western policy was not without its odium. The Palestine tragedy had seriously (and not surprisingly) lowered the respect in which the statesmanship, and even the honour, of the West was held by Arab peoples. The West included Great Britain, and to some political 'Iraqis rancour against that country was the mainspring of their policy, even while others, perhaps the more sober and experienced, felt that their country would be safest with powerful and familiar though regrettably imperfect friends. It included France, not forgiven for her twenty years of illiberal rule (as it was felt to be) in Syria, her surrender of Alexandretta and her alleged colonialism in North Africa. It included the United States, outstandingly the pro-Zionist Power and one who by her present commitments in the oil development of the Arab world could no longer claim as of old to be disinterested. It was natural that by reaction from a West thus constituted and thus suspected of 'imperialist' ambitions, many 'Iraqis were prepared to belittle the world dangers of the time, to assume that blameless neutrality would bring security in a third world war, and to shake their heads over offers of joint Defence Pacts with the Western bloc. Others, going further, found attraction in a specifically Eastern orientation; they took seriously the value of Arab League military unity, found inspiration in Islamic Economic Conferences at Karachi and Teheran, or wished

[1] 'Iraq in 1951 maintained Embassies at London, Washington, and Teheran: Legations at Delhi, Karachi, Paris, Brussels, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, 'Amman, Cairo, Rome, Kabul, Moscow, and Jidda: Consulates-General at Bombay, New York, and Istanbul: Consulates at Khorramshahr, Kirmanshah, and Aleppo.

Foreign Embassies in Baghdad were the British, United States, and Persian: Legations, the Afghan, Sa'udi Arabian, Egyptian, Spanish, French, Italian, Lebanese, and Russian. A Belgian and a Greek Minister accredited to 'Iraq were resident at Beirut, and 'National' Chinese, Danish, Swedish, and Czech Ministers at Teheran.

Outside Baghdad, British and Persian Consulates-General were maintained at Başra: a Persian Consulate-General at Sulaymania: British Consulates or Vice-Consulates at 'Amara, Kirkuk, and Mosul: French, Pakistani, and Sa'udi at Başra, and Turkish at Mosul.

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to join with Pakistan and the Sa'dabad Powers in an Eastern bloc securely Islamic and free from all Western exigencies and 'imperialism'. It could not but seem clear to contemporary observers that 'Iraqi thinking on these matters lacked realism, and that in its bewildered hesitations, its willing involvement of foreign policy with domestic factions, its patent inability to stand alone against the dangers of the time, it was typical of small nations who cried indignantly for a 'complete independence' which, in the modern world, could exist only on most precarious sufferance, unless firmly allied to the defending power of stronger friends.

In internal administration, whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more than a partial control never at one time operative over the whole country, and the 'Iraq Government in its earlier years could claim a wider but still not truly pervasive authority, in 1950 no surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh or mountain. From Mudir to minister, from clerk to Director-General, the administration as an operating and governing machine could by that date face comparison with that of any comparable country, and might be thought superior to those of many longer-established nations. The period from 1930 to 1950 had done less than might have been feared to weaken or corrupt it, and had been survived with a lowering of standards which though considerable was not disastrous. If it had benefited from its three years of British rule and twelve more of discreet tutelage, yet it derived its merits primarily from the qualities of its own personnel: qualities which, common as it was for visitors and many 'Iraqis to deride them, were most appreciated by those who knew them best. The faults endemic in all bureaucracies, the relative newness of the machine, the discontinuity of its guiding Ministries, the paucity of experienced high executives, and occasional moral lapses: all these together failed to outweigh the good intentions, the intelligence and the honesty of the majority of civil servants. And the machine itself, the interrelation and subdivision of its parts, the control of departments and their relation to the district Governors, and of the latter to their Ministries and publics: all these had, after a mere thirty years, reached a state of tolerable efficiency adapted, as the Turkish régime never was, to the conditions of the territory.

With 'Iraq's remarkable natural advantages and resources, coming at last within sight of full development: with its benevolent and generally popular monarchy vested in an ancient royal house and its not inadequate governmental machine: and with the efforts of its society to evolve on modern lines by manifold borrowing from Western thought and method as well as technology, there was, indeed, a fair measure of hope for a stable as well as a pros-

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perous future. To those who contrasted the space, life, wealth, and potentiality of the country with the misfortunes of some of its neighbours—the stark economic misery of Israel, the tragic self-destruction of Persia, the brief dictatorships of Syria, the corrupting wealth and now failing ruler of Sa'udi Arabia, the menace of over-population and the mob-brutality of Egypt—it seemed indeed that 'Iraq, its troubles in part surmounted, was well set in the way of security and advance. It could by an optimistic prophet be foreseen that, given a few years of tranquillity, a measure of harmony, and no unforeseen blows of fortune—in fact 'if all went well', as an earlier Treaty had stipulated—the nation would take without rival the lead among the Arab countries, and a respectable place in the wider international world.

But there was an alternative and less pleasing probability. It was, that the instability of which the last twenty years had given almost continuous illustration, might not after all be surmounted, but would continue to pervade the structure of 'Iraqi nationhood and prove the ruin of its people. In an age when Government can be seized and held by a dominant armed minority, it is the more necessary for a 'democratic' régime to base itself firmly upon a loyal and politically integrated public. In 'Iraq this had not been done: the merits of its Administration, and even the good intentions of much of its ruling and political class, could not, it was felt by the less hopeful observers, secure it from pervasive instability.

The phenomena of political life which seemed likely for many years to come to preclude the hope of a genuine democracy, have been elsewhere mentioned (p. 224) as prevailing in 1932; they prevailed scarcely less in 1950. The deputies were inadequately representative of the electorate, while the Ministry itself could and did ignore the deputies. The Cabinet, whose members were chosen by the Prime Minister and the Regent on lines of personal acceptability, was indeed normally a body of capable and eminent men; but it represented neither a parliamentary majority nor a stable body of principles, and the forty-seven Ministries for which the first thirty years of constitutional life had found room had fallen always by reason of internal quarrels, deadlock, or royal disfavour, never through organized public or parliamentary withdrawal of support. This was not parliamentary democracy, but Cabinet Government. The Chamber of Deputies was itself a body competent in debate, and full of experienced and intelligent members[1] but it was concerned to excess with factious controversy and, as regarded the majority of 'independent' deputies, was accustomed to conform to the wishes of the Government of the

[1] All Jewish deputies and senators had resigned by 1950: a Governmental Committee was early in 1952 considering their future representation, if any.

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642 day. It did not regard itself as the battleground of rival policies, nor, as under the Constitution it should be, as the arbiter of Ministries which, on the contrary, enjoyed an almost independent existence. At the same time by their manner of two-stage Government-controlled election, and by the wide gulf between most of the deputies and their constituents, the activity of the former was almost independent of the electorate: a position reflecting not so much defects in the Constitution as the backwardness of an illiterate electorate capable neither of exercising an enlightened free choice in selecting its spokesmen, nor of controlling them when selected. And even should the political parties occupy the Mutaṣarrif's place as the effective selectors of deputies, and electoral processes be basically altered (as opposition parties ceased not to demand), this situation in its essentials must still subsist for many years.

665 The working of parliamentary democracy which had been imposed on 'Iraq in its political infancy has seemed everywhere to demand responsible parties to represent rival policies and therewith to contend for power. But these in 'Iraq, in a form adequate to their task, did not exist. These pages have indeed made many references to the parties which, after some years' intermission, came into existence in 1946 or thereafter. They were, by 1951, responsible for the greatest part of specifically political activity in the country, and their scale and perhaps their permanence had to some degree increased by comparison with their predecessors of a generation earlier. The parties active at the mid-century, if we ignore the illegal Communist Party still working in the shadows, were five in number. One[1] of these, a party in little more than name, seemed to stand less for a policy or principle than for the personalities and hopes of a miscellaneous group of ex-ministers not unwilling to reappear in office. Two[2] of the parties, appealing to the more progressive elements in urban educated or intelligentsia circles, advocated rapid advance along many lines, with emphasis as ever on complete independence, neutrality, and social and cultural reform; they had a militant and indeed an over-violent press, and were able at times to arouse, but not to control, the emotion of the mob; but they had no considerable support from the mass of citizens. The two remaining parties were those of Nuri Sa'id (p. 355) and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr (p. 363), both standing for a mixed and various body of the possessing and substantially satisfied classes including notables, landowners, shaykhs, and their respec-

[1] The United Popular Front of Ṭaha al-Hashimi (pp. 364 and 389). It showed, late in 1951, signs of disintegration.

[2] The National Democratic Party of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the Independence Party of Muḥammad Mahdi Kubba and Fa'iq Samarrā'i (pp. 335 and 336).

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tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over-sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

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character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses. The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or 'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young State, and had gravely unsettled it.

Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing, and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise, frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement, tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of which they were inescapably members, might allow.

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APPENDIX A

Comparative Table of Islamic (Hijra) and Christian Years, 1890–1955.

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The 1st Muharram of each year of the Hijra (A.H.)—shown in col. I—falls on the Christian date shown in col. II.

I A.H.	*II* A.D.	*I* A.H.	*II* A.D.	*I* A.H.	*II* A.D.
1308	17 Aug. 1890	1331	11 Dec. 1912	1354	5 Apr. 1935
1309	7 Aug. 1891	1332	30 Nov. 1913	1355	24 Mar. 1936
1310	26 July 1892	1333	19 Nov. 1914	1356	14 Mar. 1937
1311	15 July 1893	1334	9 Nov. 1915	1357	3 Mar. 1938
1312	5 July 1894	1335	28 Oct. 1916	1358	21 Feb. 1939
1313	24 June 1895	1336	17 Oct. 1917	1359	10 Feb. 1940
1314	12 June 1896	1337	7 Oct. 1918	1360	29 Jan. 1941
1315	2 June 1897	1338	26 Sept. 1919	1361	19 Jan. 1942
1316	22 May 1898	1339	15 Sept. 1920	1362	8 Jan. 1943
1317	12 May 1899	1340	4 Sept. 1921	1363	28 Dec. 1943
1318	1 May 1900	1341	24 Aug. 1922	1364	17 Dec. 1944
1319	20 Apr. 1901	1342	15 Aug. 1923	1365	6 Dec. 1945
1320	10 Apr. 1902	1343	2 Aug. 1924	1366	25 Nov. 1946
1321	30 Mar. 1903	1344	22 July 1925	1367	15 Nov. 1947
1322	18 Mar. 1904	1345	12 July 1926	1368	3 Nov. 1948
1323	8 Mar. 1905	1346	1 July 1927	1369	24 Oct. 1949
1324	25 Feb. 1906	1347	20 June 1928	1370	13 Oct. 1950
1325	14 Feb. 1907	1348	9 June 1929	1371	2 Oct. 1951
1326	4 Feb. 1908	1349	29 May 1930	1372	21 Sept. 1952
1327	23 Jan. 1909	1350	19 May 1931	1373	10 Sept. 1953
1328	13 Jan. 1910	1351	7 May 1932	1374	30 Aug. 1954
1329	2 Jan. 1911	1352	26 Apr. 1933	1375	20 Aug. 1955
1330	22 Dec. 1911	1353	16 Apr. 1934		

Ramadhan, the month of fasting, is the ninth month of the Islamic year. The year has 354 days.

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APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā; (2) qaḍhās of each liwā, including H.Q. area;* (3) *area (sq. km.) of each qaḍhā;* (4) *population of each qaḍhā.*

Liwā	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qaḍhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kaḍhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sanjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Halabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadi)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Hai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Ṣukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣaliḥ (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

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APPENDIX C

Sources of the Present Work

THE historian of a recent or contemporary period, whatever his conscientious industry, must find it beyond possibility to quote specific authority for every statement, or even to indicate, otherwise than in general terms, all the sources from which his information is derived. He will be compelled to use the daily, weekly, and monthly presses of a dozen countries: parliamentary and international debates: compilations of statistics, Regulations, dispatches and White Papers: studies and monographs in many languages and on many allied subjects, and the published records of travellers and observers; these, with all their repetitions and varying values and relevancies, are among the too copious sources from which such a writer must disengage his material. He can offer no equivalent to the comprehensive and meticulous source-lists of the historian of ancient or medieval times. He can in his own references never achieve completeness, and he will confer no benefit on students by multiplying references beyond the essential, the significant, or at least the interesting. The bibliographical suggestions here following are, therefore, representative only of what the writer has found, in the languages known to him, to be of value; a great quantity of more or less relevant material is omitted.

One source does not appear in these lists at all—the slowly acquired body of observation and information which the writer's many years of residence in and personal acquaintance with 'Iraq in various, including official, capacities has put at his disposal. Without this, the present history would not have been undertaken.

The writer has used:

(*a*) Notes provided generously by friends, both 'Iraqi and British, who have recent and special knowledge of specific phases of 'Iraqi life or the work of Government Departments. Some of the names of these appear in the Preface.

(*b*) Compilations, reports, and monographs printed in English or Arabic by various departments of the 'Iraq Government or by its predecessor the British Occupation authority. These[1] deal with public health, provincial administration (1915–20), agriculture, surveys, archaeology, trade, education, finance, geology, irrigation, jails, police, law courts, the 'Iraq Levies, meteorology, tribes, posts and telegraphs, Port of Basra, public works, &c.

(*c*) The *'Iraq Government Gazette*, from 1920: Compilations of Laws, Proclamations, &c. (Government Press, Baghdad).

[1] Examples in A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties*, pp. xxvii–xxxi, and P. W. Ireland, *'Iraq*, pp. 479–89. For the period later than 1935 it has not proved possible to compile lists of comparable completeness; a few such publications are quoted in sections (*i*) and (*k*) below. The Annual Reports of some departments, such as 'Iraq Railways, are invaluable.

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113 For the period prior to 1914, the official Turkish *Vilayet Calendars*, for each of the three wilayas: various dates, not annual.

Statistical Abstract, published by the Ministry of Economics (Government Press, Baghdad) annually. This is invaluable.

(*d*) Cuttings from the British, French, and Italian presses, as maintained from 1921 onwards by the Press Archives of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

Extracts from 'Iraqi newspapers.

Before 1920, files of *The Times*.

(*e*) Magazine articles and news summaries[1] from (*inter alia*) the Royal Central Asian Society's *Journal**, *Oriente Moderno**, the *Near East, Great Britain and the East*, the *Geographical Journal*, *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain**, the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, the *Fortnightly Review*, *Contemporary Review*, *Correspondence d'Orient**, *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *National Review*, *World Affairs*, *International Affairs**, *Nineteenth Century*, *Asia*, *Foreign Affairs**, *Middle East Journal**, *Current History*, *International Labour Review*. A very few articles from these papers have been separately quoted in sections below.

Pamphlets and periodical publications of the Arab Offices (1946–9) in London and Washington, especially on the Arab League.

The series of brochures Facts and Prospects in 'Iraq (Arabic and English; New Publishers, 'Iraq, 1945).

(*f*) Parliamentary papers (Great Britain), for the period before 1914, under 'Turkey' and 'Asiatic Turkey': especially nos. 92, 495, 753, 779, 792, 814. Since 1914, Parliamentary debates.

(*g*) League of Nations proceedings and publications: *Official Journal*, especially for October 1924, February 1926, April 1926, March 1932, July 1932, November 1934, February 1935, June 1935, December 1937.

Minutes of the Assembly, and the Council.

Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission

(*h*) Command Papers (1914 and after) other than military dispatches.

Cmd. 7628 (1914): Rupture with Turkey.
Cmd. 8253 (1915): General Townshend's appreciation before Kut.
Cmd. 8610 (1917): Report of the Mesopotamia Commission.
Cmd. 675 (1920): San Remo Oil Agreement.
Cmd. 960 (1920): Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920.
Cmd. 1061 (1920): Review of the Civil Administration, 1914–20, by Gertrude L. Bell.
Cmd. 1176 (1921): Draft Mandate.
Cmd. 1195 (1921): Franco-British Convention, 23 December 1920.
Cmd. 1226 (1921): Correspondence with U.S.A. on economic rights.
Cmd. 1351 (1921): Petroleum in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1500 (1921): Final draft of Mandates.
Cmd. 1757 (1922): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty, 10 October 1922.
Cmd. 2217 (1922): Use of Air Force in 'Iraq.
Cmd. 1814 (1923): Lausanne Conference.

[1] An asterisk denotes the most valuable of the journals listed.

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Cmd. 1929 (1923): Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923.
Cmd. 2110 (1924): Anglo-'Iraqi Protocol, 30 April 1924, and Agreements.
Cmd. 2317 (1924): Application to 'Iraq of Art. 22 of League Covenant.
Cmd. 2438 (1925): Hilton-Young-Vernon Report of Financial Mission.
Cmd. 2557 (1925): Laidover Report.
Cmd. 2562 (1925): Turco-'Iraqi frontier: decision.
Cmd. 2563 (1925): Incidents on Turkish Frontier.
Cmd. 2565 (1925): Agreement with Najd.
Cmd. 2587 (1926): Treaty, 13 January 1926.
Cmd. 2679 (1926): Anglo-'Iraqi-Turkish Treaty, 7 June 1926.
Cmd. 2998 (1927): Draft Revised Treaty, 14 December 1927.
Cmd. 3440 (1929): Statement of British policy in 'Iraq.
Cmds. 3627 and 3675 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty and Exchange of Notes.
Cmd. 3797 (1930): Treaty of 30 June, and Financial Agreement.
Cmd. 3833 (1930): Anglo-'Iraqi-United States Convention on rights of United States citizens. Also Cmd. 3503.
Cmd. 3839 (1930): Judicial Agreement. Also Cmd. 3933.
Cmd. 4120 (1932): Anglo-'Iraqi Agreement on Extradition. Also Cmd. 4317.
Cmd. 4220 (1932): Transfer of French rights.
Cmd. 4986 (1935): Legal proceedings, civil and commercial. Also Cmd. 5369.
Cmd. 5173 (1936): Railway Agreement. Also Cmd. 5282.
Cmd. 5196 (1936): War cemeteries.
Cmd. 5373 (1937): Commercial relations, 'Iraq-Palestine, 14 December 1936.
Cmd. 6646 (1944): 'Iraq's foreign exchange needs.
Cmds. 6742 (1945) and 6803 (1946): prolongation of above agreement.
Cmd. 6918 (1946): Precedence of H.M.'s Ambassador, Baghdad.
Cmds. 7110, 7210, 7269 (1947): Foreign exchange.
Cmd. 7309 (1948): Treaty of Portsmouth, 15 January 1948.
Cmd. 7490 (1948): Financial Agreement, prolongation.

(*i*) British naval and military dispatches for war periods, notably:

(i) *1914–18:*

Reports by Commanders-in-Chief, issued as Supplements to the *London Gazette*:

General Sir J. Nixon: period April–September 1915 (5 April 1916, no. 29536).
——: period October–December 1915 (10 May 1916, no. 29576).
Sir P. H. N. Lake: period January–April 1916 (10 October 1916, no. 29782).
General Sir S. Maude: period 16 August 1916–17 March 1917 (10 July 1917, no. 30176).
——: period April–September 1917 (10 January 1918, no. 30469).
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall: period October 1917–March 1918 (28 August 1918, no. 30874).
——: period April–September 1918 (20 February 1919, no. 31192).
——: period October–December 1918 (11 April 1919, no. 31287).

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(ii) *1920:*

SIR G. F. MACMUNN: dispatches covering November 1919–January 1920.

SIR A. J. HALDANE: dispatches covering January–June 1920, July–October 1920, October 1920–February 1921.

(iii) *1939–44:*

Reports by Commanders-in-Chief issued as Supplements to the *London Gazette*:

GENERAL SIR A. P. WAVELL: *Operations in the Middle East from August 1939 to November 1940* (13 June 1946, no. 37609).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 7 February 1941–15 July 1941* (3 July 1946, no. 37638).

——: *Dispatch on Operations in Iraq, East Syria and Iran, from 10 April 1941–12 January 1942* (14 August 1946, no. 37685).

GENERAL SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK: *Operations in the Middle East, 5 July 1941–31 October 1941* (21 August 1946, no. 37695).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 1 November 1941–15 August 1942* (15 January 1948, no. 38177).

GENERAL SIR H. MAITLAND WILSON: *Dispatch on the Persia and Iraq Command covering the period 21 August 1942–17 February 1943* (27 August 1948, no. 37703).

——: *Operations in the Middle East from 16 February 1943–8 January 1944* (12 November 1946, no. 37786).

AIR MARSHAL SIR A. LONGMORE: *Air Operations in the Middle East, January 1941–May 1941* (17 September 1946, no. 37729).

Neither here nor in section (*l*) below is specific reference made to any but a small part of the copious literature of both world wars, the contribution of much of which to 'Iraq history is slight.

(*j*) Economic Reports.

(Many Governmental reports and notes printed in Baghdad—and many not printed—between 1918 and 1932 are covered by section (*b*) above.)

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—— *Economic Conditions in Iraq*, 1933–5. By J. P. Summerscale. H.M.S.O., 1936.

—— *Economic Conditions in Iraq*, 1935–7. By J. P. Summerscale. H.M.S.O., 1938.

—— *Iraq, June 1949*. By F. H. Gamble. H.M.S.O., 1949. (Overseas Economic Surveys).

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(See also in section (*l*) below, entries under Basri, Buckley, Byford, Dowson, Ghanima, Hammond, Himadeh, Jamil, Prest, Warriner.)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

(k) Annual Reports by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations, 1921–32: 113

October 1920–March 1922 (H.M.S.O., 1922), April 1922–March 1923 (H.M.S.O., 1924), April 1923–December 1924 (H.M.S.O., 1925), and thereafter for every calendar year, 1925–31 inclusive, and January–October 1932 (H.M.S.O., 1933).

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(l) Published Books.[1]

A. Background and general information relevant to political, economic, or social conditions.

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[1] The classification of these, here following, is inexact and perhaps inconvenient, especially for the travels in which the historical content varies greatly. Many works could be classified equally under, for instance, section *A* (i), *A* (ii), *B* (i), &c. To facilitate reference, the Index of Sources may be convenient.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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

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End Map (d)

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

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

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MH1 Iraq MH1

[For the rise and fall of various ministries, their policies and internal politics from 1900 to 1950 in Iraq, see category 116, entire source.]

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MH1 Iraq MH1

[For an account of the relations of Iraq with Great Britain, the Arab League nations, and with Turkey from 1900 to 1950, see category 116, entire source.]

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MH1 Iraq MH1

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]